NIC OUTLOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90R00038R000500590001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Fqq
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Council
NIC Outlook
MC NO 86-002
March 1986
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NIC OUTLOOK
Recent intelligence reflected in this Outlook points up:
- The implications of a possible Iranian victory over Iraq.
- The possibility that the Soviets will counter any US demonstra-
tions of SDI technology with demonstrations of their own.
1. The Implications of a Possible Iranian Victory Over Iraq.
The possibility of some kind of Iranian victory is on the increase, despite
Iraq's continuing massive advantages in firepower and materiel, and
even though internal pressures and the weight of the war effort may yet
bring down the Tehran regime. If an Iranian victory did occur, there
could be profound implications in the region and beyond.
- The possibility of Iraqi defeat. No sudden breakthrough or
Iranian march on Baghdad is likely, but the prospects for an
Iraqi victory are growing extremely remote, in view of Iran's
present advantages:
? The taking and holding of Al Faw. Iran's performance thus
far-and Iraq's ineffectual response-constitute a significant
victory for Tehran, militarily and symbolically. The longer
Iran holds Al Faw, the greater the psychological-political
pressure on Iraqi President Saddam Husayn.
? Iraq has ceded the military initiative to Iran. Saddam's
objective is to end the war, while Khomeini's is to win the war
by bringing down Saddam. Saddam has thus far yielded even
the tactical initiative to Iran, allowing it to choose the time
and place for its battles. These forfeitures, combined with
Iraq's stifling system of political control and central decision-
making, discount the value of Baghdad's technological
superiority.
? Iran's military conduct is improving; Iraq's is not. Iranian
forces have shown a steadily improved ability to coordinate
movement, to conceal attack indicators, to capitalize on
success, and to get results from poorly trained troops. By
contrast, Iraq's military professionalism remains poor at com-
mand levels, corrective measures have been ineffectual, and
Iraq has tended to hoard its most capable systems.
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? The Iraqi social-political system is more brittle than Iran's.
By maintaining the initiative, Iran has the luxury of being able
to gauge the public mood before heating up operations and
can back off, if necessary, to prevent unacceptable domestic
repercussions. By contrast, Iraq has a significant disadvantage
in available manpower, it is extremely sensitive to casualties,
and a significant setback or prolonged period of high casual-
ties would exert extreme pressure on Saddam.
The possible regional consequences of an Iranian victory. The
consequences of an Iranian victory would depend on the way it
had been achieved, with possible scenarios including a partial
military victory by Iran; a negotiated settlement in Iran's favor;
and a decisive military victory that toppled Saddam and,
possibly, paved the way for establishing a radical Shia regime in
Baghdad. If the prospects for an Iranian victory of some kind
continue to improve, some of the principal possible regional
consequences will include:
? The Persian Gulf states and other Arabs would have to
increase their involvement or accept Iraqi defeat-with the
prospect of a radical Islamic state emerging as the most
important regional actor.
? Syria's support for Iran, which springs from a specific set of
converging interests, stops far short of contributing to the
establishment of an Islamic republic in Iraq. Syria could
conceivably allow its support to be bought by other Arabs if
they were all confronted by the longer term implications of a
decisive Iranian victory.
? If a fundamentalist state were established in Iraq, or if a long-
term political vacuum in Baghdad seemed inevitable, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states would become hyper-
sensitive to their heightened vulnerability from both internal
and external sources. Kuwait, in particular, would be totally
reliant upon foreign support against Iran and the new Iraq.
? After the successful conclusion of the war, Iran would clearly
be the dominant regional actor. Although Iran would face a
long period of rebuilding its economy and rearming, it need
not turn inward. Using the threat of military action, subver-
sion, terrorism, and the questionable hold on power of many
regional regimes, it would define a role for itself not unlike
Qadhafi's in North Africa. Iran would also emerge as a more
major concern for Israel-especially with respect to terrorism.
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? Iran seems already destined to be the paramount Gulf power
in view of its high degree of success with minimal resources
against a vastly better armed and financed regime. Once
rearmed after even a stalemated Gulf war, Iran will probably
be the preeminent force to be reckoned with in the region.
The possible consequences for the USSR of an Iranian victory
of some kind. A treaty partner and one of Moscow's few Arab
associates, Iraq is a significant Soviet asset in the region. Its
defeat would be a definite loss to the USSR's regional strategic
position and image, and-depending on the nature of Iraq's
defeat-could seriously complicate Soviet policies in the region.
? The worst case outcome for the Soviets would be a collapse, on
Iraq's part, which produced a radical Islamic regime in
Baghdad, further intensified Soviet-Iranian frictions, and
caused frightened Gulf states to invite a greater US military
presence into the region.
? To forestall such prospects the USSR would almost certainly
bring a panoply of pressures to bear on Iran in an attempt to
constrain it from pushing to total victory. It is unlikely that
Moscow would send military forces into Iraq, except perhaps
in token form. Moscow nonetheless would probably sharply
increase arms supplies to Iraq, and possibly exert military
pressures against Iran's northern borders.
? Were the Baghdad regime to collapse so rapidly that Moscow
could not effectively bring the above restraints to bear on
Iran, then Soviet policy might even take a course opposite to
the above: that is, roll with the punch and try to strike a new
accord with Iran, the newly dominant regional power.
? Whatever the nature of Iran's victory, however, Moscow's
principal aim would be to prevent the United States from
increasing its influence and military presence in the region.
To that end, Soviet tactics would almost certainly include
efforts to develop a continuing dialogue with Washington on
future security in the region.
? Hence a continuing central aspect of the Iraq-Iran war will be
that neither superpower wants Iran to win, because this would
bring on an unavoidable test as to which is the more able and
ready to provide Gulf security. Nor could either readily afford
to permit the other to profit from the radically changed
situation Iraq's defeat would create in the region.
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2. The Possibility That the Soviets Will Counter Any US Demon-
strations of SDI Technology With Demonstrations of Their Own.
Even though available evidence does not clearly indicate whether the
Soviets would or would not carry out demonstrations,' the political
consequences of such Soviet demonstrations could be pronounced if
Moscow did so act.
- If, for example, in the next few years the United States
conducted such large-scale demonstrations as free electron laser,
particle beam, or additional kinetic energy experiments, Mos-
cow's leaders might calculate that the various political con-
straints on their replying in kind were outweighed by the
opportunity to display Soviet technological prowess, to demon-
strate that the United States cannot gain "superiority," and to
try to erode the American will to pursue SDI in the face of
matching Soviet competition.
- Whether or not Moscow chose to publicize its demonstrations,
Soviet claims for the level of weapon capabilities achieved
would be difficult to evaluate, because our ability to monitor
the details of some types of demonstrations would be limited.
- The Soviets would in any case not have to scramble to patch to-
gether a response to a US SDI technology demonstration, but
would almost certainly take something from their own programs
already well under way and put a political spin on it to serve
their campaigns against SDI. Candidates for such possible Soviet
demonstrations would include:
? Specific countermeasures to SDI-designed to create the
perception of reduced SDI effectiveness (such as fast-burn
boosters, decoys).
? Techniques for suppressing or attacking space-based elements
of an SDI system-designed to heighten US concern about the
vulnerabilities of SDI (such as new antisatellite-ASAT-
technologies, either ground- or space-based).
? Advanced technologies comparable to US SDI-designed to
show Soviet prowess in this area. The intent-ASAT or
ballistic missile defense-could be ambiguous (for example,
laser technologies).
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- If the Soviets were to follow such a general course of action,
they would probably be inclined to go for some sort of
demonstration in space, even if the system used had clearly
limited capability as a weapon, because of the political impact
this would have. One such option would be a dramatic demon-
stration of ASAT capabilities, along with a threat that the USSR
will not allow the United States to achieve a unilateral advan-
tage in so-called "space strike arms."
- We stress, however, that the Soviets would have to choose
carefully just which specific capabilities to demonstrate (or to
claim that had been demonstrated)-so as not to undercut Soviet
political campaigns against SDI, or to hand US authorities an
easy downplaying of the particular Soviet accomplishment.
- We view the chances as being at least even that the Soviets will
counterdemonstrate in some fashion, in the event there have
been prior dramatic US demonstrations.
? There is ample precedent for this type of behavior by the
Soviets: in recent years, they have responded to US INF
deployments with countermoves of their submarines and
short-range missiles, and they have not been reluctant to
publicize their accomplishments in manned space flights.
? The stakes for the Soviets in this case would be high, and the
opportunity to further inject themselves into the Western
political debate on SDI might be too tempting for the Soviet
leadership to pass up.
- On balance it is more likely that the Soviets would carry out a
counter-SDI, rather than an SDI-like, demonstration, in an
attempt to develop a perception by the US public and Congress
that SDI could be overcome.
- A Soviet demonstration to counter SDI would probably be just
as likely whether or not the United States continues to demon-
strate new technologies.
- The Soviets might consider the US election year 1988 to be an
appropriate time to have maximum effect on the US public.
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