INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION IN THE USSR: GROWING CONCERNS BUT LIMITED RESOURCES

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• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
"Intelligence 25X1
Industrial Pollution in
the USSR: Growing Concerns'
But Limited Resources
An Intelligence Assessment
ne4-,Irt^.
t ? =.1
Pa Fr
Secret
SOV 89-10079X
October 1989
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LOICCULIJI- LP 3ecret
Intelligence
Industrial Pollution in
the USSR: Growing Concerns
But Limited Resources
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Economic
Performance Division, SOVA,
Reverse Blank
Secret
so V 89-10079X
October 1989
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 September 1989
was used in this report.
Industrial Pollution in
the USSR: Growing Concerns
But Limited Resources
The severe and worsening pollution of the USSR's air and water has
emerged as an important political issue for Moscow, but, at a time of
staggering budget deficits and heightened competition for resources, the
Soviets cannot afford effective pollution control. Although Moscow is likely
to step up its efforts to clean up the environment?at some cost to
industrial modernization and other key programs?the measures taken are
unlikely to amount to more than attempts to get by "on the cheap." As a
result, pollution from industrial sources almost certainly will increase and
cause continuing political and economic difficulties for the already prob-
lem-plagued regime.
Pollution has become a political issue because of the alarming levels it has
reached and because the leadership has encouraged public debate on the
subject. As the Soviets acknowledge, no large industrial city in the USSR
meets World Health Organization standards for maximum permissible
concentration of pollutants in the atmosphere, and half of all municipal
water supplies have pollution levels 10 times Soviet national standards. In
addition to publicizing such abuses, Gorbachev has raised the priority
accorded environmental protection by adopting resolutions to protect Lake
Baikal, the North Caspian Basin, and the Aral Sea; by subjecting officials
to increased disciplinary action for failure to comply with antipollution
directives; and by creating, in January 1988, a new State Committee for
the Protection of Nature (Goskompriroda). His policy of glasnost has
resulted in civic actions and investigative reporting that have helped close,
convert, or halt the construction of numerous industrial plants. A draft
environmental program now in preparation promises ambitious goals for
reducing air and water pollution.
Fixing the problem, however, is extremely costly. Soviet officials estimate
that meeting draft program targets will require a total expenditure of more
than 400 billion rubles?an amount nearly equivalent to total annual
budget outlays?over the next 15 years, including capital investment of
135 billion rubles?an average of three times the annual level of invest-
ment currently devoted to environmental protection. Moreover, the success
of the program is dependent on substantial progress in economic reforms
that attempt to make industrial enterprises more autonomous and respon-
sive to economic rather than to administrative levers. In particular, the
Soviets need to make it unprofitable to pollute the environment or waste
natural resources by setting more rational prices for energy and raw
111
Secret
SOV 89-10079X
October 1989
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materials. They must also enforce environmental protection legislation
more effectively and impose fines large enough to deter polluters.
The costs of fixing the pollution problem doubtless appear especially
burdensome to Soviet Government officials struggling to reduce a budget
deficit amounting to 13 percent of their GNP and to industrial planners
and enterprise managers already strapped for funds to modernize obsolete
plants and equipment. Much of the needed pollution control technology,
moreover, is not available domestically, and hard currency shortages limit
the amounts that can be imported. In addition, Soviet central officials and
enterprise managers are concerned about other potential costs of pollution
control?the production declines that would result from closing down
polluting plants and the popular backlash that would result from raising
prices to provide the funds for environmental protection.
The Soviets will probably concentrate their pollution-fighting efforts on
only the most critical cases, reequipping the worst polluters or relocating
them away from heavily populated areas. Under such an approach the
economic losses resulting from pollution probably will continue to grow. So
too will the resentment of Soviet citizens who, in growing numbers, are
outraged by the pollution problem. These developments will increase the
chances of social unrest and worsen Gorbachev's political problems.
Failure to clean up the environment at home will also aggravate existing
transnational and global environmental problems such as acid rain, the
greenhouse effect, and depletion of the ozone layer and will damage Soviet
relations with other countries.
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Contents
Page
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Key Judgments
Scope Note
vii
A Growing Problem
The Major Culprits
Impact on the Economy
Health Effects
Reasons for Pollution
Pressure To Meet Output Goals
Unenforced Legislation
1
1
2
3
4
4
5
Lack of Investment
Inadequate Equipment and Technology
Fixing the Problem
The Goals
6
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7
7
The Tools 9
Public Pressure 9
Regulation 10
The Obstacles
Competition for Investment
Shortage of Technology and Equipment
Lack of New Incentives
Outlook and Implications
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Scope Note
Reverse Blank
This paper discusses pollution from industrial sources in the USSR, the
steps that Gorbachev is taking to alleviate the problem, their potential
impact on his broader economic and political programs, and their prospects
for success. It does not address radioactive releases, nuclear accidents, the
drying up of inland waterways, or environmental problems of a global
nature such as the greenhouse effect, all of which involve technical issues
that require separate discussion. For similar reasons, the paper does not
deal with environmental pollution caused by excessive and improper use of
fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture.
vii
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Industrial Pollution in
the USSR: Growing Concerns
But Limited Resources
A Growing Problem
The Soviet Union is in a state of ecological crisis.
Fedor Morgun, former Chairman of
the State Committee for the Protection
of Nature,
CPSU Party Conference
July 1988
Growing pollution in the USSR has resulted in severe
deterioration of the quality of air and water and has
reached levels that are alarming by both Soviet and
international standards. Soviet industry is responsible
for the lion's share of this problem.
for example:
? Air pollution in all industrial centers exceeds Soviet
health norms and in 102 cities is often 10 times
established standards.'
? One-half of all municipal water supplies have pollu-
tion levels 10 times Soviet national standards.
? Soviet industry emits nearly three times as many
pollutants into the atmosphere as does US industry.
? The European region of the USSR alone produces
nearly one-third more sulfur dioxide emissions than
all of the European Community.
? The USSR accounts for about one-fifth of the
carbon dioxide released from fossil-fuel combustion
worldwide.
The Major Culprits
According to Soviet journals, almost every branch of
industry bears part of the guilt for the pollution
problem (see table 1). The main sources of air and
water pollution are:
? The electric power industry, which is responsible for
one-fourth of all harmful substances released into
the atmosphere of the USSR, according to the
' The Soviets assess dangers to human beings from levels of
atmospheric pollution as follows: concentrations of materials up to
five times maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs), warning
zone; 10-15 MPCs, immediate threat to health; 25 MPCs and
above, extreme hazard to health.
1
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Table 1
Atmospheric Discharges of Harmful
Substances From Stationary Sources
by Soviet Industry, 1987
Million tons
Total
64.1
Of which:
Ministry of Power and Electrification
16.5
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
10.9
Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy
6.2
Ministry of the Construction Materials
Industry
3.9
Ministry of the Timber Industry
1.5
Ministry of the Coal Industry
1.5
Source: Vestnik statistiki, No. 6, 1988.
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Soviets. Coal- and oil-fired power plants account for
70 percent of the sulfur dioxide and 40 percent of
the nitrogen compounds released.
? Ferrous metallurgy enterprises, which discharge
about 1 cubic kilometer of effluent into surface
water and over 10 million tons of dust and pollut-
ants into the air annually, accounting for 17 percent
of atmospheric pollution by industry.
? Nonferrous metallurgy enterprises, which are major
sources of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and par-
ticulates. The 18 cities in the USSR where nonfer-
rous metallurgy enterprises account for the bulk of
discharges of pollutants from stationary sources are
among the cities with the highest levels of air
pollution (see figure 1).
? Chemical and petrochemical plants, which dis-
charge harmful substances into the atmosphere and
surface water bodies. Enterprises of the former
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Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production alone
annually discharge over 700,000 tons of harmful
substances into the atmosphere and release more
than 630 million cubic meters of polluted effluent
into surface water bodies.
? Pulp and paper mills, which emit pollution consist-
ing of gaseous emissions containing high concentra-
tions of sulfur compounds, chlorine, other chemi-
cals, and toxic sludge. Economist Abel Aganbegyan
described this industry as "occupying first place
amongst the sources of water pollution."
? The construction materials industry, where the
most serious sources of pollution are cement plants
that coat the countryside with dust. Because of
wornout production and dust-collection equipment,
for example, the Tbilisi Asphalt Concrete Plant has
dust emissions that are 23 times the maximum
permissible level.
Most of the major cities that suffer from excessive
atmospheric pollution are in the heavily industrialized
European USSR, but Siberian cities that have major
industrial facilities have not escaped, and towns such
as Bratsk and Angarsk are especially polluted. Fedor
Morgun, the former chairman of the State Committee
for the Protection of Nature, remarked that the
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191e3i xbutitaT
B ropoxe?
Figure 1. "What do they
breathe in the city?" Pollution
from smelting furnaces in the
Ural city of Karabash. Pravda,
21 April 1988.)
Donbass area of the Ukraine, which contains a large
concentration of heavy industry and coal-burning
power plants, is more polluted than the Ruhr Valley
was at its worst. Citizens of Yerevan, Armenia,
complain that the air is so bad they can no longer see
Mount Ararat, a snow-capped, 5,165-meter moun-
tain, 60 kilometers (km) away.
Impact on the Economy
According to Soviet estimates, total environmental
damage caused by industry costs the economy 50
billion rubles each year, about 5 percent of the annual
gross value of industrial output. The costs involved are
of various types. According to Morgun, for example,
water pollution and other consequences of industrial
activities have resulted in a drastic decline of the fish
catch in internal water reservoirs in the last 10 years.
Pollution has damaged spawning areas in the Volga-
Caspian Basin, which account for 85 percent of the
world's sturgeon fishing, the source of valuable caviar.
Industrial pollution in the Caspian Sea alone causes
annual losses of fish production valued at about 500
million rubles. Largely because of water pollution, the
total fish harvest today is only one-fifth that of 50
years ago, according to a Soviet report.
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Solid-waste pollution from industrial plants and min-
ing combines also often takes up land that could be
used for agriculture. Up to two-thirds of all ores are
extracted by open pit mining, which is 10 times more
damaging to the land than underground mining. In
the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly, for example, 25,500
hectares (63,000 acres) of fertile land have been lost to
agriculture, and the Soviets expect that another 5,000
hectares will be destroyed every five years. At the
Soligorsk potassium fertilizer mine, 400 million tons
of tailings occupy 1,500 hectares of good farmland.
Costly damage to the environment has also come from
acid rain?the result of emissions of sulfur and nitro-
gen oxides?which has damaged forests and agricul-
ture. On the Kola Peninsula, for example, forests
within a 20-km radius of the Severonikel' Combine?
a large nickel-processing enterprise?are completely
dead, and trees as far away as 60 km are in poor
condition. The Soviet press has reported that a sizable
amount of cotton plantings were killed in Uzbekistan
in 1988 because of acid rain caused by emissions from
the Almalyk mining and metallurgy facility. At the
same time, fluorine pollution from aluminum plants in
the Uzbek and Tajik Republics reduced fruit and silk
cocoon harvests and adversely affected cattle. Accord-
ing to a Soviet report, bogs in northeast Estonia, the
main water resource for the area, will disappear in the
next 30 years if something is not done about fly ash
pollution from oil-shale-burning power stations.
In addition to such indirect costs, air pollution has
become so severe in some areas that the Soviets have
been forced to move residential areas and even whole
villages at considerable expense. For example, air
pollution from pulp mills and an aluminum plant
forced the city of Bratsk to resettle two entire residen-
tial areas at a cost of 100 million rubles. More than
350 families residing in Pavlovka are scheduled to be
resettled because of incidents of large-scale sulfur
dioxide poisoning caused by emissions from the Oren-
burg gas works in 1988.
Health Effects
Beyond the physical damage to the environment,
industrial pollution also has a costly adverse impact
on the health of the population. According to Soviet
3
Table 2
Major Atmospheric Pollutants
Type of Pollutant
Major Sources
Impact on Health
Sulfur dioxide
Power plants
burning coal and
high-sulfur fuel
oil, ferrous and
nonferrous metal-
lurgical plants,
petrochemical
plants, and oil re-
fineries.
Aggravates heart disease
and preexisting respira-
tory conditions such as
asthma and chronic
bronchitis, and increases
morbidity and mortality. 25X1
Nitrogen oxides
Power plants
burning fossil fu-
els and automo-
tive emissions.
Causes bronchitis and
pneumonia. Contributes
to formation of ozone,
which has been associat-
ed with respiratory irri-
tation and heart disease.
Carbon monoxide
Ferrous metallur-
gy enterprises
and automotive
emissions.
Causes increased inci-
dence of lung and respi-
ratory disease.
Particulates
Power plants
burning coal and
oil shale and fer-
rous and nonfer-
rous metallurgy
and cement
plants.
Causes upper respiratory
disease and skin and cor-
neal inflammation.
data, for example, one-fifth of all expenditures associ-
ated with the treatment of illness is caused solely by
atmospheric pollution (see table 2). Although the
Soviets report that industrial emissions of all pollut-
ants were 9 percent less in 1987 than in 1980, they
acknowledge that no large industrial city in the USSR
meets World Health Organization standards for max-
imum permissible concentrations of pollutants in the
atmosphere
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In key industrial centers in the Urals, Soviet doctors
have traced the high incidence of lung cancer and 25X1
respiratory disease to air pollution from local fac-
tories. Emissions from synthetic protein plants of the
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Ministry of the Medical Industry also have been
responsible for atmospheric pollution that has caused
illness (see inset). In Magnitogorsk, a leading metal-
lurgical center, the rates of lung and respiratory
diseases are far above national averages, especially
among children. Life expectancy in this city is report-
edly 52 years, far below the national average of 69. In
Smolensk, a light bulb factory polluted the Dnepr
River with mercury levels 140 times greater than
permitted?an abuse that was discovered only when
local schoolchildren began suffering from loss of
eyesight, trembling, and other symptoms of mercury
poisoning
Reasons for Pollution
Ecological problems do not arise spontaneously.
They are the consequence of our technological and
ecological incompetence, mismanagement, and
irresponsibility.
Fedor Morgun,
CPSU Party Conference
July 1988
Moscow largely ignored the effects of economic devel-
opment on the environment until recently. The em-
phasis on rapid industrialization and the overriding
pressures to meet industrial output goals have dictat-
ed a low priority for environmental matters. Even as
its attention to the problems has increased, Moscow
has not devoted the resources necessary to deal effec-
tively with pollution nor given managers appropriate
incentives to tackle it. Moreover, few incentives exist
in the USSR for the careful use of natural resources
or protection of the environment. Instead, the idea
that natural resources are inexhaustible has fostered
excessive waste and resulted in large-scale pollution.
Pressure To Meet Output Goals
In the Soviet economic system, where the main
indicator of success is meeting output goals, there are
built-in incentives to pollute. Funds spent on pollution
control equipment are considered "nonproductive"
expenditures that seldom generate increased produc-
tion or profits and reduce the amount of money
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Pollution Impact on Public Health: The Case of the
Kirishi Biochemical Plant
Within months of the opening of a synthetic protein
plant at Kirishi, near Leningrad, the local bronchial
asthma rate increased 20 times, and the incidence of
skin disease also rose. Protein dust, which caused
these problems, was defined under existing health
rules as practically harmless. People continued to
become ill from the emissions, however, and, in 1985,
10 years after the plant began operating, scientists
declared the protein dust a hazardous substance. The
Ministry of Health found disablement due to respira-
tory disease in Kirishi to be twice that of the RSFSR
average and the incidence of bronchial asthma and
asthmatic bronchitis to be five to 10 times higher
than in other nearby cities. The dust also caused a
marked lowering of natural immunity against dis-
ease.
Local health authorities halted the enterprise's oper-
ation at least 12 times, but each time strong pressure
from the Ministry of the Medical and Microbiologi-
cal Industry enabled the plant to resume production.
In 1987, 12,000 people demonstrated in the city's
square to force closure of the plant. Ten thousand
citizens signed petitions that were sent to the Central
Committee in Moscow. The Ministry finally endorsed
a decision to close the plant temporarily for recon-
struction and modification of its output mix in June
1987. Two months later, although the reconstruction
was incomplete, the plant started operating at one-
third capacity, and the emissions continued. Threat-
ened with a city government decision to halt produc-
tion on 1 August 1989, Gorbachev and a deputy
chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers ordered
the Ministry to submit by I October options for
converting the plant.
available for equipment to increase output. Moreover,
orders that enterprises receive from ministries often
oblige them to violate environmental requirements.
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A worker at the Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Com-
bine recounted a story in 1988 that clearly illustrates
the damage to the environment resulting from the
prevailing attitude of "the production plan at any
cost":
I stand at the control panel, and when tongues
offlame shoot out of the oven, I see it is
beginning to choke. In order not to hamper the
smelting, there is one thing to do?open the
pumps and vent the smoke. Yes, release the
smoke into the atmosphere over the city.
The Ministry of Health decreed that two old polluting
coke-oven batteries at this enterprise could continue
operating only until a new one started up. The
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, however, ignored the
agreement even when the new battery went on line
because it had state orders for output that could not
be met if the old coke-oven batteries were shut down.
Because of the emphasis on production, construction
of pollution control facilities has always proceeded at
a slower pace than those for production, and plants
are frequently commissioned before environmental
protection facilities are in place. Moreover, industrial
plants at times provide false data on pollution levels in
order to maintain production. Checks made in 1987 at
several polluting factories by a Supreme Soviet com-
mission revealed that, under pressure from manage-
ment, ecological laboratories had knowingly falsified
data on pollution.
Unenforced Legislation
Neglect of antipollution laws has been another natu-
ral consequence of the Soviet emphasis on production
at any cost. The USSR has the strictest standards in
the world for discharges of many pollutants, and laws
on the protection of nature have been in effect since
the 1917 revolution. Unfortunately, the emphasis on
production and the unattainable goals embodied in
these laws have engendered a certain contempt for
environmental legislation. The basis of the problem is
that the state is both the owner and regulator of
production facilities and that strict enforcement of
existing regulations would hinder industrial produc-
tion.
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The criminal codes of all the republics of the USSR
contain articles stipulating punishments for causing
environmental damage, and some republics have
proved more willing to enforce these decrees than
have the all-union authorities. Local efforts have been
generally ineffective, however, because the largest
industrial enterprises, which are usually the major
polluters, generally are accountable only to the cen-
tral government. For example, local authorities in
Estonia cannot require oil shale mines or power
plants, which are subordinate to Moscow, to treat
emissions into the atmosphere and effluent into water
bodies as required by Estonian law. Similarly, in
1988, the RSFSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and
Water Resources (Minvodkhoz) found that the Za-
volzhsk Chemical Plant was annually dumping 9
million cubic meters of untreated waste containing as
much as 1,000 times allowable levels of toxic sub-
stances. Minvodkhoz decided to close the enterprise,
but the central ministry overturned the decision, and
the plant is still operating. In another case, a memo-
randum from an environmental official in Baku to a
higher authority complaining about serious pollution
by a local oil refinery in 1988 was returned immedi-
ately with an irate note telling the official to mind his
own business.
Soviet industries also have circumvented pollution
standards in other ways. When limits for pollutants
are deemed too stringent, they frequently are re-
adjusted to correspond to the available treatment 25X1
system, or the plants are granted an "exception" to
exceed maximum permissible levels. These exceptions
generally are given to enterprises with plans to install
pollution abatement facilities or to change their pro-
duction processes to less polluting technologies at
some point in the future. The future, however, some-
times never comes. Even fines for polluting the envi-
ronment are largely ineffective because of their limit-
ed size and because a large share is never collected. 25X1
Because ministries intend to pollute, they often set .
aside funds in their budgets to pay the fines. Further-
more, polluters are not required to pay to restore the
environment to its previous state.
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Recognizing the near hopelessness of their pollution-
fighting task, prosecutors and environmental control
authorities frequently have failed to make use of the
rights granted them to bring cases to trial, shut down
polluting facilities, or demand that the ministries or
departments remove guilty officials or institute disci-
plinary proceedings. According to a Soviet specialist
on environmental law, many violations never fully
come to light or are never formally registered. Investi-
gations are carelessly carried out, and all measures
are adopted to minimize the penalty, if not to wipe it
out entirely. In 1987 the number of criminal court
cases resulting from violation of environmental regu-
lations declined by one-third (two-thirds in the
Ukraine) compared with 1986. No cases were sent to
court in the Uzbek, Lithuanian, Azerbaijan, Molda-
vian, Tajik, or Turkmen Republics.
Lack of Investment
Incentives and legislation aside, the reduction of
pollution requires resources, and, here especially, So-
viet pollution control efforts have come up short. For
all the lipservice paid to the pollution problem in
recent years, the share of total investment devoted to
environmental protection was larger in 1975 than it is
today (see table,3). Total outlays for environmental
protection in the USSR amounted to only about 11
billion rubles in 1988, including 3.1 billion rubles for
capital investment and funds for operating costs and
the forestry sector. The Soviets, who have amore
serious pollution problem than the United States,
devote about 0.7 percent of their gross national
product to environmental protection compared with
1.7 percent in the United States.
Soviet data on pollution control spending, moreover,
probably overstate actual expenditures because many
enterprises do not use the funds provided or spend
them for other purposes. According to a Soviet envi-
ronmental official, for example, only 85 percent of
capital investment allocations for environmental pro-
tection was used during the period 1976-85. The
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, in particular, has
historically not spent the funds allocated to it for
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Table 3
USSR: Capital Investment for
Environmental Protection
Total Expenditures
(million 1984 rubles)
Share of Total Investment
(percent)
1975
2,430
1.8
1980
2,215
1.4
1981
2,151
1.4
1982
2,162
1.3
1983
2,057
1.2
1984
2,285
1.3
1985
2,486
1.4
1986
2,615
1.4
1987
2,663
1.3
1988
3,119
1.4 a
a Estimated.
environmental protection measures, and environmen-
tal expenditures in 1981-85 were even less than in the
previous five-year period. Similarly, none of the
ministries in the fuel-energy, chemical-timber, or
metallurgical complexes fulfilled the plan for putting
environmental protection facilities into operation in
1988.
The inability of construction organizations to handle
installation of pollution control facilities is the major
reason allocated funds are not spent. A former con-
struction minister reported in 1986 that the share of
environmental protection facilities in his organiza-
tion's planned total volume of construction and instal-
lation work was only 3 to 4 percent and that these
plans were usually underfulfilled. Delays in the con-
struction of a waste-water treatment complex at the
Stebnik Potassium Combine resulted in the bursting
of a dam holding industrial wastes in 1983, causing
losses to farms in the Ukraine and Moldavia that
totaled millions of rubles
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Inadequate Equipment and Technology
In a production-oriented economy, moreover, there is
little incentive to develop pollution control technology
or to move it quickly through the research and
development-to-production cycle. Consequently, the
technological level of pollution abatement equipment
produced in the USSR lags years behind that of the
West. At the same time, production of this equipment
is inefficient. Each industrial ministry tends to devel-
op its own equipment, resulting in needless duplica-
tion. Organizations tasked to design and produce
pollution control equipment have other, higher priori-
ty responsibilities, and production of such equipment
tends to get short shrift. For example, the Ministry of
Heavy Machine Building, which is responsible for
producing much of the equipment for the oil, gas, and
chemical industries, is the head ministry for develop-
ing and producing most effluent-gas cleaning equip-
ment. Because of higher priority for production of
other machinery, however, it has not devoted the
resources to developing equipment for removing sulfur
and nitrogen oxides from stack gases. Most cleaning
of industrial waste gases has generally consisted mere-
ly of trapping particulates.
Shortages, poor design, and inferior quality of equip-
ment mean that many large industrial plants are
either not outfitted with pollution control equipment,
or that when such equipment is installed, it does not
operate effectively and frequently breaks down. Main-
tenance of pollution control equipment is poor because
of the lack of trained specialists. Almost one-third of
existing waste-water treatment facilities do not pro-
vide purification that meets standards, and more than
one-third of pulp and paper mills have no such
treatment facilities at all. Less than one-third of the
sulfur dioxide, fluorine compounds, nitrogen, and
other harmful substances from industrial facilities is
removed before waste gases are released into the air,
according to the Soviets. Currently operating central
power and heating plants do not have equipment for
removing sulfur and nitrogen oxides from waste gases,
and existing ash-trapping systems are ineffective.
7
Fixing the Problem
In establishing a healthy way of life, particular
attention must be paid to environmental protec-
tion. . . . The state of affairs here is worrying, to say
the least.
Mikhail Gorbachev,
Address to the Congress
of People's Deputies
May 1989
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Since Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet leadership
has become increasingly concerned with the pollution
problem and has raised the priority accorded environ-
mental protection (see figure 2). Gorbachev's promo-
tion of glasnost has enabled pollution to become a
highly visible issue. His emphasis on achieving growth
by improving efficiency rather than by using more
resources is intended to help alleviate some of the
chronic environmental damage associated with past
shortsighted approaches to natural resource develop-
ment and use. Gorbachev, in fact, is the first Soviet
leader to include environmental deterioration in his
list of national priorities as voiced in governmental
forums.
Among the general public, as well as within the
leadership, environmental problems are now being
viewed as critical issues. Tatyana Zaslavskaya, a
leading Soviet sociologist, claimed in March 1988
that public opinion polling data indicated that the
ecological crisis ranked ahead of other public concerns
such as availability of food and other consumer goods,
housing, or higher prices. Nearly all the candidates
for election to the Congress of People's Deputies in
March 1989 had an ecological plank in their plat-
forms.
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The Goals
For all of the attention being devoted to environmen-
tal protection, the Soviets have been slow to come out
with specific goals. The 1986-90 Five-Year Plan
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Figure 2.
511411WWW3c150g
contained only a general section on the protection of
the environment and rational utilization of natural
resources, which called for wider introduction of low-
waste and waste-free technologies, better use of natu-
ral resources, protection of the country's water re-
sources and atmosphere, and improvement in
monitoring sources of pollution. The 1989 annual plan
contained similar language as well as plans to require
new and reconstructed facilities to have effective
pollution control. At the same time, three of 14 high-
priority science and technology programs announced
in January 1989 concern environmentally clean chem-
ical and steel production, energy generation, and
transport. In one of the few specifics disclosed so far,
Morgun said at the signing of an environmental
cooperation agreement with Sweden in April 1989
that the USSR will reduce emissions into air and
water by 30 to 50 percent in the next four to five
years. On the Kola Peninsula, emissions are to be cut
by 80 percent.
In spite of Gorbachev's apparent concern with reduc-
ing pollution, however, his other plans appear to
conflict with pollution control targets. For example, a
Secret
1988 report of the State Planning Committee revealed
that it is loosening restrictions on waste-water emis-
sions for the pulp and paper and natural gas industries
in the interest of increasing production. Similarly,
although Gorbachev has sought to improve the effi-
ciency of the economy, in the last three years there
has been little improvement in either conservation or
the efficiency of resource use. The 1989 plan called
for growth in energy production above levels set forth
in the original five-year plan.
Much more ambitious environmental protection goals,
however, appear to be forthcoming. According to one
of the compilers of a promised draft program for the
protection of the environment and rational utilization
of natural resources through the year 2005, the USSR
plans to:
? Stop all discharges of effluent into natural water
reservoirs by the year 2000 and raise the quality of
the country's main reservoirs to national standards
by 2005.
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? Halve atmospheric emissions from stationary
sources.
? Reduce by 80 percent emissions of specific pollut-
ants from enterprises located in 276 cities with high
levels of air pollution.
? Triple commissionings of gas-scrubbing
installations.
? Reduce air pollution from motor transport by 48
percent.
? Increase the annual volume of reforestation to 2.5
million hectares, exceeding the total area of timber
felled each year.
The program will also provide for payment for the use
of natural resources, and, in 1991, plants will be
assessed a set of progressive fines linked to the level of
damage they have caused the environment. Whether
these goals will be realized or even maintained, of
course, remains to be seen.
The Tools
To achieve the new and projected pollution control
targets, Gorbachev is using the same set of tools
employed in his overall perestroyka program. These
include the mobilization of public support for pollu-
tion control, the enforcement of greater discipline
against polluters, and administrative reorganization.
The regime has also talked about increasing the
resources allocated to pollution control and enacting
needed reforms, but there has been little follow-
through to date.
Public Pressure. Gorbachev's campaign to democra-
tize and reform the system has given the populace an
unprecedented opportunity to speak out on the pollu-
tion problem. The most visible manifestation of the
new attitude toward environmental issues is the can-
did presentation of ecological problems in the media.
Gorbachev's liberalized policy for state-controlled me-
dia has allowed environmental activism to receive
greater, more candid coverage than ever, and the
press, radio, and television are joining the people in
calling attention to problems and demanding solutions
(see figure 3). The resultant public pressure, which has
included demonstrations and protests, has actually
influenced planning decisions and closed down some
9
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industrial operations?a fundamental break with tra-
ditional Soviet policymaking procedures (see inset).
Nevertheless, complete freedom of the press and full
disclosure of environmental information are still a
long way off.2
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Petitions and demonstrations against specific cases of
environmental damage generally have been allowed to 25X1
proceed without hindrance probably because they are
in line with current policy of encouraging grassroots 25X1
activity to restrain the ministerial bureaucracies. In
August 1988, an official of the USSR Procuracy
explicitly said that environmental protests should be
allowed. Soviet authorities may consider environmen-
tal demonstrations a safe vehicle for citizens to vent
frustrations that otherwise might lead to political
protests.
The environmental situation, nonetheless, has given
rise to political groups that have organized demon-
strations and antipollution drives. In Armenia, the
Ukraine, and the Baltic republics, nationalism has
played a role in ecological protests. The original
demonstrations in Yerevan, Armenia, in February
1988, which decried air pollution from a nearby
synthetic rubber factory, preceded and appear to have
catalyzed ethnic unrest about the political status of
Nagorno-Karabakh.' Also, the Greens movement in
Estonia?a stronghold of nationalism?has led to
protests against expansion of phosphate mining in the
region. In the Baltic republics, other protests against
industrial projects may have been stimulated more by
opposition to a further influx of ethnic Russians than
by concern about damage to the environment.
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In the Ukrainian city of Chernovtsy early this year, a group of
children became ill with nervous disorders, hair loss, and nausea.
After weeks of investigation and speculation, doctors attributed the
illness to exposure to thallium from an unknown source. The local
and national media gave inaccurate and contradictory information
about the source of the problem and its dangers, and the actual
cause of the problem has yet to be disclosed.
' Armenians are demanding that Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast?an Armenian enclave inside the re ublic of Azerbaijan?
be reunited with the Armenian Republic.
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Public Pressure on Industrial Facilities
Citizen protests have had an unprecedented influence
in blocking industrial construction, closing or moving
plants, or forcing plants to change to nonpolluting
output. These actions by the Soviet authorities reflect
a sensitivity to public comment that did not exist
before glasnost. For example:
? The Priozersk pulp plant was closed in 1987 for
severely polluting Lake Ladoga. The plant is to be
retooled to make products whose manufacture is
nonpolluting.
? The Shchekino nitrogen fertilizer plant discontin-
ued production of fertilizers and resins in mid-1987
to protect Yasnaya Polyana, former residence of
Tolstoy. The plant will shift to production of ion-
exchange membranes, electrolyzers, and other non-
polluting products. Closure of the fertilizer and
resins lines cost the plant 60 million rubles, slightly
more than 30 percent of annual output. Switching
to nonpolluting output will require a more highly
trained work force.
? The people of Ufa said "enough" to another chemi-
cal plant in December 1987, and, so far, have
prevented the siting of a polycarbonate plant in
their city.
? An old synthetic rubber plant in Yerevan, which
had been polluting the city's atmosphere for many
years, was finally closed in early 1988 after a
demonstration that expanded into protests over the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
? An environmental group influenced the central go-
vernment's decision in 1988 to cancel construction
of an apatite plant that threatened Lake Baikal
with further pollution.
? After years of protests against the Baikal Pulp and
Paper Combine for pollution of the waters of Lake
Baikal and the surrounding atmosphere, a yeast
plant at the combine was closed in 1988. The pulp
facility also was ordered to convert its output to
nonpolluting furniture products, but this will not
occur until at least 1993, when another pulp plant
at Ust'-Ilimsk is scheduled to begin operation.
Plans to build a pipeline to carry wastes from the
Baikal plant to the Irkut River as a temporary
measure were thwarted by local residents who did
not want their environment damaged.
? Plans to construct a large turnkey biotechnology
project at Taroussa, near Moscow, were reportedly
canceled in 1988 because residents exerted suffi-
cient pressure on local authorities to relocate the
proposed plant's functions.
? In August 1988, an antibiotics plant in Frunze was
closed in response to public demand.
? City officials in Dneprodzerzhinsk stopped con-
struction work on a coke chemical plant in Septem-
ber 1988 until a dust-free coal delivery system, a
water recycling system, and a series of water purifi-
ers were installed.
Regulation. In an effort to strengthen existing envi-
ronmental legislation, several new resolutions carry-
ing legal weight have been adopted by the Central
Committee and' Council of Ministers. These include:
? An April 1987 resolution, "On Measures To Ensure
the Protection and Rational Utilization of the Wa-
ter Resources of Lake Baikal in 1987-1995."
Secret
? A July 1987 resolution, "On the Ecological Situa-
tion in a Number of the Country's Regions and
Industrial Centers," which noted the acute ecologi-
cal situation and the failure of ministries and
departments to take the necessary measures to
protect the environment. The resolution ordered the
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? Under pressure from the public, the former Minis-
try of Mineral Fertilizer Production canceled plans
to build a phosphate fertilizer plant at Berezovka,
near a recreation area in the southern Ukraine.
? In June 1989, the Astrakhan Oblast Environmental
Protection Committee closed a gas-processing plant
because excessive air pollution had damaged crops
and the health of nearby residents.
? Discussing the confirmation of Minister of the
Medical Industry Valeriy Bykov at a recent session
of the Supreme Soviet, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov
disclosed that a plan for doubling production of
synthetic protein may be abandoned.
? In late August 1989, public pressure forced a delay
in the opening of a newly completed plant for the
destruction of chemical weapons at Chapayevsk.
ministries to step up work on pollution abatement
and stressed the personal responsibility of the lead-
ers of ministries and departments.
? A January 1988 resolution, "Radical Restructuring
of Environmental Protection in the Country."
11
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? A February 1988 resolution to ensure ecological 25X1
safety during the development of oil and gas re-
sources in the North Caspian Basin.
? A September 1988 resolution, "On Measures To
Fundamentally Improve the Ecological and Sani-
tary Situation in the Aral Sea and Make More
Effective Use and Improve the Conservation of
Water and Land Resources in the Aral Sea.'
Despite leniency and unenforced legislation in many
cases, Soviet officials have also faced increased disci-
plinary action under Gorbachev for failing to comply
with the new directives. A deputy minister of the
timber industry, for example, was fired in 1987 for
failure to develop a water recycling system at the
Selenginsk Pulp and Cardboard Combine and for
polluting the environment with industrial waste and
gaseous emissions from the Baikal Pulp and Paper
Combine. Later the same year, the former plant
director and chief engineer of the Priozersk Pulp and
Paper Combine were convicted in a criminal case for
ermitting the plant to seriously pollute Lake Ladoga.
The excessive fragmentation of environmental protec-
tion functions among various ministries and organiza-
tions and the absence of effective incentives to reduce
pollution prompted the leadership in January 1988 to
adopt a resolution creating, for the first time, a single
body?the USSR State Committee for the Protection
of Nature (Goskompriroda)?to oversee environmen-
tal protection issues and ensure rational use of natural
resources.' Goskompriroda was given a mandate to
create and enforce a system wherein industries could
no longer ignore the environmental impact of their
activities (see inset).
'When Goskompriroda was established, the former State Commit-
tee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control was abol-
ished. A new State Committee for Hydrometeorology is charged
with earth remote sensing, weather forecastin and environmental
regulation, but it has no policy responsibility
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Figure 3
Glasnost on Pollution
Xopowo-To Praor, nxmAn! Pal
lave
uecrof Napo menpemetino nocrpo-
sgect, 455v0n03001-
Koaf5mar.
"What a marvelous place, Lord! What a heavenly place! We must
build a cellulose combine here." (Krokodil, number 6, 1988)
Soviet Swan Lake. (Trud,
19 April 1988)
"Waste treatment system."
(Solsialisticheskaya i 17 dustriya,
19 March 1989)
no-moemy, mmorosaro yememra
B rpy6y moneraer...
"In my opinion, a bit too much cement is coming out of the
stack." (Krokodil, number 30, 1988)
"River of the future." (Krokodil, number 19, 1988)
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Major Responsibilities and Rights of Goskompriroda
Goskompriroda has been tasked with:
? Managing environmental protection in the country.
? Monitoring the use and protection of land, water,
plants, and animals.
? Submitting proposals on environmental protection
and rational use of natural resources for inclusion
in the next five-year plan.
? Developing proposals for more efficient use of natu-
ral resources and setting standards for their use.
? Examining plans for siting industrial facilities, and
monitoring observance of ecological standards in
the development of new equipment, technology, and
materials and designs for construction of
enterprises.
? Issuing permits for storage of wastes.
? Managing nature reserves.
? Increasing participation of the scientific community
in designing and building pollution control
equipment.
? Delineating the environmental responsibilities of
various state and party organs.
? Organizing the dissemination of information about
the environment.
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? Planning and implementing cooperation with for-
eign countries in environmental protection.
To implement these responsibilities, Goskompriroda
and republic state committees for environmental pro-
tection have been given the right to:
? Impose bans on construction of facilities and ex-
ploitation of natural resources that violate environ-
mental legislation.
? Halt work by enterprises that violate environmental
standards and rules.
? Bring suit against enterprises, organizations, and
citizens for the reimbursement of losses resulting
from pollution of the environment or "irrational"
use of natural resources.
According to the resolution, decisions by Goskompri-
roda are binding on ministries and other organiza-
tions. Enterprises and organizations will be charged a
standard fee for use of natural resources and emission
of pollutants. A higher charge for exceeding allowable
discharges, which will come from collectives' profits,
will go into a reserve fund for unforeseen tasks
associated with environmental protection. Goskom-
priroda and other appropriate agencies were instruct-
ed to draw up a new draft law on the protection of the
environment and submit it to the Council of Ministers
in 1989.
The significance of Goskompriroda is that it can
influence the content of future environmental legisla-
tion by providing information on the extent of pollu-
13
tion problems and supplying the expertise needed for
their solution. It probably also was designed as an
enforcement agency, operating independently of the
institutions committed primarily to fulfilling produc-
tion targets. Goskompriroda's powers appear to be
strong enough on paper, and the new law, when it is
enacted, may strengthen them further.
Gorbachev's appointment in March 1988 of Fedor
Morgun, a close ally, to head the committee was a
sign that the leader had moved environmental issues
up in the Soviet agenda. Morgun said that he realized
he was battling powerful entrenched forces in the
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country, and he voiced concerns that the management
problems of setting up Goskompriroda may displace
larger objectives in the early stages. Morgun resigned
from his position in June 1989. Although he claimed
in a recent press interview that his age, 65, was a
major reason for his resignation, his comments clearly
reflected his frustration with battling the ministries
and departments and the lack of clout that Goskom-
priroda actually had in solving environmental prob-
lems. A replacement for him was not found until early
August, when Professor Nikolay Vorontsov, a biolo-
gist, was appointed to head Goskompriroda. He is the
first non-Communist party member in a central cabi-
net post.
Apparently, Goskompriroda already is having some
impact. According to an economist at the USSR State
Construction Committee (Gosstroy), future construc-
tion plans and designs must now take environmental
considerations into account, and Goskompriroda or its
regional counterparts must approve virtually all con-
struction projects in advance. The economist claimed
that Gosstroy also could not circumvent Goskompriro-
da's decisions to refuse permission to start work on a
project. Moreover, in the chemical industry, no new
production facilities are now allowed to start opera-
tion unless they have purification systems that guar-
antee environmental safety. During the first six
months of its existence, Goskompriroda halted work
temporarily or permanently on several industrial en-
terprises.
In addition, the leadership is taking steps to give the
republics more control over the environment by in-
cluding these rights in recently published draft princi-
ples on republic autonomy. All maximum permissible
pollution standards are to be set by the republics, even
for enterprises subordinate to Moscow, and the repub-
lics are to have the right to close facilities that cause
dangerous levels of pollution or violate procedures for
the use of natural resources. The republics also will be
able to charge enterprises for the use of natural
resources and for other expenses associated with
environmental conservation.
Secret
The Obstacles
To ensure that the new measures to improve pollution
are implemented, the Soviets need to back up their
programs with the necessary resources and appropri-
ate incentives. Unless there is long-range commitment
to Goskompriroda's efforts, it will simply be out-
gunned by the country's industrial giants. In particu-
lar, the resource commitment must include funds for
basic research, investment, education, and enforce-
ment of regulations.
Competition for Investment. To achieve any success
in improving environmental protection, the Soviets
must increase budgetary outlays substantially. Ac-
cording to Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, antipollution
measures in the draft plan for the environment
through the year 2005 will require capital investment
of 135 billion rubles over 15 years, an average of three
times the level of annual investment currently devoted
to environmental protection. Over the same period,
total expenditures for environmental protection?in-
cluding capital investment, operating costs, and funds
for the forestry sector?will require more than 400
billion rubles, according to Petr Poletayev, a high
Goskompriroda official.
These projected requirements may understate Mos-
cow's needs. A Soviet expert has estimated that, at a
minimum, Soviet industry needs to immediately invest
100 billion rubles, plus 6-7 billion rubles annually
thereafter just to bring the problem of air pollution
under control. The Soviets also have estimated that
removing only sulfur dioxide from power plants burn-
ing coal and oil would require a one-time investment
of about 18 billion rubles and operating costs of more
than 1 billion rubles annually. To put these require-
ments into perspective, it should be noted that the
entire current environmental protection budget is 11
billion rubles. In a classic instance of understatement,
Morgun recently said that, "this is not enough, and
more so since the funds are in the hands of the
polluting departments."
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Morgun has suggested that additional funds for envi-
ronmental protection might come from cutbacks in
military spending, and, in a speech in London in April
1989, Gorbachev seemed to concur, remarking that,
"We shall not be able to save the environment unless
we embark on a powerful disarmament and release
resources to solve environmental problems." Even
though Gorbachev's comment may have been directed
primarily at the West, it could be significant that he
sees using these potentially freed funds to help solve
environmental problems.
But more than just money is required. Qualified
personnel are needed to operate installations and
pollution abatement equipment and to staff regional
and local committees for environmental protection. In
several areas, such as Lake Baikal and Irkutsk, local
committees are being staffed by unqualified and
uncommitted personnel, according to the Soviet press.
Newly formed branches of Goskompriroda in large
industrial centers in the Urals and Siberia have staffs
of only one person. The Soviets also need to provide
increased education for the public as well as training
for personnel working in environmental protection.
Even to attempt to deal with its current pollution
problems, Moscow needs to compile a survey of the
areas that are suffering the worst from environmental
damage, outline specific measures to remedy the
situation, and determine priorities for investment.
Moreover, the cumbersome and ineffective monitor-
ing system now handled by various state committees
and ministries needs to be replaced with a unified
system
Shortage of Technology and Equipment. Even if given
additional funds and manpower, Soviet pollution
fighters are certain to be hampered by the USSR's
chronic technological backwardness. According to
Morgun, the most important problem in dealing with
pollution is access to good technology. The Soviets
need to develop more efficient low-waste and waste-
free technologies, especially equipment to clean indus-
trial effluents. Raising individual enterprise technol-
ogy to world standards would drastically reduce
environmental damage by industry; lower consump-
tion of materials, energy, and labor; and upgrade
15
product quality. The technological levels of Soviet
industry and pollution control equipment, however,
lag far behind those of the West, and low-waste and
waste-free technologies will not be available in the
near future
Another technology-related challenge for the Soviets
involves the development of equipment for recycling
pollutants?an important means of increasing the
cost-effectiveness of protecting the environment. A
Soviet study claims that the cost of producing sulfuric
acid from exhaust gases at nonferrous metallurgy
enterprises is lower than the cost of producing sulfuric
acid from conventional raw materials at enterprises of
the chemical industry. More efficient and comprehen-
sive processing of minerals and metallic ores also
could reduce the growing piles of tailings. A Soviet
report claims that producing steel from scrap reduces
air pollution by six times and water pollution by five
times compared with conventional steelmaking.
The principal industries responsible for pollution need
specific types of equipment and technologies:
? The pulp and paper industry needs to develop waste-
free technology, install closed-loop water supply
systems, and capture dust and gases prior to dis-
charge.' Implementation of these measures, howev-
er, would require development of new equipment
and chemicals not now produced in the USSR.
? Electric power plants burning coal, oil, and oil shale
need to install flue gas desulfurization equipment,
but this equipment is virtually unavailable in the
USSR.' In addition to the high cost?as much as 40
percent of capital investment?this technology
would increase energy consumption by as much as
Although the Baikal Pulp and Paper Combine uses the most
advanced Soviet equipment, it releases four times more chemicals
per ton of paper produced than comparable plants in the United
States.
According to a Soviet scientist, average discharges of dust and
sulfur dioxide from coal-burning power plants in. the USSR are
several hundred percent higher than those in the United States.
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6 percent. Modern, efficient, multistage, electrostat-
ic precipitators to remove fly ash from coal-fired
power plants also are needed. Because the precipita-
tors that the Soviets now have installed in power
plants consume so much electricity, however, they
frequently are turned off. According to a recent
article in Elektricheskiye stantsii, the Soviets esti-
mate that to meet proposed standards for atmo-
spheric emissions, 216 exhaust-gas scrubbers to
remove sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides would be
required at a cost of tens of billions of rubles. No
combustion technology presently available in the
USSR or the West has completely resolved the
problem of emissions of nitrogen oxides.
? In ferrous metallurgy, use of basic oxygen and
electric steelmaking technologies would reduce for-
mation of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, dust, and
other pollutants. At the Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgi-
cal Combine, for example, the cost of reconstructing
the converter shop to solve ecological problems is so
high that a gas-treatment project is being dropped
from the plan.
? In nonferrous metallurgy, reconstruction of lead
and zinc enterprises to incorporate waste-free, oxy-
gen-electrothermal technology for clean processing
of ores would drastically reduce the pollution associ-
ated with traditional lead and zinc refining.' Broad-
ening the use of fluidized-bed autogenous smelters
like the one at the Noril'sk Mining and Metallurgi-
cal Combine would not only reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions, but allow recovery of sulfur.
Sufficient supplies of pollution control equipment will
not be available from domestic sources any time soon.
The Soviets could obtain pollution control equipment
from the West, but hard currency constraints and a
conservative attitude toward borrowing will limit im-
ports to that machinery and technology with the
highest priority (see inset).
Lack of New Incentives. One of the best incentives for
environmental protection would be to make it unprof-
itable for industries to pollute the environment or
' The Soviets developed the KIVTsET process for clean processing
of lead, zinc, and copper ores and have sold the license abroad, but
apparently it is not yet used commercially in the USSR.
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waste natural resources. With regard to this point,
Soviet academician Vladimir Sokolov stated in a
recent Izvestiya article that "until ecology is written
into society's income and expenditure accounts, it will
make a loss." Moscow has taken the first steps with
its proposals in the resolution establishing Goskom-
priroda, but the feasibility of such a mechanism
depends on the successful implementation of Gorba-
chev's economic reforms, particularly price reform
and self-financing of enterprises. Realistic pricing of
natural resources and energy offers the potential of
improving the environmental situation substantially
by promoting conservation and more efficient produc-
tion. Under self-financing, however, a policy of ratio-
nal use and saving of natural resources is possible only
if it is viewed as economically advantageous to enter-
prises. To achieve this, Moscow would have to in-
crease wholesale and retail prices, introduce full
payment for natural resources, and abandon unrealis-
tically low prices for energy.'
If pollution control efforts are to succeed, moreover,
the concept of production cost also needs to be
broadened to include the cost of returning the envi-
ronment to its previous state. Implementation of such
a measure would provide a stronger stimulus for
industrial enterprises to move to less polluting produc-
tion processes. In addition, fines must be made more
effective deterrents to polluting the air and water.
Penalties for pollution need to be large enough to
deter violators and must exceed expenditures for
environmental protection activities, making it more
profitable for enterprises to reduce pollution. The cost
of fines should not be passed on to the consumers, but
rather paid out of enterprise profits. Heavy fines,
especially if levied by an environmental monitoring
service, independent of local and departmental organi-
zations, with the receipts put in a regional environ-
mental protection fund, could have a significant effect
on reducing pollution. The Soviets could encourage
compliance with environmental regulations by using
part of these funds as bonuses for meeting such
requirements.
According to Abel Aganbegyan, existing domestic prices for fuel
and raw materials are only one-half those on the world market.
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The Role of the West in Soviet Pollution Control
As part of the effort to control industrial pollution,
the Soviets are interested in drawing on Western
technology and expertise.
Moscow's purchases of Western technology will
concentrate on production technologies that are de-
signed to minimize emissions and effluents.
? In a recent agreement with a consortium of Western
firms to build a large chemical complex at Nizhne-
vartovsk, the Soviets specified technologies that
will fully utilize waste gases and solid wastes and
will not discharge any contaminated water.
? A West German firm won a contract in 1988 to
modernize three chemical plants largely because
the production process it offered was less polluting
than those of its competitors.
? A recent contract with a French consortium to
supply processing facilities for the Tengiz oilfleld
included new technology to recover nearly all the
sulfur removed in treatment in order to meet
stricter environmental regulations.
The Soviets also hope to gain access to Western
technology through cooperative and joint-venture
agreements. In the aftermath of Chernobyl', which
damaged its international image, Moscow has be-
come more concerned with the international implica-
tions of environmental protection. The USSR has
been more forthcoming in recent months in interna-
tional forums dealing with the environment, and is
making a special effort to clean up the Baltics and the
Kola Peninsula to reduce cross-border pollution:
? A five-year environmental cooperation agreement
with Sweden, signed in April 1989, provides for
research exchange and joint work in atmospheric
pollution control. The Soviets eventually will be
able to purchase Swedish pollution control technol-
ogy under the agreement.
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? The USSR and Finland signed an agreement in
September 1989 to reduce sulfur dioxide emis-
sions?originating mainly from Soviet enterprises 25X1
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by 1994.
? At USSR-Norwegian environmental talks last year,
the Soviets claimed that they will halve emissions
of sulfur dioxide from the nickel plants at Nike!'
and Zapolyarnyy?near the Norwegian border?by
1993.
? Five Nordic countries recently proposed creating a
joint fund from which firms producing environmen-
tally safe technology can borrow money to set up
subsidiary companies in Eastern Bloc countries in
order to introduce purification technology.
? Under a Soviet?West German five-year environ-
mental cooperation agreement, signed in October
1988 during Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to the
USSR, priority attention will be given to protection
of the Baltic Sea and the Volga and Rhine Rivers,
processing of domestic wastes, and protection of the
ozone layer of the atmosphere.
? Under a Soviet-Japanese environmental coopera-
tion agreement, Japan plans to transfer to the
USSR more efficient oil and coal combustion tech-
nology, which would reduce discharges of carbon
dioxide and nitrogen oxides.
? The USSR and the United States have a bilateral
agreement under which a number of projects are
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Although few joint ventures have been signed so far, a
joint venture with West German and Finnish firms to
produce equipment to remove sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides from waste gases was recently negoti-
ated. Also, a Soviet?Italian joint venture, Prima, is
to reduce pollution of air and water in the Moscow
area.
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Outlook and Implications
Although the Soviets are committed to reducing
industrial pollution, it is unlikely that they will have
the resources necessary to deal with the scale of
environmental damage that already has occurred and
to prevent further damage. Laboring under a stagger-
ing budget deficit, Moscow is desperately looking for
ways to slash government spending. Moreover, with
increasing competition from other high-priority needs,
such as the long-term consumer and energy programs,
it will be extremely difficult to get more funding for
environmental protection. If funds are freed as a
result of reduced military expenditures other claim-
ants probably will outrank ecology.
Much of the needed pollution control equipment and
technology, moreover, is not yet available domestical-
ly, the hard currency to obtain it abroad is scarce, and
the Soviets have not yet devised the correct incentives
to encourage the future production and application of
these new technologies. Soviet machine-building in-
dustries are already overwhelmed with orders for
equipment to modernize Soviet industry and for ma-
chinery for the light and food-processing industries,
and are unlikely to be able to assume a major role in
the production of advanced pollution control equip-
ment. Moscow probably will increase purchases of
Western pollution control equipment somewhat, espe-
cially to deal with critical problem areas, and US
firms could benefit because of their experience in
pollution control technology. The Soviets also will
encourage joint ventures and cooperative agreements
to gain access to Western pollution control technol-
ogy. Nonetheless, such efforts are likely to run afoul
of the same problems that have impeded other joint
ventures?the difficulty of repatriating profits earned
in the USSR and the general dissatisfaction of West-
ern firms with Soviet operating conditions.
Ultimately, the success of Soviet environmental policy
will depend on progress in economic reform?whether
enterprises can be made more autonomous and re-
sponsive to economic rather than administrative con-
trols. The Soviets need to make it unprofitable for
enterprises to pollute the environment or waste natu-
ral resources by setting more rational prices for
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energy and raw materials and by charging appropri-
ate fees for emission of pollutants. But they have been
dragging their feet on price reform?wholesale and
retail price reform have been postponed indefinitely?
because it entails substantial social and political costs.
We see little prospect of significant progress in eco-
nomic reform in the near term. As a result, industrial
pollution will almost certainly increase. The Soviet
leadership will be motivated to take serious action
only in instances when an increase in disease, mortal
ity rates, and lost workdays related to environmental
causes demonstrably affects large numbers of the
population. Moscow is likely to concentrate its atten-
tion on the most critical cases, and the worst facilities
probably will be retooled or moved outside heavily
polluted urban areas. Some will be closed or modified
to nonpolluting output, but these measures will be
limited by the available resources and by what the
economy can tolerate in lost production.
Failure to provide the resources and incentives needed
for environmental protection means that the economic
losses resulting from pollution will grow, and, from
the citizens' viewpoint, an already intolerable situa-
tion will worsen. Pollution will continue to damage
harvests and forests, spoil agricultural land, and
decrease fish catches. Waste will continue to be
common in industry, health-care costs will increase,
and lost workdays will lower productivity. More towns
and villages will have to be relocated at considerable
expense and social disruption. Pollution-related dis-
eases will increase and mortality rates from these
causes will rise. Many outdoor leisure activities will
have to be curtailed. These issues could increase the
chances for social unrest and political problems for
Gorbachev.
Failure to clean up the environment at home could
become a significant foreign policy issue because it
will aggravate existing transnational and global envi-
ronmental problems such as acid rain, the greenhouse
effect, depletion of the ozone layer, and pollution of
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water bodies shared with other countries. Several
countries in northern Europe, for example, would face
increased pollution of the Baltic Sea. All countries
would be affected by the greenhouse effect and
depletion of the ozone layer. Transnational pollution,
particularly acid rain, has already become a foreign
policy issue in the Nordic countries. The recent
signing of an agreement between Finland and the /
USSR for the mutual reduction of transborder air
pollution resulted from Finnish concern about damage
caused by emissions from Soviet enterprises on the
Kola Peninsula and in the Leningrad area. Norway is
seeking Soviet cooperation in reducing transborder
emissions through bilateral meetings and visits of
high-ranking Norwegian environmental protection of-
ficials to Soviet industrial enterprises responsible for
pollution
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