WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R001200650008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2014
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 19, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DE. 20505
National Intelligence Council
re 013 - 57z--
NIC4 7438 672
19 May k,
ttek;'
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT:. Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Intelligence Community representatives at the monthly warning
meeting on 17 May discussed Libyan activity in Benin, Soviet influence in
Cape Verde, political instability in Senegal and Nigeria, prospects for new
fighting in Chad, and next week's OAU summit meeting. There was consensus
on the following warning notes
2. Warning Notes:
1-itlya activity in Benin has increased again. Qadhafi's operatives
probably will resume using Benin to carry out subversive and
terrorist operations in Africa. (See paragraph 4.)
Soviet activity is on the rise in Cape Verde, where Moscow probably
seeks a new fishing agreement. If the Soviets also renew pressure
for military access, the Praia government may eventually give in.
(Paragraph 5.)
-- Urban unrest in _Senegal appears to have peaked for now, but student
demonstrations and public protests over economic grievances probably
will continue. (Paragraph 6.)
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4. Benin/Libp. State/INR began the discussion of Benin's relaxation of
restrictions on Libyan activity.
President Kerekou has backed down on restricting the Libyans in
Benin, restrictions that he implemented after two Libyan terrorists
were arrested in Senegal after transiting Cotonou in early March.
The head of the Libyan Peoples Bureau has returned to Cotonou, the
Sarra company used by Qadhafi's operatives as a front for terrorist
operations has reopened, and Libyan Airways is commencing weekly
service to Benin. Chadian rebels are again transiting Benin for
military training in Libya.
Analysts conclude that Tripoli virtually "owns" anyone of importance
in the Benin government. Libya probably arranged for the arrest of
the pro-Western head of the public security forces, who stands
accused of coup-plotting. Although the coup plot probably stemmed
from military discontent and economic grievances, Benin's security
forces now blame the US.
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5. Cape Verde/USSR. DIA led the discussion of increasing Soviet
activity in Cape Verde.
- -
Signs of greater Soviet presence in Praia are everywhere. The
Soviets' new embassy there appears to be Moscow's largest in
Africa. Soviets are heavily involved in construction and
rehabilitation of the port, and they use the Praia airport to rotate
crews for their fishing fleet. Moscow also is strengthening its
party-to-party ties with the Cape Verdeans.
State/INR concluded that Cape Verde really is up for grabs; it will
deal with the Soviets, the South Africans, or whomever will provide
assistance. Soviet military assistance probably holds little
attraction for Cape Verde, however, because it is reducing the size
of its armed forces and has little need for additional arms or
equipment. For their part, the Soviets may have in mind using Cape
Verde to support ocean-reconnaissance operations by their TU-95
aircraft.
6. Senegal. CIA/ALA introduced the topic of unrest in Senegal.
- -
MOM,
Demonstrations provoked by the arrest of opposition leader Wade
probably have run their course now that Wade is out of jail on a
suspended sentence. Because Wade needs an official amnesty if he
hopes to hold public office, he seems conciliatory and unlikely to
stimulate more protests for now.
President Diouf also has placated city dwellers upset over economic
conditions by reducing the prices of selected staple goods. But
reduced export prices for peanuts may anger some producers.
Diouf is again pressing to create a Prime Ministry to relieve him of
responsibility for day-to-day management of the government, and to
release his hard-working but unpopular adviser Jean Collin.
Nonetheless, Collin probably will not depart, and Diouf is likely to
continue equivocating on other issues.
7. Chad/Libya. DIA led the discussion of prospects for renewed fighting
or a negotiated conclusion to the Chadian war.
There has been little military activity recently, and nothing
significant is likely before the OAU ad hoc committee meets on the
Aozou Strip territorial question next week. After that, the
Chadians may stage a raid--probably to attack the Matan as Sarra
airbase in southern Libya--but not a major offensive. In general,
Habre's forces in northern Chad are receiving enough supplies to
sustain themselves in a defensive posture, but not to ,go on the
offensive. Moreover, Habre still lacks airworthy C-130;trinsport
aircraft, and imminent seasonal rains will further hinderlogistic
operations on the ground.
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- -
The Libyans also are unlikely to launch a major attack without first
conducting large-scale logistic and training activity that we would
detect. For now, the Libyans seem to be concentrating on rebuilding
Goukouni's Chadian dissident group, the GUNT. Because Qedbafi's
troops presently occupy the Aozou Strip, analysts see little to be
gained by mounting another offensive.
There is, of course, some potential for an unintended erruption of
fighting. A GUNT raid, for example, could provoke a strong Chadian
reaction that might lock both sides into an escalatory spiral.
However, analysts believe that Habre's forces could cope with any
Libyan or GUNT thrust, either across the Libyan-Chad border or
through western Sudan.
The OAU committee probably will make an inconclusive announcement.
Most likely, it will defer a ruling on the ownership of the Aozou
Strip, call for continuing the ceasefire until the issue is
resolved, and possibly refer the territorial question to the
International Court of Justice.
8. The Organization of African Unity Summit Meeting. State/INR
summarized prospects for next week's OAU anniversary meeting.
We 'anticipate nothing to come out of the meeting, however, that
would have substantial impact upon US interests in Africa. The
ministerial meeting from 19 through 24 May will discuss African
candidates for leadership positions in various international
organizations, where Africa is very underrepresented. The OAU
Secretary General will report on the Middle East and Palestine,
despite expected irritation by some participants who believe that
the OAU spends too much time on non-African issues. The
presidential summit that will follow from 26 through 28 May will
include discussion of some key African issues, however. The agenda
will include southern Africa, African external debt, nominations to
succeed Kenneth Kaunda as OAU Secretary General, and selection of a
site for next year's OAU summit meeting. Of greatest interest to
the West will be the African strategy for debt negotiations; Western
creditors want to continue the individual country-by-country talks,
while many Africans support a large conference that would enable
African debtors to adopt a unified position.
If Ethiopian rebels in Eritrea or Tigray stage a spec tack
to gain publicity during the OAU conference in Addis, would
probably not have significant impact on military prospectsiin'the
insurgencies.
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9. Nigeria. CIA/ALA led the discussion of instability in Nigeria and
Lagos's pressure on nearby Equatorial Guinea.
Likely continued economic discontent will not threaten the Babangida
regime. We expect some consumer prices to be reduced, Nit the high
cost of living will continue to stimulate popular dissatisfaction.
Lagos plans a slightly stimulative budget this year, which will
displease Nigeria's foreign creditors, so the country's financial
situation will remain troubled. Analysts generally expect continued
slow forward movement on Nigeria's ambitious structural adjustment
program.
There is no viable alternative to the current regime, and President
Babangida is sufficiently experienced at coup plotting to keep
control of the situation. Available intelligence reports indicate
that senior military officers continue to support Babangida, but
analysts remain uneasy that we may be missing something. Moreover,
we know little about the attitudes of junior officers. The
approaching transition to civilian rule could spark coup plotting in
the military, although it also serves as a safety valve on political
discontent by enabling those who are dissatisfied with official
corruption and military rule to foresee an end to the current regime.
-- The consensus was that Nigeria's threats to Equatorial Guinea to
expel several South African managers of a farming project will not
lead to military action. Nigeria's paranoia about South Africans
near its border notwithstanding, this tempest in a teapot will pass.
Walter
. Barrows
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1 I SUBJECT: Africa Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
DISTRIBUTION: (External)
Hon Chester Crocker/State/AF
Charles W. Freeman/State/AF
Amb Kenneth Brown/State/AF
Roy Stacy/State/AF
Martin Lowenkopf/State/INR
Barbara Presgrove/State/INR
Jesse Clear/State/INR
William Thom, 010/Africa
DIA DB-8D 2 co ies)
Vincent Kern/OSD/ISA
JCS/J-5
DIA/DAH-6
DIA/DB-8/Moore
DIA/DB-5E3
Alert Center, NMIC/JS0-1
Nancy McCabe/Army
Norman Last/Navy
Maj. Michael Harvin/Air Force
Maj. Andrew Budka/Marine Corps
SA/Sec (Nat'l Security) DO/DEI/Treasury
Amb. Herman Cohen/NSC
Doug Menarchik/Off Vice President
Donald Sittler/NSA
National Warning Staff
LTC Stephen Clowery/Army/ITAC
Samuel Watson, Dep Asst/Vice President
Lynn Karcich/Department of Commerce
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