REQUEST FOR IG REGULATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01264R000100010036-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: August 11, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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ADMINI'-iRATE'- INTERNAL USE ONLY"
OCA 87-3480 7
11 August 198,
FROM: (Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Request for IG Regulation
1. A few weeks ago, John Parisi of the staff of the Senate
Governmental Affairs committee requested a copy of the Agency's
Inspector General (IG) regulation. The staff wanted to compare
the IG's powers with those of the statutory IG. Accordingly, I
referred the request to Keith Hall of the staff of the Select
Committee on Intelligence.
2. Upon learning that the regulation was labeled
'!Administrative-Internal Use Only" and not classified, Hall
asked whether it was necessary to tell Parisi he could
a copy of the regulation. After discussing this with
Deputy Director for Legislation/OCA, I telephoned
to tell him that we preferred not to have copies of the
Agency's regulations retained outside of the oversight
committees. I also indicated that we would appreciate it if
he told Hall he could have a copy of the regulation this time,
but that future requests may be handled differently. He agreed
to say something to this effect.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
Distribution:
Orig. - OCA/LEG/Subject File: ; ongr}essiona-l O:vers_rght
1 - DDL/OCA
1 - OCARead
1 - OCA Registry
1 - OCA LE Chrono
OCA/LEG
11 Aug 87)
ADMINISTRATIVE /.INTERNAL USE ONLY
STAT
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August 7, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE -0,
the DOD authorization bill is disposed
of.
e .campaign financing reform bill
is a very important piece of legislation.
It goes to the heart of this institution,
the legislative branch of Government.
It goes to the heart of faith in the leg-
islative branch. It is important, and we
are going to have some more cloture
votes on that.
he reconciliation measure is some-
thing that cannot be avoided.
am going to make an effort to call
up the Grove City legislation.
Mr. President, we also have 13 ap-
propriation bills. There are eight ap-
propriation bills that have come over
from the House of Representatives al-
ready. We all know that, customarily,
appropriation bills originate in the
House-not by the Constitution but by
custom. I note, in looking at the calen-
dar, that actually nine appropriation
bills have now come over from the
House-one, the Labor-HHS-Educa-
tion appropriation bill, having been re-
ceived in the Senate only yesterday.
So there are nine appropriations
bills already here, and hearings have
been conducted in the Senate subcom-
mittees on these. But it will take a
little time for them to be marked up in
committee and reported out to the
floor.
We will have a busy time down the
road in dealing with these several ap-
propriations bills.
It is my intention and hope that the
Senate can indeed send to the Presi-
dent's desk these bills rather than
send to his desk one mammoth con-
tinuing resolution.
So, we have these and many other
important pieces of legislation, includ-
ing catastrophic illness.
Therefore, those who wish to expe-
dite action on the Bork nomination
should help the leadership to expedite
action on these bills.
Now, the House has no part in the
Bork nomination. That is a matter for
the Senate only under the Constitu-
tion. The role of advice and consent is
given by the Constitution only to this
House, the Senate, and it seems to me
the logical approach should be that we
dispose of the legislation as much. as
we can before we go to the Bork nomi-
nation because legislation when dis-
posed of here in so many instances has
to go back to' the House, there have to
be conferences thereon, and the House
has to stay around to dispose of that
legislation.
Now, it would be, I think, not very
reasonable to come back here and,
before we dispose of these major
pieces of legislation, we start to debate
the Bork nomination. That may take
quite a while. I hear that there may be
a filibuster and I see nose counts
around as to cloture votes, and all
that. I am not signing on either way
on that yet.
But what I am saying is, it does not
seem to be a very reasonable approach
to have that nomination come up and
take 2 or 3 weeks of the Senate's time,
while we delay legislation on which
the House has a role under the Consti-
tution. The House has no-role in the
advice and consent process.
So it is important that we dispose of
the legislation first as much as we can
do so. -
I urge Senators to help the leader-
ship to move the legislation forward.
Let us clear the decks so that when we
get to the Bork nomination we can
have a debate that is meaningful, that
is informative, informative not only to
the people but also to ourselves as to
the qualifications of this nominee and
as to the merits or demerits of confir-
mation of the nominee.
I implore those who have their feet
in cement and who are stiff-jawed
about the DOD authorization bill,
campaign finance reform, catastrophic
illness, and other measures, to let the
Senate get on with debate and action
on these measures. Let us clear the
decks and then we can have the kind
of debate that the country should ob-
serve and that the Senate is entitled to
engage in on the Bork nomination.
I do not think calumny should be
heaped on the chairman of the Judici-
ary Committee, Mr. BznEN, by those
who maintain that there is an inordin-
ant delay here and that it is a calculat-
ed delay.
It seems to me, as I say, the Judici-
ary chairman has moved about right.
He is not going too fast and he is not
going too slow. At the rate we are get-
ting legislation passed here-I am talk-
ing about the major legislation-at the
slow pace we are seeing on major legis-
lation that has to be disposed of
before we go out sine die this year, if
the slow pace continues, the Bork
nomination is going to be delayed.
Once the committee reports it out, if
the committee votes on October 1 and
reports that out, the Senate is not
going to be ready for it. Why? Because
the Senate will not have disposed of
the measures I have been talkin
about one way or the other: The D
authorization bill; let us get it u .
Those who have amendments, off r
them. Campaign financing reform bil ;
let us get cloture on it._ Let us get it u
Those who have amendments, offe
them.
This delay strategy, in holding back
these bills, is pushing them back, back,
back into September and then Octo-
ber.
The House is going to see no reason
why it should stay around here while
the Senate debates the Bork nomina-
tion.
I urge, I implore, I beseech,,I impor-
tune Senators who are holding back
and who will not let the Senate work
its will on these measures to let the
Senate go ahead with these measures
so that the Senate, indeed, will be
ready at a reasonably early time to
take up the Bork nomination and have
the kind of debate that it is entitled
to.
I want to see this Senate, the full
Senate, make the decision on Mr.
S 11585
Bork. Mr. Bork is entitled to a decision
by the full Senate. and if anyone is
under the impression that there is a
strategy here of delaying this nomina-
tion and pushing it over into the next
year, there is no such plan, and would
have no appeal to this Senator what-
soever. It is entirely alien to my think-
ing. This Senate in this session should
debate and dispose of that nomination
one way or the other.
I compliment the chairman, Senator
BIDEN. Those who would criticize him
should stop and think. I hope they will.
read my remarks and weigh them. I
feel that my remarks represent a rea-
sonable even-handed approach both to
the legislation and to the nomination,
And I hope that those who continue
to delay will come to their senses,
sober up a little bit, and come to an
understanding that the thing that
may delay the Bork nomination is the
very action that they themselves now
may be engaging in by delaying action
on legislation, delaying action on
DOD, delaying action on the cata-
strophic illness bill, delaying action on
the campaign financing reform bill, on
prompt payment legislation, and on
the State Department legislation.
I hope that, Mr. President, my re-
marks will be interpreted as positive
land helpful on all sides.
Mr. President, what is the situation
now as to morning business?
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GRAHAM). The time for morning busi-
ness has expired.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I believe I
have the leader's time reserved to me;
do I not?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
leader has reserved his time.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the Chair. I now claim that time.
ARMS TO THE AYATOLLAH
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the select
committee investigating the Iran-
Contra affair has now completed 3
months of public hearings, during
which the committee acquitted itself
in a distinguished manner. These his-
toric hearings refreshed our country's
tradition of open Government and
demonstrated that the best way to get
to the bottom of controversial activi-
ties is to air the facts fully, dispassion-.
ately, and carefully-and to let the
chips fall where they may.
As the closing statements of the dis-
tinguished Senators on the panel indi-
cated, the story which unfolded under
the rigorous prodding and hard work
of the committee, is a disappointing
one, a disturbing one, a disquieting
one. It is a story of arrogance, con-
tempt for the law, disdain for the
functions and structure of our Govern-
ment, and of circumvention of the
checks and balances which are the
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- . I
S 11586
"CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEDATE August 7, 1987
tried and true test of our constitution-
al system.
From the outset it was clear from
the testimony of General Secord, and
particularly the testimony of the oper-
ational figures who pursued the
arming of the ayatollah, that the
principal strategy of these men was to
avoid informing the Congress.
It is clear to me that laws were cir-
cumvented and loopholes vigorously
pursued. It is not possible to legislate
integrity, good faith, comity, among
the branches of Government. It is not
possible to legislatve high character.
No one can write mutual trust into a
statute. Trust has to be earned
through integrity.
And trust, like man's soul, once
gone, never returns.
I believe that the hearings have re-
vealed that certain fundamental cor-
rections should be made in the laws
governing covert operations.
I am sure that the Committee on In-
telligence will give its very close atten-
tion to these matters in a way that,
wherever the laws need to be changed,
such changes will be recommended.
It seems to me that the National Se-
curity Council and, indeed, any Gov-
ernment entity involved in such oper-
ations under the statute governing
those operations should be included.
And I am talking about the laws gov-
erning covert operations.
As I say, I think the National Securi-
ty Council and any Government entity
involved in such operations should be
included under the statute and should
be required the relevant congressional
committees. It is also clear that the
manner and timeliness of notification
to the Congress of covert operations
must be more explicit, and that the
use of third countries and private re-
sources to circumvent U.S. law must
be prohibited.
The need for these corrections is
clear from .recent reports of the draft-
ing of Executive orders in the White
House to accomplish these goals. This
is, of course, an admission of the need
to tighten up. the law. But, Mr. Presi-
dent, Executive orders are not good
enough because they are obeyed only
at the discretion and desire of the ad-
ministration. And we have seen in this
administration a determination to cir-
cumvent, to run around, to outflank,
to overturn, to avoid, to ignore the re-
quirements of the.law. In other words,
if the law does not permit us to do
what we do, find a way around it-
wink at it, smile at it, give it a nod. By
all means, avoid telling the Congress.
Do not let the people's representatives
know.
An administration adept at circum-
venting the laws and driving freight
trains through perceived loopholes
cannot be expected to police itself.
After the fox has eaten the chicken
for years on the matter of arming the
ayatollah, exchanging arms for hos-
tages, it is a brazen fox, indeed, which
now expects the Senate 'to agree that
the fox be deputized to guard the
chicken coop. And so I am pleased
that the Iran/Contra Committee is
now vigorously pursuing its mandate
in Senate Resolution 23, which created
the committee, to identify legislative
recommendations for the consider-
ation of the intelligence committee,
and other relevant Senate committees.
The Secretary of State was a re-
freshing relief in the parade of diffi-
cult witnesses hiding behind belliger-
ent, aggressive attorneys, who, them-
selves, should be held in contempt.
The Secretary of State indicated clear-
ly that the National Security staff had
been out of control, was too large, and
had usurped many of the functions of
the State and Defense Departments.
Indeed, this view was reinforced by
Secretary Weinberger. Clearly there is
something that needs to be done about
the size and activities of the NSC staff
to return it to its original function as a
coordinating body, the purpose of
which is to bring the full range of
policy options on important matters to
the President. We do not need any
more renegade cowboy heroes, operat-
ing in secret, with bizarre views of
what is patriotic and right, and some-
how able to command resources from
the rest of the executive branch.
Mr. President, the committee has
worked hard at unravelling this sad
tale of misjudgment and intrigue at
the highest levels of our Government.
The investigation has also had the sa-
lutory effect of stimulating other im-
portant lines of inquiry on these mat-
ters. Many questions are still not fully
answered, and may never be answered.
The story still is unfolding. Of particu-
lar note is a column by Flora Lewis of
the New York Times, which indicates
that the secret policy of arming the
Ayatollah may even have begun early
in the 1980's, and that this bribery and
ransom strategy was on the minds of
the inner circle of presidential advi-
sors even before his administration
took office. What other explanation is
there for the allegation Flora Lewis
notes, of a meeting between Mr. Allen,
the first security adviser to the Presi-
dent, and a campaign official, who ap-
parently met with Iranian officials
during that Presidential campaign,
and who may have been linked to Is-
raeli shipments of weapons to the Aya-
tollah in the early 1980's. This opens
up disturbing questions about the lon-
gevity of this illconceived arms for
hostages strategy. It needs further in-
vestigation, in my,judgment.
I again commend the select commit-
tee for its strenuous labors and look
forward to its recommendations and
report and to any additional investiga-
tion it deems appropriate on these
matters during the next several
months.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article by Flora Lewis in
the New York Times on August 3, .198?
and an article from the Washington
Times, dated August 4, 1987, be print-
ed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the arti-
cles were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Aug. 3, 19871
THE WILES OF TEHERAN
(By Flora Lewis)
PARIs.-Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Iranian
strongman, has now provoked a scandal in
France with charges that Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac urged. Teheran not to re-
lease French hostages before the March 16,
1986, elections, which he won.
Mr. Chirac vehemently denies the charge.
He did launch an attempt to "normalize" re-
lations once he took office and made several
concessions, though not enough to satisfy
Teheran. Four hostages were released after
he came to power, but another was taken.
It was Mr. Rafsanjani who revealed de-
tails of the U.S. arms-for-hostages deal last
year. He has hinted he has more such politi-
cal ammunition. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr,
former President of Iran, knows something
about it and believes he knows the motives.
Mr. Banff-Sadr, now exiled near Paris, told
me Saturday that after Iraq's invasion in
September 1980, he was desperate to restore
relations with the U.S. so as to buy military
spare parts. "We only had 5 to 10 days' sup-
plies," he said. That meant negotiating re-
lease of U.S. hostages taken before he
became. president in January 1980. What he
considered a good start was made with the
Carter Administration.
"But in October, everything suddenly
stopped. My aides found out it was because
the group in charge of hostage policy, Raf-
sanjani, Mohammed Beheshti and Khomen-
ini's son, did not want Carter to win the
election. There was a meeting in Paris be-
tween a representative of Beheshti and a
representative of the Reagan campaign."
Mr. Bani-Sadr did not know their names,
nor did he learn until later about an Octo-
ber meeting in Washington of an Iranian
envoy with three Reagan workers, Richard
V. Allen and Robert McFarlane, who later
became national security advisers, and Lau-
rence Silberman.
However, Mr. Bani-Sadr says that these
and subsequent events confirm for him per-
sistent rumors that the Reagan campaign
offered arms if the hostages were not re-
leased until after the 1980 election. In
effect, they were released at the same time
as Mr. Reagan was inaugurated.
There is no reason to believe that Mr.
Banff-Sadr is .more dedicated to full candor
than .American witnesses at. Congressional
hearings. He offers no firm proof of the
charge.
However, arms did start going to Iran
from Israel in the first half of 1981, includ-
ing.spare parts for Iran's crippled American
fighter planes. This came to light in the last
week of July 1981, when a chartered Argen-
tine plane crashed on Soviet territory, ap-
parently off course on its flight .from Israel
to Iran over Turkey. IvIr. Bani-Sadr says the
Argentine load of weapons was "the second
or third shipment." He was ousted in a coup
in July 1981, and has no direct information
of what happened later.
The C.I.A. knew about the shipments,
Bobby Ray Inman, then deputy director,
told me a year or so afterward. It is not
clear whether Israel acted with U.S. approv-
al or in apparent violation of its pledge not
to transfer U.S. weapons without Washing-
ton's permission.
Mr. Bani-Sadr said that when hostage ne-
gotiations broke down with the Carter Ad=
ministration, he warned Ayatollah Kho-
meini that relations would not improve with
Mr. Reagan in power, "they will blame Iran
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August 7, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
for everything." He said the Ayatollah re-
plied, "So much the better, that will bring a
crisis." As what he calls an excuse to stall
until the U.S. elections, Iran demanded a
$24 billion guarantee from the U.S., dropped
soon afterward.
Now, he points out, Mr. Rafsanjani, who
has control of the Iranian war effort, is
going for total political power, domestically
as well. This was indicated in the same July
23 interview with the Teheran paper Ete-
laat in which Mr. Rafsanjani made his
charges against Prime Minister Chirac. He
told the interviewer that it was necessary to
unite responsibility for domestic affairs just
as for the war.
To achieve his aim, Mr. Bani-Sadr says,
Mr. Rafsanjani needs external crises, and he
suggests the massacres in Mecca was delib-
erately provoked to bring a crisis with
Saudia Arabia as well as with the U.S. and
France. "He is like Hitler, he needs new
fronts," he said.
"But I don't understand why Reagan,
Chirac, King Fahd play his game. They are
actually helping him. It takes two to make a
crisis. That's what kidnapping and terrorism
is used for, otherwise there would be no
point."
Of course, Mr. Bani-Sadr, who claims
there was no Iranian-sponsored hostage-
taking or terrorism during his 18 months as
president, is self-serving. But he does know
a lot about the mentality and inner work-
ings of the Iranian regime, and how shrewd-
ly it is able to play on divisions within and
among Western states. If Western politi-
cians and governments cooperated honestly,
it wouldn't be possible. We do help Teheran
to outsmart us.
[From The Washington Times, Aug. 4, 1987]
NEW RULES ON COVERT ACTIVITIES DRAW
FIRE
(By Tom Diaz and Bill Gertz)
Senior members of the U.S. intelligence
community are upset by a draft presidential
executive order on covert operations they
say is'being "rammed through" the White
House by the National Security Council
staff.
Opponents say the order, which- is nearly
completed, will effectively gut the country's
ability to carry out all but routine intelli-
gence gathering.
"This order would do [to covert oper-
ations] what the old Church committee and
the Carter administration tried to do," said
one administration source. "It is a 'charter'
mentality. You don't ban these operations,
but you so restrict.them with written rules
that they in effect, can't be done."
The new draft is said to still be the sub-
ject of argument within the administration,
but has the support of National - Security
Adviser Frank Carlucci,and D. Barry Kelly.
the NSC intelligence director who has come
under fire from critics who say he has re-
treated from past intelligence policies. Paul
S. Stevens, the new NSC legal adviser, also
was said to have taken part in drafting the
new order.
Some critics charge the White House staff
is trying to push the order-through for po-
litical purposes, aiming at a public relations
blitz on "intelligence . reform" just before
Congress goes into recess.
One senior intelligence official condemned
the proposal as "preposterous" and said the
restrictions could lead to unauthorized oper-
ations of the type organized by Marine Lt.
Col. Oliver North, who along with retired
Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, supported the
Nicaraguan resistance forces.
"This is precisely the kind of thing that
creates more freelancing," the official said.
"When the legitimate guys can't do any-
thing, they will turn to extra-legal means."
According to a source who has seen the
document-titled "Approval, Review and
Notification of Special Activites"-it sets
out strict requirements governing all intelli-
gence activities other than "straight collec-
tion" of data.
But a White House source said discussions
between the White House and Congress on
the new covert action guidelines were in the
final stages. The new rules could be released
as a "rewrite" of Executive Order 12333,
which outlines permissible intelligence ac-
tivities.
"The only issue outstanding is the timing
of notification," the source said.
Another White House official opposed to
the new intelligence order said the proposal
sends the wrong signal to the public in the
wake of the Iran-Contra affair. Proper
covert action procedures were not followed
by Col. North in the Iran arms and Nicara-
guan rebel resupply efforts, the official said.
"The president ought to be asserting his
powers when he's under the gun, not fur-
thering the erroneous public perception
that something was done that was less than
constitutional," the official said.
As of last weekend, the document was un-
classified, and its supporters intend to issue
it as a public document, a plan that also is
criticized by some members of the intelli-
gence community.
"Why lay out all of our internal ground
rules for the world to see?" said one source.
"Can you imagine the Kremlin doing that?"
The source who has read the document
said it contains the following major points
with which some key members of the intelli-
gence community take exception:
All activity other than intelligence collec-
tion will be considered "special" activity,
subject to the requirement for a presiden-
tial "finding" authorizing the activity. In
addition to making counterintelligence a
"special" activity subject to such a finding,
it also apparently would require presidential
findings for very delicate intelligence-gath-
ering operations outside of normal chan-
nels.
"Some of these are one-time intelligence
coups presented by a special circumstance,"
said a source familiar with them. "If you
have to run these things through the White
House bureaucracy, they'll never happen."
The president will be required to sign
every finding every year, in effect recertify-
ing the need for the activity. Critics fear the
staff time and paper work inevitably re-
quired by such a rule will lead to bureau-
cratic inertia.
"It will become a lot easier to say, 'Heck,
they'll never approve that.'" said one
source.
The president will be required to notify
Congress within 48 hours of every finding,
without exception. A congressional source
511587
strike a balance between executive and leg-
islative authority.
State Department and CIA officials testi-
fied in June against two House bills that
would amend covert action reporting proce-
dures in the 1980 Intelligence Oversight
Act. One bill requires advanced notice of all
covert action programs, and a second meas-
ure would allow for a maximum 48-hour
delay.
CIA General Counsel David P. Doherty
told the House Intelligence Committee the
bills "impermissibly intrude on the presi-
dent's authority in foreign affairs."
The Iran arms transfers, he said, "stand
as an exception to this administration's
practices."
All findings will be required to certify that
the proposed activity not only conforms to
U.S. law, but also to "international law."
Critics say the question of what is and is not
permitted in the area of covert operations
under international law is a subject of in-
tense debate.
"The order doesn't say so, but you know
who will make the decision on what interna-
tional law permits: the State Department,"
said one source. He implied that the State
Department's hostility to covert operations
would ensure that few if any covert oper-
ations would be found to meet the proposed
order's test.
Other less controversial points said to be
included in the draft order are:
Requiring presidential findings when spe-
cial activities are carried out, regardless of
the agency involved. This would close the so
called "Department of Agriculture" loop-
hole, under which in the past it has been at
least theoretically possible to assign a covert
mission to an agency other than the Central
Intelligence -Agency, thereby avoiding the
need for a presidential finding authorizing
it.
Banning any retroactively effective find-
ings, such as was involved in one of the arms
sales to Iran.
Sen. Chic Hecht, Nevada Republican and
a member of the -Intelligence Committee,
said in an interview yesterday the proposed
covert action guidelines appear to be an
"overreaction" by the NSC staff to the Iran-
Contra hearings.
"I was against the Iran-Contra hearings
-because I said at the start that they would
jeopardize our worldwide intelligence appa-
ratus," Mr. Hecht said. "My worst fears
have been realized."
Intelligence activities, such as covert
action, require professionals to carry them
out, said Mr. Hecht, who was once a covert
operative.
"We must not tie the hands of those indi-
viduals that are seeking to maintain the se-
curity of America," Mr. Hecht said. "I hope
we don't get to the point where every intelli-
said current language calls for notification . gence agent will have to have a law degree -
within "two working days." to interpret his job."
Critics say this would make some oper- The most recent version of Executive
ations-such as the 1980 rescue of American Order 12333 was issued by President Reagan
hostages hiding in the Canadian Embassy in in 1981.
Tehran-impossible to mount. It contains a one-paragraph explanation
Stansfield Turner, CIA director during of the role of "Special activities"-the term
the Carter administration, told the House for covert action programs-that officials
Intelligence Committee in April that he op- say leaves the president with more flexibil-
posed such strict reporting procedures since ity than the proposed order.
a requirement for advanced notification or a The order states that the CIA director-
maximum 48-hour delay would have scut- "shall be responsible to the president and
tled a covert rescue mission of U.S. hostages the NSC and shall ... conduct special ac-
in Iran on the drawing board. tivities approved by the President. No
Under the 1980 Intelligence Oversight agency except the CIA [and the military in
Act, all presidentially approved covert oiler- time of declared war] may conduct any spe-
ations must be revealed to select members cial activity unless the president determines
of Congress "in a timely fashion." The that another agency is more likely to
wording was left ambiguous in order to achieve a particular objective."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09 :
CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100010036-8 -