COUP ATTEMPTS IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1987 AND 1989 SIMILIARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01243R001000290049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: January 1, 1989
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP90M01243R001000290049-7 25X1
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Coup Attempts in the Philippines: 1987 and 1989
Similiarities and Differences
1987
Background Issues Concerning the AFP
Poor AFP Leadership: Deep
dissatisfacton with Ramos and senior
officers because they do not protect
AFP corporate interests.
Aquino soft on Communism: Believe
government infiltrated by radical left.
Deteriorating law and order: Local
government Secretary Ferrar
assassinated; national transportation
strike.
Preceding Events/Rumors
?Serious coup threats in November 1986
and January 1987.
?Numerous coup rumors surface
throughout 1987.
?AFP receives specific, advance
warning of coup.
1989
Background Issues Concerning the AFP
Corruption in senior ranks:
Dissatisfaction that Ramos tolerating
corruption; some units reported
unhappy over delayed pay.
Aquino Incompetent: Concern that she
is not halting, and is probably
facilitating, corruption by relatives and
senior government officials; civilian
government not supporting
counterinsurgency; her popularity
slipping.
Deteriorating living conditions:
Growing dissatisfaction with inflation,
transportation gridlock in Manila,
power outages, oil price increases,
general fear living standards are
deteriorating for middle and lower
income groups.
AFP reorganization: Soldiers oppose
pending legislation to disband the PC
and create a national police force.
Preceding Events/Rumors
?No destabilizing incidents involving
AFP.
--Fewer credible reports of coup
rumors.
?Danding Cojuangco returned 24
November.
?AFP receives specific, advance
warning of coup.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP90M01243R001000290049-7 25X1
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1987
Plotters and Support
RAM: Gringo Honasan and other
RAM leaders from 1986 EDSA revolt
planned and lead the coup attempt.
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Support: Largely regular army units.
Strategy of Plotters
?Political emphasis, with numerous
public statements by Honasan, early
attack on palace (risk hurting Aquino).
--Early objectives of coup: seize palace
and Aquino (failed); take TV stations
(successful); take Villamor and air
assets (failed); cut military
communications and seperate military
command from civilian command by
taking Camp Aguinaldo (partial
success).
US Role
?Embassy encourages Ramos to react
aggressively
?Coup leaders warned to backdown
?No US military assets involved.
--US accused in some quarters of
backing coup and helping Honasan
escape.
1989
Plotters and Support
RAM: Honasan, Turigin, and other
RAM leaders in charge, with Young
Officers Union, "YOU"?comprising
officers below rank of major?supplying
organizational support.
Support: Elite units of marines and
scout rangers.
Strategy of Plotters
?Military emphasis: few public
statements, focus on first seizing air
assets and airfields, cutting military
communications, blocking approach
roads, eventually attack military GHQ,
isolate palace (avoid hurting Aquino).
?Early objectives of coup: cut AFP
communications link (succeeded);
occupy key airbases (succeeded);
airstrikes against palace and GHQ
(succeeded); seize TV station (succeeded
but didn't use)
US Role
?US flies air cover.
?Some Filipinos already accusing US
of interference with an internal
Philippine problem.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP90M01243R001000290049-7
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