PROSPECTS FOR COUNTERTERRORIST COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90R00038R000300340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
S ret
Central
4%4d' Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
_DO KIT GIVE OUT
03 MARK ON
25X1
Prospects for Counterterrorist
Cooperation Among
Developed Countries
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Se et
I JIM 86-10007
May 1986
Copy 4 6 4
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NI IIM 86-10007
PROSPECTS FOR COUNTERTERRORIST
COOPERATION AMONG
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Information available as of 31 March 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum,
approved for publication on 25 April 1986 by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
v
KEY JUDGMENTS
1
DISCUSSION
5
Determinants of Counterterrorist Policy
5
International Cooperation To Combat Terrorism
5
The Difficult Question of Sanctions Against State-Supported
Terrorism
5
Clubs, Conventions, and Extradition Treaties
7
Multilateral Clubs
7
International Conventions
8
Bilateral Extradition Treaties
10
Prospects for Enhanced Counterterrorist Cooperation
10
ANNEX A: The Domestic Versus International Threat
15
ANNEX B: Country Attitudes
21
ANNEX C: Multilateral Groups
23
ANNEX D: International Conventions and Declarations
25
iii
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum assesses the current situation and some pros-
pects for increased international cooperation on terrorism. In so doing it
examines the orientation and effectiveness of counterterrorist policies in
11 West European countries and Japan and the present potential for
expanded counterterrorist cooperation among these countries with the
United States.
' Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany. The Scandinavian countries have not been included in this analysis. While not entirely
immune from terrorist incidents?as evidenced by the recent murder of Swedish Prime Minister Palme and
problems arising from an influx of Middle Eastern refugees?Nordic countries are generally low-threat
areas, and their governments heretofore have not been active in counterterrorist cooperation.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
While combating local terrorist organizations remains a high
priority for the developed countries, the United States cannot count on
effective multilateral action from its West European allies and Japan to
thwart terrorist states and organizations and must depend largely on
bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism fomented by nonindigenous,
primarily Middle Eastern, elements. While strong bilateral relations are
useful and important, an effective multilateral agreement?or web of
bilateral agreements tantamount to a multilateral agreement?could
lead to more efficient counteractions against increasingly mobile terror-
ists.
None of the 12 developed states under study in this IIM has taken,
is taking, or contemplates taking a leadership role against states that
sponsor terrorism. Varying degrees of action have been taken against
foreign terrorist organizations that may or may not be active on the na-
tional territory of these developed countries.
Many forces preclude adoption of significant multilateral actions
against foreign sponsors and perpetrators of terrorism. Chief among
these forces are conflicting economic interests, competing foreign policy
priorities, concerns not to abridge sovereignty, fear of terrorist retalia-
tion, and concerns not to compromise intelligence. These considerations
are often amplified in multilateral settings but may be more easily
accommodated or sidestepped in bilateral dealings.2
Most European governments believe bilateral exchanges to be the
most useful form of counterterrorist cooperation and, accordingly, in
recent years have developed a series of such relationships with neigh-
boring or friendly states. They nonetheless recognize the utility of
formalized working-level contacts fostered by multilateral groupings.
Recent terrorist violence in Western Europe and signs of limited
cooperation among some European leftwing groups and increased
-spillover" of Middle Eastern violence have made some governments
2 The Director of INR believes that the JIM, through its emphasis on multilaterialism as a method of
counterterrorist cooperation, underestimates the importance of bilateral cooperative efforts and their
prospects for success. As a result, the JIM does not pinpoint the areas where bilateral cooperation may be
preferable to multilateral approaches and vice versa, nor the impact of international counterterrorist
efforts on containing terrorism. Moreover, the JIM does not fully distinguish between the very different
problems of multilateral action against states that sponsor terrorism as opposed to bilateral or
multilateral action against selected terrorist groups, some of which have no major outside benefactor. The
Director, however, believes that the JIM is valuable in that it pulls together for the first time a range of
information on the organization and operations of multilateral counterterrorism fora.
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more receptive than before to assistance and training from like-minded
states and more willing to broaden counterterrorist discussions. Most
West European countries, however, continue to be wary of potential US
domination of counterterrorist initiatives in multilateral fora.
Countries that have experienced a significant domestic terrorist
threat?Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Tur-
key?are supportive of international cooperation as long as such
cooperation does not conflict with other areas of national policy goals
they consider more important. Although Belgium and Portugal each
have made some progress against domestic terrorists?particularly the
Belgians?both countries continue to grapple with inadequate counter-
terrorist resources, debilitating rivalries among services, and a dearth of
experienced personnel. We believe, moreover, that both will continue to
be circumspect about confronting foreign terrorists who operate on their
soil. States that are troubled principally by foreign terrorists, such as
Greece, are more resistant to joining international efforts, in part
because of ideological sympathies with some groups, such as the
Palestine Liberation Organization, that also engage in terrorist acts, but
primarily for fear of terrorist or economic retaliation. Although Japan
has a group capable of carrying out terrorist acts, the government goes
along with international initiatives only when there is a clear consensus
of countries in favor of specific counterterrorist measures.
Despite the continuing promotion and export of terrorism by
Libya, Syria, and Iran, most West European countries and Japan are not
prepared to impose unilateral or multilateral sanctions against them
because they believe such measures would put at greater risk the lives of
their citizens residing in these countries, jeopardize existing economic
equities and political goals, and have little or no impact on the behavior
of these radical states. Their policies toward these states are for the most
part permissive. Some, moreover, such as France and West Germany,
have even moved to improve relations with one of the major sponsors of
state terrorism?Iran.
Attempts by the United States to elicit support for US observer
status in the Trevi Group have not been successful. A more mutually
satisfactory arrangement would be a regularized US liaison relationship
with Trevi 3?short of observer status?that would ensure US under-
standing of group deliberations on a more consistent basis than is now
the case.
The barriers to more active cooperation on a multilateral basis
remain high. Closer counterterrorist cooperation with like-minded states
probably will continue to evolve in response to particular crises.
The Trevi Group, an outgrowth of European Political Cooperation, was established in 1976 to
promote counterterrorist cooperation among EC member states.
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Although the West European members of the Bonn Group 4 are
likely to remain reluctant to agree on measures to increase mutual
cooperation, we believe most would welcome an opportunity to hold
bilateral rounds at the summit on salient terrorist and counterterrorist
issues without, however, being held to commitments for multilateral
statements of intent to act.
Furthermore, group members probably would be more receptive
to the concept of a -menu- of different types of actions they could take
in response to specific types of international terrorist events. A flexible
approach would provide a framework in which governments could
choose response options that are compatible with their own national
goals and not in direct conflict with their perceived interests.
The European Economic 'Community's new permanent working
group on terrorism and the abuse of diplomatic immunity, which met in
March 1986, offers a promising avenue of clearly focused counterterror-
ist cooperation. Nevertheless, the countries involved will almost certain-
ly avoid unraveling sensitive areas of international consensus regarding
diplomatic privileges and immunities that the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations has pulled together.
In the past, allied sensitivities have constrained NATO's consider-
ation of, and as a result actions against, international terrorism, but a se-
ries of anti-NATO terrorist attacks by indigenous West European
groups since late 1984 has led to some positive shifts in attitudes. There
has been little concrete action, however, on the part of the Alliance.
Like the Bonn Group we expect that NATO talks on terrorism probably
will reflect?and be limited by?a desire not to duplicate efforts in
other multilateral fora
The Western Mediterranean Club, established in 1983, represents
the first instance in which West European governments (France, Italy,
Spain) have drawn two Arab countries (Tunisia and Morocco) into a
multilateral arrangement in such a sensitive area of cooperation as
counterterrorism. We are skeptical, however, of the group's ability to
have worthwhile exchanges on this subject in view of Tunisia's support
of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the fact that many
apprehended Arab terrorists possess false or authentic Moroccan pass-
ports. These concerns notwithstanding, the formation of this group
almost certainly signals an awareness among the West European
participants that counterterrorism is best approached on a regional
basis.
' The Bonn Group's members are the seven summit countries: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States
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Most bilateral extradition treaties between individual states ad-
dressed here date from the late 19th or early 20th centuries and are out-
moded documents that do not take into account modern technologies of
transportation, communications, and weaponry. Updated treaties have
been negotiated since 1983 between the United States and Italy; the
United States and the United Kingdom; Italy and the United Kingdom;
and Spain and the United Kingdom. For many of the other countries;
the primary reservation to extradition is their unwillingness to concede
what they view as their legal rights as sovereign nations, which may be a
pretext for domestic political considerations or broader foreign policy
concerns.
Although multilateral cooperation to reduce or punish terrorist
activity has prompted eight international agreements since 1969, in-
cluding the well-known European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism (Strasbourg Convention) and the Summit Seven countries'
Bonn Declaration on aircraft hijacking, these efforts have met with
mixed success, which does not augur well for future initiatives. Some
countries will remain reluctant to ratify the former, because of
reservations about distinctions between political offenses and terrorist
crimes and a hesitation to cede sovereign judicial authority.
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DISCUSSION
Determinants of Counterterrorist Policy
1. An increase in the global level of terrorist vio-
lence has compelled many governments to reassess
their counterterrorist policies and capabilities. The
basic consideration that determines how governments
deal with terrorism on their soil or against their
interests is whether terrorism is domestic or foreign in
its origin and affiliations. Another leading determinant
is the official response public opinion will demand or
support (see annex B).
2. The nature and provenance of the terrorist threat
are key factors in shaping a government's response.
Most West European governments and Japan have
shown a readiness to respond firmly to indigenous
terrorism. In cases of separatist or ethnic terrorism?as
in Spain and the United Kingdom?and instances of
substantial sociopolitical or generational terrorism?as
in West Germany and Italy?governments have not
hesitated to act forcefully against the perpetrators.
Belgium, Portugal, and Japan have generally respond-
ed in a similar manner with mixed results. On an
altogether different scale, Turkey responded to wide-
spread domestic political terrorism and the consequent
possibility of civil war with full-scale military inter-
vention. Official reaction to foreign terrorism may be
muted, however, if foreign policy interests counsel
restraint?as they often do in France and Greece?or
if a tough response is perceived as potentially compli-
cating an official policy of neutrality?as in the case of
Austria and Switzerland.
3. Public opinion is another major factor in deter-
mining how tough West European governments will
be on terrorists. In West Germany, Italy, Spain, and
the United Kingdom, in particular, where indigenous
terrorist groups are active, terrorism has consistently
ranked among the top noneconomic problems in sur-
veys attempting to identify the most serious challenges
to social order and political stability that a country
faces (see annex B). Public perceptions of a significant
terrorist threat have provided the impetus and the
mandate for governments to adopt special laws and
resort to tough counterterrorist measures. At the same
time, however, public opinion is amenable to or
sometimes demands that a government exercise le-
niency with "repentant" terrorists or negotiate with
terrorist groups rather than eliminate them through
conventional police methods. For the British, Italian,
Spanish, and, to a lesser extent, Turkish Governments,
stern government countermeasures are encouraged
because popular perceptions of official success in
suppressing terrorism may have an impact on the
ability to govern effectively.
International Cooperation to Combat Terrorism
The Difficult Question of Sanctions Against State-
Supported Terrorism
4. How to deal with state-supported terrorism of
Arab and Middle Eastern origin continues to be a
delicate question even for West European govern-
ments otherwise strongly committed to combating
terrorism. For example, major West European coun-
tries and Japan traditionally have resisted adopting
joint trade measures aimed at punishing or isolating
states that sponsor international terrorist activity. Even
in the case of Libya, increased concern among major
West European governments about Libyan leader
Qadhafi's promotion of terrorism does not, for the
most part, outweigh the importance of their economic
and political stakes in Tripoli.
5. Italy's strong historic ties, extensive trade links
and geographic proximity argue against any measures
that would endanger those interests or anger Tripoli.
Indeed, despite indications of Libyan complicity in
the December 1985 attack at Fiumicino airport, it
appears that Rome currently has no plans to alter
significantly its policy toward Libya. Libyan terrorism
against exiles resident in Italy peaked in 1981 and has
not reached that level since
Italy is a major participant in development of Libya's
offshore oil resources. Tripoli imported more than $2
billion in goods from Italy in 1984 and, moreover,
holds a 14.5 percent interest in FIAT. The presence of
some 10,000 to 15,000 Italians in Libya would give
Rome pause even in the absence of economic interests.
The Italians are also likely to avoid any moves they
think might give Qadhafi reason to renew threats
against the NATO INF base at Comiso, Sicily. With so
much vested in bilateral relations, it appears that only
a series of actions more massive and horrendous than
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the airport attack and conclusively traced to Tripoli
would prompt a reassessment by Rome.
6. The terrorist events surrounding the siege at the
Libyan People's Bureau in London in April 1984
prompted Britain to break diplomatic relations with
Tripoli and press within the EC for a review of the
1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic privileges and
immunities with a view to better enforcement of its
provisions. Although diplomatic ties remain severed,
London's economic interests have not suffered as a
result; on the contrary, British commercial links are
largely undisturbed. Tripoli still refuses, however, to
abandon efforts to stalk its opponents in the United
Kingdom. While this provides London little impetus to
restore relations, it also suggests that a diplomatic
rupture has had a limited effect on Libyan behavior.
7. West Germany values Libya as its third-largest
oil source and as a market for German goods but was
shaken when Tripoli seized and held West German
nationals in Libya in 1983 in retaliation for the arrest
of Libyan terrorists in West Germany. Following these
and other terrorist acts, Bonn reached a "gentleman's"
agreement with Tripoli calling for the avoidance of
further confrontations. Foreign Minister Genscher
sought and received assurances from Libyan officials
in 1984 that terrorism on West German soil would
cease. This understanding was broken early in 1985,
however, in an incident in which two West Germans
were wounded by a Libyan gunman. As a result, Bonn
quietly expelled four Libyan officials in July and
warned that it would cut diplomatic ties if Tripoli
continued to attack anti-Qadhafi dissidents in West
Germany. This was an unprecedented move, but we
do not believe Bonn would carry out its threat as the
Foreign and Economic Ministries fear retaliation
against 2,000 West Germans in Libya and cancellation
of commercial contracts worth $4 billion. Recently
Bonn has been quietly cutting back on its deliveries of
Libyan oil in favor of other suppliers.
8. French attitudes toward Libya turn more on
Qadhafi's attempts to subvert former French colonies
than they do on his policy of exporting terrorism.
Although Prime Minister Chirac has expressed the
new center-right government's strong support for in-
ternational cooperation on terrorism and "strong ac-
tion" terrorists, he recently told senior US officials that
a -moderate" approach to Qadhafi would better serve
US and French interests. Paris apparently believes its
interests are best served by trying to entice Qadhafi by
diplomatic means into such action as leaving Chad.
Offers of limited arms sales play a role as well, but,
Qadhafi's recent actions aimed at
destabilizing Tunisia are likely, in our view, to intensi-
fy Paris's focus on this aspect of Libyan behavior
rather than its support for terrorism. Moreover, Tripoli
is quite capable of repeating its 1983 step of holding
French citizens in Libya hostage to obtain the release
of Libyans arrested in France
9. West European nations also see their relations
with Syria as enmeshed in a web of complex consider-
ations that make it advisable not to focus too much on
its involvement with terrorism. French relations with
Syria make clear that Paris has decided to downplay
the issue of Syrian support for terrorism as part of the
price for improved relations. On the one hand, French
security officials have long suspected Syrian complic-
ity in a series of attacks on French interests in
Lebanon?including the assassination of a French
ambassador, the bombing of the French contingent of
the Multinational Force, and the kidnaping of French
diplomats and journalists. On the other hand, French
policymakers have publicly acknowledged that Syria is
a major regional power that must be reckoned with.
Priority has been given to the political considerations,
and Paris seeks to cultivate the Syrians through an
expanding program of arms sales and high-level visits,
while not pressing the terrorism issue.
10. The West European posture toward Iran is
characterized in the main by caution, with some
countries trying to maintain a strict balance in their
dealings with both Tehran and Baghdad, and avoiding
confrontations with Iran over its export of terrorism
aimed at regime opponents. The West Europeans are
aware that Khomeini's adherents are willing to avenge
any insults or actions against their fundamentalist
zealots and might counter any Western moves to
suppress Iranian terrorism by escalating bombing and
assassination attempts. To this end, trade threats and
diplomatic injunctions against Tehran appear fruit-
less?and dangerous. Most West European govern-
ments hope ultimately to restore full relations with
Iran, and appear spurred in part by a perception that
in the long term Iran will prevail over Iraq in the
region.
11. Japan is also uncomfortable with the idea of
trade or diplomatic sanctions as a method for combat-
ing terrorism, and it has been reluctant in the past to
subscribe to any measures not universally adopted.
This applies especially to the Middle East from which
Tokyo draws 70 percent of its crude oil supplies. Japan
will let other governments take the lead in any
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protests, and then cites outside pressure?particularly
from the United States?as a reason for joining in a
unified response against terrorists. Most recently, pres-
sure from the United States and South Korea induced
Tokyo to impose trade sanctions on North Korea after
the 1983 Rangoon bombing incident. Japan waited
until the Burmese Government fixed blame on P'yon-
yang before acting, however, and lifted the measures
this year. In the absence of Iranian or Libyan threats
against Japanese interests, Tokyo almost certainly feels
little compunction to volunteer for punitive trade
measures.
Clubs, Conventions, and Extradition Treaties
Multilateral Clubs
12. Despite their reluctance to use trade and diplo-
matic sanctions, most West European governments
officially acknowledge that some sort of response to
terrorist acts is necessary. In general, however, they
prefer bilateral to multilateral counterterrorist re-
sponses or initiatives?as in the wake of the TWA
hijacking and the Achille Lauro affair because achiev-
ing a consensus on concerted action by Allied or like-
minded countries is so difficult. 5 They nonetheless
understand the utility of formalized working-level
contacts among specialists, which are fostered by
multilateral groupings. Although several governments,
notably the British and French, assert that multilateral
exchanges require that information in the group be
geared to a lowest common denominator-
-they participate nonet e ess in a variety
of counterterrorist groups and organizations.6 Of the
multilateral clubs, some function as vehicles for con-
sultation and cooperation among security officials at
the technical level such as the Club of Bern and the
Trevi Group. Others deal with broader aspects of
counterterrorist policy at the ministerial level. These
include the Council of Five, the Bonn Group, the
Western Mediterranean Club, and NATO (see annex
C).
13. The level of US access to the proceedings of
these groups fluctuates. While the United States is not
a member of the Club of Bern, the FBI is a recipient
Somewhat apart from this view, Tokyo often prefers a multilat-
eral approach whereby hard political or economic decisions may be
sidestepped and exposure to economic or terrorist retaliation thus
avoided or limited.
Turkey is the only country here that does not belong to any
multilateral counterterrorist group, unless such talks within NATO
are counted. Ankara has bilateral contacts, however, with the United
States, West Germany, and other governments.
of some of the information disseminated through its
secure telex systems. Several efforts to elicit support
for US observer status in the Trevi Group have not
succeeded. The United States intermittently receives
readouts, however, of aspects of Trevi's work that are
of interest to the United States. In 1982 EC member
states reluctantly agreed that the Trevi's chairing
country?which corresponds to the rotation of the EC
presidency?could brief the United States on Trevi
proceedings and, moreover, that other member states
could provide supplementary briefings. The thorough-
ness and detail of any briefing is at the discretion of
the presidency country. During their respective chair-
manships, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark,
and, in particular, West Germany have accommodat-
ed US interest in Trevi's activities.
14. The well-known Bonn Group consisting of Can-
ada, France (which often refrains from participation),
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and
the United States traditionally has had problems agree-
ing on measures to increase counterterrorism coopera-
tion. The four West European countries have ex-
pressed their wishes to avoid moving too far toward
formalizing a -summit seven" counterterrorist group.
Paris, in particular, asserts that such exchanges con-
tribute little to progress against terrorism because of
their high level of generality. Moreover, the French
have stated that the summit should focus on economics
as is its mandate, and avoid institutionalizing working
groups on diverse topics, which tends to undercut the
informal tone of exchanges among summit leaders.
15. West European summit participants have also
indicated that they believe more institutionalized mul-
tilateral intelligence exchanges or new counterterrorist
initiatives would be an unnecessary duplication of
effort in view of the existence of the Club of Bern, the
EC's Trevi Group, and the Council of Five. In fact,
the four West European summit participants each
have expressed on many occasions their preferences
for dealing bilaterally with the United States on
terrorism matters rather than in a summit context. We
believe most of the summit governments would wel-
come an opportunity to hold bilateral rounds at the
summit on salient terrorist and counterterrorist issues
without, however, being held to commitments for
multilateral statements of intent to act
16. Indeed, in consultations in March 1985 the
Summit Seven's aviation security authorities reached a
consensus that sanctions?the only ones ever imposed
under the terms of the Bonn Declaration?against
Ariana Afghan airlines should be dropped as they have
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not compelled Kabul either to prosecute or extradite
hijackers or to abide by international antihijacking
agreements. Moreover, the Afghanis have more than
once threatened to deny overflight rights to the air-
lines of the seven countries, which would particularly
complicate flight patterns in the region for West
European carriers. In order that the prospects of lifting
sanctions not appear to be an abandonment of the
Declaration's principles, representatives believe that,
in the bargain, Kabul should make a public commit-
ment to respect the Hague and Montreal Conventions
governing air piracy.
17. The Western Mediterranean Club, established
in 1983 represents the first instance in which West
European governments have drawn two Arab coun-
tries into a multilateral arrangement in such a sensitive
area as cooperation on counterterrorism. Reportedly,
the group intends to grapple with the problem of the
harboring of terrorists by third countries. We are
skeptical, however, of the group's ability to have
worthwhile exchanges on this subject in view of
Tunisia's support of the PLO and the fact that many
apprehended Arab terrorists possess false or authentic
Moroccan passports. Italian authorities may fear that a
lack of preparedness on terrorist matters among other
Western Mediterranean countries poses a potential
threat to Italian security. The Spanish Government
probably welcomes another avenue of access to offi-
cials in Morocco, where the security of the Spanish
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as unrest in the
Western Sahara, are of concern to Madrid. France, for
its part, would not want to be excluded from any
forum in which francophone Maghreb countries par-
ticipate,
18. Although NATO dealings with terrorism tradi-
tionally have been limited, attacks since October 1984
against NATO and Alliance-related facilities have
prompted members to reassess the terrorist threat in
Western Europe, with a view to intensifying common
measures against terrorism. Security at NATO head-
quarters and other installations has been tightened and
personnel advised on additional safety steps. NATO
member states are moving toward adopting a stan-
dardized alert system on terrorist activities and threats.
In addition, statements last year by previously reluc-
tant members?notably France?indicate a new will-
ingness to expand Allied counterterrorist consultations.
19. Continuing NATO talks on terrorism will re-
flect?and be limited by?a desire not to duplicate
efforts in other multilateral fora. For this reason and
individual national concerns for legal sovereignty,
prospects for the development of a common Alliance
political policy and strategy to combat terrorism,
encompassing such aspects as a common extradition
policy, are bleak. Despite a willingness to upgrade
deliberations in NATO on the terrorist threat, a
majority of member countries believe nonetheless that
NATO talks regarding terrorism should be private,
and any specific recommendations should take into
account counterterrorist measures adopted in other
multilateral groups. Moreover, many members will
remain wary of potential US domination of such
discussions in an Alliance context. Perhaps most im-
portant is the concern of some members that NATO
convey a public image of firm resolve against terror-
ism without, however, creating false expectations of
collective action that the Alliance is not capable of
undertaking.
International Conventions
20. Several international conventions (see annex D)
recognize specific terrorist crimes and set forth stan-
dards for legal treatment by signatory states in cases
involving such offenses. The Tokyo, Hague, and Mon-
treal Conventions address aspects of civil aviation
security and appropriate legal response that arise from
terrorist acts in the air and on the ground. In particu-
lar, they call for the safe passage of hijacked passen-
gers, the return of aircraft and crew, and?most
important?the extradition of hijackers or, failing that,
local prosecution. Within this precept, the Hague
Convention establishes that adhering states may not
disclaim responsibility in airborne terrorist acts on the
excuse that the offense took place outside of its
territory or airspace. We know of no instances involv-
ing the countries discussed here in which these con-
ventions have been violated. There have been cases,
however, in which the country of destination has not
prosecuted hijackers.
21. Nonadherence to extradition, along with the
principle of political asylum, remains one of the
greatest hindrances to full enforcement of criminal
and antiterrorist laws by effectively blocking the
ability of states to prosecute fugitive terrorist suspects.
For many states otherwise amenable to counterterror-
ist cooperation, the primary reservation to extradition
is their unwillingness to compromise what they view as
their legal rights as sovereign nations?sometimes a
pretext in deference to domestic political consider-
ations or broader foreign policy concerns. These con-
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Signatory and Acceding States
Tokyo Convention Hague Convention
(14 September 1963) (16 December 1970)
Montreal Convention Convention on Suppression of
(23 September 1971) Terrorism (27 January 1977)
Austria
Ratified Ratified-1974
Ratified-1974 Ratified-1977
Belgium
Ratified-1970 Ratified-1973
Ratified-1976 Ratified-1986
France Ratified-1970 Ratified-1972
Ratified-1976 Signed only
Greece Ratified-1971 Ratified-1973
Ratified-1974 Signed only
Italy Ratified-1968 Ratified-1974
Ratified-1974 Signed only
Japan Ratified-1970 Ratified-1971
Ratified-1974 NA
Portugal
Ratified-1964 Ratified-1972
Ratified-1973 Ratified-1981
Spain
Ratified-1969 Ratified-1972
Ratified-1972 Ratified-1980
Switzerland
Ratified-1970 Ratified-1971
Ratified-1978 Ratified-1983
Turkey
Ratified-1975 Ratified-1973
Ratified-1975 Ratified-1981
United Kingdom Ratified-1968 Ratified-1971
Ratified-1973 Ratified-1978
United States Ratified-1969 Ratified-1971
Ratified-1972 NA
West Germany Ratified-1969 Ratified-1974
Ratified-1978 Ratified-1978
This table is Unclassified.
cerns mean that despite the existence of multilateral
conventions and bilateral agreements covering the
extradition of criminals and terrorists, harboring states
often refuse to extradite terrorist suspects to the
requesting state on the grounds that the offense in
question was politically motivated. The best alternate
recourse for enforcement rests in the legal formula of
extradite or prosecute,- whereby a government un-
willing or unable to honor an extradition request
would take steps to prosecute in the requesting govern-
ment's stead. Even this meets with objections, how-
ever, as some harboring countries do not recognize as
crimes the charges brought in a requesting country's
extradition request.
22. The most authoritative international document
that deals with the extradition of terrorists is the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism, more often known as the Strasbourg Convention.
A product of the 21-member Council of Europe, the
convention establishes that specific violent crimes?
including hijacking, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
bombing, and attacks on internationally protected
persons?are to be considered extraditable crimes that
do not fall in the category of the political offense
exception that many states have traditionally invoked
in terrorist cases and that has often prevented extradi-
tion. The fact that 20 of the Council's member states
have signed the convention and 16 have ratified it was
a positive step in the efforts of West European coun-
tries to strengthen law enforcement cooperation
against terrorism. Several countries?France, Italy,
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden?have filed reserva-
tions, however, that their governments retain the right
to refuse extraditions for any offense they consider to
be political in nature. The net effect of these reserva-
tions has been to undermine the ultimate effectiveness
of the convention.
23. Because all of the 12 EC countries ' are also
members of the Council of Europe, the EC has tried to
define how the Convention would be applied within
the Community. This resulted in the Dublin Agree-
ment of 1979, which narrowed interpretation of the
Convention principally to reflect Irish reservations
regarding extradition?long a sensitive point in rela-
tions between Dublin and London. France, however,
refuses to ratify either the Convention or the agree-
ment, arguing that provisions for compulsory prosecu-
tion violate French sovereignty. Because the Dublin
Agreement cannot enter into effect until ratified by all
EC members, none of the other members is inclined to
ratify as long as France refuses.
24. The political accords on Northern Ireland
signed by London and Dublin last November led to
Ireland's accession to the European Convention on
Among EC countries, Denmark, Luxembourg, the United King-
dom, Belgium, West Germany, and new members Portugal and
Spain, have ratified the Convention.
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Terrorism in February 1986. Dublin's status as a
signatory improves chances?but does not guarantee?
that automatic extradition of political offenders who
commit criminal and terrorist acts in Ulster and are
apprehended in Ireland will take place. We believe
Dublin will insist that the final decision in such cases
remain the prerogative of the Irish Supreme Court. In
recent months, the Court has upheld several extradi-
tion orders issued by lower Irish courts.
Bilateral Extradition Treaties
25. Limited international cooperation occurs within
the context of formal bilateral legal agreements such as
extradition treaties. Most of the treaties between states
addressed here date from the late 19th or early 20th
centuries. These are for the most part outmoded
documents that do not take into account modern
technologies of transportation, communications, and
weaponry that have made criminality, including ter-
rorism, vastly different than a century ago. Not only
have the mobility and methods of modern criminals
made these treaties in some respects obsolete, but the
practice of enumerating specifically covered offenses
in treaties results in such anomalies as extradition for
bigamy or robbery but not for drug trafficking or
hijacking. In the case of an Armenian terrorist, Vicken
Tcharkhutian, for example, a French Appeals Court
decided in August 1982 against the Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) mem-
ber's extradition to the United States, where he was
wanted for two bombing attempts in Los Angeles. The
only charge that could be levied against him under the
Franco-American extradition treaty of 1909 was arson,
which the Court ruled did not apply.
26. There have been several noted instances in
which states have agreed to extradite a terrorist sus-
pect, but only on the condition that he be prosecuted
on criminal charges lodged by the requesting country
that also exist under the sending country's law:
? In November 1977 France extradited Red Army
Faction (RAF) lawyer Klaus Croissant in response
to a West German Government request, but the
terms allowed Bonn to try Croissant on only one
of the 15 criminal charges against him.
? In October 1978 the Netherlands agreed to
extradite wanted RAF member Knut Folkerts to
West Germany on only two of several counts
Bonn filed against him. Neither charge, however,
related to his participation in the kidnaping and
murder of German industrialist Hans Martin
Schleyer, as Dutch law determined that action to
have been politically inspired.
Conversely, Switzerland allowed extradition of
another RAF fugitive to West Germany on mur-
der charges in Schleyer's death but under rules of
reciprocity would not permit his prosecution for
the charge of membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion?a crime in West Germany but not in
Switzerland.
27. All too often, however, cases that appear to
signal a more amenable general attitude on the part of
some countries toward extradition reflect a coales-
cence of political factors that apply only to the case in
question. This has long applied more to France per-
haps than to other countries. For example, the French
decision to extradite four ETA members to Madrid in
September 1984 was made, in our view, primarily
because Paris felt backed into a corner at that mo-
ment. The Mitterrand government was increasingly
compelled to make a significant gesture of support for
Spanish democracy and France's fellow Socialist gov-
ernment in Madrid, and at the same time try to
discourage further activities by antiterrorist vigilantes
in the French Basque region.
28. Last year, however, Paris decided against the
extradition of two Italian terrorists, choosing instead to
expel them to Burundi. Three other Italian terrorists
remain in French custody, but extradition of one
already has been denied. We believe there is a
reasonable chance that France may extradite the
others to blunt criticism that it is a refuge for terrorists
and to dissipate some of the rancor the issue has
engendered with Italy. But, as in the case of the
extradited Spanish Basques, we believe any new coop-
eration with Italy on extradition would not signal
automaticity in extradition matters or a fundamental
change in French policy.
29. Greece, too, has created obstacles to extradition,
but probably more from political indecision and fears
of terrorist retaliation than from fundamental legal
problems. Athens has long delayed the extradition to
Italy of a Palestinian wanted in the 1982 bombing of a
Rome synagogue. The Greeks reneged on their prom-
ise to allow Italian magistrates to interview the suspect,
who had already received a light sentence for smug-
gling explosives into Greece. Although the Greek
Supreme Court finally ruled in 1984 that the Palestin-
ian's extradition would be constitutional, the govern-
ment has made no move to extradite him to Italy.
Prospects for Enhanced Counterterrorist
Cooperation
30. We believe prospects are generally positive for
at least a limited expansion of international counter-
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terrorist cooperation because many countries perceive
terrorism as a growing threat that cannot be effective-
ly countered by only national or bilateral means.
Moreover, recent resurgence of terrorist violence in
Western Europe and indications of limited but new
cooperation among some leftwing groups in Western
Europe and the increased "spillover" of Middle East-
ern violence have made some of the governments with
misgivings, shortcomings, or a lack of experience in
this area more receptive than before to international
cooperation, such as assistance and training from like-
minded states. They also appear to be more willing to
broaden counterterrorist discussions and consider joint
measures. Many governments will continue, however,
to resist any new international initiatives that would
seek directly to punish states that support terrorism by
imposition of political or economic sanctions because
they believe such measures may complicate their own
vital foreign policy interests and economic equities
and, in any case, have little positive effect. Most West
European countries will also continue to be wary of
potential US domination of counterterrorist discussions
in multilateral fora.
31. Although mindful of the positive public impact
that may accrue from the fact or the appearance of
multilateral cooperation or solidarity, most countries
believe substantive international progress against ter-
rorism is best achieved through bilateral channels. In
such dealings, governments are not constrained by a
"lowest common denominator," which often limits or
diminishes the value of exchanges in larger groups.
The bilateral counterterrorist relationships that many
of the countries discussed here have developed among
themselves and with the United States over the last
several years affirm this view, and suggest that work-
ing-level intelligence exchanges and, in some cases,
training assistance will continue to be the principal
vehicles for such cooperation.
32. One encouraging sign for increased multilateral
efforts is that the meeting last July of the Summit
Seven's Bonn Group experts on civil aviation security
was the first international gathering to address con-
cerns raised by the July 1985 TWA hijacking. Al-
though the meeting produced no consensus that would
lead to any new measures or initiatives to improve
airport security against hijacking and sabotage, several
members, particularly Canada and Britain, voiced
support for the revitalization of the Bonn Declaration,
which is increasingly perceived as ineffective.
33. We believe lessons learned from deliberations
among the Bonn Summit Seven Group following the
July 1985 TWA hijacking and the failure of the
Group's December meeting to lead to any concrete
action suggest a different approach to encouraging
coordinated counterterrorist responses. Group mem-
bers probably would be more receptive to the concept
of a "menu" of different types of actions they could
take in response to specific types of international
terrorist events. This kind of flexible approach would
provide a framework in which governments could
choose response options that are compatible with their
national goals and not in direct conflict with their
perceived interests.
34. With regard to expansion of US participation in
such West European groupings as the Trevi Group, we
believe the chances are slight that the United States
will be invited to attend even as an observer or that it
would be necessarily advisable to accept if we were.
US participation or attendance at Trevi meetings
would be complicated by the absence of a mandate for
the FBI?the analogue of the West European internal
services involved?to deal with foreign terrorism out-
side of the United States, and by the fact that the US
State Department?rather than the counterparts of
domestic West European ministries?would be the
principal US interlocutor. These institutional dispari-
ties and the group's exclusive focus on terrorism within
the region would only underscore the exceptional
circumstances of US participation. Moreover, many of
the previous obstacles to US involvement with Trevi
still remain, and some EC member states would be
resistant to the possibility of undue US influence in a
heretofore European forum.
35. EC reservations about a more active US role in
Trevi suggest that the most mutually satisfactory
arrangement would be a more regularized US liaison
relationship with Trevi?short of observer status?that
would ensure readouts of group deliberations on a
more consistent basis than is now the case. This could
be modeled along the lines of the current procedure
for informing the United States of developments and
discussions within European Political Cooperation,
whereby the United States is given a meeting agenda
beforehand for comments and receives a readout of
proceedings after the talks.
36. Some improvement in the functioning of the
Trevi Group also may occur. In the past two years,
officials of some EC countries have criticized Trevi's
seeming lethargy and lack of initiative. The British, in
particular, are encouraging revitalization of Trevi,
whose working groups increasingly lack dynamism
and reportedly produce little in the way of concrete
joint counterterrorist measures or procedures. To this
end, the EC Foreign Ministers advanced last spring's
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Trevi meeting?on which the United States has yet to
receive information?to accelerate technical coordina-
tion on communications and protection of embassies.
37. We believe that despite bona fide EC concerns
about terrorism, several member states find it more
desirable to improve counterterrorist cooperation by
using existing laws and vehicles for consultation than
to create new, possibly redundant structures within the
EC framework.
38. In the absence of new initiatives, the EC will
nevertheless not hesitate to condemn terrorism. At
their July meeting last year, EC Foreign Ministers
adopted a resolution condemning terrorism and air
piracy and dedicated themselves to exploring possibili-
ties of establishing and maintaining strengthened in-
ternational standards for airline and airport security in
order to prepare concrete recommendations in this
area. This would include concerted action by EC states
in the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and urging third countries that are not party to
existing international conventions to adhere to them.
Earlier, on 24 June, the EC Transport Ministers issued
a statement condemning terrorist acts against civil
aviation and called for renewed cooperative security
efforts to thwart them. These and other such state-
ments may not result in prompt action but are almost
certainly politically important to EC member govern-
ments who intermittently must satisfy their domestic
need to appear tough on terrorism.
39. EC member states have met twice in the past
two years to explore and identify international stan-
dards of diplomatic practice and behavior that could
be more rigorously enforced as a means of deterring
and preempting certain terrorist activities. At its meet-
ing last spring, the EC's working group on terrorism
and diplomatic immunity looked at several practical
measures of cooperation that they believed merit
further examination:
? Examination of the Vienna convention with a
view to applying its rules more strictly.
? Exchange of information on foreign diplomats
suspected of abusing diplomatic immunity for
purposes of terrorism.
? Uniform diplomatic visa policies.
? The removal of diplomatic status from foreign
state commercial offices and trade centers in
noncapital cities.
? Appropriate notification to receiving countries
regarding incoming diplomatic personnel and
proper declaration of diplomatic status.
? Measures of inspection and control of the weight
and dimensions of diplomatic pouches.
Although some of these measures may garner suffi-
cient support for adoption and enforcement, individ-
ual national political sensitivities and foreign policy
concerns?especially toward Arab states?are likely
obstacles to, the broadest possible approval for steps
aimed at reducing diplomatic abuses that support
terrorism. The countries involved will move cautiously
to avoid unraveling sensitive areas of international
consensus that the Vienna Convention has pulled
together.
40. Most countries will continue to respond to in-
digenous terrorism firmly and unilaterally, but there
may be instances in which bilateral or limited multi-
lateral cooperation may be desirable. The series of
"anti-imperialist" terrorist attacks over the past year
by the Red Army Faction, Action Directe, and the
Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), for example, has
provided the impetus for regular trilateral consulta-
tions among West German, French, and Belgian secu-
rity officials.8 Representatives of the Belgian Groupe
Interforce Anti-Terroriste, (G.I.A.), the French Unite
de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste, (UCLAT),
and the West German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) have
met three times since February 1985. They plan to
meet bimonthly, and we expect further cooperation in
an attempt to impede the flow of unchallenged trans-
national mobility of terrorists as a result of these
meetings.
41. Similarly, following the Audran and Zimmer-
mann assassinations early last year, West Germany
and France declared a "united front against terror-
ism." Both governments have agreed to form a joint
operational working group, set up a hotline between
security headquarters in Paris and Cologne to intensify
intelligence exchanges, and try to tighten the border
controls.
42. Despite these efforts, we believe that tracking
and monitoring terrorist movements in the region will
continue to be complicated by porous borders. Among
most EC states, border controls are virtually nonexis-
tent. The extraordinary mobility across borders is
probably unique among developed countries and will
remain an important factor contributing to terrorists'
ability to elude detection and capture.
43. A joint, multilateral approach to such regional,
defensive counterterrorist measures may ultimately
prove most effective. In the wake of the Achille Lauro
For a discussion of links among these groups, see /IM 85-10005
(Secret NF), April 1985, West European Terrorism: The Indige-
nous Threat to NATO and US Interests. (s NF)
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and EgyptAir hijackings, as well as the airport attacks
at Rome and Vienna, most Allied and EC countries
almost certainly will intensify basic security measures
at air and sea ports of entry and increase identity
checks and inspections at land frontiers. Although
some individual states already have clamped down,
EC member states may find themselves increasingly
compelled?short of standardizing such procedures?
to consult among themselves to ensure some consisten-
cy of standards within the region.
44. Recent terrorist attacks in Western Europe have
also heightened concerns about the proliferation of
false or fraudently obtained Maghreb passports among
Iranian and Levantine Arab terrorists. Holders of
Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian papers do not need
visas to enter most EC member states, which compli-
cates counterterrorist efforts. Although existing immi-
gration arrangements could not be easily changed
without hurting the EC countries' relations with the
countries involved, a few states have moved to adopt
measures to intensify scrutiny of incoming Maghreb
travelers. Nonetheless, in the absence of multilaterally
agreed upon means of better and more uniformly
screening the entry of Maghrebians into Western
Europe?where, as legitimate residents, they number
in the hundreds of thousands?we believe terrorists
will continue to -use" these nationalities to advantage.
45. With respect to Belgium, Portugal, and Turkey,
the forecast is mixed. Turkey has already established
itself as a firm advocate of counterterrorist coopera-
tion; its biggest challenge, however, will be to convince
otherwise like-minded states that Ankara can pursue
an aggressive counterterrorist policy and at the same
time observe human rights and political freedoms?
long sore points with other Allied countries. Belgium
and Portugal both have had some success against
domestic terrorists, but we believe Belgium has a
better chance of gaining the upper hand over such
groups. Although these countries continue efforts to
upgrade counterterrorist capabilities and improve per-
formance, they still suffer from meager budgets, inter-
nal squabbling and rivalries, and a lack of experienced
personnel. Both Brussels and Lisbon, however, proba-
bly will continue to be circumspect in their dealings
with foreign terrorists who operate on their soil.
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ANNEX A
The Domestic versus International Threat
1. Terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is
dominated by the activities of Irish nationalist groups.
In recent years, Middle Eastern terrorists also have
stepped up their activities in the United Kingdom. In
June 1982 an assassination attempt against the Israeli
Ambassador to the United Kingdom by a Palestinian
group got headlines and was a factor in precipitating
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The April 1984 shoot-
ing of a British policewoman outside the Libyan
People's Bureau in London dramatized the Libyan
terrorist threat in the United Kingdom.
2. Spain continues to be plagued by the separatist
Basque terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)
and its various factions. During the tenure of the
current Socialist government, ETA periodically has
escalated the number and ferocity of its attacks against
military targets. Despite the considerable anti-ETA
successes of the past one to two years, Madrid has
recently witnessed another upsurge in ETA's lethal
acts.
3. Although ETA is the primary source of violence
in Spain, the homegrown radical leftist GRAPO terror-
ists have also been active and intermittently have
targeted US interests, most often with low-level bomb-
ings of US businesses. GRAPO may have been in-
volved in the bombing of a restaurant near the
Torrejon Airbase last year, which was frequented by
US servicemen.
4. With government counterterrorist resources fo-
cused on the Basque provinces and attentive to the
security of ranking Spanish officials in Madrid, terror-
ism among Arab elements has increased. The capital
has proved fertile ground for state supporters of
terrorism (such as Syria) and dissident Palestinian
factions (such as Abu Nidal) to attack diplomats and
prominent figures from moderate Arab states. Spanish
officials appear, however, to be stepping up surveil-
lance of Arab nationals, as evidenced by the expulsion
last December of four Libyan officials believed to be
planning an attack at Madrid's airport
5. Foreign terrorist activity in France outstrips that
of domestic terrorists, and, indeed, foreign elements
are more active there than in any other West Europe-
an country. Historical factors and political values?
such as the French tradition of asylum and a tolerance
of dissent that often precludes extradition?make
France fertile ground for both terrorists and their
prospective targets.
A
plethora of Arab groups and subnational terrorist
organizations have carried out acts against other for-
eigners but are generally careful to avoid French
nationals and interests.
6. Since their metamorphosis from ethnic activists,
Armenian terrorists have been active and have en-
joyed a measure of local support among France's
significant Armenian population, but ASALA's bomb-
ing of the Turkish airlines counter at Orly Airport in
July 1983, which killed eight and wounded 55,
prompted a government crackdown on Armenian
groups. Since then there have been no further Arme-
nian attacks in France.
7. Although Iranians and their surrogates have at-
tacked French interests in the Middle East because of
France's materiel and economic support to Iraq, Iran
has not attacked French targets in France. Tehran
focuses instead on members of the Iranian exile com-
munity.
8. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
(LARF) carried out several assassinations, including
that of the deputy US defense attache in Paris in 1982,
and has attempted to kill three other US officials. A
series of key arrests by Italian and French police since
August 1984 appeared to have dealt a serious blow to
LARF's operational capability in France and Western
Europe. Remaining LARF members threatened repri-
sals for the arrests, but the subsequent kidnaping of a
French diplomat in Beirut to swap for the group's
leader imprisoned in France did not succeed. Al-
though the diplomat was released, the simultaneous
discovery of a LARF arms cache in Paris enabled
French authorities to connect the suspect to several
terrorist attacks and keep him in custody. Despite
these setbacks for LARF, pressure for release of its
leader has not subsided. Sympathizers have claimed a
series of bombings in Paris since last December.
9. Domestic groups have been less active than the
foreign terrorists operating in France. Direct Action
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(AD) is the most visible French domestic terrorist
group. An extreme leftist anarchist group with proba-
bly fewer than 50 members, AD has perpetrated
bombings to protest French, American, and Israeli
foreign policies, as well as South African domestic
policy. It is ideologically rather than ethnically moti-
vated and has reported links to foreign terrorist
groups, notably LARF. The newly elected Socialist
government in 1981 amnestied imprisoned members
of AD, including its two leaders. After the group
carried out bombings against US and Israeli interests in
the spring and summer of 1982, the government
officially outlawed it, making any members automati-
cally subject to fines and imprisonment
10. An escalation of symbolic bombings by the
group in 1984?increasingly aimed at Alliance and
military-related institutions?culminated in January
1985 in a joint declaration by AD and the RAF against
NATO and Western "imperialism." 9 This was under-
scored 10 days later by the assassination near Paris of
Gen. Rene Audran, a senior official in the French
Defense Ministry. There have been no arrests in the
case, but French security officials believe there was
RAF involvement in the killing. AD subsequently
claimed a series of bombings in the Paris area in
March and April 1985 and has been linked to the
Belgian CCC as well.
11. The principal terrorist threat in West Germany
comes from indigenous groups such as the RAF and
the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Small neo-Nazi groups
also occasionally engage in terrorism but do not pose
the major threat to West German and foreign officials.
Foreign terrorist activity stems from either the "diplo-
matic" activities of state supporters of terrorism, such
as Libya, or dissident political activity within the
significant foreign worker community?made up pre-
dominantly of Turks and Yugoslays?who may be the
targets of ethnic opponents or agents of their own
governments
12. Even after repeated counterterrorist successes
against the RAF over more than a decade, West
German authorities acknowledge that the RAF has
recovered from setbacks suffered since 1982, including
the capture and imprisonment of important group
members. The RAF launched a so-called anti-imperi-
alist front terrorist campaign last year, declaring itself
in league with AD in France. Last August, the RAF
successfully planted a car bomb at Frankfurt's Rhein-
Main airbase that killed two Americans and wounded
9 For an expansion on this relationship, see IIM 85-10005 (Secret
NF), April 1985, West European Terrorism: The Indigenous
Threat to NATO and US Interests. (s NE)
another 17 Americans and West Germans. The RAF
issued a communique of responsibility for the bomb-
ing along with AD.
13. State-supported terrorist activity, usually under
cover of diplomatic missions, sometimes has resulted
in deaths on West German soil and injunctions by the
government against those responsible. Bonn expelled
four Libyans last spring because of their involvement
in the assassination of an anti-Qadhafi dissident?a
shootout that wounded two West German bystand-
ers?and warned Tripoli of a possible break in rela-
tions if such activity continues. When Lebanese Shia
terrorists hijacked an Air France flight in 1984 from
Frankfurt to Paris, however, and diverted it to Teh-
ran, Iran's complicity was clear, but Bonn had little
recourse.
14. Although both foreign and domestic terrorism
are relatively new to Belgium, the domestic threat
currently holds the spotlight. The emergence of the
CCC in October 1984 was accompanied by a series of
bombings and arson attacks that nearly claimed the
lives of two US military personnel and inadvertently
killed two Belgian firemen. The group is Belgian but
has supported West Germany's RAF and France's AD
in their conduct of anti-NATO and "anti-imperialist"
terrorist actions. Some individuals in the CCC also
have close ties to AD members. The arrest of several
key leaders last December and the subsequent discov-
ery of arms caches and hideouts have made the CCC
less of a threat to Allied, US, and Belgian interests.
15. In April a previously unknown group calling
itself the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action
(FRAP) bombed the office of the North Atlantic
Assembly in Brussels. Although the CCC has dis-
claimed any connection with FRAP, both target
NATO facilities and defense-related industries and
appear to share technical expertise.
16. Historically, Belgium has offered shelter as well
as intellectual sympathy to a variety of foreigners that
has included terrorist elements. Spanish Basques, for
example, established support groups in Brussels and
Louvain around 1964. They have provided fugitive
ETA members support ranging from safehouses to
solidarity protests, according to a reliable source. Their
only notable action was the bombing of the Palais de
Justice in Antwerp last year after the government
extradited two Political-Military Wing (ETA/PM)
members to Madrid. Belgium is also host to numerous
Albanian and Yugoslav exiles, as well as a diverse guest
worker community of longstanding that includes Med-
iterranean and Maghreb workers
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17. Although Italy has dealt severe blows to leftist
terrorist groups in recent years, there are signs of
successful reorganization and rebuilding of the terror-
ist infrastructure, especially among the Red Brigades
(BR). The assassination of a prominent labor economist
in March 1985 marked the group's aggressive reasser-
tion only two to three years after security officials
rounded up more than 1,000 leftist terrorists and
terrorist suspects during an antiterrorist crackdown
that followed the successful release of the kidnaped
General Dozier. Since the arrests last summer of two
key leaders and other group members, the group may
have lacked experienced leadership and operational
guidance, but its tenacity, better security practices,
and apparent ability to sustain periods of clandestinity
while rebuilding indicate that a good part of the group
remains intact and operational. The recent wounding
of an economic counselor to the Prime Minister and
the assassination of a former mayor of Florence appear
to bear this out.
18. The BR have not been party to the anti-NATO
offensive declared by the RAF, AD, and the CCC.
The group nonetheless has long openly opposed the
presence of US forces in Italy and Italian membership
in NATO. Individuals thought to be associated with
the BR have been spotted carrying out surveillance
activities near US and NATO military installations.
19. Rightwing groups and individuals also pose a
domestic terrorist threat. Four major bombings from
1969 through 1984 killed more than 200 and wounded
hundreds more but remain unsolved. Despite tough
action against leftist terrorists, similar enforcement
against rightwing elements?a series of small neofas-
cist groups?unaccountably has lagged.
20. Libyans have been among the most active
foreign terrorists in Italy, but assassinations of anti-
Qadhafi dissidents in Italy at Tripoli's behest have
dropped off since the early 1980s. Libyan complicity
in last December's Rome airport attack may signal
increased activity as Libya and radical Palestinian
groups have begun to work together more closely, and
because Qadhafi apparently believes he can promote
such acts with impunity. Operational terrorist plan-
ning by Iranians under cover of diplomatic missions
has increased. In November 1984 Italian authorities,
acting on a Swiss lead, arrested seven radical Lebanese
Shias who had been preparing?with Iranian assis-
tance?to bomb the US Embassy in Rome.
21. Over the past decade, terrorism in Greece has
been the product of both domestic and foreign groups.
The targets of both, however, have been predominant-
ly foreign. The most notorious Greek terrorist group is
the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, which
has claimed responsibility for the murder of CIA
Chief of Station Richard Welch in 1975, Greek police
officials in 1976 and 1980, US Navy Capt. George
Tsantes and his Greek driver in November 1983, and a
prominent Athens publisher in February 1986. The
group also shot and wounded US Army M.Sgt. Robert
Judd in April 1984. People's Revolutionary Struggle
(ELA)?thought to be an umbrella organization en-
compassing most Greek terrorists?continues to con-
duct intermittent violence against the TS presence in
Greece.
22. Foreign terrorists are also increasingly active in
Greece
growing numbers of foreign extremists are using
Greece as a transit point, haven, and site to work out
internecine differences. Greece's location?including
its proximity to Cyprus?has made it a major point of
passage between the Middle East and Europe, particu-
larly since the frequent closures of the Beirut airport
began in 1982. Further, Greece's lack of adequate
means to monitor aliens and transients probably has
encouraged an influx of foreign extremists. In addi-
tion, foreign terrorists in Greece generally have been
safe from arrest and prosecution as long as they do not
engage in violence on Greek soil.
23. Often used as a haven by foreign terrorists,
Portugal was largely untroubled by terrorism until the
Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) appeared on the
scene in 1980. The FP-25?a relatively small radical
leftist faction of perhaps 40 to 50 hardcore members
with limited goals?has carried out bombings and
robberies and killed policemen, while claiming to
defend the rights of workers and farmers against the
government. Portuguese authorities were also shaken
by two major foreign terrorist attacks in 1983, the
assassination of PLO official Isam Sartawi and an
Armenian assault on the Turkish Embassy, which
demonstrated the ease with which international terror-
ists can operate.
24. Although more than 70 suspected FP-25 mem-
bers were arrested in a police sweep in June of 1984,
sporadic attacks by the group continued last year,
including ineffective mortar rounds aimed at the US
Embassy in Lisbon and NATO-related targets and the
assassination of a businessman at a Lisbon trade fair.
The trial of the arrested terrorists, which recessed last
July after the shooting and subsequent death of a key
prosecution witness, resumed as a nonjury trial last
October and is expected to continue through much of
1986.
25. Turkey's experience with terrorism is unique
among the countries discussed here. The violence and
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terrorism that brought Turkey to the brink of civil war
in 1980 have their roots in the sweeping demographic,
economic, and sociological changes over the last three
decades and were exacerbated by support to the
terrorists from Soviet client states. Political terrorism
also was fueled by the weaknesses of internally divided
coalition governments and culminated in military
interventions in 1960, 1971, and, finally, in September
1980, when up to 20 Turks were dying daily in
terrorist attacks.
26. Violence also stems from Turkey's serious
minority problems. The Kurds in the southeastern
provinces constitute 10 percent or more of the popula-
tion and are second only to ethnic Turks in supplying
recruits to radical leftist groups. The Alevi religious
community, concentrated in eastern Turkey and com-
prising perhaps 15 percent of the population, is another
significant minority. The complexity of the causes of
violence is matched by the diversity of terrorist groups
that sprung up in Turkey. Leftist organizations pre-
dominate and more than 50 such groups were in
existence before the 1980 coup, with no trace of a
common organization.
27. Despite the military's crackdown on radical
groups, violence has not been eliminated. The govern-
ment claimed in 1983 that nearly half of the illegal
groups active at the time of the coup were still in
operation.
28. Armenian terrorism, although it has garnered
more headlines abroad, is a less serious threat at home.
Armenian-sponsored terrorism for the most part has
taken place outside Turkey and has not contributed
significantly to political instability in Turkey. In fact,
Armenian terrorism tends to unite Turks and reinforce
government efforts to portray the problem of terror-
ism simply as a result of foreign subversion. Even so,
attacks by ASALA and the Justice Commandos for the
Armenian Genocide (JCAG)?now calling itself the
Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)?have un-
nerved the Turkish foreign service, generated unfavor-
able publicity about Turkey, and further burdened the
security services.
29. Neither Austria nor Switzerland has significant
domestic terrorist activity but both have been host to a
variety of foreign terrorist incidents, including hostage
takings, assassinations, and bombing attempts. The
presence in both countries of the headquarters of
several international organizations, multiple diplomat-
ic missions, and international businesses and banks
ensures a plethora of potential targets for foreign
terrorist elements. The central location of Austria and
Switzerland for air travel to and from Middle Eastern
and Mediterranean countries, as well as the rest of
Europe, provides access to prospective targets.
30. The territory of Switzerland is host to estab-
lished terrorist infrastructures for states that support
terrorism and for subnational terrorist groups as well.
Libyan diplomatic missions, in particular, reportedly
play a significant logistic and support role for Tripoli's
terrorist operatives elsewhere in Europe. Armenian
terrorist activity has included a botched bombing
incident in 1980 for which two ASALA members were
arrested, but subsequently released following a series
of reprisal attacks by ASALA against Swiss interests.
The group's 1981 assassination of a Turkish diplomat
in Geneva and the arrest of the perpetrator resulted in
threats from ASALA, but the assassin in this case was
not released.
31. Other West European terrorist groups and their
sympathizers also transit Switzerland and occasionally
carry out activities there. West Germany's Revolution-
ary Cells, for example, bombed the West German
Consulate General in Zurich in 1982. In January 1985
a Zurich-based group claiming to be supporters of the
West German RAF staged a temporary takeover of the
International Red Cross building in solidarity with
RAF hunger strikers
32. Most terrorist acts in Austria have been com-
mitted by foreign groups. In 1984, for example,
ASALA carried out two assassinations in Vienna, and
Austrian authorities thwarted a planned attack by the
Pakistani antiregime terrorist group Al-Zufiqar. As in
Switzerland, Libyan and Iranian diplomatic missions
support terrorism elsewhere in Europe, but the orga-
nizers generally avoid endangering the hospitable cli-
mate in which they function by refraining from any
acts on Austrian soil. However, a Libyan dissident was
wounded last spring in Vienna, probably on orders
from Tripoli.
33. Terrorism came sharply to the fore in Japan in
the early to mid-1970s, when Tokyo confronted sever-
al international incidents instigated or executed by the
Japanese Red Army (JRA), but the threat posed by this
group has diminished considerably. Today the JRA is a
small expatriate group based in the Middle East and
affiliated with the Popular front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP).
34. Official concerns about guerrilla incidents cur-
rently center on the radical group Chukaku-Ha, or
Nucleus Faction, which Japanese authorities say num-
bers about 3,500 members, half of whom are students.
The Faction, whose declared objective is to prevent
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the expansion of Tokyo's Narita Airport, has carried
out a number of incendiary and bombing attacks,
including one against the US Consulate General in
Kobe in January 1985, and large-scale sabotage of the
Tokyo national rail system that paralyzed the city for
two days last November. Members of the group are
radical elements from the fringes of Japanese society
who, despite years of struggle, have elicited no appre-
ciable popular support, even among the farmers whose
land is threatened by airport development and in
whose interests the Nucleus Faction purports to act.
Japanese police believe a similar, smaller group was
responsible for a late March incendiary attack against
the US Embassy in Tokyo, and authorities believe this
group attempted to disrupt the Economic Summit in
May.
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ANNEX B
Country Attitudes
1. Public attitudes toward terrorism in West Ger-
many have been volatile over the past decade, but on
balance they have affirmed the correctness of Bonn's
aggressive counterterrorist policies against indigenous
groups. The country successfully weathered terrorist
challenges that undermined authority in the late 1970s
to the extent that today fewer than half of the West
Germans view terrorism as a major problem. A 1985
multicountry survey by the US Information Agency
(USIA) found that 58 percent of West Germans believe
terrorism to be no threat?or only a minimal threat?
to the political system. Nonetheless, there appears to
be little complacency: public approbation for extraor-
dinary measures to combat terrorism remains firm, as
75 percent approve giving police special powers to
search out terrorists.
2. A rich body of public opinion data on Italy from
a reliable survey organization indicates that from 1979
through 1982, terrorism was identified by a majority
or a strong plurality as the most serious problem
confronting the nation. Notably, some key legislation
was passed during this period, and the government
scored an impressive series of counterterrorist success-
es.
3. Although terrorism dropped slightly in impor-
tance among respondents in 1983 surveys, it continued
nonetheless to figure as a national concern. Moreover,
according to USIA's April 1985 poll, 78 percent of
Italians believe terrorism still threatens the country's
political system to some extent. The same survey also
found that 75 percent of respondents approve of
giving police special powers to search out terrorists.
Because nearly 87 percent also oppose the goals of
terrorist groups operating in Italy, the government has
a firm counterterrorist mandate.
4. Since the resurgence of violence in Northern
Ireland in 1969, public opposition to terrorism in the
United Kingdom has increased to reflect the intensity
and ferocity of the terrorism itself. Episodes such as
the 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing and, in a foreign
vein, the siege at the Libyan People's Bureau have also
helped harden popular views of the terrorist threat
and the government's proper response. The USIA's
1985 poll, for example, found that 70 percent of the
British believe the death penalty should be imposed
for terrorists in the United Kingdom. Congruently, a
majority of Britons think terrorism threatens the gov-
ernment. Only Italians questioned in the same survey
felt similarly menaced, which almost certainly reflects
both countries' experience with leaders killed or nearly
killed by terrorists, as well as terrorism's direct chal-
lenge to the state.
5. Spain outdistances its West European neighbors
in its concern over terrorism, which 88 percent of
Spaniards named a major national problem in a recent
poll. While concern about terrorism has remained high
for several years, support for ETA?the leading terror-
ist organization?among Basques has steadily declined
as Madrid has devolved powers of autonomy since
1979. A survey for a leading Spanish newsmagazine
this year revealed that more than 75 percent of
Spanish Basques believed ETA should lay down its
arms, and 45 percent felt the group no longer had a
reason to exist. With a majority of Spaniards viewing
terrorists as criminals (rather than idealists or misguid-
ed individuals), there appears to be a sufficiently
tough-minded opinion of Basque terrorism in particu-
lar to give Madrid a green light on continuing aggres-
sive counterterrorist policies and tactics.
6. Terrorism in France most often has involved
foreign players and, as such, has not aroused or
sustained significant public perception of a terrorist
threat. Increasing activity among domestic terrorist
elements, however, and international targeting of
French interests and symbols abroad appear to have
elevated terrorism somewhat in the French hierarchy
of national concerns. A poll taken in late 1984 by a
reputable French firm determined that terrorism is
considered the -primary menace- by 61 percent of
the population. In another 1984 survey, nearly 83
percent of French respondents agreed that terrorism is
a major problem in their society?a level of concern
similar to Italians and Spaniards. Yet although 63
percent of the French feel terrorism is -never justi-
fied,- according to USIA's 1985 poll, they lag consider-
ably behind the surveys of British, Italian, and West
German respondents, of whom about 80 percent hold
this view.
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7. In Belgium, where terrorist violence is still a
relatively new phenomenon, the actions of the CCC
already have elicited public outcry. More than 1,000
Belgians held a demonstration against terrorism in the
streets of Brussels last May following a bombing by the
CCC that killed two firemen. Perhaps more important
to perceptions of a threat to public order and safety
are the increased number of armed criminal attacks
that have resulted in the deaths of many bystanders. If
such acts continue, terrorism along with criminality
will be of greater popular concern, and public senti-
ment in favor of tougher measures against terrorists
almost certainly will increase
8. Nonetheless, in countries where terrorist activity
has been limited and sporadic or aimed primarily at
foreigners, the public has not generally determined
terrorism to be a leading problem. Public identifica-
tion of terrorism as a major national threat does not
appear strong in Portugal despite terrorist activities by
the perpetually resurgent FP-25 group and occasional
episodes by foreign terrorists. Popular opinion has
focused instead on government efforts to enact new
internal security legislation, some of which, ironically,
could help official counterterrorist efforts. The Portu-
guese public has expressed concern about possible
infringements on civil liberties?a reaction condition-
ed by memories of decades of secret ?olice abuses
under the Salazar-Caetano dictatorships.
9. In both Austria and Switzerland popular opinion
does not place terrorism high on the national agenda.
This may be due largely to the absence of significant
indigenious terrorist groups. At the same time, the
Swiss and Austrian Governments appear well aware of
the potential threat to their national interests from
foreign terrorist activities. The Government of Greece,
in contrast, has been forced to recognize the dimen-
sions of the terrorist threat there. The Greek public
attaches little importance to terrorist activity, even
that aimed at Greek nationals. The absence of public
demands for a tougher official counterterrorist stance
sug ests that any progress by Athens will continue to
lag.
10. In both Turkey and Japan, public attitudes
toward terrorism currently have less significance, albe-
it for different reasons. The level of terrorism and
political violence in Turkey was so great in the months
preceding September 1980 that military intervention
was almost inevitable and, based on historic precedent,
would have taken place in order to preclude a civil
war regardless of popular sentiment. In fact, public
expressions of relief at the cessation of violence were
widespread, despite the immediate cost in terms of
civil liberties. In Japan, where terrorism ?has not
significantly affected Japanese interests at home or
abroad, terrorism and the government's response to it
is not a particularly salient public issue. In a 1981
public opinion poll, 58 percent of Japanese respon-
dents believed all terrorism should be condemned;
only 8 percent felt there might be circumstances in
which terrorism was justified. Japanese citizens que-
ried in a 1984 survey identified terrorism as one of
several major international problems.
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ANNEX C
Multilateral Groups
1. The Club of Bern, established in 1971, is a nine-
country intergovernmental group of West European
security services that specializes in information ex-
changes on counterintelligence and counterterrorism.
Members include Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, and West Germany. The Club holds
meetings twice a year that are hosted on a rotational
basis by the chiefs of the national security services, in
their respective headquarter cities. In addition to
working groups at the "experts' level," which confer
on counterterrorist enforcement and analysis prob-
lems,
Although Club members reportedly discussed admit-
ting Spain a few years ago, to our knowledge this has
not yet occurred and membership of these countries is
not currently envisaged.
2. Cooperation against terrorism among the EC
countries has proceeded over the past decade at the
technical and working levels in the Trevi Group. 10
Made up of representatives of the interior and justice
ministries, sometimes the chiefs of security services,
and occasionally the ministers themselves, Trevi paral-
lels but stands outside of the regular European Politi-
cal Cooperation mechanism. The Group consults regu-
larly on internal security matters and terrorism
questions within Europe. The Trevi Group does not
always produce formal agendas or reports. Working
Group I (which deals with exchanges of information
on terrorism) and Working Group II (for coordination
of technical police activities) are supposed to meet
twice a year, while a Committee of Senior Officials
(primarily a consultative body that prepares the way
for ministerial conferences) meets annually. There is
no set schedule for ministerial level meetings.
3. The Council of Five (also known as the Group of
Five or the Club of Vienna) is a smaller, more
informal multilateral group whose founding?deter-
mined by geography?resulted from Italian initiative.
Immediately after the kidnaping of Aldo Moro in
1978, the Italian Interior Minister met with his coun-
terparts from Austria, France, Switzerland, and West
Germany to coordinate border security measures that
would hamper any attempt by the abductors to spirit
Moro out of Italy. The Council has convened semian-
nually since then and, in addition to meetings of the
Interior Ministers, the chiefs of the national police
forces also meet. Council gatherings apparently con-
tinue to focus on upgrading police cooperation against
terrorist and criminals who would transit the borders
of these alpine countries in fli ht from author' ti
for illicit purposes.
- I
4. The most recent effort to promote multilateral
cooperation against terrorism on a largely geographic
basis is the Western Mediterranean Club, first pro-
posed in 1983 by the then chief of Italy's military
intelligence service.
The name is an acronym for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism,
Violence International. New EC members Spain and Portugal were
admitted originally as observers in 1982. Since then, Austria and
Switzerland reportedly were accorded similar status.
The Club's mission is to
identify common threats to its members from Palestin-
ian and Armenian terrorists and examine the efforts of
Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq to destabilize the Mediter-
ranean region. Heads of services meet annually
The Club's chairmanship is said to rotate
annually, but we do not know which services have
taken the helm following Italy's initial tenure.
5. The Bonn Group, or the Summit Seven experts
on terrorism, evolved from preparations for the annual
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economic summit, where terrorism was increasingly
discussed by the late 1970s. The seven countries that
participate in the annual summit that has taken place
since 1975 are Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germa-
ny. The Group, which generally plays a peripheral
role in summit planning, attempts to identify the
terrorist issues of common concern that might be
fruitfully pursued in discussions arrtong heads of state
and government at the summit itself. Before previous
summits, the experts' group submitted a draft declara-
tion on some aspect of terrorism for the leaders to
incorporate in their final summit statement. In the
past, this process has helped smooth the way for
agreements such as the 1978 Bonn Declaration on
aircraft hijacking and the 1980 Venice Declaration on
the protection of diplomats."
"The Bonn Declaration states that, in cases where a country
refuses to extradite or prosecute hijackers and/or does not return
hijacked aircraft, governments of the summit countries should take
immediate action to cease all flights to that country. Summit
governments will also initiate action to halt all incoming flights from
that country or from any country by the airlines of the country
concerned.
The Venice Declaration denounces terrorist or criminal actions
against diplomatic or consular personnel or premises in contraven-
tion of the norms of international law and practice. The summit
governments resolve to provide "support and assistance" in situa-
tions involving the seizure of diplomatic or consular establishments
or personnel. The declaration also recalls that states have the duty
under international law to refrain from supporting or engaging in
terrorism.
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ANNEX D
International Conventions and Declarations
1. The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft)
entered into force in December 1969, calls for states to
make every effort to restore control of a hijacked
aircraft to its lawful commander and to arrange for
the prompt onward passage of the aircraft, passengers,
cargo, and crew.
2. The Hague Convention (Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) entered
into force in October 1971, requires adhering states
either to extradite skyjackers or to submit them to local
prosecution.
3. The Montreal Convention (Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation) entered into force in January 1973,
extends The Hague Convention's extradite-or-prose-
cute provisions to acts committed on the ground
against civil aircraft in service and against associated
ground facilities.
4. The UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents entered
into force in February 1977, applies the extradite-or-
prosecute formula to acts committed against protected
persons (chiefly diplomats and people who have been
granted political asylum) and their premises and
vehicles.
5. The Strasbourg Convention (European Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Terrorism) is an agreement
drafted in Strasbourg (at the initiative of France and
West Germany) in November 1976 by the Council of
Europe and signed in January 1977 by all members of
the Council except Ireland and Malta. It entered into
force in August 1978. The convention declares that?
regardless of the motivation?certain violent crimes,
including kidnaping, hijacking, bombing, and attacks
against internationally protected persons, are not sub-
ject to the -political offense exception" that might
otherwise prevent extradition of the perpetrators; if
extradition is denied for some other legal reason, the
denying country must prosecute under its own laws.
6. The Bonn Economic Summit Declaration on
Hijacking of July 1978 asserted that the participating
countries (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany)
would halt all air traffic with any country harboring a
hijacker or refusing to return the aircraft and passen-
gers. This was the first effort to put teeth into the
antiskyjacking conventions; previously there had been
no way to punish countries that violated the provisions
of these conventions.
7. The Venice Economic Summit Declaration on
the Protection of Diplomats of June 1980 is a denun-
ciation by the Summit Seven of terrorist or criminal
actions against diplomatic or consular personnel or
premises in contravention of the norms of internation-
al law and practice. The summit governments further
resolve to provide "support and assistance" in situa-
tions involving the seizure of diplomatic or consular
establishments or personnel.
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE
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agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP90R00038R000300340001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP90R00038R000300340001-5
?Seeret-
-Secret?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21: CIA-RDP90R00038R000300340001-5