DCI TESTIMONY ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01243R001400180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 91
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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DCI TESTIMONY ON
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
1 March 1989
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36- 101st Congress/Interim Roster
CI
Committee on Foreign Relations
SD-446 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510
Ratio: 10/9.
MAJORITY MEMBERS mitioRrry MEMBERS
Claiborne Pell, R.I., Jesse Helmes, N.C.,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Del. Richard G. Lugar, Ind.
Paul S. Sarbanes, Md. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kan.
Alan Cranston, Calif. Rudy Boschwitz, Minn.
Christopher J. Dodd, Conn. Larry Pressler, S.D.
John F. Kerry, Mass. Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska
Paul Simon, Ill. Mitch McConnell, Ky.
Terry Sanford, N. C. Gordon J. Humphrey, N.H.
Daniel P. Moynihan, N.Y. Connie Mack, Fla.
Charles S. Robb, Va.
[phone]
Majority Staff Director Geryld B. Christianson SD-446 224-3953
Minority Staff Director James P. Lucier SD-447 224-3941
STAT
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Chemical Warfare Facilities in the Middle East
Black Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Tripili-
TRabta chelnical weapons
producton facility
SYRIA Samarra chemical weapons
prodiction facility
*Damascus*BaghdCad
Persian
Gull of Oman
no defined
boundary
400 Kilometers
400 Miles
Arabian Sea
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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STAT
STAT
OCA 89-0561
22 February 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your 1 March Testimony on Chemical and
Biological Weapons
1. Your testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee
on chemical and biological weapons will be an open session at
0930 on Wednesday 1 March. In the afternoon, Gordon Oehler
along with a group of Agency analysts will testify in closed
session. With the exception of an updated section on pending
legislation and minor chanaes in your opening statement which
acknowledge recent public admissions of
cooperation with Libya, the briefing book remains the same as
the one you used the last time you testified on this subject.
2. Again, because of the extremely sensitive sources and
methods associated with our knowledge of chemical and
biological weapons, we have tried to carefully script your
opening statement and the enclosed questions with the Committee
staff. We have also provided the staff with a list of subject
areas that cannot be discussed in open session. These include
3. The Foreign Relations Committee, however, is not as
disciplined as Senator Glenn's Committee on Governmental
Affairs or Senator Nunn's Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. Fortunately, Gordon Oehler will be testifying
.in the afternoon so that you can defer questions on sensitive
issues to the closed session.
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36 - 101st Congress/Interim Roster
Committee on Foreign Relations
SD-446 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510
Ratio: 10/9.
MAJORITY MEMBERS MINORITY MEMBERS
Claiborne Pell, R.I., Jesse HeImes, N.C.,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Del. Richard G. Lugar, Ind.
Paul S. Sarbanes, Md. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kan.
Alan Cranston, Calif. Rudy Boschwitz, Minn.
Christopher J. Dodd, Conn. Larry Pressler, S.D.
John F. Kerry, Mass. Frank H. Murkowski, Alaska
Paul Simon, Ill. Mitch McConnell, Ky.
Terry Sanford, N. C. Gordon J. Humphrey, N. H.
Daniel P. Moynihan, N.Y. Connie Mack, Fla.
Charles S. Robb, Va.
[phone]
Majority Staff Director Geryld B. Christianson SD-446 224-3953
Minority Staff Director James P. Lucier SD-447 224-3941
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Claiborne Pell (D)
Of Newport ? Elected 1960
Born: Nov. 22. 1918, New York, N.Y.
Education: Princeton U., A.B. 1940; Columbia U., A.M.
1946.
Military Career Coast. Guard, 1941-45.
Occupation: Investment executive.
Family: Wife, Nuala O'Donnell; four children.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career. No previous office.
Capitol Office: 335 Russell Bldg. 20510: 224-4642.
In Washington: Pell began his service as
Foreign Relations chairman in 1987 with a
burden of comparison far heavier than that
confronting any other new Democratic chair-
man. Even before he began, many people had
concluded that he could not match the record
established by his predecessor, Republican
Richard G. Lugar of Indiana.
Widely viewed as the most successful For-
eign Relations chairman in recent times, Lugar
had managed in two years to restore a signifi-
cant share of the prestige and power the panel
had lost Over the preceding decade. Pell seemed
unable to escape pre-labeling as a lesser figure.
Those comparisons are not entirely fair. A
good deal of Lugar's strength came amid spe-
cial circumstances. He played his most impor-
tant.role in mediating between the Republican
administration and Senate, especially when he
convinced President Reagan to avoid defeat by
accepting compromise. That role is not open to
a chairman from the Democratic Party.
In normal circumstances, the chairman-
ship of Foreign Relations simply is not geared
to providing its occupant with a lot of power.
The committee does not consider a great deal
of legislation, and those topics under its juris-
diction ? foreign aid, diplomatic nominations
and an occasional treaty ? do not customarily
provide a lot of bargaining clout with other
members. The panel attracts young, ambitious
senators who are more interested in establish-
ing a name for themselves on controversial
issues than in working under the authority of a
strong leader. It is no coincidence that the
three chairmen before Lugar all found it diffi-
cult to maintain much control.
It is also true, though, that many of the
doubts about Pell spring from his own person-
ality and image. A diffident, absent-minded
socialite, he strikes many as an implausible
candidate to become a strong force on arms
control, Central America policy and the other
Rhode Island - Senior Senator
difficult foreign-policy issues confronting the
100th Congress.
Pell has accumulated power mainly
through seniority. He possesses no notable flair
for internal Senate politics or behind-the-
scenes dealing with his colleagues. His aristo-
cratic demeanor can sometimes come across as
aloofness or arrogance. Although his voting
record on social and economic issues is consis-
tently liberal, he often displays a kind of Patri-
cian distance from the concerns of ordinary
folk, or even from camaraderie in the Senate. "I
have the uncanny facility for making the most
exciting matters gray," he cheerfully admits.
Pell seems particularly unlikely to attack
the bane of many Foreign Relations chairmen
? the semi-autonomous subcommittee chair-
men who "free-lance" their own issues without
much regard to the interests of the full commit-
tee head. Not only does Pell lack the personal
authority to bring his fellow Democrats to heel,
he has little ideological motivation to do so ?
aggressive liberals such as Christopher J. Dodd
of Connecticut and John Kerry of Massachu-
setts pursue causes with which Pell is more
than comfortable.
Pell did make some efforts early in the
100th Congress to take a more assertive stance.
He pressed Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd to
give his committee a role in the investigation
into the Iran-contra affair. But the centerpiece
of Pell's first months as chairman ? ratifica-
tion of two nuclear test-ban treaties ? quickly
foundered. Despite Pell's efforts to negotiate a
compromise with the Reagan administration,
the pacts got bogged down in a dispute over
verification.
Arms control is a subject on which Pell
may have some credibility problems. His image
as an ardent believer in disarmament does not
always help his efforts to line up support for his
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Claiborne Pell, D-R.I.
point of view; rightly or wrongly, he makes
foreign policy conservatives worry he might
support unwise concessions in his eagerness to
obtain an arms agreement.
Still, there is no doubt that Pell is a man of
conviction in foreign policy. He rarely loses
interest in a subject once he decides it is
important, and often he gets what he wants in
the end. "I am less dynamic than many," he
likes to say, "but I have my own course, which I
set and try to follow."
Usually, that course brings Pell into sharp
conflict with Senate Republicans and the Rea-
gan administration. He tried hard during the
99th Congress, however, to work closely with
Lugar. The two men joined in opposing an
effort by the Appropriations Committee to
reduce their committee's authority over foreign
aid programs, and cooperated in 1985 to push
the first foreign aid authorization bill to clear
Congress in several years.
But that did not stop Pell from being a
vocal critic of the Reagan administration's
arms control and Central American policies. He
was a strong backer of a nuclear weapons freeze
? he joined with California Democrat Alan
Cranston in sponsoring the freeze resolution
rejected by the Foreign Relations Committee in
1982. Earlier, during the Carter administration,
he supported adoption- of the SALT II treaty.
In 1983, Pell led a delegation of eight
senators to the Soviet Union, where they dis-
cussed Reagan's "Star Wars" missile defense
plan with Kremlin leaders, including then-
President Yuri V. AndropoV. "If we really were
to develop that defense strategy," Pell said
later, "it would put us in the position of being
able to have a first strike and not worry about
the consequences. I think that would be very
unsettling to the Soviet Union." He returned to
Moscow in 1985 for a visit with new Soviet
leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev.
Pell was one of the most vehement con-
gressional opponents of the 1984 Kissinger
commission plan, which called for increased
U.S. military and economic aid to Central
America. He led the attack on a commission
suggestion that the U.S. advance about $80
million in aid to El Salvador, saying that in-
creased military aid did not represent "the road
to a peaceful solution." Like other liberal Dem-
ocrats on his committee, he has favored using
U.S. aid to pressure the Salvadoran govern-
ment to negotiate with leftist guerrillas, "clean
up its human rights act" and pursue land
reform.
He also fought against the administration's
efforts to provide aid to the "contra" rebels
lighting the leftist government of Nicaragua.
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His most important step came during work on
the 1985 foreign aid aut horization, when he
won !tarn 1W corn mitt ee approval for an amend-
ment barring the United States from pressur-
ing third countries to help the contras. The
Reagan administration strongly opposed the
provision, finally using a veto threat to force
conferees on the bill to weaken it substantially.
In the 98th Congress, Pell made an issue of
American support for Pakistan. He warned
that any major American arms sale to Pakistan
would damage hopes for improved relations
between the U.S. and India. He said that
Indian officials were becoming increasingly
worried that American arms would be used by
the Pakistanis. against their country and not
against Soviet-backed Afghanistan.
Pell spent part of the 98th Congress work-
ing.to secure the freedom of Benazir Bhutto,
daughter of the late Pakistani prime minister
Ali Bhutto, who was being held hostage by the
Zia regime. Shortly after a Pell aide traveled to
Pakistan on the matter, Bhutto was released.
? Ocean law is another one of Pell's favorite
issues on Foreign Relations. He was involved in
the International Law of the Sea Conference,
which produced a treaty the United States has
refused to sign. He was the author of another
treaty, approved by Congress and ratified by
numerous countries, which prohibits the place-
ment of weapons on the ocean floor. Still an-
other Pell treaty prohibits the use of environ-
mental modification weapons.
Pell has been interested in the eastern
Mediterranean and has repeatedly sponsored
increases in aid to Cyprus. A strong partisan of
Greece in its conflict with Turkey, he opposed
the end of the embargo on arms shipments to
Turkey in 1978.
When the final record of Pelt's Senate
career is written, however, his work in educa-
tion may outweigh anything he does in foreign
affairs. He was the main force behind a change
in federal education law that has benefited
millions of low- and middle-income college stu-
dents. In 1972 he pushed through, over the
opposition of the House and the indifference of
much of the higher education community, legis-
lation establishing the Basic Educational
Opportunity Grant (BEOG).
BEOGs quickly became the cornerstone of
federal aid to students. The program marked a
basic shift in policy, because it provided aid
directly to students, instead of channeling it
through the institutions, as early aid programs
had done. The BEOG program was renamed
"Pell Grants" in 1980. While Pell did not push
for the change in public, associates say he
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ncght it in private.
But 198o \AM, ilk(o I ht. ycar .0 Pell's worst
ilefeat in education legislation. The Senate
rejected the ciniference report in the higher
education reauthorization bill he bad managed.
Critics insisted its estimated $50 billion five-
year price tag was too high. Stung by the
defeat. Pell was careful to satisfy the objections
before he came back with a revised second
version. The second conference reptii. reduced
in cost by about $1.4 billion, finally became
Pell's involvement with higher education
. ;ssues faded during Reagan's first term; he
could do little to block the deep cuts in student
aid programs approved by Congress in 1981.
In subsequent years, however. Pell and his
allies generally were able to prevent further
deep cuts in student aid. Along with-Education
Subcommittee Chairman Robert T. Stafford,
he helped enact in 1986 a new higher education
authorization that increased the limits on indi-
idual Pell Grants, while tightening eligibility
for guaranteed student loans.
At Home: Far from resenting Pell's privi-
leg.ed background, his blue-collar c?instituents
- have handed him landslide victories four out of
jive times. Only. Republican John H. Chafee,
now his Senate colleague, was able to hold him
tinder 60 percent of the vote.
Pell's pro-labor record has kept him in the
good graces of the unions, always a potent force
in Rhode Island. And while he does not have
much personal rapport with the state's ethnic
voters, he can talk to them: He speaks Portu-
zuese, Italian and French.
Pell's father, Herbert, was a Democrat who
lriefly represented Manhattan's Silk Stocking
District in the House and served as a foreign
envoy for Franklin D. Roosevelt. Claiborne Pell
was born in New York, but he spent summers
in the exclusive Rhode Island resort of New-
port, where the Pells had been going for five
.generations. The family moved there perma-
nently when he was nine.
Following his graduation from Princeton in
1940. Pell went to Europe to try to help con-
centration camp inmates. The Nazis arrested
him several times. He was a Coast Guard
officer during World War II and spent several
years in the foreign service, stationed at the
i.:nited Nations, in Czechoslovakia and Italy.
Later, while working as an investment banker
and publisher, he dabbled in politics, at one
point serving as registration chairman for the
Democratic National Committee.
Pell_decided to run himself in 1960 and
stunned the political community by over-
vhelming two former governors, Dennis J. Rob-
Rhode Island - Senior Senator
(.1-t, and .1. Howard Mil rat h, to win the 1/1.111.-
eratic nomination for the Senate. In the fall. he
crushed Republican Raoul Archarnbault. for-
mer assistant U.S. budget director, to win hi,
Senate seat. One of Pell's advantages that year
was his relationship with John F. Kennedy.
who was very popular in Rhode Island. Pell's
wife. Nuala, campaigned for Kennedy in West
Virginia.
Running for a second term in 1966. Pell
had an equally easy time with his GOP oppo-
nent ? a retired Women's Army Corps officer
named Ruth M. Briggs, who insisted upon
being called "colonel.". She sought to make an
issue out of his dovish line on the Vietnam War
and to portray him as a wealthy dilettante.
calling Pell "the prize entertainer of the Ken-
nedys." But like Archambault, she failed to
draw even a third of the vote.
Chafee, seeking a political comeback it:
1972 after serving as Navy secretary in the
Nixon administration, provided the only seri-
ous Republican opposition Pell has ever had.
Starting far ahead in the polls, Chafee linked
Pell to a fellow anti-war Democrat, Sen. George
McGovern. .the Democratic presidential nomi-
nee. But Pell, sensitive about the Navy's large
influence in. Rhode Island, deflected the tactic
by repudiating McGovern's call for cutting the
defense budget.
And Chafee was still carrying some of the
liabilities of his support for a state income tax.
an issue that had helped defeat him in his
campaign for re-election as governor in 1968.
As a moderate Republican, Chafee never man-
aged to come up with a compelling reason for
an overwhelmingly Democratic state to turn
out an incumbent Democrat. Pell won by
32,000 votes.
Things were back to normal for Pell in
1978, when he buried Republican James G.
Reynolds, a little-known bakery executive who
complained that Pell was more interested in
the arts than in saving jobs for Rhode Island.
Any GOP hopes of ousting Pell in 1984
ended early when popular U.S. Rep. Claudine
Schneider decided to remain in the House
rather than challenge the veteran Democrat.
The Reagan administration encouraged her to
run for the Senate, but she declined despite
polls where she ran at least even with Pell.
That left the Republican nomination to
Barbara Leonard, the president of a screw
manufacturing company and widow of a long-
time GOP fund-raiser. A political novice, she
found it difficult to_raise money or even get
Pell's attention. Bucking a Republican tide in
Rhode Island for the second time in 12 years,
Pell was re-elected with 73 percent of the vote.
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Claiborne Pell, D-R.I.
Committees
Foreign Relations (Chairman)
Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs.
Labor and Human Resources (2nd of 9 Democrats)
Education, Arts and Humanities (chairman); Aging
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism.
Rules and Administration (2nd of 9 Democrats)
Joint Library (Chairman)
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986) '
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Children,
Elections
1984 General
Claiborne Pell (D) 286,780 (73%)
Barbara Leonard (R) 108,492 (27%)
Previous Winning Percentages: 1978 (75%) 1972 (54%)
1966 (68%) 1960 (69%)
Campaign Finance
Receipts Expend.
Receipts from PACs Hums
1984
Pell (D) $745,270 $210,592 (28%) $433,436
Leonard (R) $164,275 $33,850 (21%) $162,699
Voting Studies
Presidential Party Conservative
Support Unity Coalition
Year S 0 S 0 S 0
Year
ADA ACU AFL-CIO
CCUS
1988
1985
30 67
29 67
75
82
20
14
16
7
80
92
1988
80
17
67
42
1984
31 66
82
14
15
81
1985
95
9
95
29
1983
41 48
81
15
14
82
1984
100
5
100
22
1982
36 59
75
19
17
78
1983
90
0
94
26
1961
42 52
82
14
10
82
1982
95
0
92
37
1981
95
0
95
17
S = Support
0 = Opposition
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Jesse Helms (R)
Of Raleigh ? Elected 1972
Born: Oct. 18, 1921, Monroe, N.C.
Education: Attended Wingate Jr. College and Wake
Forest College, 1941.
Military Career: Navy, 1942-45.
Occupation: Journalist; broadcasting executive.
Family: Wife, Dorothy Jane Coble; three children.
Religion: Baptist.
Political Career: Raleigh City Council, 1957-61.
Capitol Office: 403 Dirksen Bldg. 20510: 224-6342.
In Washington: "If there is one . job I'd
like to have around here," Helms once said,
"it's Foreign Relations." In the 100th Congress,
part of his wish has been fulfilled. He is the
senior Republican spokesman in the Senate on
foreign policy. But that job is not the prize it
was just a year ago. Republicans do not control
the Senate anymore, so Helms is not the For-
eign Relations chairman. He is the voice of an
outvoted GOP minority.
Helms could have chaired Foreign Rela-
tions for two years after 1984, when the previous
head of the committee, Illinois Republican
Charles H. Percy, was defeated for re-election.
But Helms had just survived a difficult cam-
paign of his own in which he had promised
North Carolina tobacco interests that he would
maintain his chairmanship at Agriculture in
order to work in behalf of tobacco price supports
in the 99th Congress. He held to that promise,
allowing GOP Sen. Richard G. Lugar of Indiana
to take over at Foreign Relations. "If I can't
keep my word, I don't belong here," Helms said.
The passage of tobacco legislation in 1986
freed Helms from some of his home-state ob-
ligations and led to speculation that he might
challenge Lugar for the Foreign Relations
chairmanship at the end of the year. Then the
prize was devalued when the Senate went Dem-
ocratic in the midterm elections.
Helms went ahead with his challenge to
Lugar anyway, citing the perquisites of senior-
ity. There was a rivalry between the two men
that gave a bitter tone to their contest. Though
Lugar was a conservative who supported most
Reagan foreign policy initiatives, he had shown
a willingness to negotiate with Democrats that
Helms found distasteful.
Their sharpest exchange occurred during
debate on a bill-mandating economic sanctions
against the government of South Africa. Lugar
supported the anti-apartheid bill. But Helms
? protective of the Pretoria government's role
North Carolina - Senior Senator
as an anti-communist force in Southern Africa
? not only opposed the bill, but set up phone
calls to two senators from Pik Botha, South
Africa's foreign minister.
Lugar angrily described Botha's interven-
tion as -despicable" and called Helms' assistance
"inappropriate." Helms responded by asserting
that Lugar and liberal Massachusetts Democrat
Edward M. Kennedy would be responsible for
the fall of South Africa to militant leftists.
Lugar hoped that his image as a coalition
builder, contrasted with Helms' profile as an
angry conservative militant, would preserve his
senior GOP position. But seniority clinched the
post for Helms. Connecticut's Lowell P.
Weicker Jr., a liberal Republican whose own
senior positions on other committees could be
vulnerable to conservative challenge, made a
crucial decision to support Helms so he could
bolster the system that protected him as well.
Helms won the ranking position by a 24-17 vote
in the Republican Conference; Lugar moved
into the ranking Agriculture position that
Helms vacated.
Helms has never needed any formal posi-
tion of leadership to carry on his crusade
against communism. He has used the Senate
floor, the media, and his direct-mail network to
proselytize against arms control efforts, trade,
and other forms of rapprochement with the
Soviet Union and other communist nations.
Helms favors close ties with various right-
wing governments that share his militant views.
Though he insists these alliances are necessary
to counter communist imperialism, he has been
criticized severely by those who see such right-
ist regimes as totalitarian and abusive of hu-
man rights.
During debate on the South Africa sanc-
tions measure, Helms said, "Here we go again,
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Jesse Helms, R-NC.
kicking a friend in the teeth because they don't
do what we want them to do." He is a supporter
of the Chilean government headed by Presi-
dent Augusto Pinochet. He opposed the efforts
to oust Philippines President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1986, stating that his replacement by
Corazon Aquino "happens to be on the agenda
of the bocialist world right now."
Helms worked hard to block passage of an
international treaty making genocide a crime.
Contending that it could threaten the Constitu-
tion and subject the United States to frivolous
lawsuits by other countries, Helms succeeded
for years in barring consideration of the pact.
After Senate leaders agreed to his reservations,
Helms voted for the treaty in committee for the
first time in 1985. However, he blocked a
unanimous-consent decree to bring the treaty
to the floor at the end of the 1985 session.
When the treaty finally passed in 1986 with 83
senators in favor, Helms was one of 11 to vote
against it.
Given his views and style, Helms may
actually find himself more comfortable in the
minority than he was in the majority. During
six years of Senate control, most Republicans
acted with deference to the Reagan administra-
tion. But Helms, whose drive for ideological
purity takes precedence even over loyalty to a
president he helped elect, has been a problem
for President Reagan on several occasions.
During a visit to Chile in July 1986, Helms
sharply criticized the American ambassador
and the State Department's attitude toward
Pinochet. "A coalition of the media, the Marx-
ists and the State Department is seeking to
destabilize the transition to a full-fledged de-
mocracy in Chile," Helms said. When The New
York Times published an article stating that
Helms was being investigated for leaking classi-
fied information to Pinochet, Helms alleged
that State Department officials planted the
information, and accused the CIA of spying on
him. "They want to silence me and intimidate
me, and you know what? It's not going to
work," he said.
Helms was strongly critical of the Reagan
administration's support for centrist Jos?a-
poleon Duarte in El Salvador's 1984 presiden-
tial election. He instead provided vocal backing
for the more conservative Roberto d'Aubuisson,
despite allegations that the candidate had been
involved with "death squad" murders. "You
don't have perfect choices in trying to prevent a
communist takeover of this world," Helms said.
After the election, Helms presented evi-
dence on the Senate floor to support his claim
that Duarte's victory had been the result of
covert CIA assistance. Senate leaders criticized
1106
him for releasing secret information, although
Helms argued that all his material had come
from public sources.
Helms has also nettled the administration
by utilizing his parliamentary skills to hold up
confirmation of diplomatic appointees whose
views he questions. He has sent diplomatic
candidates lists of as many as 247 questions to
be answered prior to their confirmation hear-
ings. From the very outset of the Reagan years
? when he and his now-deceased North Caro-
lina colleague John P. East cast the only votes
against confirmation of Caspar W. Weinberger
to be secretary of defense ? Helms has placed
dozens of executive branch appointees through
a long and arduous ordeal.
Helms' efforts in foreign affairs, if not
consistently successful, have brought him more
victories than his initiatives in domestic social
policy. He started the first Reagan term with
high hopes for enactment of the New Right
social agenda. But it soon became evident that
the Reagan administration placed higher im-
portance on economics and foreign policy than
on social issues.
Helms made an all-out push for his anti-
abortion And school prayer proposals in the
summer of 1982, when the Senate took up
legislation increasing the ceiling on the federal
debt. His anti-abortion amendment stated that
the Supreme Court had erred in its 1973 deci-
sion legalizing abortion, permanently banned
federal funding of abortion and granted a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court for challenges to
new anti-abortion laws. The school prayer
amendment barred the federal courts from han-
dling cases involving "voluntary" school prayer.
But Helms, who had staged so many filibusters
in the past, could not overcome one by moderate
Republicans; his amendments were tabled.
Despite his inability to get what he calls
"the crime of abortion" prohibited, Helms has
persisted. He has demanded numerous roll-call
votes on this and other emotional issues, and
has turned his opponents' votes against them,
using the direct-mail capability of his national
organization to denounce them for ignoring the
will of the conservative electorate.
Helms has continued to build a national
apparatus of lobby and fund-raising groups
unlike anything possessed by other senators.
He and his lieutenants have used high finance,
modern technology and knowledge of federal
laws to erect an interlocking network of politi-
cal organizations bent on influencing policy.
The cornerstone of Helms' empire is the
National Congressional Club, a direct-mail
fund-raising group that became the nation's
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largest political action committee in 1981. In
addition, there is a variety I if think tanks, such
as the Institute for American Relations, the
Centre for .a Free Society and the American
Family Institute, and tax-exempt lobby groups.
Each of the groups is operated in whole or part
by close associates or employees of Helms.
Early in 1985, another Helms group, Fair-
ness in Media, staged an unsuccessful effort to
persuade conservatives to buy a controlling
interest in the CBS television network. Helms
and his allies argued that the network's news
coverage was tainted by liberal bias.
In his zeal, Helms has made enemies. He is
to liberal activists what Kennedy is to conser-
vatives: an ogre whose name is frequently
thrown into fund-raising letters to raise the
anger of potential contributors.
Helms can also antagonize his colleagues in
pursuit of his domestic policy ends. When he
delayed adjournment in December 1982 with a
fruitless filibuster on a gasoline tax increase bill,
threatening to keep Congress in through Christ-
mas, several senators denounced him openly on
the floor. Fellow Republican Alan K. Simpson
of Wyoming called Helms "obnoxious."
Helms again found himself isolated from
most of his colleagues in 1983, this time over a
proposal to make the birthday of the late Rev.
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. into a national
holiday. Accusing the slain civil rights leader of
espousing "action-oriented Marxism," Helms
unsuccessfully filibustered against the bill.
He has shown somewhat more willingness
to compromise in recent years, though. In 1986,
he agreed not to block $145 million for family
planning programs in a spending bill, in ex-
change for Weicker's deletion of an amendment
allowing federal funds to be used to pay for
abortions in cases of rape or incest. He also
allowed Weicker to strike anti-busing and pro-
school prayer language from the bill.
Helms has had some successes on the do-
mestic front. He pushed for strong drug abuse
laws long before the passage of an omnibus
drug bill in 1986. He also attached an amend-
ment to that bill banning "dial-a-porn" tele-
phone services, though he accidentally caused
himself some embarrassment in doing so. In-
cluded in a pile of documents that Helms
submitted for the Congressional Record was an
unaltered transcript of a sexually graphic tele-
phone message. The transcript was duly pub-
lished in the Record.
Given the primacy of foreign policy and
social issues on Helms' agenda, there is irony in
the fact that he spent all six years of the
Republican majority as chairman of the Agri-
North Carolina - Senior Senator
culture Committee. It was not an active chair.
inatiship. Indeed, with a fey, signal exceptions.
he virtually abdicated control of the committee
during his first four years as chairman, allowing
a coalition of Republicans, led hy Majority
Leader Robert Dole of Kansas, -to take the lead
on farm legislation.
Helms would have gladly given up the
Agriculture post in 1985 were it not for his
tobacco constituency. He had angered this in-
terest group in 1982 by voting for a Reagan-
backed tax increase bill that included a provi-
sion doubling the federal excise tax on
cigarettes to 16 cents. Needing every vote he
could muster in his 1984 re-election campaign,
Helms promised to be there for tobacco farmers
in the 99th Congress.
Helms did win the enactment of legislation
to reduce tobacco surpluses by allowing ciga-
rette manufacturers to buy up large portions of
the tobacco crop at substantial discounts. But
he prevailed only with difficulty. He ran into a
conflict with Democratic Rep. Charlie Rose of
North Carolina, who charged that Helms fa-
vored cigarette companies over the growers.
Rose suggested that 2 cents of the 16-cents-per-
pack cigarette tax be earmarked to pay for
tobacco subsidies, a proposal Helms described
as a tax increase. Helms worked out a compro-
mise between manufacturers and growers in a
meeting from which Rose was specifically ex-
cluded.
Concerned that the omnibus farm bill, the
committee's major effort in 1985, would be
defeated on the floor, Helms removed the to-
bacco provisions and attached them to a budget
reconciliation bill. To do so, he had to agree to
a permanent reauthorization of the 16-cent
cigarette tax. Helms' strategy almost backfired.
While the farm bill passed, the reconciliation
measure stalled and appeared in danger of
defeat. However, the bill, with its tobacco pro-
visions, eventually passed.
On most other farm issues, Helms re-
mained a hands-off chairman. While Dole
worked-with House Majority Whip Thomas S.
Foley of Washington to iron out the controver-
sial 1985 farm legislation, Helms criticized it as
a "budget buster" and held to his prediction
that he would become the first Agriculture
chairman to vote against a farm bill.
Helms' lack of a central role on the farm
bill led to some snide comments from other
members. The strongest rebuke came from Iowa
Democrat Tom Harkin, who referred to Dole as
"Mr. Real Chairman" after Helms left a hearing
to take a phone call. Helms reacted defensively.
During a floor speech shortly thereafter, he
said, "As far as I know, I am still the chairman
1107
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Jesse Helms, R-N.C.
... I will tell senators on what terms we are
going to meet, and they can like it or lump it."
At Home: Whatever the national implica-
tions of Helms' 1984 victory, its lessons at home
were clear. In the battle for pre-eminence in
North Carolina politics, Helms emerged the
undeniable victor.
When his bid for re-election to a third
Senate term began taking shape two years
earlier, Helms' future influence in state politics
was very much in doubt. His vaunted political
organization, the Congressional Club, had suf-
fered severe setbacks in 1982, losing every one
of the five congressional contests it had tar-
geted in the state.
Further, Helms was being plagued by a
rain of negative publicity. His 1982 vote in
favor of raising the cigarette tax had drawn fire
from North Carolina's crucial tobacco constitu-
ency. He was widely vilified for his unsuccessful
efforts to block creation of the King holiday.
Pollsters tracking the battle between Helms
and Democratic Gov. James B. Hunt Jr. found
Helms to be significantly behind throughout
most of 1983.
But Helms battled back, drawing on finan-
cial support from conservatives across the
country to invest ..$16.5 million:in the race,
shattering the record for the most money spent
by a Senate candidate in U.S. history. His
advertisements assaulting Hunt and the na-
tional Democratic Party not only bolstered his
own campaign ? they created a climate in
which other North Carolina Republicans could
prosper. When the dust settled on election
night, the GOP had captured the governorship
and three new congressional seats.
In many ways, it was an unusually static
Senate campaign. The national media dutifully
detailed each tortuous twist .and turn, from
Hunt's charge that Helms was a supporter of
right-wing death squads in El Salvador, to the
incumbent's complaint that Hunt had misused
state airplanes. But most North Carolinians
seemed little affected by the long and vitupera-
tive debate. Faced with a choice between a
leading apostle of the New Right and an activ-
ist Democratic governor, most knew relatively
early on how they would vote. Only 4 percent-
age points separated the two contenders in
polls taken in May of 1984; in late October, it
was still considered a dead heat.
Hunt focused his campaign on his record as
governor, tirelessly sounding his commitment to
improved education and arguing he was experi-
enced in bringing the state jobs. He cast Helms
as a right-wing radical, too extreme in his views
to serve the state's interests effectively.
1108
Helms, putting aside his own significant
differences with Reagan, embraced the presi-
dent wholeheartedly, sending voters taped tele-
phone messages in which Reagan endorsed him.
Helms also sought to link Hunt to Democratic
presidential candidate Walter F. Mondale and
his national party. That charge left Hunt ham.
strung, as he sought to distance himself from
Mondale's proposal for a tax increase without
repudiating his party's presidential nominee.
In the end, Hunt won strong support from
the extensive network of teachers, unions, party
regulars and other activists he had built up over
the course of 10 years in state government. He
Carried the rural northeast, traditional Demo-
cratic territory that both men had taken in
previous campaigns. Hunt also carried most of
the state's major urban areas, thanks in part to
the overwhelming allegiance of black voters.
But Hunt's eastern margins were not as
decisive as he had hoped for, and his black
.support helped produce a conservative white
backlash that benefited Helms. Further aided
by Reagan's top-of-the-ticket strength and a
strong turnout from newly registered funda-
mentalists, Helms built his victory in the small
towns and crossroads communities of the cen-
tral and western Piedmont. He finished with a
52-48 percentage-point edge.
Although Helms' 1984 victory was decisive,
its effects on North Carolina politics appar-
ently were not long lasting. In 1986, key lieu-
tenants of his Congressional Club got involved
in the GOP Senate primary, backing losing
candidate David Funderburk. Helms himself
campaigned on behalf of Republican Rep.
James T. Broyhill ? the eventual GOP nomi-
nee ? during the fall campaign, but Broyhill
lost out to Democrat Terry Sanford. Further,
Republican Rep. Bill Cobey, one of the three
House members elected in 1984 with the aid of
Helms' coattails, was defeated for re-election.
For most of his adult life, Helms was a
Democrat himself, even while he delivered con-
servative editorials for 12 years over WRAL-
TV in Raleigh. He left the Democratic Party in
1970 and two years later ran for the Senate.
He was an underdog in that campaign
against U.S. Rep. Nick Galifianakis, who had
convincingly defeated aging Sen. B. Everett
Jordan in the Democratic primary. Press ac-
counts regularly described Helms as a "right-
winger," but that label was far less dangerous
to him than the liberal McGovern-Shriver
presidential ticket was to Galifianakis.
Helms played down his rhetoric and
shifted to a pro-Nixon tone. "President Nixon
Needs Jesse Helms," the advertisements read,
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although Helms was far to the right of Nixon
on most issues. A year earlier he had called the
president's trip to mainland China "appease-
ment" of the communists. In a Republican
sweep, Nixon won nearly 70 percent of the
state's presidential vote. Helms defeated
Galifianakis with 54 percent of the vote, and
the GOP won the governorship for the first
time since 1896.
Six years later, a host of Democrats sought
to prove Helms' win a coattail fluke. The early
favorite for the nomination was Luther H.
Hodges Jr., a moderate banker with a well-
financed campaign but a "stuffed shirt" image.
Another Democrat, state insurance Commis-
sioner John Ingram, pledged to fight for the
common man against insurance companies,
banks and other monied interests he ?accused
both Helms and Hodges of defending. Ingram
was under-financed and disorganized, but he
forced Hodges into a runoff and won.
North Carolina - Senior Senator
Ingram appeared to pose a threat to
Helms. His populist themes had some appeal
for rural and working-class conservatives who
had supported Helms in 1972. But Helms had a
reputation and an organization. Many of his
constituents were proud that in a single Senate
term he had become an articulate and nation-
ally known defender of the right, one who had
been promoted as a vice presidential choice by
more than 800 national convention delegates in
1976. Helms' Congressional Club had been
powerful enough to engineer Ronald Reagan's
victory in the 1976 North Carolina primary.
Helms also had unprecedented amounts of
money. As direct-mail solicitations brought
contributions from' admirers across the nation,
Ingram derided the incumbent as "the six
million dollar man." Helms eventually col-
lected about $7.5 million, more than any Senate
candidate in U.S. history up to that time, and
won by a margin slightly larger than in 1972.
Committees -
Foreign Relations (Ranking)
African Affairs.
. Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (3rd-of 9 Republicans).
Agricultural Production and Stabilization of Prices (ranking);
Domestic and Foreign Marketing and Product Promotion; Nutri-
tion and Investigations.
Rules and Administration (4th of 7 Republicans)
Select Ethics (2nd of 3 Republicans)
Elections
1984 General
Jesse Helms (R)
1,156,768
(52%)
James B. Hunt Jr. (0)
1.070,488
(48%)
1984 Primary
Jesse Helms (R)
134,675
(91%)
George Wimbish (R)
13,899
( 9%)
Previous Winning Percentages: 197$
(55%) 1972
(54%)
Campaign Finance
Receipts
Receipts from PACs
Expend-
Rums
1984
Helms (8)
$16,522,266
$847,337 (
5%)
$16499387
Hunt (D)
$10,031,502
$834,601 (
8%)
$9,429,924
Voting Studies
Presidential
Support
Party Conservative
Unity Coalition
. Year
S 0
S 0
S 0
1986
90
10
95
5
95
5
1985
79
21
94
6
97
3
1984
86
10
90
8
100
0
1983
56
41
77
20
95
2
1982
75
25
87
13
99
1
1981
84
16
88
11
94
6
S = Support 0 = Opposition
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU
AFL-CIO
CCUS
1988
100
0
95
1985
100
5
93
1984
100
0
89
1983
100
0
89
1962
100
8
95
1981
100
5
100
1109
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lualualvls fuTuado
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SENATOR PELL AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, I AM HONORED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TO
DISCUSS THE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF THE PROLIFERATION OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IS PART OF THE
DISTURBING TREND OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES. CURRENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT AS MANY AS 20
COUNTRIES MAY BE DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND WE
EXPECT THIS TREND TO CONTINUE, DESPITE ONGOING
MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO STOP THEIR PROLIFERATION.
A MAJOR QUESTION WE ARE NOW ADDRESSING IS WHAT
LESSONS HAVE BEEN LEARNED FROM THE IRAN?IRAQ WAR, THE
FIRST WAR SINCE WORLD WAR I THAT INVOLVED SUSTAINED USE
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE USE
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS OUTLAWED BY THE SIGNERS OF THE
1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD WAR II--EVEN DURING
THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES--BOTH SIDES REFRAINED FROM
USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS--WEAPONS THAT WINSTON CHURCHILL
REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."
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THE IRAN?IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY HAS EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN,
TOO, EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE THOUGHT TO OFFER A CHEAP AND
READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF REDRESSING THE MILITARY
BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES. SOME SEE THEM AS
THE POOR MAN'S ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR PRESIDENT
HAS SPOKEN OUT STRONGLY ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, AND I AM
SURE YOU HAVE READ MANY ACCOUNTS RECENTLY ABOUT THE USE
AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MANY COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING MUSTARD GAS, A
TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I. IT IS A FAVORITE
CHEMICAL AGENT FOR SEVERAL REASONS--ITS RELATIVE EASE OF
MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE Ar ON THE
BATTLEFIELD, AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE WHO ARE
EXPOSED TO IT.
SOME COUNTRIES ARE ALSO DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS.
THESE AGENTS, THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN
CAUSE DEATH IN MINUTES BY ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND
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NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER NATIONS MAY USE COMMON
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE.
CYANIDE PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN, WHILE
PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED IN MAKING PLASTICS, CAN DESTROY THE
LUNGS.
ALONG WITH THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
TWO EQUALLY DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS ARE THE PROLIFERATION
OF BOTH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES.
WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE MORAL BARRIER TO
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE HAS BEEN BREACHED. AT LEAST 10
COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO PRODUCE BOTH PREVIOUSLY KNOWN
AND FUTURISTIC BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGENTS--INCLUDING TOXINS--ARE MORE POTENT THAN THE MOST
DEADLY CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, AND PROVIDE THE BROADEST
AREA COVERAGE PER POUND OF PAYLOAD OF ANY WEAPON
SYSTEM.
THE EQUIPMENT USED TO PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGENTS IS TRULY DUAL?USE IN NATURE. WITH CURRENTLY
AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN BE ,
PRODUCED AT SUCH A RATE THAT STOCKPILES ARE NO LONGER
NECESSARY. THERE ARE NO PRECURSOR CHEMICALS OR
ILLEGIB
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EQUIPMENT THAT CAN BE USED ONLY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS. ACTUALLY, ANY NATION WITH A
MODESTLY DEVELOPED PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY CAN PRODUCE
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, IF IT CHOOSES.
FINALLY, BY THE YEAR 2000, AT LEAST 15 DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES WILL BE PRODUCING THEIR OWN BALLISTIC MISSILES.
BALLISTIC MISSILES CONVEY IMPORTANT NEW POLITICAL AND
MILITARY STATUS TO THOSE WHO ACQUIRE THEM. MANY
COUNTRIES WHERE THESE MISSILES ARE BEING DEVELOPED ARE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST.
ALL OF THE THIRD WORLD MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
RELY,ON FOITO TECHNOLOGY TO SOME DEGREE. BUT MUCH OF
THIS CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY IS ALREADY DIFFUSED THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD, IS AVAILABLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES, OR CAN EASILY
BE DIVERTED. THERE IS ALSO EXTENSIVE SHARING OF TECHNOLOGY
AMONG THIRD WORLD MISSILE COUNTRIES, AND THEY ARE
INCREASINGLY POOLING THEIR RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL KNOW?
HOW.
WITH THE INCREASE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD
WORLD, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST BE ALERT TO
ATTEMPTS BY THESE NATIONS TO ARM MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL
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OR BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE U. S.
POLICYMAKERS WITH TIMELY AND ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE
CAPABILITIES OF COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE BALLISTIC
MISSILES AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
LET ME NOW DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE TROUBLED
MIDDLE EAST, THE CURRENT CENTER OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION.
THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFFECTS THE
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN ARE IRAQ, SYRIA, IRAN, AND LIBYA--NATIONS
THAT HAVE EITHER USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR HAVE BEEN
ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
IRAQ HAS PRODUCED CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS SINCE THE
EARLY 1980S, WITH SYRIA AND IRAN BEGINNING CHEMICAL AGENT
AND MUNITION PRODUCTION SHORTLY AFTERWARD. LIBYA IS
NEARLY READY TO BEGIN LARGE?SCALE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL
AGENTS AND MUNITIONS.
IRAQ, SYRIA, AND IRAN ARE STOCKPILING A VARIETY OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS FOR VARIOUS BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS.
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STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN OFTEN BE STORED
FOR A PERIOD OF 10 TO 20 YEARS.
THESE SAME COUNTRIES ARE ALSO QUIETLY PRODUCING AND
AMASSING A VARIETY OF MUNITIONS THAT CAN BE USED AS
DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR CHEMICAL AGENTS. BOMBS, ARTILLERY
SHELLS, ARTILLERY ROCKETS, AND--IN SOME CASES--BATTLEFIELD
MISSILES HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS.
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAQ, IRAN, SYRIA,
AND LIBYA HAVE A NUMBER OF COMMON TRAITS:
? ALL HAVE BEEN GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY BY THEIR
GOVERNMENTS AND HAVE BEEN CLOAKED IN SECRECY.
? THE PRODUCTION COMPLEXES HAVE BEEN ACCORDED
STRICT SECURITY; IN MANY INSTANCES, ATTEMPTS
HAVE BEEN MADE TO CONCEAL THEM AS LEGITIMATE
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.
? ASSISTANCE BY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS HAS BEEN CRUCIAL
TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT.
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ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS--MANY OF
WHOM WERE FULLY WITTING OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST COUNTRIES TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS--HAS BEEN
THE KEY ELEMENT THAT HAS ENABLED THESE NATIONS TO DEVELOP
A CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITHIN ONLY A
FEW YEARS. AND, WITHOUT THIS ASSISTANCE, THESE MIDDLE EAST
COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. FOREIGN SUPPLIERS HAVE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
TYPES OF ASSISTANCE:
? TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONS EXPERTISE
? CONSTRUCTING PRODUCTION FACILITIES
? SUPPLYING PRECURSOR CHEMICALS
? SUPPLYING PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
? SUPPLYING PARTS FOR MUNITIONS
? TRAINING PERSONNEL.
I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME DETAILS
ABOUT THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS OF IRAQ, SYRIA, IRAN,
AND LIBYA.
IRAQ
THE WAR WITH IRAN PROMPTED IRAQ TO ACCELERATE ITS
PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. IRAQ
7
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HAS PRODUCED CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS SINCE THE
EARLY 1980S. THE MAIN CHEMICAL WARFARE COMPLEX, LOCATED
SOME 70 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF BAGHDAD NEAR SAMARRA,
AND A NUMBER OF OTHER PRODUCTION FACILITIES, HAVE
PRODUCED SEVERAL THOUSAND TONS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS.
FROM THE PROGRAM'S INCEPTION, FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS
FROM WESTERN EUROPE WERE KEY TO THE SUPPLY OF CHEMICAL
PROCESS EQUIPMENT, CHEMICAL PRECURSORS, AND TECHNICAL
EXPERTISE. WEST EUROPEANS REMAINED AT SAMARRA EVEN AFTER
IT BEGAN OPERATIONS. BUT AFTER SEVERAL YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
IN PRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IRAQ'S WELL?ESTABLISHED
EFFORT NOW IS FAR LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
AT SAMARRA, BAGHDAD PRODUCES THE BLISTER AGENT
MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN AND SARIN._ SEVERAL
TYPES OF WEAPONS--INCLUDING BOMBS, AND ARTILLERY SHELLS
AND ROCKETS--HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH THESE AGENTS.
IRAQ FIRST MADE MILITARY USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN
1983 AND 1984, WHEN IT BEGAN TO USE MUSTARD AND NERVE
AGENTS AGAINST IRANIAN FORCES. BAGHDAD CONTINUED TO USE
CHEMICAL AGENTS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS DURING THE WAR.
MORE RECENTLY--AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE CEASE?FIRE WITH
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IRAN--IRAQ USED LETHAL AND NON?LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS
AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS.
DESPITE THE CURRENT CEASE FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ
CONTINUES TO PRODUCE AND STOCKPILE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MOREOVER, IT IS EXPANDING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY
AND IS TAKING FURTHER STEPS TO MAKE ITS PROGRAM ENTIRELY
INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
SYRIA
SYRIA BEGAN PRODUCING CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND
MUNITIONS IN THE MID-1980S AND CURRENTLY HAS A CHEMICAL
0 WARFARE PRODUCTION FACILITY.
SYRIA HAS NERVE AGENTS IN SOME WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
DAMASCUS CONCEALS ITS PROGRAM--IT IS QUITE CLOSELY HELD--
AND, MUCH LIKE ITS MIDDLE EAST NEIGHBORS, IS LIKELY TO
CONTINUE TO EXPAND ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE IN
ALLOWING SYRIA TO DEVELOP ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY.
WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN SUPPLYING THE
REQUIRED PRECURSOR CHEMICALS AND EQUIPMENT. WITHOUT THE
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PROVISION OF THESE KEY ELEMENTS, DAMASCUS WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
IRAN
IN THE MID-1980S--AFTER NUMEROUS IRAQI CHEMICAL
ATTACKS--IRAN BEGAN TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL AGENTS AND
MUNITIONS, LATER USING THEM IN RETALIATION AGAINST IRAQI
TROOPS. IRAN'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY IS
LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF TEHRAN.
IRAN PRODUCES THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD, BLOOD
AGE,BIS, AND NERVE AGENTS AND, LIKE IRAQ, HAS FILLED BOMBS
AND ARTILLERY WITH THESE AGENTS.
REPEATED CHEMICAL ATTACKS BY IRAQ AGAINST IRANIAN
TROOPS PROMPTED TEHRAN TO SEEK FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO
QUICKLY ESTABLISH ITS OWN PRODUCTION PROGRAM. WEST
EUROPEAN AND ASIAN FIRMS RESPONDED BY PROVIDING CHEMICAL
PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND CHEMICAL PRECURSORS. DESPITE
THE CEASE?FIRE WITH IRAQ, IRAN IS CONTINUING TO EXPAND ITS
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM.
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LIBYA
LIBYA'S RESOLVE TO HAVE A CHEMICAL WARFARE
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IS ABOUT TO BE ACHIEVED. A LARGE
COMPLEX--CONSISTING OF A CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION PLANT
AND A METAL FABRICATION FACILITY--IN A REMOTE AREA ABOUT
80 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF TRIPOLI, NEAR RABTA, HAS BEEN
CONSTRUCTED FOR THIS PURPOSE. WHEN THIS SITE IS FULLY
OPERATIONAL, IT MAY BE THE SINGLE LARGEST CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENT PRODUCTION PLANT IN THE THIRD WORLD. BECAUSE IRAQ
HAS A NUMBER OF PRODUCTION SITES, HOWEVER, ITS TOTAL
PRODUCTION CAPACITY WILL CONTINUE TO EXCEED LIBYA'S.
LIBYA'S CHEMICAL AGENT PLANT IS EXPECTED TO SOON
BEGIN LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION OF MUSTARD AND NERVE
AGENTS--POTENTIALLY TENS OF TONS PER DAY. THE PLANT HAS
ALREADY HAD AT LEAST ONE SERIOUS TOXIC CHEMICAL SPILL, AND
SUCH PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE.
THE ADJACENT METAL FABRICATION AREA IS EQUIPPED WITH
PRECISION MATERIALS THAT CAN BE USED TO MANUFACTURE
COMPONENTS FOR A VARIETY OF BOMBS AND ARTILLERY. OTHER
FACILITIES IN THIS AREA ARE INVOLVED WITH FILLING AND STORING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
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IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR LIBYA TO
HARNESS THE TECHNOLOGIES NECESSARY TO BUILD AND OPERATE
SUCH FACILITIES WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN
COMPANIES AND PERSONNEL FROM SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN AND
ASIAN COUNTRIES.
MANY OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS HAVE ALSO BEEN
INVOLVED, OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, IN CONSTRUCTION AND
SUPPLY OF MATERIALS FOR THE ENTIRE COMPLEX.
LIBYA'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN LARGE?SCALE CHEMICAL
WARFARE PRODUCTION WILL, IN LARGE MEASURE, DEPEND ON
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fl
CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. OVER TIME, TRIPOLI WILL GROW
LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, BUT, FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN
SUPPLIERS TO PROVIDE CHEMICAL PRECURSORS AND EQUIPMENT.
ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS
ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES WE NOW
FACE.
BECAUSE MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PRODUCE
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN ALSO BE USED TO PRODUCE
LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, ANY PHARMACEUTICAL OR
PESTICIDE PLANT CAN BE CONVERTED TO PRODUCE THESE AGENTS.
A NATION WITH EVEN A MODEST CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COULD USE
ITS FACILITIES FOR PART?TIME PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENTS.
LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI, IN A SPEECH DELIVERED IN
OCTOBER, CLAIMED THAT THE FACILITY AT RABTA IS INTENDED TO
PRODUCE PHARMACEUTICALS?NOT CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS--
AND HE PROPOSED OPENING THE COMPLEX FOR INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION. BUT WITHIN FEWER THAN 24 HOURS, IT WOULD BE
RELATIVELY EASY FOR THE LIBYANS TO MAKE THE SITE APPEAR TO
BE A PHARMACEUTICAL FACILITY. ALL TRACES OF CHEMICAL
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WEAPONS PRODUCTION COULD BE REMOVED IN THAT AMOUNT OF
TIME.
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS SITE, HOWEVER, IS CLEARLY
CHEMICAL WARFARE PRODUCTION. THE SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT,
BUILDING DESIGN, AND SECURITY THERE FAR EXCEED THE
REQUIREMENTS OF A COMMERCIAL PLANT.
THIS CONCLUDES MY OPENING REMARKS ON THE
PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. I WISH
TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY KEEPS THE
ADMINISTRATION, AS WELL AS THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF
THE SENATE AND HOUSE, FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
THIS AREA.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION. I WILL NOW TRY TO
ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE, ALTHOUGH PLEASE
UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL BE CONSTRAINED BY THE NEED TO
PROTECT HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS.
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THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS SAID LITTLE PUBLICLY ABOUT
COUNTRIES THAT POSSESS OR USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, YET
WE KNOW THAT PUBLIC PRESSURE IS ONE WAY TO DISSUADE
COUNTRIES FROM USING THESE WEAPONS. DO YOU BELIEVE
THAT LEAKS OF INFORMATION ABOUT COUNTRIES WHICH SEEK
OR ACQUIRE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DAMAGES
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?
YES, I DO BELIEVE THAT SUCH LEAKS ARE DAMAGING TO OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EXPLORES ALL
AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON NUMEROUS SUBJECTS
RELATED TO NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING THE CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS OF OTHER NATIONS. WHEN ANY
DETAILS--GATHERED BY HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS--ARE MADE PUBLIC, OUR ABILITY TO GATHER ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION DECREASES.
ILLEGIB
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YOUR STATEMENT SAYS CLEARLY THAT FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
PROVIDE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS AND EQUIPMENT?H-TolireAN
YOU TELL THAT THESE FOREIGN SUPPLIERS A E AWARE THAT
THE BUYERS ARE PLANNING TO MAKE CHEMI6W S.
AS I HAVE STATED, THE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS NEEDED
TO MAKE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAN ALSO BE USED TO PRODUCE
LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS--SUCH AS PESTICIDES OR
PHARMACEUTICALS. BECAUSE THERE ARE CIVILIAN USES OF THESE
MATERIALS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME SUPPLIERS DO NOT KNOW
THAT THEY ARE FURNISHING MATERIALS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAMS.
IN ADDITION, AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY JUDGMENT THAT
A COUNTRY HAS DECIDED TO DEVELOP CHEMICAL WEAPONS
RESULTS FROM ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION FROM ALL AVAILABLE
SOURCES. IT IS THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE FROM ALL OF
THESE SOURCES THAT ALLOWS US TO MAKE SUCH JUDGMENTS.
ALTHOUGH I CANNOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS THAT LED TO THESE
ASSESSMENTS HERE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS ARE
INVOLVED--I WOULD BE AMENABLE TO PROVIDING THOSE DETAILS
IN A CLOSED SESSION.
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DO THE SOVIETS SHARE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROLIFERATION?
BOTH THE US AND USSR HAVE MADE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
STATEMENTS CONDEMNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.
THE US HOLDS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
11!!)WON THIS SUBJECT. THESE MEETINGS FACILITATE THE
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON A SUBJECT ABOUT
WHICH BOTH THE US AND USSR ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED. THESE
MEETINGS ARE A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO THE MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FOR A
WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL BAN.
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HOW DO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES VIEW NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN?
MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE MADE
PROPORTIONATLY LARGE INVESTMENTS IN THEIR CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAMS. THEY VIEW THESE WEAPONS AS THE MOST
EXPEDIENT MEANS OF ATTAINING A WEAPON GEMASS
DESTRUCTION FOR USE AS A STRATEGIC DETERRENT AGAINST
Ci%;...a5011.?.11110110.511.....
POWERFUL ENEMIES.
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT A
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN MUST BE LINKED TO A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS BAN TO PROVIDE A TOTAL BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION. IN THIS REGARD, MANY OF THE ARAB NATIONS MAY
BE UNWILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS LONG AS
THEY BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
?r? _ :-
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CAN A CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY BE VERIFIED?
IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO
MONITOR THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALL OF THE
EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN
ALSO BE USED TO PRODUCE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, AND ANY
PHARMACEUTICAL OR PESTICIDE PLANT COULD BE EASILY
CONVERTED TO CW PRODUCTION. IN ADDITION, THIRD WORLD
NATIONS OFTEN SHROUP THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS IN THE STRICTEST SECRECY, FURTHER COMPLICATING
OUR ABILITY TO ASSESS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE
CAPABILITIES. FINALLY, THESE COUNTRIES DEVELOP ELABORATE
MECHANISMS TO CIRCUMVENT_EMBARGOES_ THAT ARE CURRENTLY
IN EXISTENCE.
ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE IT WOULD BE EXTEREMELY DIFFICULT
TO VERIFY A CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY, THE U.S. IS WORKING
DILIGENTLY AT TI-IE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA TO
ENSURE THAT VERY STRINGENT VERIFICATION-PROVISIONS?WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE TREATY BEING NEGOTIATED. ALTHOUGH STRICT
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WILL HELP ENHANCE OUR CONFIDENCE
THAT THE TREATY WILL BE ADHERED TO, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO
IDENTIFY THOSE FACILITIES THAT ARE NOT DECLARED, AND EVEN
MORE DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE
TREATY.
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HAVE THE SOVIETS VIOLATED THE BIOLOGICAL AND
TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)?
THIS QUESTION WOULD BE BETTER ANSWERED BY A MEMBER
OF THE POLICY COMMUNITY. DETERMINATION OF WHETHER
roma.
CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE IN VIOLATION OF AN ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENT IS NOT AN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION.
WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION
MAINTAINS AN OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM AND
.0.10
CAPABILITY. THESE ACTIVITIES ARE PROHIBITED BY THE 1972
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION.
THE U.S. HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IN
SVER OVSK IN THE SPRING OF 1979--TEN YEARS AGO--WAS THE
RES LT OF AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF ANTHRAX SPORES FROM A
PROHIBITED BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FACILITY. THE U.S. HAS RAISED
THE ISSUE REPEATEDLY WITH THE SOVIETS SINCE MARCH 1980, AND
HAS BEEN TOLD REPEATEDLY THAT THE OUTBREAK STEMMED FROM
EATING MEAT CONTAMINATED WITH ANTHRAX. ALTHOUGH THE
SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DATA ON THIS INCIDENT,
THEIR ACCOUNTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. IN MANY CASES, THEIR EXPLANATIONS ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONTAMINATED MEAT SCENARIO.
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WHY DO SO MANY NATIONS NOW HAVE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAMS?
THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
BEGAN IN THE 1970S, WITH THE IRAN?IRAQ WAR PROVIDING THE
IMPETUS FOR THE RECENT RAPID GROWTH OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAMS.
ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES HAD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AVAILABLE
IN WORLD WAR II, NEITHER SIDE USED THEM. PERHAPS THIS
RESTRAINT WAS A RESULT OF THE MEMORY--STILL FRESH IN THE
MINDS OF MANY--OF THE HORRIBLE EFFECTS CAUSED BY CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN WORLD WAR I. THAT RESTRAINT ENDED WITH THE
IRAN?IRAQ WAR.
LIMITED PUBLIC OUTCRY OVER THE USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS-, COUPLED WITH IRAQ'S SUCCESSFUL USE OF CHEMICALS
ON THE BATTLEFIELD, MAY ACTUALLY SPUR OTHER NATIONS TO
DEVELOP AND USE THEIR OWN CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
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HOW BIG WOULD A CW AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITY
HAVE TO BE TO PRODUCE A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY
OF AGENT?
A FACILITY THE SIZE OF THIS ROOM COULD EASILY MAKE
ENOUGH CW AGENT FOR USE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. FOR EXAMPLE,
A 200 LITER _REACTOR COULD PRODUCE UP TO ONEVIETRIC TON OF
_MUSTARD A DAY, ASSUMING 24 HOUR?A?DAY PRODUCTION. THUS,
USING ONLY ONE REACTOR VESSEL, A SMALL FACILITY COULD
THEORETICALLY MAKE UP TO 30 TONS_OF AGENT INA MONTH.
NERVE AGENT PRODUCTION REQUIRES MORE STEPS, BUT COULD
OCCUR ON A SLIGHTLY SMALLER SCALE USING THREE TO FIVE 200
LITER REACTORS. THREE TO FIVE 200 LITER REACTORS COULD
EASILY FIT WITHIN A ROOM THIS SIZE.
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HOW MUCH CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENT
DOES IT TAKE TO CONTAMINATE A BATTLEFIELD?
ONE TON OF CW AGENT (SARIN) IS ENOUGH TO LETHALLY
CONTAMINATE AN AREA OF ABOUT ONE SQUARE MILE. ONE TON
OF ANTHRAX SPORES, HOWEVER, WOULD LETHALLY CONTAMINATE
AN AREA OF OVER 7000 SQUARE MILES FOR SEVERAL DECADES.
..11.????1??????ft
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CAN YOU PLEASE TELL US WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS?
AS I HAVE STATED, OVER 20 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO
DEVELOP CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. THOSE COUNTRIES
INCLUDE THE U.S., THE U.S.S.R, IRAQ, IRAN 5y,BIA,._A .NpinyA., FOR
INTELLIGENCE REASONS--SOURCES AND METHODS--I AM NOT AT
LIBERTY TO IDENTIFY ANY ADDITIONAL NATIONS.
REGARDING THE AT LEAST 10 NATIONS WHICH ARE
DEVELOPING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES, I CAN ONLY
STATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
PROGRAM.
tD
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Th
WHAT IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT TERRORISTS MAY
DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM
PROLIFERATING NATIONS?
WE CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT SUCH AN
EVENT COULD TAKE PLACE. WE ARE MONITORING CLOSELY THE
ACQUISITION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
CAPABILITIES BY A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CURRENT
OR PAST SUPPORTERS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS. WE
ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
DELIBERATE OR INADVERTENT TRANSFER OF THESE CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS TO THESE GROUPS. TO DATE,
HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT ANY SUCH TRANSFERS
HAVE TAKEN PLACE.
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WHY IS BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION A PROBLEM?
BALLISTIC MISSILES PROVIDE THIRD WORLD NATIONS WITH
THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE WELL BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD. THUS
EVEN A SHP_Ra.-aANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE CAN PROVIDE MIDDLE
EAST COUNTRIES WITH A TRULY STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEM.
ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS THAT COULD DELIVER
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS HEIGHTENS THE ALREADY TENSE
SITUATION IN THE TROUBLED MIDDLE EAST. AND FEAR OF A
STRIKE--PRE-EMPTIVE OR OTHERWISE--WITH THESE WEAPONS
ONLY SERVES TO INCREASE THE INSTABILITY OF THE REGION.
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CAN YOU PLEASE COMMENT ON ANY OF THE RECENT
MEDIA STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE PROGRAM?
AS I HAVE STATED, AT LEAST 10 NATIONS ARE WORKING TO
DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. I CAN NEITHER
CONFIRM NOR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF AN IRAQI BW PROGRAM. I
CAN ONLY STATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF THE NATIONS
WITH A BW PROGRAM. s
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SWONOId TOI;UOD
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HOW EFFECTIVE ARE EMBARGOES OF PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS AT STOPPING CW PROLIFERATION?
THE US MEETS TWICE A YEAR WITH THE OTHER 18 MEMBERS
OF THE AVSTRALIAN SUPPLIERS aBDIJ,E_T_Q DISCUSS
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON SHIPMENTS OF CHEMICALS THAT
CAN BE USED TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. AS A
RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
HAS SLOWED, BUT NOT STOPPED.
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS HAVE CAUSED COUNTRIES AND
COMPANIES TO SET UP CIRCUITOUS ROUTES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
THE MATERIALS THEY REQUIRE.
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WHAT FUTURE ACTIONS BY THE US CAN EITHER STOP OR
SLOW CW PROLIFERATION?
THE RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH ANY NATION CAN ACQUIRE A
CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY MAKES THIS A COMPLICATED
QUESTION. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE
NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL LEAD TO AN EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE
WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN THAT WILL BE SIGNED BY
ALL CHEMICAL CAPABLE NATIONS. WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN,
HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE IDENTIFIED ALL CHEMICAL WARFARE
PRODUCTION FACILITIES BECAUSE THE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES
USED TO MAKE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAN HAVE MORE THAN ONE
USE. THIS DIFFICULTY ALSO MAKES LIKELY THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THERE ARE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE NOT
YET IDENTIFIED.
THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH
OUR ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS ON CURTAILING FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO THIRD WORLD CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS.
FINALLY, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL
EFFORTS TO EMBARGO PRECURSOR CHEMICALS.
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WHAT SORTS OF CONTROLS OR EMBARGOES WOULD BE
EFFECTIVE AT STOPPING BW PROLIFERATION?
THE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE NEEDED TO
PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS ARE TRULY DUAL?USE IN
NATURE. THERE ARE NO ITEMS COMPARABLE TO PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGENTS. BECAUSE ALL OF THESE MATERIALS HAVE LEGITIMATE
USES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY, TRADE IN
THESE ITEMS IS UNRESTRICTED. NOR WOULD WE WANT TO DENY
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE CHANCE TO IMPROVE THEIR
HEALTH BY RESTRICTING THE TRADE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
EQUIPMENT. BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY LEGITIMATE MEDICAL
USES OF THIS EQUIPMENT, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO AGREE ON AN EMBARGO. AND
WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AN
EMBARGO WOULD HAVE VERY LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS.
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HAVE ANY U.S. FIRMS BEEN INVOLVED IN SUPPLYING
MATERIALS TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS?
AS YOU KNOW, IT IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO MONITOR ANY U.S. ACTIVITIES.
HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE FBI AND US
CUSTOMS SERVICE AND TO BE ALERT FOR ANY INDICATION THAT A
U.S. FIRM WOULD BE INVOLVED IN CW PROLIFERATION. ONLY BY
MAINTAINING THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP CAN WE HOPE TO
DISCOVER AND LEGALLY PROSECUTE ANY FIRM THAT IS INVOLVED IN
SUCH DEALINGS.
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WHY DO COMPANIES CONTINUE TO SUPPLY MATERIALS
TO CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS IN SPITE OF LAWS
BANNING THEIR SALE?
MOST OF THE COMPANIES THAT SUPPLY PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS, EQUIPMENT, AND EXPERTISE TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAMS DO SO WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS.
POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF EMBARGOES, THE MARKET FOR THESE
MATERIALS IS QUITE LUCRATIVE.
AND ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE FORMAL DIALOGS WITH OTHER
GOVERNMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT, YOU MUST REALIZE THAT OFTEN
INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT PROVIDE LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF
WRONGDOING.
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HAVE WE SHARED INFORMATION WITH OUR ALLIES ON
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR COMPANIES IN CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION?
WE ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING THIS APPROACH WITH OUR
ALLIES, AND HAVE PROVIDED BRIEFINGS TOA NUMBER OF THEM.
WITH THE INFORMATION WE HAVE PROVIDED, WE ARE HOPEFUL
THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL PURSUE THEIR OWN LEGAL
MEANS OF INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING COMPANIES AND/OR
INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE PROVIDED MATERIALS TO VARIOUS
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE DIALOGS
ON THIS SUBJECT.
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WHAT EFFORTS ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE
THAT THE U.S. HAS ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION?
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S 1985 CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION, I CAN
ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE INCREASED OUR EFFORTS TO PROVIDE
ACCURATE AND TIMELY REPORTING ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE PROLIFERATION. WE ARE AWARE OF THE HIGH LEVEL OF
INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT, AND CONSISTENTLY EXPLORE ALL
AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS
WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUIRE.
STAT
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11
101ST CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S.195
Entitled the "Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act of 1989".
IN THE SENATE OF TEE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989
Mr. PELL (for himself, Mr. HELMS, Mr. KERRY, Mr. McCAIN, Mr. GORE, Mr.
SIMON, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. DODD, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. BURDICK, Mr.
HUMPHREY, Mr. SANFORD, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. HARKIN, Mr.
DOLE, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. MURKOWSKI, and Mr. LUGAR) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
A BILL
Entitled the "Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act of
1989".
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 fives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SHORT TITLE
4 SECTION. 1. This Act may be cited as the "Chemical
5 and Biological Weapons Control Act of 1989".
6 FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
7 SEC. 2. The Congress finds that?
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1 (a) chemical weapons were employed in the recent
2 Iran-Iraq war and by Iraq in attacks against its Kurd-
3 ish minority;
4 (b) the use of chemical or biological weapons in
5 contravention of international law is abhorrent and re-
6 quires immediate and effective sanctions;
7 (c) United Nations Security Council Resolution
8 620, adopted on August 26, 1988, states the intention
9 of the Security Council to consider immediately "ap-
10 propriate and effective" sanctions against any nation
11 using chemical and biological weapons in violation of
12 international law;
13 (d) the Declaration of the Paris Conference on
14 Chemical Weapons Use demonstrates the resolve of
15 most nations to reaffirm support for the 1925 protocol
16 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weap-
17 ons and to press for attainment of a ban on the produc-
18 tion and possession of lethal and incapacitation chemi-
19 cal weapons;
20 (e) a growing number of nations, including Libya
21 and Syria, have or are seeking the capability to
22 produce lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons;
23 (f) the further spread of chemical or biological
24 weapons capabilities would pose of a threat of incalcu-
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3
1 lable proportions to friends and allies and undermine
2 the national security of the United States;
3 (g) the United Nations should create an effective
4 means of monitoring and reporting regularly on corn-
merce in equipment, materials, and technology applica-
6 ble to the attainment of a chemical and biological
7 weapons capability; and
8 (10 every effort should be made to conclude an
9 early agreement banning the production and stockpiling
10 of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons.
11 PURPOSE
12 SEC. 3. It is the purpose of this Act to mandate United
13 States sanctions and to encourage international sanctions
14 against nations that use chemical or biological weapons in
15 violation of international law; to require semi-annual presi-
16 dential reports on efforts by Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria and
17 other developing nations to acquire the materials and tech-
18 nology to produce and deliver chemical and biological weap-
19 ons; to urge cooperation with other supplier nations to devise
20 effective controls on the transfer of materials, equipment, and
21 technology applicable to chemical or biological weapons pro-
22 duction; to promote agreements banning the transfer of mis-
23 siles suitable for armament with chemical or biological war-
24 heads; to encourage an early agreement banning the produc-
25 tion and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitating chemical or
26 biological weapons; and to seek effective international means
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1 of monitoring and reporting regularly on commerce in equip-
2 ment, materials, and technology applicable to the attainment
3 of a chemical or biological weapons capability.
4 AUTOMATIC SANCTIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL
5 WEAPONS
6 SEC. 4. In the event any foreign country shall use
7 chemical or biological weapons in violation of international
8 law or against its own citizens, the sanctions listed below
9 shall take effect against such country:
10 (a) The United States Government shall not sell
11 the sanctioned country and item on the United States
12 Munitions List.
13 (b) Licenses shall not be issued for the export to
14 the sanctioned country of any item on the United
15 States Munitions List.
16 (c) The authorities of section 6 of the Export Ad-
17 ministration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the
18 export to the sanctioned country of any goods or tech-
19 nology on the control list established pursuant to sec-
20 tion 5(c)(1) of that Act.
21 (d) The United States shall oppose any loan or fi-
22 nancial or technical assistance to the sanctioned coun-
23 try by international financial institutions in accordance
24 with section 701 of the International Financial Institu-
25 tions Act.
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1 (e) The United States shall not provide any mili-
2 tary or economic assistance (except for urgent humani-
3 tarian assistance) to the sanctioned country.
4 (f) The United States shall not import any good,
5 commodity, or service from the sanctioned country.
6 (g) The United States shall not provide the sane-
7 tioned country any credit or credit guarantees through
8 the Export-Import Bank of the United States.
9 (h) Regulations shall be issued to prohibit any
10 United States bank from making any loan or providing
11 any credit to the sanctioned country.
12 (i) Landing rights in the United States shall be
13 denied to any airline owned by the government of the
14 sanctioned country.
15 WAIVER
16 SEC. 5. The President may waive some or all of the
17 sanctions listed above for a period not to exceed nine months
18 following the illegal use of chemical or biological weapons if
19 he determines that such waiver is in the national interest of
20 the United States and so reports in writing to the Speaker of
21 the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Coin-
22 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. In making such a
23 report, the President shall present a detailed explanation of
24 the national interest requiring a waiver. In no event shall the
25 President have authority under this Act to issue a waiver for
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1 that country that would remain in effect beyond nine months
2 following the initial illegal use of chemical weapons.
3 NOTIFICATION
4 SEC. 6. Not later than five days after sanctions become
5 effective against a country pursuant to this section, the Presi-
6 dent shall so notify in writing the Speaker of the House of
7 Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on For-
8 eign Relations of the Senate.
9 CONTRACT SANCTITY
10 SEC. 7. The President may not prohibit or curtail the
11 execution of any contract or agreement (except for an agree-
12 ment to provide military assistance or to sell military equip-
13 ment) entered into prior to the date on which Congress is
14 notified of the imposition of sanctions against a country pur-
15 suant to this section.
16 REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS
17 SEC. 8. The President may waive any sanctions im-
18 posed pursuant to section 3 of this Act if the President deter-
19 mines and so certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House
20 of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on
21 Foreign Relations of the Senate that the nation under sane-
22 tion-
23 (a) has eliminated facilities for the production of
24 chemical or biological weapons and existing stockpiles
25 of such weapons;
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1 (b) has renounced the use of chemical or biological
2 weapons in violation of international law and provided
3 reliable assurances to that effect; and
4 (c) has made satisfactory restitution to those af-
fected by its earlier use of chemical or biological weap-
6 ons in violation of international law.
7 PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS
8 SEC. 9. Not later than ninety days after the date of
9 enactment of this Act, and every one hundred and eighty
10 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the Speaker of
11 the House of Representatives, and the chairman of the Com-
12 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on efforts
13 by Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria and other developing nations
14 to acquire the materials and technology to produce and deliv-
15 er chemical and biological weapons, together with an assess-
16 ment of such countries' present and future capability to
17 produce and deliver such weapons.
18 MULTILATERAL EFFORTS
19 SEC. 10. The President of the United States is urged-
20 (a) to continue close cooperation with others in
21 the nineteen nation Australian Group in support of its
22 current efforts and in devising additional means to
23 monitor and control the supply of chemicals applicable
24 to weapons production to Iraq, Iran, Syria, and
25 Libya?nations that currently support or have recently
26 supported acts of international terrorism;
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1 (b) to work closely with other nations also capable
2 of supplying equipment, materials, and technology with
3 particular applicability to chemical or biological weap-
4 ons production to devise the most effective controls
5 possible on the transfer of such materials, equipment,
6 and technology;
7 (c) to seek agreements with nations that produce
8 ballistic missiles suitable for carrying chemical or bio-
9 logical warheads that would prevent the transfer of
10 such missiles; and
11 (d) to take the initiative in pressing for early con-
12 elusion of an international agreement banning the pro-
13 duction and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitating
14 chemical or biological weapons.
15 UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT
16 SEC. 11. The President is urged to give full support
17 to-
18 (a) the United Nations Security Council, in fur-
19 therance of Security Council Resolution 620, adopted
20 August 26, 1988, in developing sanctions comparable
21 to those enumerated in section 3 of this Act to be im-
22 posed in the event any nation uses chemical or biologi-
23 cal weapons in violation of international law;
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1 (b) the creation by the United Nations of an effec-
2 tive means of monitoring and reporting regularly on
3 commerce in chemical equipment, materials, and tech-
4 nology applicable to the attainment of a chemical or bi-
5 ological weapons capability.
0
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101ST CONGRESS
1ST SESSION _
S.8
II
To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to impose sanctions against
companies which have aided and abetted the proliferation of chemical or
biological weapons, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989
Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. GARN, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. DODD, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr.
KASTEN, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. ROTH, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, and Mr. COHEN) in-
troduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
A BILL
To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to impose
sanctions against companies which have aided and abetted
the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons, and for
other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 lives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Chemical and Biological
5 Weapons Control Act".
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7 The Congress finds that?
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1 (1) proliferation of the material and technology to
2 produce and deliver chemical and biological weapons
3 threatens American national security interests and re-
4 gional stability;
5 (2) reliable reports of Libya's attempt to acquire a
6 chemical weapons production and delivery capability,
7 efforts by Iran and Syria to do likewise, and Iraq's use
8 of chemical weapons against its Kurdish minority are
9 of grave concern to the other states of the Middle
10 East/Persian Gulf region and to the United States;
11 (3) any efforts by Communist-bloc countries to aid
12 and abet the production or use of chemical or biological
13 weapons, or the development and deployment of deliv-
14 ery systems for chemical or biological weapons, by any
15 state are deplorable;
16 (4) there are increasing reports that major corpo-
17 rations in certain non-Communist countries have aided
18 and abetted the reported efforts of Libya, Iraq, Iran,
19 and Syria to acquire chemical weapons production and
20 delivery capabilities and, if true, any such activity by
21 those companies is deplorable and represents a threat
22 both to American security interests and the peace and
23 stability of the Middle East/Persian Gulf region;
24 (5) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
25 recognizes that national security concerns may serve as
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1 a legitimate basis for constricting free and open trade;
2 title XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
3 Trade states that Inkthing in this Agreement shall be
4 construed . . . to prevent any contracting party from
5 taking any action which it considers necessary for the
6 protection of its essential security interests . . . ."; and
7 (6) international cooperation has so far been
8 unable to stem the trade in materials essential to
9 produce chemical weapons and their industrial inputs.
10 SEC. 3. POLICY.
11 (a) IN GENERAL?It should be the policy of the United
12 States to take all appropriate measures-
13 (1) to discourage the proliferation of the material
14 and technology necessary and intended to produce or
15 deliver chemical or biological weapons;
16 (2) to discourage Communist-bloc countries from
17 aiding and abetting any states from acquiring such ma-
18 terial and technology;
19 (3) to implement a United States control regime
20 to prohibit the flow of United States materials, equip-
21 ment, and technology that would assist countries in ac-
22 quiring the ability to produce or deliver chemical or bi-
23 ological weapons; and
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1 (4) to discourage private companies in non-Com-
2 munist countries from aiding and abetting any states in
3 acquiring such material and technology.
4 (b) MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.?The United States
5 should seek to pursue the policy described in subsection (a) to
6 the extent practicable and effective through multilateral di-
7 plomacy, including through efforts such as the efforts of the
8 so-called "Australia Group" and the recently concluded Paris
9 conference on chemical weapons.
10 (c) UNILATERAL ACTIONS.?The United States retains
11 the right to and should take unilateral actions to pursue the
12 objectives in subsection (a) until such multilateral efforts
13 prove effective and, at that time, to support and enhance the
14 multilateral efforts.
15 SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
16 Section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
17 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) is amended-
18 (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as
19 paragraphs (9) and (10), respectively; and
20 (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
21 "(7) the term 'biological weapons' refers to-
22 "(A) microbal or other biological agents or
23 toxins, whatever their origin or method of produc-
24 tion, of types and in quantities that have no justi-
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1 fication for prophylactic, protective, or other
2 peaceful purposes; and
3 "(B) weapons, equipment, or means of deliv-
4 ery designed to use such agents or toxins for hos-
5 tile purposes or in armed conflict;
6 "(8) the term "chemical weapons" refers to-
7 "(A) toxic chemicals, including supertoxic
8 lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other
9 harmful chemicals and their precursors, including
10 key precursors, except such chemicals intended
11 for peaceful purposes as long as the types and
12 quantities involved are consistent with such pur-
13 poses; and
14 "(B) munitions and devices specifically de-
15 signed to cause death or other harm through the
16 toxic properties of such toxic chemicals which
17 would be released as a result of the employment
18 of such munitions and devices;".
19 SEC. 5. AMENDMENT TO THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
20 OF 1979.
21 Section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
22 U.S.C. App 2405) is amended-
23 (1) by redesignating subsections (k) through (o) as
24 subsections (1) through (p), respectively; and
25 12) by inserting after subsection (j) the following:
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1 "(k) CHEMICAL WEAP0NS.?(1) The Secretary, in con-
2 sultation with the Secretary of State, shall establish and
3 maintain, in accordance with the provisions of subsection
4 (m)-
5 "(A) a comprehensive list of goods or technology,
6 whether military or dual-use items, that would assist a
7 country in acquiring the ability to produce or deliver
8 chemical or biological weapons; and
9 "(B) a list of those foreign countries which are
10 pursuing or expanding such ability, as determined by
11 the President.
12 "(2) The Secretary shall require a validated license for
13 any export of goods or technology listed under paragraph
14 (1)(A) to a country listed under paragraph (1)(B). The Secre-
15 tary shall deny any application for such a license if the Secre-
16 tary has reason to believe that the goods or technology will
17 be used by a country described in paragraph (1)(B) in produc-
18 ing or delivering chemical or biological weapons or will oth-
19 erwise be devoted to such purposes. Issuance of a license by
20 the Secretary shall be the only approval required for the ship-
21 ment of goods or technology on the list.
22 "(3)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
23 a determination of the Secretary to approve or deny an
24 export license application for the export of goods or technolo-
25 gy under this subsection may be made only after consultation
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1 with the Secretary of State, subject to subparagraph (B). In
2 any case where the Secretary of Commerce proposes to take
3 an action under this subsection without the concurrence of
4 the Secretary of State, the matter shall be referred to the
5 President for resolution.
6 "(B) In any case where an application subject to this
7 subsection involves a military item, a determination to ap-
8 prove or deny such an application may be made only after
9 consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State. In
10 any case where the Secretary of Commerce proposes to take
11 an action under this subsection without the concurrence of
12 the Secretary of Defense or State, the matter shall be re-
13 ferred to the President for resolution.".
14 SEC. 6. REPORT.
15 Section 14 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
16 (50 U.S.C. App. 2413) is amended-
17 (1) by striking the section heading and inserting
18 "REPORTS";
19 (2) by striking "CONTENTS" in subsection (a) and
20 inserting "ANNUAL REPORTS"; and
21 (3) by adding at the end the following: ,
22 "(g) REPORTS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
23 WEAPONS MATTER5.?(1) Not later than 90 days after the
24 date of enactment of this subsection, and every 180 days
25 thereafter, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the
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1 House of Representatives, the Minority Leader of the House
2 of Representatives, the Majority Leader and Minority Leader
3 of the Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
4 gence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
5 Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence,
6 the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
7 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a report
8 on the efforts of all foreign countries to acquire the material
9 and technology to produce and deliver chemical and biologi-
10 cal weapons, together with an assessment of the present and
11 future capability of those countries to produce and deliver
12 such weapons.
13 "(2) Each report under this subsection shall include an
14 assessment of whether and to what degree any Communist-
15 bloc country has aided or abetted any foreign country in its
16 efforts to acquire the material and technology described in
17 paragraph (1).
18 "(3) Each such report shall also list-
19 "(A) each company which in the past has aided or
20 abetted any foreign country in those efforts; and
21 "(B) each company which continues to aid or abet
22 any foreign country in those efforts, as of the date of
23 the report.
24 "(4) Such report shall also include an assessment as to
25 whether any company listed in paragraph (3)(A) or (3)(B) was
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1 aware that the assistance provided was for the purpose of
2 developing a chemical and biological weapons production and
3 delivery capability.
4 "(5) Each report under this subsection shall provide any
5 confirmed or credible intelligence or other information that
6 any non-Communist country has aided or abetted any foreign
7 country in those efforts, either directly or by facilitating the
8 activities of the companies listed in paragraph (3)(A) or
9 (3)(B), or had knowledge of the activities of the companies
10 listed in paragraph (3)(A) or (3)(B), but took no action to halt
11 or discourage such activities.
12 "(6) Nothing in this section-
13 "(A) requires the disclosure of information in vi-
14 lation of Senate Resolution 400 of the Ninety-fourth
15 Congress or otherwise alters, modifies, or supersedes
16 any of the authorities contained therein; or
17 "(B) shall be construed as requiring the President
18 to disclose any information which, in his judgment,
19 would seriously-
20 "(i) jeopardize the national security of the
21 United States;
22 "(ii) undermine existing and effective efforts
23 to meet the policy objectives outlined in section 4;
24 or
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2
3
10
"(iii) compromise sensitive intelligence oper-
ations, with resulting grave damage to the nation-
al security interests of the United States.
4 "(7) If the President, consistent with paragraph (6)(B),
5 decides not to list any company in that part of the report
6 required under paragraphs (3) and (5) which would have been
7 listed otherwise, the President shall include that fact in that
8 report, with his reasons therefor.".
9 SEC. 7. SANCTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES.
10 The Export Administration Act of 1979 is amended by
11 inserting after section 11A the following:
12 "CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL
13 VIOLATIONS
14 "SEC. 11B. (a) DETERMINATION BY THE PRE SI-
15 DENT.?The President, subject to subsection (c), shall apply
16 sanctions under subsection (b) if the President determines
17 that-
18 "(1) any foreign company has in the past aided or
19 abetted a country on the country list prepared pursuant
20 to section 6(k)(1)(B) of this Act in acquiring goods or
21 technology that were used in producing or delivering
22 chemical or biological weapons or were otherwise de-
23 voted to such purposes; or
24 "(2) any foreign company continues to aid or abet
25 a country on the country list prepared pursuant to sec-
26 tion 6(k)(1)(B) of this Act in acquiring goods or tech-
o 10
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1 nology that are being used in producing or delivering
2 chemical or biological weapons or were otherwise de-
3 voted to such purposes.
4 "(b) SANCTI0N.?(1) Before October 1, 1990, the
5 United States Government shall not procure, or contract for
6 the procurement of, any goods or services from any company
7 referred to in subsection (a)(1).
8 "(2) The United States Government shall not procure,
9 or contract for the procurement of, any goods or services
10 from any company referred to in subsection (a)(2). The provi-
11 sions of the preceding sentence shall cease to apply upon the
12 expiration of 2 years after the President certifies to the Con-
13 gress that-
14 "(A) conclusive intelligence or other information
15 demonstrates that such company has totally ceased to
16 aid or abet any foreign country in its efforts to acquire
17 goods and technology described in section 6(k)(1)(A);
18 and
19 "(B) in the President's judgment, it would be in
20 the national interest of the United States to again pro-
21 cure, or contract for the procurement of, goods and
22 services from such company.
23 "(3) The importation into the United States-
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1 "(A) before October 1, 1990, of products pro-
2 duced by a company referred to in subsection (a)(1),
3 and
4 "(B) before the close of the 2-year period de-
5 scribed in paragraph (2), of products produced by a
6 company referred to in subsection (a)(2) with respect to
7 which a certification under paragraph (2) was made,
8 is prohibited.
9 "(c) EXCEPTIONS.?The President shall not apply
10 sanctions under this section-
11 "(1) in the cast of procurement of defense articles
12 or defense services-
13 "(A) under existing contracts or subcon-
14 tracts, including the exercise of options for pro-
15 duction quantities to satisfy United States oper-
16 ational military requirements;
17 "(B) if the President determines that the
18 person or other entity to which the sanctions
19 would otherwise be applied is a sole source sup-
20 plier of essential defense articles or services and
21 no alternative supplier can be identified; or
22 "(C) if the President determines that such
23 articles or services are essential to the national
24 security under defense coproduction agreements;
25 "(2) to?
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1 "(A) products or services provided under
2 contracts entered into before the date on which
3 the President notifies the Congress of the inten-
4 tion to impose the sanctions;
5 "(B) spare parts;
6 "(C) component parts, but not finished prod-
7 ucts, essential to United States products or pro-
8 duction;
9 "(D) routine servicing and maintenance of
10 products; or
11 "(E) information and technology; or
12 "(3) to companies which in the President's assess-
13 ment provided so-called "dual-use" material or tech-
14 nology, and were unaware that the intended use of
15 that material or technology was the development of a
16 chemical weapons production or delivery system.
17 "(d) REVIEW OF RELATIONS.?The United States
18 Government should review the full range of its security, po-
19 litical, economic, and commercial relations with any country
20 named in a report submitted under section 14(g) for the pur-
21 pose of paragraph (2) or (5) of such section.
22 "(e) DEFINITIONS.?For purposes of this section-
23 "(1) the term 'component part' means any article
24 which is not usable for its intended functions without
25 being imbedded in or integrated into any other product
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1 and which, if used in production of a finished product,
2 would be substantially transformed in that process;
3 "(2) the term 'dual-use', when used in the context
4 of chemical materials or technology, means chemical
5 material or technology which may be utilized both in
6 the production or delivery of chemical weapons and in
7 the production or application of chemicals for other
8 uses;
9 "(3) the term 'finished product' means any article
10 which is usable for its intended functions without being
11 imbedded or integrated into any other product, but in
12 no case shall such term be deemed to include an article
13 produced by a person other than a sanctioned person
14 that contains parts or components of the sanctioned
15 person if the parts or components have been substan-
16 tially transformed during production of the finished
17 product; and
18 "(4) the term 'sanctioned person' means a person,
19 and any parent or successor entity of the person, upon
20 whom sanctions have been imposed under this sec-
21 tion.".
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101sT CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. 238
II
To amend the Arms Export Control Act to impose sanctions against firms
involved in the transfer of chemical and biological agents or their related
production equipment or technical assistance to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya,
and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 25 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989
Mr. HELMS (for himself, Mr. PELL, Mr. DOLE, and Mr. BoscHwaz) introduced
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
A BILL
To amend the Arms Export Control Act to impose sanctions
against firms involved in the transfer of chemical and bio-
logical agents or their related production equipment or tech-
nical assistance to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and for
other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Chemical and Biological
5 Warfare Prevention Act of 1989."
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7 The Congress finds that?
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1 (1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
2 recognizes that national security concerns may serve as
3 a legitimate basis for constricting free and open trade;
4 title XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
5 Trade states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be
6 construed . . . to prevent any contracting party from
7 taking any action which it considers necessary for the
8 protection of its essential security interests
9 (2) the essential security interests of the United
10 States require an immediate end to all trade in chemi-
11 cal and biological weapons, and transfers of technology
12 and delivery systems for chemical and biological weap-
13 ons, to certain destinations;
14 (3) four countries of the Middle East, Iran, Iraq,
15 Libya, and Syria, either support terrorism as a national
16 policy or have done so in the recent past;
17 (4) Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are either produc-
18 ing chemical weapons or on the verge of doing so;
19 (5) chemical weapons have been used by Iraq
20 against its own citizens;
21 (6) chemical weapons represent a grave new
22 threat to friendly countries of the Middle East and ulti-
23 mately the United States itself;
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/Th
3
1 (7) free world industrial firms have been instru-
2 mental in the development of chemical weapons in
3 these and other countries;
4 (8) any efforts by Communist-bloc countries to aid
5 and abet the production or use of chemical or biological
6 weapons, or to develop and deploy delivery systems for
7 such weapons, by Iraq, Libya, or any other nation of
8 the Middle East/Persian Gulf region are deplorable;
9 (9) international cooperation has so far been
10 unable to stem the trade in chemical and biological
11 weapons and their industrial inputs; and
12 (10) in order to inhibit the trade in chemical and
13 biological weapons and their industrial inputs, severe
14 sanctions must be applied to individuals and firms
15 which export prohibited items and technology to pro-
16 scribed destinations.
17 SEC. 3. POLICY.
18 It should be the policy of the United States to take all
19 appropriate measures-
20 (1) to discourage the proliferation of the material
21 and technology necessary and intended to produce or
22 deliver chemical weapons;
23 (2) to discourage all states from acquiring such
24 material and technology;
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1 (3) to discourage Communist-bloc countries from
2 aiding and abetting other countries from acquiring such
3 material and technology; and
4 (4) to discourage private companies in non-Corn-
5 munist countries from aiding and abetting other nations
6 from acquiring such material and technology.
7 SEC. 4. AMENDMENT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.
8 The Arms Export Control Act is amended by adding at
9 the end thereof the following new chapter:
10 "CHAPTER 7?SANCTIONS AGAINST FIRMS TRANS-
11 FERRING CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO TERRORIST
12 COUNTRIES
13 "SEC. 71. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EXPORTS.
14 "(a) PROMBITION.?(1)(A) No item on the list prepared
15 by the President under paragraph (2) which is subject to the
16 jurisdiction of the United States or which is exported by a
17 person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States may be
18 exported to a country described in subsection (b).
19 "(B) Subparagraph (A) does not apply to any export
20 pursuant to a contract entered into before the date of enact-
21 ment of this section.
22 "(2) The President shall prepare a list of chemical and
23 biological agents, production equipment, and technical assist-
24 ance the export of which would materially assist a country in
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1 attaining a chemical or biological warfare capability or sys-
2 tems for the delivery of chemical or biological weapons.
3 "(b) DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS.?The countries re-
4 ferred to in subsection (a) and section 73(a)(1) are Iran, Iraq,
5 Libya, Syria, or any country which has used chemical or bio-
6 logical weapons in the past five years or use such weapons
7 after date of enactment of this Act, except that any of these
8 countries shall be excluded, for purposes of applying such
9 provisions, beginning thirty days after the President requests
10 such exclusion by submitting the name of such country to the
11 Congress.
12 "SEC. 72. REPORT.
13 "(a) Not later than ninety days after the date of enact-
14 ment of this section, and every ninety days thereafter, the
15 President shall submit to the chairman of the Senate Com-
16 mittee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the House of
17 Representatives, a report on efforts by Iran, Iraq, Libya,
18 Syria, and any country which has, during the five years prior
19 to the report used chemical or biological weapons, to acquire
20 the material and technology to produce and deliver chemical
21 weapons, together with an assessment of such countries'
22 present and future capability to produce and deliver such
23 weapons.
24 "(b) Such report shall also include an assessment of
25 whether and to what degree Communist-bloc countries have
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1 aided and abetted the government any country reported upon
2 pursuant to subsection (a) in its effort to acquire the-material
3 and technology described in subsection (a).
4 "(c) Such report shall further list-
5 "(1) those companies in non-Communist countries
6 which in the past have aided and abetted the govern-
7 ment of any country reported on pursuant to subsection
8 (a) in that effort; and
9 "(2) those companies in non-Communist countries
10 which continue to aid and abet the government of any
11 country reported on pursuant to subsection (a), in that
12 effort, as of the date of the report.
13 "(d) Such report shall provide any confirmed or credible
14 intelligence or other information that any non-Communist
15 country has aided and abetted the government of any country
16 reported on pursuant to subsection (a) in that effort, either
17 directly or by facilitating the activities of the companies listed
18 in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) or had knowledge of
19 the activities of the companies listed in paragraph (1) or (2) of
20 subsection (c), but took no action to halt or discourage such
21 activities.
22 "(e) Nothing in the section requires the disclosure of
23 information in violation of Senate Resolution 400 of the
24 Ninety-fourth Congress or otherwise alters, modifies, or su-
25 persedes any of the authorities contained therein.
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1 "SEC. 73. MANDATORY SANCTIONS FOR FUTURE VIOLATIONS.
2 "(a) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.?The
3 President, subject to subsection (c), shall apply sanctions
4 under subsection (b) for a period of three years, if the Presi-
5 dent determines that, on or after the date of enactment of this
6 section, a United States or foreign person has exported any
7 item in violation of section 71(a).
8 "(b) SANCTIONS.?The sanctions referred to in subsec-
9 tion (a) shall apply to any person committing the violation, as
10 well as to any parent, affiliate, subsidiary, and successor
11 entity of the person, and, except as provided in subsection (c),
12 are as follows-
13 "(1) a prohibition on contracting with, and pro-
14 curement of products and services from, a sanctioned
15 person, by any department, agency, or instrumentality
16 of the United States Government;
17 "(2) a prohibition on importation into the United
18 States of all products produced by a sanctioned person;
19 and
20 "(3) a suspension of patent rights, as described in
21 section 75.
22 "(c) EXCEPTIONS.?The President shall not apply
23 sanctions under this section-
24 "(1) in the case of procurement of defense articles
25 or defense services?
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1 "(A) under existing contracts or subcon-
2 tracts, including the exercise of options for pro-
3 duction quantities to satisfy United States oper-
4 ational military requirements;
5 "(B) if the President determines that the
6 person or other entity to which the sanctions
7 would otherwise be applied is a sole source sup-
8 plier of essential defense articles or services and
9 no alternative supplier can be identified; or
10 "(C) if the President determines that such
11 articles or services are essential to the national
12 security under defense coproduction agreements;
13 or
14 "(2) to-
15 "(A) products or services provided under
16 contracts entered into before the date on which
17 the President notifies the Congress of the inten-
18 tion to impose the sanctions;
19 "(B) spare parts;
20 "(C) component parts, but not finished prod-
21 ucts, essential to United States products or pro-
22 duction;
23 "(D) routine servicing and maintenance of
24 products; or
25 "(E) information and technology.
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1 "(d) DEFINITIONS.?For purposes of this section-
2 "(1) the term 'component part' means any article
3 which is not usable for its intended functions without
4 being imbedded in or integrated into any other product
5 and which, if used in production of a finished product,
6 would be substantially transformed in that process;
7 "(2) the term 'finished product' means any article
8 which is usable for its intended functions without being
9 imbedded or integrated into any other product, but in
10 no case shall such term be deemed to include an article
11 produced by a person other than a sanctioned person
12 that contains parts or components of the sanctioned
13 person if the parts or components have been substan-
14 tially transformed during production of the finished
15 product; and
16 "(3) the term 'sanctioned person' means a person,
17 and any parent, affiliate, subsidiary, or successor entity
18 of the person, upon whom sanctions have been imposed
19 under this section.
20 "SEC. 74. PENALTIES.
21 "(a) IN GENERAL.?Whoever knowingly violates or
22 conspires to or attempts to violate section 71(a) shall be fined
23 nor more than five times the value of the exports involved or
24 $50,000, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than
25 five years, or both.
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1 "(b) CIVIL PENALTIES; ADMINISTRATIVE Sc-
2 TI0NS.?(1) The Secretary of Commerce (and officers and
3 employees of the Department of Commerce specifically desig-
4 nated by the Secretary) may impose a civil penalty not to
5 exceed $10,000 for each violation of section 71(a), either in
6 addition to or in lieu of any other liability or penalty which
7 may be imposed.
8 "(2)(A) The authority under law to suspend or revoke
9 the authority of any United States person to export goods or
10 technology may be used with respect to any violation of sec-
11 tion 71(a).
12 "(B) Any administrative sanction (including any civil
13 penalty or any suspension or revocation of authority to
14 export) imposed under section 71(a) may be imposed only
15 after notice and opportunity for an agency hearing on the
16 record in accordance with sections 554 through 557 of title
17 5, United States Code.
18 "SEC. 75. SUSPENSION OF PATENT RIGHTS.
19 "(a) The term of a patent granted pursuant to title 35,
20 United States Code, for any chemical agent or production
21 equipment, produced by a sanctioned person, including any
22 subsidiary of such person, under section 73(a) of the Arms
23 Export Control Act, shall be suspended for a period of three
24 years.
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1 "(b)(1) No rights under title 35, United States Code,
2 shall be derived from any patent described in subsection (a)
3 during the period of any such suspension.
4 "(2) Any suspension of patent rights imposed pursuant
5 to the provisions of this section shall not extend the term of
6 any such patent.
7 "(c)(1) Within thirty days after the date of enactment of
8 this Act, the Commissioner of Patents, after a determination
9 has been made regarding which companies have violated the
10 provisions of this Act, shall recommend the suspension of the
11 appropriate patents.
12 "(2) The Commissioner shall notify the holder of such
13 patent within thirty days after the date of such determination
14 and shall publish in the Federal Register a notice of such
15 determination, together with the factual and legal basis for
16 such determination. Any interested person may request,
17 within the sixty-day period beginning on the date of publica-
18 tion of a determination, that the Commissioner making the
19 determination hold a hearing on such determination. Such a
20 hearing shall be an informal hearing which is not subject to
21 section 554, 556, or 557 of title 5, United States Code. If
22 such a request is made within such period, the Commissioner
23 shall hold such hearing not later than thirty days after the
24 date of the request, or at the request of the person making
25 the request, not later than sixty days after such date. The
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1 Commissioner who is holding the hearing shall provide notice
2 of /the hearing to the company involved and to any interested
3 person and provide the owner and any interested person an
4 opportunity to participate in the hearing. Within thirty days
5 after the completion of the hearing, such Commissioner shall
6 affirm or revise the determination which was the subject of
7 the hearing and shall publish such affirmation or revision in
8 the Federal Register.
9 "(d) The Commissioner may establish such fees as are
10 appropriate to cover the costs of carrying out his duties and
11 functions under this section.
12 "(e) The Commissioner shall make the determination
13 that a patent is suspended and that the requirements of sub-
14 section (c) have been complied with. If the Commissioner de-
15 termines that the patent is suspended, he shall issue to the
16 owner of record of the patent a certificate of suspension,
17 under seal, stating the length of the suspension, and identify-
18 ing the product and the statute under which regulatory
19 review occurred. Such certificate shall be recorded in the offi-
20 cial file of the patent and shall be considered as part of the
21 original patent. The Commissioner shall publish in the Offi-
22 cial Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office a notice of
23 such suspension.".
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