CONVERSATION WITH MIKE O'NEIL RE: SWINDALL AMENDMENT TO HOUSE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL, H.R. 4387

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001500030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 31, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Aff.4,
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
OCA Fir
31 May 1988
OCA 1699-88
SUBJECT: Conversation with Mike O'Neil Re: Swindall Amendment
to House Intelligence Authorization Bill, H.R. 4387
1. On 25 May 1988, I spoke by telephone with Mike O'Neil,
chief majority counsel for the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, regarding an amendment to be offered to the
House intelligence authorization bill (attached). The
amendment, to be proposed by Rep. Swindall, seeks to curtail
travel in the United States by certain diplomatic personnel and
their families suspected of aiding the interception of United
States diplomatic, military or intelligence communications or
engagement in intelligence activities against the United States
Government. This amendment is one similar to one offered by
Swindall to the FY88 FY89 State Authorization Bill, which
25X1 failed to pass.
2. I explained to O'Neil that the DCI had previously
written a letter to Senator Roth stating that he supports the
principle of such an amendment and that we are seeking to
25X1 determine whether the DCI still adheres to this view.
25X1
25X1
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He made no promises, but made it clear that he wishes
to know the DCI's current position before he takes any action.
I told him we would let him know this as soon as possible.
yZR E T
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25X1 3. On 26 May 1988, I spoke with of the
Defense Intelligence Agency with regard to the same matter. He
indicated that DIA is totally opposed to this amendment. In
addition, he has spoken with staff members of the Senate
Intelligence Committee who are inclined to delete it in
25X1 conference, if necessary.
Attachment
25X1 OCA/LEG
Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
(31 May 1988)
Distribution:
Original - OCA/Leg/Subject File: Counterintelligence and Security
1 - D/OCA
1 - DDL OCA
25X1
11 7_0 A Registry
1 - RH Signer
1 - OCA Read
2
SECRET
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AMENDMENT To H.R. 4387, As REPORTED
OFFERED BY MR. SWINDALL OF GEORGIA
At the end of the bill, add the following new title:
1 TITLE VIII--ANTI-ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1988
2 SHORT TITLE ,
3 SEC. 801. This title may be cited as the ??Anti-Espionage
4 Act of 1988?.
5 ANTI-ESPIONAGE
6 SEC. 802. Title II of the State Department Basic
7 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.) is amended
8 by adding at the end the following new section:
9 SEC. 217. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO
10 PERSONNEL OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES AID ENTITIES..
? ?
11 (a) Travel in the United States by the personnel of a
12 foreign mission of a foreign country or foreign entity
13 described in subsection (c)(1) shall not be permitted if, in
14 the judgment of the Secretary of Defense (after consultation
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15 with the Secretary of State), such travel might
16 timpmeme the capability of that country or entity to intercept
17 communications involving United States Government diplomatic,
18 military, or intelligence matters.
19 (b) Travel in thE United States by the personnel of a
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1 foreign mission of a foreign country or for2Ign entity
2 described in subsection (c)(1) shall not be permitted if, in
3 the judgment of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
4 Investigation (after consultation the Secretary of
ak---10riwbe/i
5 State), such travel might satelipantitiguri47-4eigeetve the
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6 capability of that country or entity to engage in
7 intelligence activities directed against the United States
8 Government, other than the intelligence activities described
9 in subsection (a).
10 (c)(1) For the purposes of this section, the term
11 foreign country or foreign entity ? means?
..
12 (A) any country listed as a Communist country in
13 section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
14 (? B) any country determined by the Secretary of
15 State, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
16 Administration Act of 1979, to be a country which has
17 repeatedly provided support for acts of international
18 terrorism;
19 ? (C) any other country or foreign entity which
20 engages in intelligence activities in the United States
21 which are adverse to the national security interests of
22 the United States; and
23 (? D) any country or entity with respect to which the
24 United States withholds funds from the United Nations for
25 International Organizations, Conferences, or Programs
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under section 114 of the Department of State
2 Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (22 U.S.C.
3 287e, note) or section 527 of the Foreign Operations,
4 Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
5 Act, 1988 (Public Law 100-202).
6 (2) For the purposes of this section, the term
7 personnel of a foreign mission of a foreign country.or
8 foreign entity' includes the family members and dependents of
9 such personnel, but such term does not include persons who
10 are nationals or permanent resident aliens of the United
11 States.
12 (d) The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the
13 Federal Bureau of Investigation shall transmit to the Select
14 Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign
15 Relations of the Senate, and to the Permanent Select
16 Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign
17 Affairs of the House of Representatives, not later than 6
18 months after the date of the enactment of this section, and
19 not later than every 6 months thereafter, a report on the
20 actions taken by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
21 the Federal Bureau of Investigation in carrying out this
22 section within the previous 6 months.''.
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TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AMENDMENT
(Title 8 of H.R. 4387)
THE ISSUE: Curtailing espionage by foreign diplomats in the U.S. to
protect our military secrets and advanced technology from our enemies.
AMENDMENT: Grants the Secretary of Defense and the FBI Director
discretion over travel requests to the State Dept. by Communist and
terrorist diplomats.
* Affects all Communist countries listed in Foreign Assistance Act
and all terrorist countries listed in Export Administration Act.
* Instead of one executive department overseeing the travel requests
of hostile foreign diplomats (as in current law), the amendment creates
authority for two additional departments to review diplomatic travel,
both of whom have responsibilities which are affected by such travel.
* Amendment balances our national security interests with political
and diplomatic concerns by creating a system of checks and balances
within the executive branch to oversee the travel requests of hostile
intelligence operatives on U.S. soil.
* Amendment necessary because the current law allows too little
input on questions of individual travel from the agencies most
concerned with the trips of hostile intelligence personnel in the U.S.
* Moreover, State Dept. has not complied with the full Congressional
intent of the Foreign Missions Act. It failed to implement last
year's ca-7-1:i=isc travel :..E:.trfczon f aft.-
Cne five
the :of
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applying 7::-::iCtC713, the Dept. chose to bypass such intelligencc
threats as the Hungarian and Romanian missions to the U.N. The Dept.
has also chosen for three years not to fully implement the Roth-Hyde
Amendment by allowing Soviet members of the U.N. Secretariat to travel
to sensitive closed areas. More recently, the Dept. has granted a
travel request to a known KGB agent, who also happens to head the
Soviet commission on U.S.-Soviet trade.
* Last year, in Section 161 of the State Dept. Auth. bill, Reps.
Fascell, Mica, Broomfield, and Snowe plugged the loophole in the FMA
with respect to the acquisition of American property by hostile
foreign diplomats. This was aimed at avoiding another scandal like
Soviets occupying Mt. Alto.
* Section 161 is identical to the substance of my amendment and
serves as a precedent for my proposal.
* The only difference is that, instead of avoiding the prospect of
giving the Soviets and their allies real property to spy on U.S.
military, diplomatic and intelligence matters, my amendment gives the
executive authority to avoid spies having the run of the country.
* Amendment recognizes that, in addition to the State Department's
political and diplomatic interests, diplomatic travel affects the FBI
and NSA's internal security responsibilities. These agencies'
concerns deserve to be recognized and acted upon.
1-;!. r,1 omat t n-scl comnet ir.7, int eres ts-
e
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with unilateral and final authority over the subject.
* Otherwise, the State Dept. will continue to ignore the
Congressional intent and mandate in the Foreign Missions Act.
* Amendment should not be misinterpreted as a DOD and FBI "veto" over
travel requests because both must consult with the Secretary of State
before using their authority in the amendment to deny diplomat travel.
* No executive branch is free to disregard totally the points of
view and desires of another because the head of the department always
has the recourse to go to the President to seek resolution of the
interagency dispute. In the case of foreign policy or national
security related questions, the mechansim clearly rests within the
process of the National Security Council.
* By offering this amendment, we are allowing the executive branch
to specifically target those types of travel which directly threaten
U.S. national security, while at the same time respecting the State
Dept.'s interests in allowing the nonthreatening types of travel to
proceed unimpeded. That ability does not exist now.
* Currently, the FBI has no vested or institutional arrangement
whereby it can object to individual instances of' travel which it deems
harmful to national security.
* The present l. on creates arrangements for brca.-3 travel
controls rather rr,strict-lonc. The c.,_;rrE7.7
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both the FBI and the State Dept. the ability to respond to hostile
intelligence activities on an individual basis.
-* As it stands now, the controls have to apply to intelligence
personnel as well as nonintelligence personnel in a given embassy.
* My amendment offers a more sophisticated, "rifle" approach to the
problem,
instead of the present shotgun approach and thereby protects
both diplomatic and counterintelligence interests.
* This legislation is not opposed by the Intelligence Community.
* If Congress fails to pass this legislation, it will be saying to
the FBI that it does not deserve an institutional means of objecting
to hostile intelligenc activity and also tell the State Dept. that the
Congressional intent of the Foreign Missions Act no longer matters.
* This amendment differs greatly from last year's approach by not
ordering the imposition of specific restrictions. If the FBI and DOD
have no disagreements with the State Dept., it will be meaningless.
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