PRIVATE HELP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R001700950024-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: December 5, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-g1J-P90M00551R001700950024-3
Deputy Director For Requirements and Evaluation
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505
ICS 7206-88
5 December 1988
NOTE FOR: DDR&E Task Force
SUBJECT: Private Help
0 7 bre int
Attached is a draft short item on a subject of great
concern to me; i.e., the impact on US intelligence if "the
cold war is over." My opinion is that we need to have a
story about this issue, and sooner the better.
I would appreciate any feedback--especially
improvements--on the Soviet dimension of this issue.
But most of all I am interested in knowing reactions
to and substantive help on the key point; i.e., exactly
what is the impact?
Thanks for your help.
Attachment:
As Stated
cc: D/PBO
D/PPO
,A4ttAr,
0,
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12: CIA-RDP90M00551R001700950024-3
?
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12: CIA-RDP90M00551R001700950024-3
SUBJECT: Private Help
DISTRIBUTION: (ICS 7206-88 w/att)
Original - D/REO
1 - Chmn/COMIREX
1 - Chmn/HUMINT
1 - Chmn/MASINT
1 - Chmn/SIGINT
1 - Chief, IPCS
1 - D/PBO
1 - D/PPO
1 - DDR&E/ICS (w/o att)
1 - DDR&E Chrono (w/o att)
1 - IC Registry
DCWICS/DDR&E (5Dec88)
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UKAF I
A SPECULATIVE LOOK:
THE IMPACT ON US INTELLIGENCE IF "THE COLD MAR IS OVER"
Introduction
o This short point paper addresses an issue--the impact on intelligence--
that gets lost regularly in any treatment or discussion of the basic
Idea: what if the classic US-USSR cold war is over?
This paper addresses the key pieces of the topic in sequential
fashion; all pieces are included to ensure the reader has all of the
pieces at hand and can keep all of the ideas in mind.
o The punchline is that the USSR may seem to be internally-directed and
relatively easier to deal with, but the Soviet military--which gets most
of US intelligence's attention and money--is being maintained and
modernized apace. Soviet diplomacy and other important topics, such as
nationalities' unrest and economic performance, are growing in importance
to US policy officers and, thus, to US Intelligence.
o As a result, US intelligence is in a more stressful situation than most
people recognize: the USSR's many on-going changes require US
Intelligence to stay abreast of them, but Soviet public diplomacy is
feeding domestic pressures in the West to reduce defense costs--including
intelligence.
Fundamental Change in Soviet Foreign Policy
o What is happening today in the Soviet Union is tantamount to an earthquake
in terms of its political and economic magnitude.
o Soviet policy, foreign and domestic, has taken on a relatively more benign
cast in public since Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985.
o A case can be made that this will continue and intensify as Soviet
leadership is preoccupied increasingly with internal affairs.
o These changes may be fragile.
They depend to a large extent on the person of Mikhail Gorbachev.
Internal instability (brought on by reforms that reduce the
privileges of the nomenklatura, nationalities problems, and/or
difficulties created when consumer expections are unmet) may trigger
replacement of Gorbachev and reversal of current policies.
Likely Trends in Soviet Behavior
o The Soviets are ending the 1980s and moving towards the 1990s with a more
sophisticated diplomatic policy in place--one that is publicly defended in
terms calculated to appeal to US friends and allies. Expect:
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DRAFT
Bold tactical moves initiated from the top.
? Arms control: Sudden changes in position, unanticipated even by
Soviet negotiating teams.
- Human rights: e.g., International Human Rights Conference
proposed for Moscow in 1991.
- Foreign policy initiatives in the Third World: e.g., agreement
to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Skillful use of public diplomacy, especially in West Europe.
o At the same time--and despite some public annoucements that appear to be a
softening of the military hard?line--the Soviets continue to:
Maintain their existing military strength.
Invest in advanced new capabilities for the future.
o However, some changes may occur:
The Soviet military likely will have to live with at least a bit less
and do more with what they have.
A public shift in strategic doctrine to "reasonable sufficiency" was
announced some time ago, although the change has not yet been
manifest in military exercises.
o Evidence to date indicates that Soviet support for the military in terms
of quantity and quality of weapons continues unabated.
Deployment of strategic forces first built during late 1970s and
1980s continues.
It will take a decade or more for any changes to significantly affect
the strategic military balance.
The Soviets are now making critical new investments in advanced
technologies for new weapons and modernizations.
Ramifications for US Policy
o It has become more difficult to predict Soviet behavior and formulate
effective policy responses.
-- Soviet policymaking on key issues is more susceptible to sudden
tactical changes.
-- Reform movements and resulting instabilities in Soviet domestic
politics have unpredictable effects on Soviet foreign and security
policies.
2
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DRAFT
o Moscow is engaging the West, not just the US, on a wider range of issues
than before:
Arms control is still the central or sole public focus of US?Soviet
relations.
Economics and trade, are especially key in Soviet relations with West
Europe, Japan, and China.
Scientific and technical exchanges are increasing sharply.
o US relations with other countries (especially Third World friends and
allies) are growing more complicated as the Soviets seek to portray
themselves as less threatening and willing to pursue better bilateral
relations through trade and other exchanges.
Implications for US Intelligence
o Policymakers' needs are increasing in support of a broader range of
US?Soviet policy interactions (arms control, trade, scientific and
educational exchanges) and to help assess a more fluid situation inside
the USSR.
o At the same time, the need to cover the Soviet military, especially
changes in strategic and conventional force postures, is consuming even
more technical and analytical resources.
This problem is at least as difficult as before glasnost.
- It is unlikely that reforms will be successful enough in the
next decade to have much impact on Moscow's basic military
capabilities.
- Secrecy persists in Soviet defense programs, particularly in
advanced technology weapons development.
Assessing Soviet military capabilities is the most expensive thing we
do today--and the need for costly new investments is likely to
persist as the Soviets continue to move toward modern, advanced
technology weapons for the future.
o Because the Soviet political and economic earthquake is coupled with
glasnost, data about the Soviet Union is virtually hemmoraging everywhere,
including--but not limited to--public documents.
Personal contacts of US Government officials and private citizens
with Soviet counterparts are likely to expand even more.
? The new Soviet "openness" makes more Soviet officials available
and they are more willing to talk to foreigners.
3
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DRAFT
At the same time, this gives the Soviets more opportunities to
affect US policymaking, including trying to shape views through
"private" discussions.
This extra volume of data could lessen the apparent value of
data acquired through more sensitive sources and methods.
All of this underscores the need for enhanced capabilities to handle
and assess this dramatic increase in data.
4
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