CHINA AFTER DENG: SUCCESSION PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90R00961R000200060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
China After Deng: Succession
Problems and Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate ,
SNIE 13-86
May 1986
Copy 297
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the
Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
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SNIE 13-86
CHINA AFTER DENG: SUCCESSION
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Information available as of 22 May 1986 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
3
DISCUSSION
7
Background
7
The Current Political Scene
7
Other Succession Participants
9
Contesting Individuals
10
Succession Scenarios
11
Implications for the United States
17
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Since 1978 Deng Xiaoping has sought to ensure the continuity of his
political and economic reforms by selecting and securing powerful posts
for his chosen successors. To a substantial degree, Chinese politics in the
Deng era have been the politics of succession. This Estimate examines
succession scenarios, key players, institutional interests, and implications
for the United States over the next five years. It also examines regional
and provincial aspects of succession as well as how the Taiwan issue,
Sino-Soviet, and Sino-Japanese relations might impact on succession.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Since our last assessment of political succession in China (NIE 13-10-
82), the Chinese polity and economy have undergone a dramatic
sequence of changes. Deng and his allies have made more progress on
their reform agenda than we anticipated, and have achieved consider-
able success in shoring up their political positions and initiating
structural economic reforms.
In particular, the earlier Estimate, although recognizing the cen-
trality of Deng's economic program to prospects for his successors,
ascribed only a low probability of success for economic reform. We
believe the stronger-than-anticipated performance of the Chinese econ-
omy markedly strengthens the succession prospects of Deng's reformist
lieutenants. As long as they continue to demonstrate their ability to
deliver practical results, prospects for an orderly succession are im-
proved. Conversely, a sharp deterioration in China's economic perfor-
mance or social stability while Deng is still in power would damage sig-
nificantly the equities of his chosen successors.
Barring such an unforeseen event,' we believe the present balance
of forces within the party basically sets the course for the duration of
this decade. China's reformist leaders are in the midst of consolidating
their position, and it will be exceedingly difficult for a small group of
leaders to upset the political balance in Beijing. A calmer political
culture has been established under Deng. Mao-style upheavals have
been rejected. Conservatives simply do not have the power to win
control of the Standing Committee, put a new Politburo and Secretariat
in place, and dismantle both the policies and the broad leadership net
that Deng has built up. And, once he is gone, it is doubtful whether
there would be any old guard leader possessing the prestige, political
power, and personal stamina to see the necessary changes through.
When Deng dies or can no longer effectively control China's
politics, the central question before the leadership will not be who
becomes the titular head of the party, but who will really wield Deng's
power. Short of a major power struggle and breakdown in social order,
an exigency we consider unlikely, the post-Deng party elite and not the
military will decide the issue. Reformists are the strongest force on the
current Politburo and Secretariat.
' Despite the many hazards that will confront China's modernization effort, we believe the most likely
outcome over the next decade will be a general continuation of reform and an uneven but gradual growth of
China's economic strength, stability, and power
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Therefore, we are reasonably confident that reformist leaders would
inherit Deng's mantle in relatively orderly fashion. The most likely such
scenario, if Deng were to leave the political scene tomorrow, would be
a two-stage process:
? Hu Yaobang would maintain his position as General Secretary
but would defer to the surviving party elders so long as they did
not tamper with longer term succession arrangements.
? One of Deng's generational peers?we believe President Li
Xiannian or Politburo member and Military Commission Vice
Chairman Yang Shangkun most likely?would assume some of
Deng's responsibilities as broker, although much less effectively
than Deng has done.
? Zhao Ziyang would remain as Premier, and the rest of the
leadership would remain largely intact.
? As time passed and the elders began to fade, a second stage of
the succession would begin to unfold, in which Hu, Zhao, and
several younger leaders assumed greater prominence and estab-
lished their own power relationships that more fully consolidat-
ed their positions. After a period of sorting out, we expect
another "first among equals" to emerge in Beijing.
In the event Deng were not to leave the political scene for some
time, the most likely scenario would be a relatively easy, one-stage
transition in which younger reformists would take power, having
consolidated their positions under Deng with the passage of time.
Other possible succession scenarios are conceivable, but we view
them as much less likely to occur than the above. For example:
? The reformist group that Deng has led could break up into
mutually exclusive groups once his stabilizing influence is
removed.
? Party elders might voluntarily withdraw, declaring their sup-
port for a succession to a younger leader, such as Hu Qili.
? Hu Yaobang, Zhao, and other reformist leaders might decide to
purge the remaining party elders.
? The old guard might attempt a coup of its own, seeking in
particular to oust Hu Yaobang.
? Disgruntled military officers might attempt a coup, or the
radical left might somehow return to power?although either of
these is the least likely of all outcomes.
In any event, the United States (or any other foreign power) has lit-
tle prospect of affecting succession outcomes in China. In our view,
concerns of domestic political power, not policy issues, will be
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controlling; and foreign policy considerations?short of some crucially
important new development affecting the strategic environment?will
be marginal at most. In fact, we believe Beijing will continue to pursue
a pragmatic orientation in foreign policy, regardless of the likely
successor regimes.
Nonetheless, succession outcomes will have an important effect
on the character of US-China relations. We expect any reformist
succession regime to value continued correct relations with the United
States, on the basis of strategic calculations and economic need. There
could be important variations in tone and cooperativeness, however, on
the basis of who emerges as China's most powerful leader in a post-
Deng situation:
? The best outcome for US interests, regional and global, would be
the emergence of pragmatic moderate leaders such as Zhao
Ziyang or Hu Qili. Such leaders would be less inclined to stir up
trouble over Taiwan or work very hard for close Sino-Soviet ties.
They would also be more inclined to continue closer economic
relations in the short term with the West.
? The most likely outcome, however, will be a regime dominated
by Hu Yaobang.
u may see more openings or better relations with the Soviets
than other reformist leaders.
? A conservative, elderly leadership is an even less desirable
succession outcome for US interests in Asia. The old guard are
less inclined toward the domestic economic priorities that
influence the foreign policy of the reformers, and they harbor
more ideological reservations about dealing with the capitalist
West. Although they are not pronouncedly pro-Soviet, their long
experience with Soviet-style economic methods might make
them more willing to draw closer to Moscow for economic
purposes and perhaps on some global issues.
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DISCUSSION
Background
1. Since our last assessment of political succession in
China (NIE 13-10-82), the Chinese polity and econo-
my have undergone a dramatic sequence of changes.
Deng and his allies have made more progress on their
reform agenda than we anticipated, and have
achieved considerable success in shoring up their
political ositions and initiating structural economic
reforms.
2. In particular, the earlier Estimate, although rec-
ognizing the centrality of Deng's economic program to
prospects for his successors, ascribed only a low proba-
bility of success for economic reform. We believe the
stronger-than-anticipated performance of the Chinese
economy markedly strengthens the succession pros-
pects of Deng's reformist lieutenants: as long as the
reformist leadership continues to demonstrate their
ability to deliver economic results, their political grip
must strengthen. In fact, we believe the most likely
outcome over the next decade?despite the many
hazards that will confront China's modernization ef-
fort?will be a general continuation of reform and an
uneven but gradual growth of China's economic
strength, stability, and power
The Current Political Scene
3. Deng has never been the party's titular chief.
Formally, he is ranked higher now?second, behind
Hu Yaobang?than at any previous time. Yet, despite
China's acutely hierarchical system, Deng?as broker,
conciliator, and final decisionmaker?has clearly been
China's boss for several years. Paradoxically, it is
precisely this state of affairs, in which a more junior
leader officially presides while the subordinate elder
leader actually rules, that may force any still active
leaders of Deng's generation?men like President Li
Xiannian, Politburo Standing Committee member
Chen Yun, Military Commission Vice Chairman Yang
Shangkun, and National People's Congress Chairman
Peng Zhen?into eventual competition with party
General Secretary Hu Yaobang for recognition as the
party's dominant leader. When Deng dies or is inca-
pacitated, the main task before the leadership will not
be the formal selection of a new party chief?that post
will be occupied by Hu or another younger leader.
The immediate succession issue will be to answer the
more complex question: who will wield Deng's power?
4. Like Mao, Deng has sought to present his col-
leagues with formal succession arrangements that will
make power distribution a foregone conclusion on his
death or incapacitation. Also, like Mao, he has become
somewhat dissatisfied with the performance of his
chosen heirs, although he has not pursued Mao's
radical remedy of a wholesale political purge. In the
final analysis, however, it will still be the post-Deng
party elite who will decide the succession. That is, a
small circle of the most powerful leaders will have to
choose between leaving Deng's succession arrange-
ments basically intact, or modifying them
5. Since our earlier Estimate, the individuals, insti-
tutions, and political processes that will shape choices
have changed significantly. From 1981 to 1985, most
important central and provincial leadership positions
have changed hands, and many, more than once. The
first phase in Deng's six-year effort to install -younger,
more revolutionary, better educated, and technically
competent" officials in the top posts culminated in
September 1985 at the National Conference of Party
Delegates, which endorsed changes affecting approxi-
mat 1 one-fourth of the Central Committee member-
ship
6. Central Committee. As a result of the Septem-
ber party meetings, the Central Committee for the
first time has a markedly reformist cast. Approximate-
ly 19 percent of the 343-member body is now made
up of first-time members. Generally younger and
better educated, the new members are predominantly
newly promoted ministers and provincial officials
whose appointments were expressly intended to fur-
ther reformist goals. Military representation on the
Central Committee was reduced to 56 members (about
16 percent), its lowest point in decades.
7. Politburo/Politburo Standing Committee. At
the party meetings, 10 Politburo members?eight of
whom were in their seventies or eighties--retired"
from their posts, and six younger members were
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Politburo and Secretariat:
Probable Balance of Forces
Reformers Conservatives
Politburo
Deng X iaoping
Hu Yaobang
Zhao Ziyang
Wan Li
Xi Zhongxun
Fang Yi
Tian Jiyun b
Qiao Shi b
Yang Shangkun
Wu Xueqiao b
Hu Qili b
Qin Jiwei (alternate)
Yang Dezhi
Ni Zhifu
Yu Qiuli
Li Peng b
Yao Yilin a
Hu Qiaomu
Chen Muhua
(alternate)
Li Xiannian
Chen Yun
Peng Zhen
Secretariat
Hu Yaobang
Hu Qili
Wan Li
Tian Jiyun b
Qiao Shi a
Hao Jianxiu a
Wang Zhaoguo a
Yu Qiuli
Li Peng b
Chen Pixian
Deng Liqun
a promoted from alternate member, September 1985.
b New member, September 1985.
This table is Confidential Noforn.
added, reducing total Politburo membership from 26
to 22. With the retirement of Marshal Ye Jianying, the
Standing Committee was reduced to five members:
Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Li Xian-
nian, and Chen Yun, leaving reformers with a 3:2
advantage on the party's most powerful body. Al-
though the reorganized Politburo spans the entire
spectrum of Chinese politics, in our analysis, the
reform group holds a slim but absolute majority on
that body (see table). The ranks of conservative party
elders have been drastically thinned, but the most
important players stayed on, particularly Chen Yun
and Peng Zhen. Because the reformers face no cohe-
sive opposition bloc on the Politburo but rather a loose
collection of conservatives, moderates, and swing
votes, we judge their plurality to be stronger than the
bare numbers indicate
8. Secretariat. The political balance on the 11-
member Secretariat since the September party sessions
is even more pronouncedly pro-reform. The solid
reform core of Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, and Wan Li was
strengthened at the September party meetings by the
addition of five new members, all of whom are
considered pro-reform to varying degrees.
9. A Stabilized Balance. Barring an unforeseen
disaster, we believe the balance of forces within the
party that emerged from the September 1985 meet-
ings basically sets the course for the duration of this
decade. China is now in the midst of a reformist
consolidation, during which it will be exceedingly
difficult for a small group of leaders to upset the
political balance in Beijing. The arrangement of party
institutions will be difficult for conservatives to shake
partly because of the calmer political culture estab-
lished under Deng and the rejection of Mao-style
upheavals, and, consequently, because conservatives
would have to follow a path Deng laid out: win control
of the Standing Committee, put a new Politburo and
Secretariat in place, and dismantle both the policies
and the broad leadership net that has been built over
the past three years. Once Deng is gone, it is doubtful
whether there would be any old guard leader possess-
ing the prestige, political power and rsonal stamina
to see those changes through
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Other Succession Participants
10. If the current political conditions of stability
and relative consensus continue to obtain at the time
Deng leaves the scene, various of these other institu-
tions and participants will play only a facilitating or
insurance role. Under some circumstances, however,
especially if Deng's departure precipitated a serious
breakdown in social order?the role of the military
and public security organs could grow substantiall
larger and, perhaps, even be determining.
11. People's Liberation Army. Since the earliest
days of China's revolution, the People's Liberation
Army has been one of the main pillars of party power.
It is well represented at the party's upper echelon, has
the best and fastest electronic communications in
China, its own newspapers, periodicals, and docu-
ments system, and many of the country's finest re-
search and production facilities. It is heavily garri-
soned in every important region, has vast experience
in local pacification, and when called on has inter-
vened in politics with great effect. As a result, the
Army remains a most important political actor.
post have been rumored or adduced: that senior
military officers oppose the move, that Deng has
changed his mind, and that party leaders are reluctant
to grant Hu additional authority. None of these is
compelling
12. Deng and others have devoted considerable
energy to reforming the Army, both in its relationship
to the party and government and as a professional
military organization. As chairman of the party and
state military commissions, Deng has sought to dis-
tance the Army from politics and to ensure it loyalty
during a succession. Within the armed forces, he has
introduced reforms that have brought about nearly a
complete turnover of commanders at every level, the
demobilization of hundreds of thousands of officers
and men, and improvements in war-fighting capabili-
ty, weapon and logistic systems, and morale. Although
there has been some dissatisfaction with aspects of
Deng's military reforms, the strength of his leadership
was demonstrated during the Fourth Plenum of the
12th Central Committee in September 1985, when
seven career officers resigned from the Politburo.
13. In our view, one of the key questions involving
the succession to Deng concerns his replacement as
chairman of the party Military Commission, a job
perceived as one with great powers. Since late 1984,
iDeng intends for Hu Yaobang to replace
him as Mili
t
ary Commission chairman. Hu has not
done so, and for this reason, more than any other, the
succession picture is not yet wholly clear. Several
explanations of Hu's failure to assume the military
14. We believe, however, that the centrality of the
Military Commission chairmanship to the political
succession does not make the armed forces any more
influential in that decision. In fact, the ultimate choice
of Deng's successor on the Military Commission will
be made by the party leadership, not by the Military
Commission alone. Senior soldier politicians will be
consulted on that choice but, in our view, are unlikely
to have predominant influence. Deng has strongly
reinforced the time honored precept that the armed
forces must be subordinate to party leadership, and we
are persuaded that none of the political leaders who
may vie for Deng's power are inclined to alter the
civilian-military balance, nor would any senior mili-
tary leader lightly consider intervening on the side of
one or another potential leader
15. Ministry of Public Security and People's
Armed Police. The ministry and the Armed Police, in
our view, are most important primarily as peacekeep-
ing forces in the event of social disorder. Reformers
within the party have been tinkering with the security
apparatus at least since the 12th Party Congress in
1982, largely, we believe, to curb the bald abuses of
power that had long characterized the police force and
to line it up more securely behind the reforms. The
most recent personnel shakeup in the ministry placed
at its head a reformist technocrat who has career ties
to Hu Yaobang
16. Party General Office. The General Office
performs two functions that will be of prime impor-
tance during a succession period. First, it is responsible
for the dissemination of party documents, basically
determining who gets to see what. Second, and of
potentially crucial significance, it provides for the
physical security of the top leadership through its
Central Guards Bureau, which formally is subordinate
to the Ministry of Public Security but in fact operates
out of the General Office and is directed by its First
Deputy Director, Yang Dezhong. The bureau has
detailed knowledge of the movements and special
requirements of each Politburo- and Secretariat-level
leader and not only protects but provides for the
physical comfort of the leadership. Its potential power
was amply demonstrated in 1976, when the bureau,
then known as the 8341 Unit, arrested Mao's wife and
her three Shanghai colleagues, the so-called Gang of
Four.
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17. Deng and his allies have attended carefully to
ensuring the absolute loyalty of the General Office
and Guards Bureau directors. Like other departments
within the party bureaucracy, the General Office has
been reorganized and placed under reformist leader-
ship. The current director, Wang Zhaoguo, is a reliable
reformer who recently was named to the Secretariat
and whose star is one of the most rapidly rising in
China. Yang Dezhong has directed the Guards Bureau
since the late 1970s and presumably is trusted by
Deng.
Contesting Individuals
18. The Party Elders. In China, power within the
party has tended to gravitate toward the most experi-
enced senior veterans who have developed the person-
al connections necessary to sustain a long political life.
In our view, political power in China is structured in
such a way that, in the near term, no younger leader
could slip into Deng's shoes and play his pivotal roles.
Despite increasing institutionalization, Chinese politics
remain dominated by guanxi?simply, personal con-
nections or "pull"?and Deng has the guanxi to
deliver where others cannot. Even his political oppo-
nents seem to regard Deng as a man of honor who
keeps his end of a bargain. Few men outside the most
senior leaders can approach the kind of support Deng
routinely commands.
19. For a variety of reasons?not the least of which
is a jealous preservation of their unique standing
within the party?the elders seem to place an inordi-
nate reliance on the collective wisdom and vision of
their own generation. In our view, China's second- and
third-echelon leaders are regarded by the revolution-
ary veterans as distinctly junior members of the party
elite. For the immediate period after Deng's death,
therefore, we believe?should the current leadership
remain otherwise intact?that Deng's generational
peers have the prestige, guanxi, and bureaucratic clout
to decide the distribution of power. If they should
survive Deng in sufficient numbers, a majority of
party elders could close ranks, insist on moving down
the pecking order of the gerontocracy, and look to one
of their own for leadership
20. Succession estimates must therefore be con-
cerned not only with Deng's death but with the deaths
of his generational peers. During the next five years, it
is highly probable that most of those remaining from
the "founding" generation will either die or become
otherwise inactive. Chen Yun and Li Xiannian have
long been ailing, Peng Zhen is 84, and Yang Shangkun,
Deng's man, seems the fittest of the lot but is about 78.
Although Deng's health probably is superior to either
Chen's or Li's, it seems no better than Peng Zhen's. In
our judgment, the order in which the top leadership
departs the political scene is perhaps central to short-
term prospects for a smooth succession. This is so
because three of the four most powerful party elders?
Li, Chen, and Peng?have, at one time or another,
been at odds with aspects of Deng's reform program.
Although all the elders have broadly supported struc-
tural change and economic reform, some have ex-
pressed serious reservations about pace, scope, and
several specific reform policies. All tend to favor
"collective leadership"?in which their influence will
weigh heavily?and a rejuvenation of party leader-
ship, although they ma not fully support Deng's
succession choices.
21. The Successor Generation. In our view, the
practical range of succession candidates is narrow?
largely because of Deng's personnel measures?and
the criteria according to which they are evaluated will
be fairly specific. Although it is conceivable that a
relative unknown may rise suddenly to a position of
great importance, we view this as highly unlikely and
confine our attention to the group of leaders who are
current members of the Central Committee. We
narrow our focus in this way because the Central
Committee itself has been shaped precisely with the
succession in mind by the very political forces and
players that ultimately will determine the post-Deng
leadership.
22. Moreover, we believe the field must be delimit-
ed further. We estimate that all the party's most
important national leaders over the next five years will
be drawn from three classes of officials: those current-
ly sitting on the two top party bodies, the Politburo
and Secretariat; those who head national departments
within the party bureaucracy (both military and civil-
ian); and those who are principal party secretaries in
China's 29 provincial-level jurisdictions. In our view,
the post-Deng configuration of political power will
emerge from the group of approximately 60 officials.
23. The current Central Committee and, more im-
portant, the core of 60 key leaders have been chosen
according to political criteria established under Deng,
and we expect prospective leaders during the next five
years generally to reflect Deng's preferences. Although
the age of these leaders ranges from 42 to 83, those
most relevent to the succession question are clustered
in the 50 to 60 group and are part of China's second
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and third echelons. Generally, they share common
traits and career patterns:
? All have spent their entire adult lives in the
party, but some have developed expertise in
specific professions (like banking or engineering)
other than general politics.
? As a rule, they have devoted greater attention to
formal education than the party veterans they
will replace.
? Virtually all, including those of a relatively con-
servative cast, appear generally agreed that the
policies and practices of the Mao era were
disastrous for China. None can be considered a
"leftist" in any historical sense of that term.
? Most have "clean" Cultural Revolution records;
that is, almost all resisted or in some way were
victimized by the radicalized party leadership of
that period.
24. The most important second- and third-echelon
leaders?and the men about whom most succession
speculation has focused?are Hu Yaobang, Zhao
Ziyang, Wan Li, Yao Yilin, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, Tian
jiyun, Li Peng, and Wang Zhaoguo (see foldout at
back).
Succession Scenarios
25. Prologue. At present, the key uncertainties
concern Deng's precise intentions and the standing of
Hu Yaobang. These were less problematic when the
succession Estimate of 1982 was written. At that time,
we were reasonably confident that Deng's succession
plans called for Hu to serve as party chief and Zhao as
premier following Deng's death. That analysis was
consistently confirmed by Deng's own statements and
by a wide variety of intelligence reporting. Since that
time, our knowledge of Chinese politics and personal-
ities has advanced considerably. Moreover, the general
leadership picture is far more stable now than it was
four years ago, when Hua Guofeng remained a Polit-
buro Standing Committee member and it was uncer-
tain whether Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang would
remain on the scene for the duration of the Estimate
period.
26. Nevertheless, our more detailed understanding
includes little direct information on the current status
of succession planning. From the spring of 1985 until
the September party meetings, accounts of a new
succession arrangement circulated through Beijing, the
provinces, and among the Hong Kong "China-watching
community." It was reliably reported that Deng would
vacate the chairmanship of the party Military Commis-
sion for Hu Yaobang and that Hu Qili would replace his
mentor as party general secretary. On the state side, Li
Xiannian reportedly was set to retire, Zhao to move to
the presidency, and Li Peng to become premier. This
arrangement was repeatedly confirmed in intelligence
and Hong Kong reports until the September sessions,
when the stories stopped completely. The story was
revived in late March of this year when China's weekly
news magazine for foreign audiences, the Beijing
Review, referred to Hu and Zhao as connecting links
between the pioneers and the successors of the revolu-
tion, implying that Hu Qili and other third-echelon
leaders were the true successors.
27. Deng's Intentions. We cannot reconcile the
strong signal on succession issued by Beijing in mid-
1985 with the subsequent silence from all quarters
following the September meetings. We believe Deng
may intend one of two options:
? Deng may be satisfied with the current configu-
ration of leaders, which, in our view, favors
reformist continuity at the top party and state
levels. Under these circumstances, it may then be
left to Hu and Zhao to manage the succession
following Deng's death, more or less as executors
of his political will. Circumstantial evidence
supports this interpretation: neither Hu nor Zhao
appear to be leaders preparing for an exit, both
seem to enjoy Deng's continued support, timing
their departures may be particularly difficult?a
change in the top leaders almost certainly would
be viewed by Chinese as a reform-related politi-
cal retreat?and both have recently strengthened
themselves with their respective bureaucracies.
? Alternately, Deng may still be committed to the
succession arrangements circulated in mid-1985
and, at an opportune moment, may replace Hu
and Zhao with younger, more energetic leaders
who can assure leadership?and therefore poli-
cy?continuity into the next decade. Circumstan-
tial evidence supports this interpretation also. It is
apparent from Deng's comments and the person-
nel appointments made over the past three years
that he fully intends for the "third echelon"?
party leaders in their forties and fifties who have
been selected for future prominence?to assume
most of the routine responsibilities of leadership
and to do so before Deng departs the scene. Deng
has avowed publicly that Hu Yaobang and Zhao
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Ziyang both are already old men. Younger lead-
ers such as Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, Li Peng, and
Qiao Shi obviously are being groomed for top
party and state posts and have played a more
visible role since the September party meetings.
28. The Trouble With Hu. From the outset, the
principal sticking point in Deng's succession arrange-
ments appears to have been Hu Yaobang. Hu was a
controversial choice to head the party, not only among
the party veterans but also for the rank and file. He is
hard driving, outspoken, abrasive, and too "liberal" for
many party traditionalists. Deng, however, obviously
saw in Hu a pugnacious "doer" who could goad the
hidebound party bureaucracy into action, work long
hours attending to necessary detail, go on inspection
tours, and thereby allow Deng the freedom to play the
sagacious elder statesman. Most important, Deng must
believe that Hu will continue to support the Policies
both have worked to set in place.
29. Hu's rise under Deng's tutelage and his tenden-
cy to stake out extreme positions have drawn fire from
numerous critics. During his five years atop the party
bureaucracy, Hu has absorbed much of the criticism
and little of the credit for China's policies, and he is
personally associated with the most controversial as-
pects of the reform, such as efforts to propagandize
China's newly wealthy peasant households and the
push to replace superannuated officials.
30. Among his critics, Hu's views and unconven-
tional, combative style have tended to overshadow his
political and organizational abilities, with the conse-
quence that Hu has had problems winning the full
approval of senior party traditionalists. To some party
veterans, Hu is a man who jumps too easily to
conclusions, is too readily tempted to impetuous ac-
tion, and therefore may not be quite up to the job of
party general secretary.
leaders such as Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, and
even Deng Xiaoping have at one time or another been
critical of Hu's performance.
31. By the spring of 1985, when the new succession
package entered circulation, Hu had already commit-
ted a number of public faux pas, which fueled
speculation that Deng would move Hu to a post with
less public exposure. Despite circumstantial evidence
that Deng and Hu disagree on aspects of policy, there
has been no convincing evidence that they at any time
have had a serious falling out. Deng, however, proba-
bly weighed his colleagues' reservations about Hu into
his deliberations on the succession. We have seen no
convincing evidence, nevertheless, that Deng has lost
confidence in his protege of more than 40 years.
32. The Plan. It is more probable, however, that
Deng wished to preserve both the influence of Hu (and
Zhao Ziyang) as well as to demonstrate progress toward
rejuvenation at the highest party and state levels by
bringing in third-echelon leaders. In our view, there-
fore, the competing interpretations of Deng's intention
can be merged into a relatively unified view. At the
same time, Deng may be urging them to follow his
own way to reduced, selective involvement in routine
affairs of party and state. Rather than moving off to
purely honorary duties, the two leaders may remain
members of the Politburo Standing Committee. If the
leadership package of mid-1985 is still intact, it will
have fostered the impression of a working "cadre
reserve" not only for provincial and lower-level posi-
tions but for the topmost posts as well. The arrange-
ment seems to advance the reformist cause in several
ways:
? It would put in place a leadership group commit-
ted to reform and young enough to be able to see
plans through and would do so while Deng is still
alive and able to oversee its consolidation of
power.
? It would lessen the possibility of a messy power
struggle over the succession to Hu Yaobang.
? It would make Beijing's cadre rejuvenation poli-
cy more credible by extending it to the highest
ranks of the party and state.
? To a degree, it may mollify conservative con-
cerns about Hu Yaobang and prevent Hu from
acquiring the power of China's two key posts.
? It would tend to advance Deng's efforts to clearly
separate party and government authority, again
preventin one 1 ad r from acquiring too much
power.
33. Such a plan may at the moment remain a dormant
item on Deng's agenda, pending other more pressing
business. We believe that, eventually, Deng wants Hu
Qili to replace Hu Yaobang as party general secretary
at an opportune moment. In our view, Deng probably
wants to put this plan into effect at or before the
13th Party Congress, scheduled for some time in 1987.
The package may or may not have the Central Commit-
tee's official endorsement. It is conceivable that the
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details of Deng's arrangements are highly classified
and have been circulated only in restricted channels. It
is also possible they are strongly opposed by various
party leaders. Hu Yaobang's status seems a continuing
problem. To a lesser extent, so seems the identity of
Zhao's successor. But, even if Deng's plan ran into
political trouble over the summer of 1985, it would be
out of character for Deng to accept a setback on so
important an issue and then to resign himself to
arrangements cobbled together through politics. We
presume, therefore, that Deng's succession proposals of
1985 are the reformist succession agenda and will be
the center of controvers if Deng dies before he can
put them into effect.
34. Key Succession Concerns. In our estimation,
three key variables in the succession to Deng will be
the condition of China's economy, the longevity of
Deng and other key elders, and Hu Yaobang's ambi-
tions.
35. An ailing economy will complicate the transfer
of power in post-Deng China. Conversely, a continua-
tion of China's generally healthy economic perfor-
mance will all but ensure the continuation of reform-
ers in office. The Chinese economy, although
experiencing its share of problems, has done far better
than most observers expected, but critics of reform
tend to judge the reforms on other than purely
economic grounds, such as ideology and social impact
of the new policies. Deng and his allies have demon-
strated considerable flexibility and willingness to com-
promise on economic problems, in part because they
view their own programs as experimental and unprov-
en, in part to undermine critics and neutralize the
economy as succession issue.
36. If Deng outlives other powerful members of
the party old guard, chances for a smooth succession
will improve. There are differences among the re-
formers most closely allied to Deng, but it is highly
unlikely that, within the period of this Estimate, these
differences could form the basis of a succession strug-
gle. However, if Deng should die before Chen Yun or
Peng Zhen, the party elders would be in much better
position to assert their own preferences or, more
probably, to play the principally negative role of
undermining or delaying what they do not like. Should
several powerful elders outlive Deng, they may be
able to exercise a veto over the ensuing distribution of
power. In our estimation, if even one of the most
important of the elders survives Deng, a younger
successor such as Hu would in the short term be
constrained to defer to the older leader.
37. Hu Yaobang's own ambitions are a topic for
speculation, and, while Deng lives, are largely a
function of Deng's intentions. On several occasions
since 1984, Hu has intimated publicly that he may
vacate his post by the next party congress in 1987. The
succession plan of mid-1985, however, raises several
questions concerning Hu's status. It is not clear, for
example, that Hu is willing to resign voluntarily the
post of General Secretary or that he still expects to
assume the post of Military Commission chairman. If
he does, the military leadership finally must have
reconciled itself to Hu's leadership, but we have seen
few signs of this.
38. That the Politburo may already in principle
have decided on its future composition, and, conse-
quently, on who will lead the party is at least a
possibility.
t the summer meetings to prepare for the
September party sessions, the Politburo fixed an age
limit of 72 for its members. The measure reportedly
does not affect Politburo members already past the
retirement age. Thus Deng Xiaoping and other senior
leaders would be immune from the provisions, while
Hu Yaobang, who will reach the ceiling in 1987, when
the next party congress is scheduled to meet, could be
compelled to step down. The regulation was probably
intended to facilitate an orderly succession, perhaps to
mollify Hu's critics, and may even have been framed
with Hu specifically in mind.
39. We rule out a long period of collective leader-
ship for China after Deng. The current regime in some
respects already operates more collectively than its
predecessor under Mao, but, when issues have snarled,
it has fallen to a single man, Deng, to cut the knot.
After a period of sorting out, we expect another -first
among equals" to emerge in Beijing. This leader, like
Deng, will need the respect of his peers, the experi-
ence to bring issues to closure, and the personal and
bureaucratic connections enabling him to discipline
rebellious junior officials.
40. Calling the Succession. As the foregoing dis-
cussion suggests, any attempt to sketch out a range of
succession scenarios necessarily must be broadly specu-
lative. For most of the scenarios discussed below,
including what we term the -most likely case," a two-
stage process is posited: during the first stage, political
relations are clarified; in the second, political power is
consolidated by whoever gained most during the
earlier period. In the first stage, Deng's leadership
proposal of 1985 probably will drive succession poli-
tics. For a relatively brief period, perhaps less than a
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year, considerable positional jockeying will take place
as the players look to their interests and take soundings
on potential measures to shore up political liabilities.
During this first stage, we believe the surviving elders
of the revolutionary generation will continue to play a
strong role and will generally press for arrangements
that best suit their interests. Their range of influence
will nevertheless be restricted by the preponderance of
younger, more dynamic leaders in the top party, state,
and military organs. The younger leaders will not, in
our view, seek to convert their numerical superiority
into a victory by force. Both elders and younger
leaders probably will want to avoid a showdown
atmosphere, not only because of the political risks
involved for all sides but also to preserve the sem-
blance of leadership stability and unity as the elite
goes about filling the vast vacuum Deng will leave.
41. The second stage will occupy the remainder of
the Estimate period and beyond. In our view, although
the structure of power will be less clear cut, the main
feature of the later succession years will be the
emerging authority of a new generation of party
elders: men such as, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang,
who by 1.990 will be less than 75 years old and will
have been able to establish strong political bases within
the party and state. Those leaders we currently identi-
fy as part of the "old guard- will begin to fade from
the scene, unable for lack of energy or reliable support
from below to compete with more energetic younger
leaders. During this period, new political cleavages are
likely to appear as the principal successors jockey for
power and authority among themselves and as China's
changing economic and strategic conditions present
the leadership with new challenges and problems.
42. The Most Likely Case. A sequence of proce-
dures triggered by Deng's death or incapacitation
almost certainly has been predetermined in Beijing.
We expect the Politburo to convene, probably with the
Secretariat and assorted elders, in an expanded meet-
ing. When Deng dies, a funeral committee will be
formally named, or, more likely, a preset committee
endorsed. As the ranking member of the Politburo
Standing Committee, Hu Yaobang almost certainly
will head the committee and deliver the eulogy. The
Military Commission chairmanship may be an issue if
Deng has not by that time stepped down: the Politburo
may take preliminary steps toward appointing a suc-
cessor or, more simply, can opt to continue as before,
with the commission permanent Secretary General
presiding over the work of that organ
43. In the immediate aftermath of Deng's death or
incapacitation, the party elders will be at their maxi-
mum influence. The interests of the reformist succes-
sors appear best served by continuing to defer to the
veteran revolutionaries, preserving the appearance of
relative harmony at the top and content that time
ultimately is in their favor. Younger leaders, who
generally are in control of the bureaucracy, probably
will use a variety of procedural dodges to close off
political tam erin with succession arrangements by
party elders.
44. Demonstrating concern for the veteran revolu-
tionaries in the short term may well be accomplished
by permitting an elder to assume Deng's role in having
the final say on the largest matters. We believe either
Li Xiannian or Yang Shangkun is best suited for the
role of ranking elder. Both, in our view, are more able
to stand above the fray and perhaps have their
political equities spread more evenly throughout the
bureaucracy. From the elder candidates, we specifi-
cally exclude Chen Yun because of his physical infir-
mities and Peng Zhen, who may have been neutralized
by reports of corruption within his family. Whoever
assumes the role, however, will not be another Deng
Xiaoping. None of the likely candidates has Deng's
unique combination of skills, initiative, power, and
prestige.
45. If Deng were to die soon?while the current
leadership configuration is intact?the reformers may
put prudence before other considerations and tempo-
rize on outstanding personnel questions, thereby cool-
ing the controversy that apparently has surrounded the
leadership proposals of 1985. We do not therefore
expect Deng's death to trigger an upheaval in the top
government leadership. Zhao Ziyang will remain Pre-
mier, at least through what we identified above as the
first stage of the transition period. Hu Yaobang will
remain the General Secretary, but his behavior at this
time will be critical to succession outcomes. He proba-
bly is politically resourceful enough to control his
ambitions and keep the situation on an even keel.
46. If the first stage of the succession proceeds
roughly aldng lines discussed above, the reformers?
and especially Hu and Zhao?will be in fine political
shape for consolidation in the second stage, as the
current generation of elders musters out of politics and
the succession regime settles into "normal- politics. As
Hu, Zhao, and select other leaders of their generation
grow in stature and authority, they will face the same
choice as Deng: either to assume a lowered profile,
operating largely behind the scenes through reliable
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subalterns; or to insist on retaining their places as the
top party and state officials, presiding over routine
affairs.
47. Both men will become increasingly preoccupied
with their own succession arrangements and with
further defining the structure of party power. Over
the latter part of the Estimate period, the younger
leaders now on the Politburo and Secretariat will
dominate speculation over the allocation of top party
and state slots, but new, currently unknown, leaders
almost certainly will come to the fore as a "fourth
echelon" begins its ascent.
48. If Deng remains in his current state of good
health for at least another year or two, the prospects
for a smooth succession are even stronger. On the basis
of available evidence, we believe Deng will continue
his efforts to install a second-stage succession, as
described above. If he is successful and a leadership
core of Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, or Li Peng, and perhaps
Qiao Shi is emplaced at the 13th Party Congress,
succession essentially will have been completed, and
Deng could withdraw from political activity with less
likelihood of political disruption. The succession pro-
cess would then be a one-stage consolidation effort on
the part of younger leaders who ha ? established their
positions under Deng's protection.
49. Less Likely Scenarios. Other outcomes worth
considering are discussed below in the order of esti-
mated probability.
50. The Elders Retreat. T e senior leaders may
choose fully to accept Deng's arrangements and throw
their collective weight behind a true third-echelon
succession to Hu Qili and either Li Peng or Tian Jiyun.
By stepping aside, the old guard would be seen as
voting for stability and continuity, values Deng has
sought to institutionalize. However, they may only be
abandoning the field to the most powerful second-
echelon figures. Doing so would, in our view, be the
equivalent of allowing Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang
to have absolute sway over outcomes in the succession
period
51. Moreover, loss of official position, whether
through retirement or demotion, has always entailed
loss of status or face as well. Although Deng managed
to effect a more or less voluntary surrender of power
by 10 Politburo members at the Fourth Plenum in
September 1985, the younger leaders would presum-
ably have to grant concessions to the elders on a broad
range of policy questions and protocol issues in order
to buy their compliance with succession arrangements.
For the short term, then, policy could become more
conservative, deliberate, and dogmatic following a
retreat by the old guard. Over the long run, however,
the preferences of the young reformers would become
more evident.
52. Coup of the Successors. It is conceivable that
Deng has not only protected his youthful proteges
from bullying by party elders,' but that he also has
restrained the newly powerful second- and third-
echelon leaders from wholly deposing the remaining
veteran revolutionaries of Deng's own generation.
When Deng dies, Hu, Zhao, and younger leaders,
emboldened by a long run of success in securing
favorable personnel placement in the center and prov-
inces, may attempt to fully consolidate a successors'
regime by seeking to dislodge elders like Chen Yun
and Li Xiannian from their satrapies within the party.
53. In our view, however, any effort to exclude the
elders from significant political participation, aside
from shattering the myth of leadership harmony,
would not only court the unified opposition of threat-
ened senior civilian and military leaders, but would
also likely split the ranks of younger reformers, which
are populated with the children of high-ranking offi-
cials.
54. The Elders' Revenge. With Deng out of the
way, the party's old guard conceivably could seek to
install its own choices in the top party and state posts
and attempt to reverse aspects of reform they consider
most onerous. Under such circumstances, Hu Yaobang
would be the most obvious target for replacement,
perhaps even in order to hasten the accession of Hu
Qili. Some government leaders like Tian Jiyun, who
previously have been under challenge, may also be
threatened. Zhao Ziyang, on the other hand, seems to
have won high marks across the board and may be
virtually immune to a move by the elders
55. We believe, however, that most of the veteran
revolutionaries will place an overwhelming value on
political stability and, if unprovoked, will be loath to
act contrary to standing arrangements in a precipitous
fashion. Moreover, it seems that the process of displac-
ing a leader like Hu Yaobang, who already has more
than five years of experience in the top post and has
supporters interlarded throughout the bureaucracy,
would require more time and more stamina than is
available to most elders. Finally, the old guard is far
from unified on succession questions, and key elders
like Yang Shangkun and Xi Zhongxun are likely to
back Deng's arrangements solidly.
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56. The Reformers Factionalize. It is possible that
the group that has come to be known as the reform
coalition or reform faction will subdivide into mutual-
ly exclusive groups once the stabilizing influence of
Deng Xiaoping is removed. It is not uncommon within
Chinese personal loyalty-based groups for the erst-
while subordinates to contest each other bitterly for
leadership once the chief is gone, and even to break up
the group in the process. Because the reform program
itself is more an operational ethos than a specific set of
policies or principles, the group's loyalty to constituent
members might easily be strained in a post-Deng era.
There have already been rumors and some indications
of tension between Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and
personal feuds between other reformers would seem
equally possible. If these break out in a period shortly
after Deng's death, they could throw the succession
situation into considerable turmoil.
57. We believe, however, that reformers are as
committed to at least the image of political unity and
stability as are the party elders, and would seek to
submerge their differences and avoid damaging the
party's legitimacy through internecine quarreling, at
least during the early phase of succession. They would
have the additional motives of wanting to avoid giving
conservatives any political advantage, and of making
sure that the positive results already achieved through
reform would not be lost to traditional factional
infighting. We believe that Deng's efforts to disperse
power within the system to different institutions might
also help lessen the temptation to engage in personal
power struggles. In the second stage of the succession
process, however, we believe that readjustment or
even dissolution of the current reform coalition is a
greater likelihood.
58. Soldiers in ommans. We believe that an
armed coup or the installation of a regime dominated
by soldiers is an extremely remote possibility. Perhaps
under conditions of escalating social disorder following
Deng's death, the Army might be called on to control
violence. In our view, however, China's senior military
leaders would not otherwise dare to order their troops
to -storm the palace" should the post-Deng team not
suit them. Moreover, the system of political controls
that penetrates the military structure at every level is
specifically designed to alert the civilian party of
putschist activity. Nonetheless, it is clear from the
customary caution with which civilian leaders handle
the military, that, from Deng on down, they are wary
of the Army and perhaps believe that a well-placed,
well-organized group of armed cons irators could gain
military control of China
59. The Left Resurgent. If it is presumed that
Deng, by the sheer force of his personality and
political connections, has been able to suppress the
recrudescence of Cultural Revolution-style leftism, his
death may, under some circumstances, presage an
attempt by more orthodox Maoists to recapture politi-
cal leadership. However, there is no current member
of the Politburo or Secretariat who would be likely to
lead or even support a "leftist" resurgence, and the
constituency within the party or society for such a
movement is virtually nil. In our estimation, there is
almost no possibility of a leftist revival over the next
five years.
60. We believe that Chinese leftists?whose num-
bers have rapidly dissipated but pockets of whom
remain at lower levels?will have few opportunities to
undertake the political offensive. The Cultural Revo-
lution and the policies it spawned are abhorred by
most Chinese. The current party, state, and military
structures are heavily populated with officials who
were persecuted during that period and who would
sternly resist a return to its policies or leaders.
61. Implications for China's Future Policies. In
our view, one of three basic policy orientations may
characterize China after Deng, each one generally
dependent on the personality and style of the leader
who emerges as dominant:
? Impatient for Success. A party dominated by
Hu Yaobang would, in our view, be the closest
approximation to China under Deng during his
most enthusiastic moments. Hu has displayed
much of Deng's impulsiveness without having
the commensurate prestige or political acumen to
know when and how to accommodate himself to
opponents. In our view, the reforms would pro-
ceed basically as they have to date, subject
perhaps to more frequent lurches between peri-
ods of reformist zeal and the determined braking
efforts of moderates. We also believe that Hu is
more stridently nationalistic than any of the
other principal contenders for party leadership,
which may find expression in China's relations
with the West.
? Cool and Deliberate. The party under men like
Hu Qili or Zhao Ziyang would move in a more
calculated fashion and would be less prone to
grandiose gestures than either Deng or Hu Yao-
bang. We read both Zhao and Hu Qili as more
inclined to compromise than Hu Yaobang. Policy
continuity with the Deng era would be main-
tained, but the pace of reform under a Zhao-Hu
Qili leadership would be steadier, although slow-
er, and more internationalist in perspective.
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? Hidebound and Conservative. A regime domi-
nated by party elders would probably be a
temporal phenomenon. If determined to override
many of the views of younger reformist leaders,
we believe they would not reverse, but rather
would limit the pace and scope of the reforms.
We would expect such a regime to pay exagger-
ated attention to such traditional concerns of the
party as social control, official work style, ideo-
logical orthodoxy, and perhaps socialist interna-
tionalism. In foreign policy, conservatives may
see more openings for warmer relations with the
Soviets but would perhaps be more nativist in
basic orientation than even Hu Yaobang.
Implications for the United States
62. Can the United States Influence Succession
Outcomes? Even in the years that preceded the
warming trend in US-Sino relations, Beijing was sensi-
tive to developments in Washington. Following the
normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979, foreign
relations, and Sino-US relations in particular, have
played a small but significant role in domestic Chinese
politics. Because a key presupposition of reform has
been the desirability of Western and Japanese partici-
pation in the Chinese economy, some observers believe
that the United States can help Deng and his allies
consolidate the reforms by accommodating Beijing
whenever possible on economic and political ques-
tions. Washington, in other words, can help Deng
demonstrate to doubters within the Chinese policy-
making elite that he can "deliver" on foreign policy
questions.
63. US influence over succession outcomes, howev-
er, is mostly negative. Stabilized relations between
Washington and Beijing benefit the reformers only
modestly. When Deng dies, most leaders probably will
place foreign relations far down the priority list while
they tend to more immediate problems. Under these
circumstances, the United States could probably only
affect the succession in a negative way, by destabiliz-
ing relations with China. In other words, by taking
such actions as greater cooperation with Taiwan,
discriminating against Chinese exports, or restricting
Chinese access to American technologies, the United
States could strengthen the conservative, anti-Western
forces in the leadership. Conversely, although the
United States conceivably could improve the political
position of the reform group by behaving more coop-
eratively on Taiwan, trade, and technology, it is more
likely that any US behavior that can be perceived in
Beijing as an effort to facilitate a solution to succession
questions favorable to US interests would injure those
very interests we seek to advance. This is so because
the United States would risk laying reformers open to
the charge of having permitted foreign or even "im-
perialist" interference in China's domestic affairs.
64. The fact remains, however, that, if policy con-
cerns in general will not be controlling during the
succession, then foreign policy considerations?short
of a serious development affecting the strategic envi-
ronment?will at most be marginal. The effect on the
succession of a serious foreign policy crisis is difficult
to predict. Under some circumstances, the policymak-
ing elite may regard leadership continuity as the only
feasible way to meet a potential international chal-
lenge?"don't change horses in the middle of the
stream." Under different circumstances, it is conceiv-
able that the incumbent leadership may be part of the
problem and that personnel moves may ease a crisis
toward resolution.
65. Succession Outcomes and US Interests. De-
spite the periodic fear of governments' dealing with
China that Beijing will revert to a more radical,
ideologically driven foreign policy, we believe there is
little chance that this will happen. After all, the
decision to improve relations with the West was made
by Mao during the Cultural Revolution, and Chinese
behavior since that time suggests a virtually unani-
mous view within the leadership that strategic calcula-
tions transcend ideology. In our view, Beijing will
continue to pursue a pragmatic orientation in foreign
policy regardless of successor regimes. This is not to
say that successor regimes will similarly appraise
China's relations with both the USSR and the United
States. Indeed, Deng is China's most anti-Soviet leader,
and once he is gone we expect the chances for
substantially warmer relations with Moscow to in-
crease, perhaps to the point of party-to-party relations
within the next five years.
66. It should be recognized that?again, regardless
of successor regimes?Chinese foreign policy will con-
tinue to have strong ideological and nationalistic con-
tent. The ideological content may impel Beijing to-
ward closer "fraternal" relations with socialist states
but will otherwise be a benign factor. We believe that
nationalism is a much more volatile strain in Chinese
policy deliberation, and successor regimes, especially
at their outset, are likely to react more quickly to
perceived slights involving questions of sovereignty or
national dignity
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67. We believe that all possible succession regimes,
proceeding from strategic calculations, will value con-
tinued good relations with the United States. Successor
regimes, according to the character of their dominant
personalities, are likely to differ in the relative weights
they assign to pragmatic, ideological, and nationalistic
calculations in foreign policy, and therefore in the way
they regard their relations with the United States. For
example, the nationalism of second- and third-echelon
succession regimes generally is likely to be more
pronounced than under Deng, who along with many
of his generational peers has substantially greater
foreign experience and is far more cosmo olitan than
most of China's future leaders.
68. Taiwan will remain the most important poten-
tial obstacle to smooth Sino-US relations. The new
leadership will have, in our view, three broad options
to choose from: continuing the current policy of
overlooking Sino-US differences on Taiwan in the
interest of other foreign policy objectives; raising the
priority of national reunification and, within those
limits, pursuing more vigorously efforts to enlist US
assistance in bringing Taipei into negotiations; and
renouncing the policy of peaceful reunification in
favor of fixing a deadline and undertaking a policy of
reunification by whatever means necessary. These
considerations will be complicated by the fact that
Taiwan, too, will be undergoing a succession period,
with its attendant political uncertainties possibly
changing Beijing's perceptions of what is necessary
and possible.
69. Over the next five years, however, we estimate
that China's interests are best served by continuing to
operate within the confines of peaceful reunification:
no successor government will coerce or precipitate an
attack on Taiwan to achieve reunification. Foregoing a
more belligerent policy is, in our view, a more practi-
cal course for Beijing, and one that preserves for China
the broadest array of foreign and domestic policy
options. Moreover, we tend to believe that, over time
and as the generational transfer of power proceeds, the
Taiwan issue will lose its immediacy as the symbol to
the leadership of -the revolution unfulfilled." We do
not believe, however, that Taiwan will cease to be an
issue in Sino-US relations: precipitous action in Wash-
ington, Taipei, or Beijing could cause a flareup at any
time. But, for the period of this Estimate and under
most successor regimes, Beijing will continue to be
cooperative if the Taiwan question is appropriately
finessed.
70. The heirs to Deng will inherit the regional
problems that Beijing now confronts, all of which are
directly related to the condition of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions: eroding relations with North Korea, continued
hostilities with Vietnam, periodic problems with Ja-
pan; the Soviet military buildup on the northern
border and in the South China Sea; continued Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan; and instability in and the
threat of US military withdrawal from the Philippines.
It is possible that a successor regime would view the
problems as interrelated and seek progress across a
broad front by reaching a new accommodation with
the Soviets, at the expense of US regional interests:
? The regional interests of the United States would
best be served, in our view, by pragmatic, mod-
erate leadership that men like Zhao Ziyang or Hu
Qili could provide. Zhao has long been one of the
strongest supporters of closer Sino-US ties in the
leadership. Hu Qili, although less well known,
has impressed domestic and foreign observers
alike as a realistic man who places ideology in a
practical perspective. Hu's relative youth and
inexperience would doubtless place him under
very different pressures from those that now
operate on Zhao and Hu Yaobang, and he may
be more prone to the pulls of nationalism, espe-
cially under the influence of remaining party
elders. A moderate leadership would, in our
view, be far less inclined to stir up trouble over
Taiwan or work very hard for close Sino-Soviet
ties.
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? We would expect a regime dominated by Hu
Yaobang to maintain the general orientation of
China's foreign policy but to be less steady,
perhaps more mercurial. A less experienced hand
in foreign policy, Hu probably would be more
difficult to deal with than Deng. Hu is, more-
over, poised to play a strong role in foreign policy
whether or not he is openly acknowledged as
China's principal leader: his continuing grip on
the foreign policy apparatus through Minister
Wu Xueqian and other ministerial appointees
seems solid in the short term. The product of a
relatively narrow international perspective with
strong overtones of -socialist internationalism,"
Hu may see more openings for better relations
with the Soviets than other reformist leaders.
? Short of the highly improbable resurgence of
China's radical left, a conservative leadership
composed of men like Chen Yun or Yao Yilin is
the worst succession outcome for US interests in
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Asia. The traditional old guard are far less
inclined toward the domestic economic priori-
ties?the opening to the West, special economic
zones?that drive the foreign policy of the re-
formers. The old guard, in our view, will be far
more likely to carry the torch on Taiwan as well.
Moreover, although not pronouncedly pro-Soviet,
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the conservatives worked closely with the Soviets
on the first five-year plan and the creation of
China's industrial base during the 1950s, and
almost certainly will have fewer inhibitions over
drawing closer to Moscow for economic purposes
and perhaps on some foreign policy Questions.
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