MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR MARCH 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R001901160129-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 129
• Publication Date: April 20, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
20 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for March 1988
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
Panama
A decision by General Noriega to cling to power, despite his eroding base
of support, increases the likelihood of violence and prolong Panama's recovery
period. A protracted crisis will also increase the risk to US personnel and
facilities. There is some evidence that the left wing of the ruling
party--Tendencia--is arming and preparing to take to the streets to challenge
anti-Noriega elements; it also has the capacity to conduct terrorist actions.
Analysts differ over_Noriega's prospects for political survival. Some believe
that an influx of funds to meet payrolls would sharply narrow the opposition's
base of support and shore up military backing for Noriega; others believe that
Noriega's departure is inevitable and that a cash infusion would only buy him
a limited time in power.
This review reflects consideration of inputs generated at warning meetings
conducted by the National Intelligence Officers with Community representatives
from all areas. As such, it represents a Community-wide review, but it is not
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The NIO for Warning believes that the USSR and other socialist countries
could decide that they have a real opportunity to make long-term inroads in
Panama. Reports of deliveries of planeloads of arms from Cuba to equip
Panamanian leftists, as well as Noriega's past practice of dealing with all
sides to his advantage, are consistent with this view.
South Africa/Cuba/Angola
A major battle between South African and Cuban forces in southwestern
Angola is increasingly likely. Cuban and Angolan units are moving south but
the South Africans have yet to respond in a major way. Pretoria could strike
lead Cuban units or strike bridges in their rear. The volatile military
situation has clouded prospects for US/Angolan negotiations to end the war.
Luanda wants a settlement, and it may be more comfortable in negotiating now
that its battered southern defenses have been improved. The prospect,
however,-of major new fighting with South Africa reduces chances for talks to
succeed. The NIO for Warning notes an airfield in southern
Angola will enable the Cubans to strike further into Namibia than they have
been able to, and provide better air cover for Cuban forces in the south,
especially near the Namibian border.
Israel
The Palestinian uprising is polarizing the Israeli electorate and
benefiting extremists the most. None of the country's leaders has the
confidence of the people and the government is unlikely to make decisions on
the peace process. Both parties are jockeying for the possibility that
disagreements over policy in the territories could force early elections. The
continuing conflict is humiliating the Israel Defense Forces and is causing
significant emotional trauma within the ranks; prolonged police duty will have
negative affects on the training, morale, discipline, and cohesiveness of
Israeli combat units.
The Intelligence Community believes that the situation in the Occupied
Territories will never be the same again and could get worse. The
Palestinians may turn away from their policy of avoiding lethal force. There
Is a good chance that Israeli settlers and more extreme Palestinians will
initiate a self-feeding series of incidents that would further inflame the
situation.
The NIO for Warning believes that the current polarized political
environment benefits politically the hawks in the Likud bloc, like Ariel
Sharon, and that the initiation of tougher repressive measures in the Occupied
Territories reflects Prime Minister Shamir's political need to neutralize the
radicals who are calling for draconian measures to end the unrest. The goal
of these right-wing extremists appears to be expulsion of Palestinian
activists and their families, as well as suppression of all Palestinians who
advocate a separate state.
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Ethiopia/Sudan
Recent rebel gains after heavy fighting in northern Ethiopia have
disrupted deliveries of food relief, and Addis Ababa has responded to its
defeats with a series of moves, including cutting food shipments to Eritrea
and Tigray. Food stocks already were low. Major population movements to
neighboring Sudan are imminent despite Sudanese warnings that refugees will be
turned back.
2. Trend Commentary:
USSR
The results of Moscow's efforts to get the genie of ethnic assertiveness
back in the bottle in the Transcaucusus will have a significant impact on
planning-now underway for a Central Committee plenum on nationalities issues.
The Intelligence Community is confident that Moscow will not grant demands
that Nagorno-Karabakh be formally linked to Armenia. Instead, the Community
believes that Moscow is likely to offer a series of concessions in the
cultural and educational realms. These measures will probably be enough to
defuse the current crisis. There is a chance for more violence, but security
forces will do a better job of controlling crowds.
The NIO/USSR believes, however, that this relatively sanguine prognosis
could be wrong; neither we nor the Soviets can be sure that Armenians will
accept a rejection of their demand for the joining of Nagorno-Karabakh to
Armenia. The NIO/USSR does not rule out a new round of large demonstrations
that could excite the already emotionally charged atmosphere between Azeris
and Armenians, lead to renewed communal violence, and find resonance among
other minority .nationalities. The unrest will at least selectively slow the
leadership's reform program and ?Moscow probably will define more clearly the
limits of glasnost and democratization. If efforts to resolve the crisis
succeed, the damage to Party leader Gorbachev will be limited. However,
Gorbachev has increased his personal risk by injecting himself so visibly into
efforts to find a solution. If regime initiatives fail to quell the
disturbances, Gorbachev's reform program and his political survival could be
in jeopardy.
Hungary
The 15 March demonstration in Budapest--the largest since the 1956
revolution--set a benchmark for street protests demanding change. The party
leadership is increasingly divided by rising demands for freedom of the press,
free elections, and democratic reform. So far, only comparatively small
numbers of intellectuals and activists have participated in demonstrations.
Should recent austerity measures encourage others to join the protests, we may
see much broader opposition to party policies and more serious splits within
the top leadership.
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Yugoslavia
Soviet leader Gorbachev's recent visit to Yugoslavia suggests a gradual
improvement in bilateral relations but not a change in Belgrade's basic stance
toward Moscow. Atmospherics were good, but Yugoslavia will continue to stress
its independence and non-alignment. Resolution of trade disputes, the
immediate point of contention, will await Premier Ryzhkov's forthcoming visit
to Yugoslavia.
Italy'
The likely outcome of the current Italian government crisis is a
reconstitution of the old coalition headed this time by Christian Democrat De
Mita. A less probable outcome, which would result from the inability of De
Mita and Socialist leader Craxi to agree, would be a cooperative arrangement
between the Christian Democrats and the Communists. Such an outcome would be
distasteful to Craxi; he will be motivated to work things out with De Mita.
USSR/Africa
Recent Soviet statements of interest in resolving regional conflicts and
reducing East-West tensions in the Third World have not yet lead to concrete
suggestions or changed Soviet behavior in Africa. Moscow appears more
Interested in process than in solutions. The USSR clearly is interested in
cutting costs where possible, but it probably will not cut aid to a major
client or to any country that can pay for goods and services. Community
analysts speculate that Moscow is going through a period of reassessment and
that what we see in Africa are indications of policy drift rather than firm
decisions.
South Africa
Government repression probably will intensify, dashing hopes for political
reform in the near term, at least. More black workers's strikes and student
boycotts are likely on May Day and 16 June, the anniversary of the Soweto
uprising. The government seems determined to criminalize all political
dissent, but the repression is unlikely either to smother black unrest or
prevent more electoral gains by the pro-apartheid Conservative Party. Blacks
have three unpromising options: increased church activism; more ANC attacks;
more ad hoc township protests. The impressive size of strikes on 21 March
probably will encourage more.
Chad/Libya
A major battle for Aozou airbase appears unlikely until after the
Organization of African Unity summit scheduled for 10-12 April. Libyan forces
are likely to probe Chadian positions in the Tibesti Mountains in coming weeks
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If Chad does not attack first. Tripoli may attack in conjunction with the
French national election, when they may calculate the French will be
distracted from Chad. Chadian forces continue to suffer from logistical
problems.
3. The MO/Warning notes these additional areas of warning concern:
North Korea
North Korea's military readiness measures in the past two months suggest
that P'yongyang may believe it faces a major threat from the South. North
Korean actions are real war preparations, but they are not sufficient to
support a total war effort and troops have not moved into attack positions.
Increases in North Korean readiness are normal during the US/South Korean Team
Spirit exercises each spring; this year, however, the scope and duration of
preparations are significantly greater. forces
are at unprecedented states of readiness. This year's declaration of a state
of *semi-war" has caused extensive economic disruptions during a time of
economic slowdown. In the past, paramilitary personnel generally conducted
training independent of regular forces, but this year they are reaching
advanced readiness at the same time. The duration of training of rear area
forces also is longer than usual.
Although there are a number of reassuring indicators suggesting that the
North is concerned about its defense and is not preparing for offensive
operations, the situation has especially worrisome features:
o The alert seems generated by a fear of a South Korean attack
inconsistent with our knowledge of the threat. Either the North
intends to do something to warrant fear of retaliation--such as
disruption of the Olympics in a major way--or it perceives a greater
South Korean aggressive intent than we see.
* A conversion of the economy to wartime conditions could occur with
little additional effort.
Iran
The series of recent Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf suggest that
Tehran has shifted strategy toward a more offensive posture, which may include
minelaying. The Iranians have increased attacks on tankers on their own
Initiative as opposed to their usual practise of responding to Iraqi strikes.
They are flying F-4 aircraft against shipping and putting forward air
controllers on frigates. the Revolutionary
Guards have placed 20 mines in Kuwaiti waters and may put more in the path of
US warships. Iran has numerous contingency plans for operations in the Gulf,
including amphibious assaults against Gulf Arab states and direct attacks
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against US Navy ships. Tehran reportedly believes that attacks on US Naval
vessels will provoke US retaliatory strikes against Iranian islands, oil
platforms, and mainland.
China/Vietnam/Spratly Islands
China, having deployed marines to its Spratly Islands holdings and
Its bombers on Hainan Island to prepare for missions, may be about to press
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militarily its long-held claim to the islands. It could opt either to attack
isolated garrisons or blockade them into submission. Vietnam, China's main
opposition and on the defensive against stronger Chinese naval and air forces
In the Spratlys, could decide to retaliate against China along their mainland
border to relieve pressure on its troops. The Vietnamese did well against
China in their 1979 war and probably have confidence that they could do so
again.
,Iran/Saudi Arabia
Iran is already lining up militant Shia for the Hajj this summer to
Mecca. Tehran wants vengeance for the violence that resulted in deaths of
several hundred Iranians last year. Saudi Arabia is likely again to have
trouble controlling the crowds. The pilrimage could be cover for subversion,
sabotage, and terrorism by Revolutionary Guards.
India/Pakistan/China
The spring thaw will increase opportunities for Indian military
confrontations with both Pakistan and China in disputed mountain border
regions. Pakistan may want to recover parts of Siachen Glacier lost to India
last year.
Ecuador
A win by leftist, anti-military candidate Bucaram in Ecuador's May
presidential election could trigger a military coup. The Army appears
reluctant to move, however, unless the charismatic Bucaram has won.
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Charles E. Alien
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