MEXICO: POPULATION AND EMIGRATION PRESSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000100330001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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9)
MEXICO: POPULATION AND
EMIGRATION PRESSURES
1 July 1987
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Central Intelligence Agency
1 July 1987
Summary
Mexican demographic trends portend growing domestic
economic and social strains as well as continuing problems of
illegal emigration to the United States. Although Mexico has
made significant progress toward reducing its rate of
population growth over the past 20 years, an earlier baby boom
will cause Mexico's population to expand at a comparatively
manageable bounds.
fast pace through the end of the century. The continuous high
growth of the labor force will have major implications for the
United States, with hundreds of thousands of Mexicans seeing
the United States as a land of opportunity and attempting to
cross the border illegally. In addition, some friction with
the Mexican government is likely over implementation of the
new US immigration laws, although this should remain within
By the year 2000, Mexico will have drastically cut its
population growth rate to less than half of the 4 percent per
year that it reached in the 1960s. Implementation of family
planning programs, advances in female education, declining
infant mortality, and greater female participation in the
labor force will help lower birthrates. Nevertheless, at the
turn of the century, Mexico's population growth rate will far
exceed that of industrialized countries and the number of
people within its borders will have grown by 50 percent in
Division,
African and Latin American Analysis. Questions and comments
may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
This memorandum was prepared by
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--? i i ~
ceuid easily Drove to be be the largest city in the world.
only 20 years. In addition, Mexico City--which at present
trends will hit some 26 million inhabitants by the year 2000--
Shifting patterns of demographic growth and migration
will present the Mexican Government with a number of
formidable challenges in the years to come. These include:
-- Job creation. Unemployment is likely to be the most
serious and intractable problem as the baby boom of
the 196Os and early 1970s reaches working age.
-- Urbanization. The swelling number of migrants to
urban centers and the natural increase of the urban
population will create demands for public services
that the government probably will not be able to
meet.
-- Education. Although the school age population will
shrink as a percentage of the total population, it
will grow in absolute numbers, straining an
educational system already hard pressed to deliver
on the skills training Mexican workers need.
-- Agricultural production and employment. Mexico's
inefficient agricultural sector probably will not be
able to satisfy growing demand for staple foods or
provide sufficient job opportunities for surplus
farmworkers.
-- Regional imbalances. A steady influx of migrants
from poor, agricultural states into the most
urbanized and commercially developed states will add
to existing regional imbalances and further
centralize Mexico"s population.
other regions.
From a political perspective, these population pressures
are likely to pose additional problems for the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Unemployment almost
certainly will become a major political issue as the ranks of
the~jobleas grow, probably creating friction between the
government and Mexico"s coopted labor unions. Deteriorating
public services in urban areas may heighten the middle-class
perception of the government as a corrupt and inefficient
bureaucracy. Protest votes for the National Action Party, the
leading opposition party, may grow particularly in the more
affluent northern states, which resent being taxed to support
On the international front, friction over, illegal
immigration into the United States probably will intensify.
Mexican officials are concerned that the new US immigration
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cards.
law will lead to the sudden return of thousands of illegal
workers, creating problems in relocating and employing
workers. Although the government has taken no official stance
on the US law, it has allowed hearings in the Mexican Senate
and sponsored academic conferences that focus on alleged US
maltreatment of Mexican workers. We expect the pressures for
Mexicans to emigrate to the United States will continue at
high levels, despite US efforts to stem the tide. A rapidly
increasing male working age population and slimmer chances of
finding a job probably will spur more Mexicans to emigrate.
We believe the trend toward more family groups emigrating to
the United States will further swell the number of illegal
immigrants seeking a better standard of living across the
border. Higher wages and an increasing demand for farm labor
in the United States will continue to be the chief drawing
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Introduction
Mexico will experience a tremendous increase in
population--in absolute terms--over the rest of this century,
reflecting past high rates of growth. This will be true
despite Mexico's declining rate of population growth, which
fell from nearly 4 percent in the 1960s to just over 2 percent
in 1986. Indeed, a recent US Census Bureau projection
estimates that the country's population growth rate will slow
even further, dipping below 2 percent by the year 2000. Even
percent increase over 1980 figures (see Figure 1)*.
with a reduction in the birthrates, however, Mexico's
population will continue to grow at a rate far above the 0.5
percent projected for industrialized countries from 1980 to
2000 (see Table 1). As a result, by the year 2000, Mexico
will have nearly 104 million people within its borders--
compared to 268 million projected for the United States--a 50
This paper looks beyond the statistics to examine the
major demographic trends sweeping Mexico through the year
2000. It also analyzes the long-term outlook and domestic
fallout of these trends. The paper concludes with an
assessment of the impact on the United States of population
developments in Mexico, including a discussion of the
potential for increased friction between the two countries
over illegal immigration.
The Demographic Trends
Like other Third World countries, Mexico is experiencing
demographic shifts that will have a varied effect on the rate
of growth of different age groups and will increase
urbanization pressures. To understand these potential
pressures, it is important to analyze the factors that
underlie Mexico's population growth and examine trends that
will boost the size of its cities.
*Demographic estimates and projections made under contract by
the-US Bureau of the Census provided the basis for much of the
statistical analysis in this paper. The Census Bureau drew on
Mexican census and survey data, making adjustments for
possible misreporting in all age groups. In addition, the
Census Bureau estimated Mexican emigration from a combination
of Mexican and US census data, surveys, and refugee
statistics. Looking at the overall population picture, the
possible outcome in the year 2000 ranges from 100 million to
117 million. The lower estimate assumes a faster drop in the
fertility rate than we think is likely while the upper range
assumes that the fertility rate remains stubbornly high.
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25X1 -- The government has made a concerted effort to widen
the use of contraceptives.
-- Female literacy has risen 12 percentage points to 81
percent in 1980 and secondary school enrollments
have increased markedly. According to Mexican
census data, women with no schooling have more than
twice as many children on the average as women who
finish primary school. The same women have more
than three times as many children as women who
complete secondary school.
Fallinct Fertility But Continued High Birthrates
Fertility rate trends are a key component in
understanding Mexican demographic patterns. The number of
children the average Mexican woman will have--the total
fertility rate--will continue to decline through the year
2000, according to US Census Bureau estimates. The US Census
Bureau estimates that the fertility rate, after falling by
one-third during 1961-80, will decline another 45 percent by
2000 (see Figure 2). In our opinion, this development is
largely the result of two factors:
female jobs outside the home are important factors.
Improved chances of survival during the first year of life
also will help lower the number of children each woman will
bear in order to attain a desired family level. Moreover, a
higher average age at marriage and lower cultural barriers to
These trends notwithstanding, the crude birthrate will
remain high (see Figure 3). High fertility and falling
mortality through the early 1970s produced a large number of
women who are now entering their childbearing years.
According to US Census Bureau data, women aged 15 to 49
already represent one-fifth of the total population and their
share will grow to more than one-fourth by the end of the
century as the growth of this age group outstrips the
expansion of the population as a whole. Overall birthrates
thus will remain hi h even thou h we ex ect each woman to have
fewer children.
Declining Mortality
A second key ingredient in understanding population
dynamics is trends in mortality rates. Improvements in the
mortality rate and life expectancy will be more gradual than
in past decades, allowing the overall rate of population
growth to decelerate (see Figure 3). According to the US
Census Bureau, the mortality rate will drop by about one-fifth
during 1981-2000, compared with a 50-percent decline during
the previous 20 years. The Census Bureau expects that at the
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expectancy at birth. According to Mexican statistics,
cardiovascular diseases have now replaced parasitic and
turn of the century the average Mexican will live to the age
of 73, a gain of six years compared with life ex ectanc in
1980, and 16 years compared with 1960.
Difficulty and expense in treating the leading causes of
death will blunt future progress in reducing mortality rates
and extending the average Mexican's life span, in our view.
Vaccinations and better access to sanitation and safe water
supplies in the last two decades--particularly in rural
areas--slashed the number of deaths due to diarrhea and
infectious diseases. These improvements sharply reduced
infant mortality and the crude death rate and lengthened life
infectious diseases as the primary cause of death.
Fewer Youth But a Growing Labor Force
represent only about 25 percent of the population.
The interaction of changing fertility and mortality rate
trends will generate a rather dramatic shift in Mexico's age
structure by the year 2000. The swing to smaller families
will cause the growth of the primary school age population to
taper off to an average annual rate of 0.5 percent during 1981
to 2000, according to US Census Bureau estimates (see Figure
4). This figure compares with 3.5 percent during the previous
20 years. As a result, we calculate that by 2000, the share
of the population made up of children under 15 years of age
will shrink more than 12 percentage points--from about 44
percent to 32 percent (see Figure 5). This level will still
be above that of industrialized countries, where children
A follow-on decline in the percent of population
represented by secondary school students, however, will not
occur until well into the next decade, according to Census
projections (see Figure 4). During the remainder of this
decade, the lagged effect of lower fertility rates will be
evident in this age group, resulting in the proportion of
persons between the ages of 15 and 24 remaining roughly 20
percent of the population (see Figure 5). Even with the
substantial decrease in growth, Mexico will not experience a
decline in the number of secondary school-age youths, as has
occurred in the industrialized countries, until about 2020.
Similarly, the percentage of Mexicans in the labor pool
will continue to swell. According to Census Bureau estimates,
the working age population will continue to expand at an
average annual rate of approximately 3 percent during 1981 to
2000 (see Figure 4). The growth in the rolls of the working
age group (15 to 64) will be fed largely by the maturing of
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25X1 The "youth bulge" will not be the only factor prompting
or
F 1 t' t' th k
h
h
Assuming, as Mexican officials do, that these factors
exactly offset one another, the average number of new
jobseekers each year will rise from 800,000 during the 198Os
to 1.1 million during the 199Os. Even under this estimate,
Mexico's labor force will grow by one of the most rapid rates
ratio of potential workers to dependents under age 15 will
improve from about 1:1 in 1980 to 2:1 in the year 2000.
Mexico's well-documented "youth bulge" from the 196Os.*
Reflecting this surge, the share of those in the prime working
age group (25 to 54) will grow by 10 percentage points--from
28 percent to nearly 38 percent (see Figure 5). Overall, the
owever. ema a par icipa ion in a w
,
labor force growt
place is projected by the World Bank to continue to rise. The
move toward smaller families will enable women to keep jobs
longer and to enter the work force earlier. Moreover, while
increased school enrollments will keep younger workers (15 to
24) out of the labor force longer, Census Bureau data
indicates rising life expectancy will help increase the number
of older workers.
in Latin America and more than four times faster than the
average for industrial countries, nearly doubling by the end
of the century (see Table 1 and Figure 6).
A Hicih Pace of Urbanization
world
Another impact of these population trends will be that a
steady stream of rural migrants and the natural increase of
the urban population will sharply boost the number of urban
dwellers. Census Bureau estimates suggest that by the end of
the century, approximately three out of four Mexicans will
reside in urban centers, compared with two out of three in
1980 (see Figure 7). Based on past trends, rural migrants
probably will head to the three largest industrial and service
centers--Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey--and to
cities along the US border, lured mainly by job openings in
assembly plants and hopes of crossing into the United States.
Largely because of the influx of migrants, Mexico City is
expected to add 600,000 people to its population each year and
nearly to double in size to 25.8 million in 2000. If this
growth occurs, Mexico City will become the largest city in the
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other areas are still too small to weigh much in decisions on
plant location, Moreover,
because tax breaks are avai able for oth wealthy and poor
regions, firms usually opt for the higher-income zones.
Insufficient plant and equipment, accompanied by a general
deterioration in the country's infrastructure, are also
holding back development of industrial parks and complexes,
especially in areas away from established commercial centers.
The results of efforts to promote a more balanced growth
of cities and regions are likely to be no better than mixed.
Attempts to create alternative industrial centers began during
the 197Os oil boom, but even when Mexico had resources, the
record shows decentralization programs were not very
successful. Tax incentives to encourage industries to open in
discouraging firms from locating outside the capital.*
Mexico's highly
centralized government decisionmaking is an additional factor
The Long-Term Outlook and Domestic Fallout
imbalances in these sectors.
The absolute growth in Mexico's population and the nature
of demographic trends sweeping the country will place growing
strains on the political system and on an economy already
suffering from insufficient resources. Mexican policymakers
will face formidable challenges on a number of fronts. In our
judgment, the most pressing problems will stem from demands
for jobs, social services, food and land, and from regional
Labor Market Pressures
Based upon Census Bureau estimates and our own
econometric forecast**, we calculate that rising unemployment
clearly will pose serious and growing problems for Mexican
policymakers during the coming years. We see little prospect
that real economic growth during the next decade will achieve
the 6 to 7 percent annual rate that private sector forecasters
25X1 *The one exception is the maguila program, initiated in 1966,
which allows foreign firms to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries
for assembling export products and has fostered the growth of
cities along the US border.
**Our analysis of the impact of economic factors on
unemployment is based in part on the results of an econometric
model. While we recognize that no model can gauge with
precision the exact effects variables will have, we
nevertheless are confident that the results provide a good
measure of the orders of magnitude involved.
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calculate is required to provide jobs for new entrants to the
labor market. We project that Mexico's economy will emerge
from the steep recession that occurred in 1986 because of the
expected spending surge leading up to the 1988 presidential
election. Beyond that point we suspect that Mexico could
reasonably expect to continue expanding at about a 3-percent
pace. At this rate of growth, our model projects that on
average 400,000 jobs will be created each year during 1988-
2000. If participation rates remain at current levels, this
will produce a 3-percentage-point increase in unemployment--to
26 percent--during 1988-1990. We estimate that joblessness
will rise nearly 6 more percentage points by the end of the
century (see Table 2).
4 percentage points less at the end of the century.
The sensitivity of these estimates to assumptions about
labor force participation, emigration rates, and real GDP
growth varies. We calculate that an alternative participation
or emigration rate probably would not cause much more than a
2.5-percentage-point deviation from this baseline estimate. A
different economic performance during the next decade,
however, could have a larger effect on unemployment. If lower
oil prices or a new round of stop-and-go economic policies
limited real GDP growth to only 2 percent each year on average
during the 1990s, our projections indicate the unemployment
rate would rise 4 percentage points over our baseline estimate
for the year 2000, resting at 35 percent. On the other hand,
if higher oil prices raised the average annual rate of
economic growth to 4 percent, the jobless rate would be about
growth and rapid employment in the 1970s.
Mexico has traditionally attempted to deal with
unemployment through the use of fiscal policy tools, but in
our view, these tools may not be as effective in the future.
For one thing, Mexico's current and growing unemployment
problems are largely the outcome of past economic
mismanagement and underlying structural deficiencies and
probably will not respond to the degree of stimulus that
Mexico City will be able to afford. For example, econometric
simulations indicate that a 1-percentage-point increase in
real government investment would only result in a 0.2-
percentage-point increase in real economic growth. This
would, in turn, generate a mere 0.1-percentage-point decrease
in the unemployment rate. We believe Mexico's massive debt
and difficulties in borrowing abroad to finance public
spending will preclude the huge increases in government
consumption and investment that underpinned real economic
dims long-term employment prospects.
The slow process of correcting structural problems also
Mexico City's import subs i u ion po icy
encourages capital-intensive industries, stifles labor-
intensive export industries, and chokes off the growth of the
agricultural sector. In our view, even though Mexico has
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growth.
domestic
Those policy changes made to date have met with much
criticism, however and we do not ex ect major
progress
in the near term.
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joined the GATT, taken steps to loosen import controls, and
lowered tariffs, these imbalances will remain for some time to
come. at the end of last year 25X1
more than half of domestic production was still fettered by
quantitative restrictions on im orts, and the average tariff
was more than 20 percent. Mexico must go 25X1
even further to open the economy in order to revive
productivity and boost industrial and agricultural employment
Insufficient Social Services
In our opinion, the rapid pace of population increase and
urbanization is likely to create dramatic shortfalls in basic
social services such as housing--particularly for lower income
groups. Mexican officials put the 1980 housing deficit at 4.5
million units. They have estimated that 11 million units must
be added to the existing housing stock of 12 million by the
end of the century. Even with increased government spending,
however, we do not believe average annual construction would
outpace the 400,000 average output during the 197Os
construction boom. Moreover, even during that period, up to
65 percent of new housing--much of it substandard--was
by the inhabitants themselves or by illegal builders.
ability to correct this problem.
Mexico also is likely to fall behind the demand for water
systems in urban areas. In 1980, 61 percent of urban dwellers
had safe drinking water, down from 68 percent a decade
earlier, Only about half of
urban residents had access to sewage disposal systems,
compared with 60 percent 10 years earlier. In addition to
resource constraints, distance to water supplies and the
expense of extending pipes to squatter settlements in
unsuitable geographic areas will limit the government's
Even in rural areas, where water systems have improved
substantially, Mexico clearly has a long way to go to correct
existing deficiencies. one out 25X1
of every two rural residents had access to safe drinking water
in 1980, up from one out of five a decade earlier. A little
more than 10 percent of rural dwellers were connected to a
sewage disposal system in 1980. 25X1
untreated domestic and industrial waste--some of it toxic--is
routinely emptied into sewers, water bodies, and open areas,
and we see no sign of a major change in these practices. With
most infant deaths resulting from diarrhea, we believe that
contaminated water will be the leading factor keeping the
and irrigation of farmland.
In both urban and rural areas, inadequate water systems
and waste treatment will have negative implications for health
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municipal waste water for irrigation.
rural infant mortality rate almost 50 percent higher than in
urban areas. Because decayed human waste is also carried
through the air, we expect respiratory diseases will become
even more widespread. Pollution of scarce water resources may
hold back development of arid agricultural fields,
particularly in the area outside of Mexico City that uses
According to the US Embassy, urban congestion has already
led to unhealthy levels of air pollution and, in the absence
of corrective government policies, we believe the situation
can only deteriorate. Population pressures and the
concentration of more than one half of the country's industry
in Mexico City probably will exacerbate levels of air
pollutants that in 1980 were up to 600-percent higher than
standards set by the World Health Organization. We doubt that
the government will limit the use of private vehicles--the
major source of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions. To
make matters worse, government efforts to reduce the amount of
lead in gasoline by replacing lead with other additives has
simply increased ozone levels, which are consistently reaching
harmful levels in Mexico City. Even if the government did
have the necessary political mettle, it would need to
reallocate limited budgetary resources to expand and properly
maintain its overcrowded bus system, which is itself another
prime contributor to air, pollution because of the high sulfur
content of diesel fuel.
problems will only increase as enrollments rise.
they receive often is unsuited to available jobs. T
Despite the expected slowdown in the growth of Mexico's
school age population, the already-strained education system
is likely to be overwhelmed. Through the end of the century,
we estimate Mexico will need to provide facilities for close
to 120,000 new primary and secondary school students each year
if current enrollment rates remain constant. Just to hold
real expenditures per student constant at the present low
level, the government would have to boost real spending on
education--which currently takes 5 percent of the budget--by 3
percent annually. The enrollment of 45,000 additional
university students each year will pose an additional strain
because of heavy subsidization of public universities and
overcrowded conditions at state colleges. Even now, according
to Embassy reporting, 91 percent of the students at Mexico's
largest university never obtain a degree, and the education
Strains on the education system will have a number of
important economic implications. The creation of a more
skilled labor force, in our opinion, will require a longer-
term commitment to opening new vocational schools, improving
the quality of training in secondary schools and universities,
and raising the enrollment rate at the secondary level above
current levels. Budgetary constraints, cuts in real
expenditures on education in the 1980s, and pressures on the
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job front make us skeptical that Mexico City is willing to
give education a higher priority. Mexico's consequent
inability to ease shortages of skilled workers and technicians
will hold labor productivity down, hobble the development of
non-traditional exports, and limit the extension of health
Inadectuate Agricultural Production and Employment
have grown more slowly than consumption.
Mexico's inefficient agricultural sector probably will
not be able to satisfy the food demands of its growing
population or provide sufficient jobs to soak up increasing
numbers of surplus farmworkers. In spite of the fact that
farmworkers make up one fourth of the labor force, the
agricultural sector accounts for only 9 percent of GDP and
production of such basic foods as beans, corn, rice, and wheat
imports of these major crops represen e a
neg igi a percentage of domestic consumption in the 1960s.
By 1980, however, they accounted for up to one-third of
Mexico's food needs.
reverse its agricultural deficiencies. For example,
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In our view, politically sensitive government policies
are primary reasons why Mexico probably will not be able to
under Mexican law, ranchers risk
ownership policies
invasions, falling
having their holdings expropriated if they own more land than
the legal maximum--defined as the area needed for 500 animals
--or if they raise crops. These regulations effectively
curtail the expansion of both production and employment
because they do not permit large enough land holdings or a
more efficient system combining livestock and crop production,
land.
agricultural growth in the 1960s. However,
irrigation projects were highly successful in spurring
In our judgment, quirks in land
almost certainly will perpetuate land
investment, and underutilization of arable
Furthermore, Mexico's scope for expanding agricultural
production--even with the implementation of more appropriate
policies--is narrowing. Politically expedient, large-scale
production.
Mexico City is reaching the limit of possible
irrigated, arable land. Moreover, increments in existing
large irrigation schemes will bring smaller increases in
A growing rural population probably will aggravate
existing land shortages and drive more workers to seek off-
farm employment. Land distributed to peasants is likely to
consist increasingly of woods and pastures unfit for farming,
according to Embassy reporting. Consequently, even fewer
peasants would be able to survive from their farm income
alone. In our view, low agricultural productivity probably
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widening the gap between farm and manufacturing wages.
holding farm labor demand below rural population growth and
will increase the pressure for peasants to find other jobs by
Regional Imbalances and Migration Patterns
Migration patterns are likely to aggravate existing
regional imbalances. According to Census Bureau estimates,
the states that will grow the fastest--Quintana Roo, Baja
California, Mexico State, Queretaro, Campeche, and Morelos--
already are the most urbanized and boast commercial, tourist,
and oil industries. The drawing power of Mexico State in
particular, which reflects the growth of cities near the
capital, is expected to further centralize Mexico's population
(see Figure 8). Continuing an historic trend, rural migrants
25X1 will come primarily from poor, agricultural states, led by
Michoacan, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas.*
It is too early to assess the effect of the new US
immigration law on net Mexican emigration. According to the
US Embassy, the Mexicans are afraid of a return of several
hundred thousand illegal immigrants from the United States.
If such a worst case scenario--from the Mexican perspective--
were to come true, the northern states probably would feel the
pressures first and would be hard-pressed to accommodate a
sudden influx of returnees. The maguila industry, with a
total of 250,000 employees, is too small to absorb currently
laid-off workers in heavy industries in the north and clearly
could not soak up thousands of surplus workers--most of whom
are unskilled farm laborers. Consequently, we expect that
some displaced workers would migrate to other Mexican cities
in search of jobs. A recent government study also foresees
some problems in relocating returning migrants away from
border cities and finding housing and jobs for them, but it
concludes--and we agree--that these problems will be short-
term.
Census Bureau estimates show that significant changes in
the pace of emigration have only a marginal impact on the size
of the domestic Mexican labor force. For example, if tougher
US laws on hiring illegal immigrants gradually cut the number
of emigrants by the year 2000 to one-half of the 1980 figure,
the working age population would grow by less than 1 percent
over than the baseline estimate.* Should some economic
to the United States on average each year during 1980-83.
*Based on US and Mexican census data and a 1983 US survey, the
Census Bureau estimates that nearly 200,000 Mexicans emigrated
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Urban and regional population pressures and the fallout
disaster in Mexico cause emigration to double by the year
2000, the working age population would shrink by only 2
percent (See Appendix).
Implications for the Ruling Party
urban dwellers in the major cities. Deteriorating public
services could further alienate the middle class and heighten
imes higher than the national average. Increasing taxes in
he north for needed infrastructural improvements in Mexico
ity and the south might generate even more protest votes and
ore support for the leading opposition party, the National
ction Party. The opposition may also gain some backing from
allocations for social improvements--a per capita share four
as received more than 55 percent of all government
evolutionary Party (PRI). According to the US Embassy, taxes
n the more prosperous northern states to sustain the growing
entral region are already resented. In the past, Mexico City
important challenges for the ruling Institutional
from increasing unemployment will almost certainly pose
Mounting unemployment and falling real wages could
intensify friction between labor--one of the pillars of the
ruling party--and the government in the~next decade, in our
view. Mexico City may not be able to count on the cooperation
of the country's largest trade union, the Confederation of
Mexican Workers, after the death of labor czar Don Fidel
Velazquez, who is 86 years old. According to the US Embassy,
Don Fidel's heir apparent holds the same conservative and pro-
government views, but he lacks the current labor leader's
magnetism and may not be able to keep union members in line.
Even now, wildcat strikes suggest that some cracks are
appearing in labor unity. At the same time, minority leftist
and Communist unions may press hard for concessions on wages
and jobs. Discontent over income distribution--already among
the most unequal in Latin America, according to the World
Bank--could grow as young, unskilled workers enter the labor
the PRI's image as inefficient and corrupt.
force and depress real wages even further.
A high and sustained rate of unemployment also carries
the~risk that part of a generation will be left out of the job
market and become politically estranged. Most of the new
entrants on the labor market will be young adults seeking
their first job. Young people who are unable to find jobs are
less likely to develop links with the PRI. This group also is
likely to boost the size of the underground economy that
operates outside of government controls. In addition,
unemployed youths will provide a larger pool of manpower for
illegal activities, such as drug cultivation and trade.
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Implications for the United States
and equal work conditions.
The new US immigration legislation may create some--in
our view, manageable and short-run--friction in bilateral
relations, largely because emigration to the United States
provides a key political safety valve. The de la Madrid
government so far has refrained from taking an official
position on the US law, but it has publicized its efforts to
prepare reception areas in the border states for the possible
sudden return of thousands of emigrants. In addition,
hearings in the Mexican Senate, government-sponsored academic
research and conferences, and the PRI's own study on migration
have focused attention on the law. We believe Mexico City's
strategy to limit the political impact of the bill involves
appealing to nationalist sentiments by focusing on alleged US
exploitation of Mexican workers and evading underlying
domestic causes of emigration. For example, a Mexican Senate
study proposes concluding a "bill of rights" for Mexican
workers with the United States that would guarantee various
labor and social rights, cultural amenities, "human dignity",
substantially higher wages.
Over the long term, however, we agree with Mexican and US
observers' views that the US legislation will not itself be
sufficient to turn around the rising tide of illegal
immigrants from Mexico. Given a rapidly increasing male
working age population, the poor outlook for agricultural
employment, and that the majority of illegal immigrants are
male farmworkers who stand a slim chance of finding a job in
urban Mexico, the pace of emigration is not likely to slow.
Job shortages, shrinking real wages, and poor public services
are likely to cause the number of illegal semi-skilled
immigrants to pick up as well. We believe that a trend
observed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service toward
emigration of workers accompanied by their families is likely
to persist and that it will further swell the number of
illegal migrants. These workers will be drawn by a US labor
market that will continue to create employment opportunities
because of the gradual aging of the US population, the growing
demand for cheap farm labor, ,and continuing promise of
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Appendix I
Demographic Methodology
The US Bureau of the Census prepared three alternative
projections of Mexican population growth during 1980-2000,
shown in the table below. The baseline scenario assumes that
net annual international emigration--the difference between
the number of people leaving and those entering Mexico,
including foreigners--during 1980-85 remains constant through
the end of the century. The Census Bureau estimated the net
annual flow of Mexicans--including illegal immigrants--to the
United States at 197,230 based on refugee statistics, data on
the foreign-born population by period of entry from the 1980
Mexican and US population censuses, and a 1983 US survey.
This figure takes only permanent migrants into account, not
temporary migrants, who may number 400,000 during peak seasons
according to a Mexican household survey.
Two alternative scenarios analyze the impact of shifts in
Mexican emigration. The first takes into account a possible
slowdown in emigration caused by tighter US immigration
regulations and assumes that net international emigration
declines by half by the year 2000. The "worse case"
alternative--from the US perspective--assumes that net
international emigration doubles by 2000--an outcome that we
believe probably would only be provoked by a catastrophe in
Mexico.
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Population in millions
Constant projection
1980 1990 2000
Rural population 24.3 25.9 27.2
Ages 15-64 11.2 13.1 14.2
Urban population 45.8 60.9 76.4
Ages 15-64 24.9 37.6 50.9
Total population 70.1 86.8 103.6
Ages 15-64 36.1 50.7 65.1
Slower migration
1980 1990 2000
Rural population 24.3 26.0 27.5
Ages 15-64 11.2 13.1 14.4
Urban population 45.8 60.9 76.9
Ages 15-64 24.9 37.7 51.3
Total population 70.1 86.9 104.4
Ages 15-64 36.1 50.8 65.7
Faster migration
1980 1990 2000
Rural population 24.3 25.9 26.7
Ages 15-64 11.2 13.0 13.9
Urban population 45.8 60.7 75.2
Ages 15-64 24.9 37.6 50.1
Total population 70.1 86.6 101.9
Ages 15-64 36.1 50.6 64.0
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Comparative Population Growth Projections,
Selected Countries
Average annual ctrowth rates, 1980-2000
Total population Labor force
Country growth growth
Mexico 2.0 3.1
Honduras 3.0 3.4
Nicaragua 2.9 3.7
E1 Salvador 2.7 3.4
Venezuela 2.6 3.4
Bolivia 2.5 2.9
Ecuador 2.3 3.0
Paraguay 2.3 3.0
Peru 2.2 2.9
Brazil 2.0 2.3
Colombia 1.8 2.5
Chile 1.4 2.1
Argentina 1.3 1.5
Uruguay 0.7 0.9
Upper middle income LDCs 1.9 2.2
Industrialized countries 0.5 0.7
Sources: US Census Bureau and the World Bank.
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Mexico: Labor Force and Employment Projections*
Employment
(millions)
A
Labor Force
(millions)
B
C
Unemployment Rate
(percent)
A B C
1985
20.9
23.8
23.8
23.8
12.2
12.2
12.2
1986**
19.9
24.7
24.7
24.7
19.4
19.4
19.4
1990
21.1
27.4
28.4
28.9
23.1
25.8
27.1
1995
23.0
31.4
32.5
33.2
26.6
29.1
30.6
2000
25.2
35.4
36.7
37.2
28.9
31.4
32.3
*Alternative A assumes a falling participation rate, B assumes
a constant participation rate, and C assumes a rising
participation rate.
**Mexico City has not issued an estimate of end-of-year
unemployment since mid-1986, when it reckoned that the jobless
rate would reach 17.8 percent. A simulation of an econometric
model indicated the recession ma have driven unemployment up
even higher.
Sources: Official Mexican estimates for 1985 and CIA
estimates for 1986-2000.
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Glossary of Terms
Term Definition
Crude birth rate The number of births per thousand
of population. Measures the
components of population growth,
but does not indicate the number
of children each woman is likely
to have.
Total fertility rate The total number of births a woman
would have if she lived to the end
of her childbearing years and if
her fertility in each of those
years exactly matched the current
fertility of women in her own and
other age groups. Defined as the
sum of the birth rates of women of
different ages at a given point in
time.
The number of deaths per thousand
of population. Like the crude
birth rate, does not measure the
number of deaths for each
household.
Natural rate of increase The difference between the crude
birth rate and the crude death
rate.
The part of the population between
the ages of 15 and 64 that is
employed or actively seeking
employment.
Labor force The labor force as a percentage of
participation rate the working age population.
According to World Bank data,
slightly more than half of all the
men and women of working age hold
jobs or are looking for jobs.
Primary school age The population aged 5-14.
population
Secondary school age The population aged 15-19.
population
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Working age population The population aged 15-64.
or potential workers
Prime working age The population aged 25-54.
population
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MIWONS
120 ~
90
FIGURE 1
MEXICO: POPULATION PROJECTIONS
HIGH VARIANT
:~
~ ~~'BASELINE PROJECTION
~~ ~= ' ~.~'LOW VARIANT
i ' r'r', ~'~?
,,~ ~~.
i ,= `~ ?
-`.-
.'~ ~''a
.' ,~-'~
_._...,
2000
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CHILDREN 80RN
~ER WOMAN
FIGURE 2
COMPARATIVE TOTAL FERTILITY RATES
T_
1980
1985 1990 1995 2000
25X1
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FIGURE 3
MEXICO: BIRTH, DEATH, AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES
RATE PER THOUSAND
~.T.._._.~..__.__._~
1885 1890 1995 2000
25X1
~i
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FIGURE 4
Iv1EXlC0: SCHOOL AGE AND WORKING AGE POPULATIONS
INDEX 1960=100
350,
s
i
t
300
250
I
i
.~_~_.__._... ~ __ -Tv ____._T.
1970 1980 1990
SECONDARY SCHOOL AGE
POPULATION
--- - - --~~--~~~~~ "~`"'PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE
POPULATION
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25X1
FIGURE 5A
MEX1C0: AGE DISTRIBUTIONS
?ot,
7a-7~ ~,
70-74 a
!8-~~~
?0-{4 ~
as-as~
ao-e4a
4s-4Y ;
40-44 ti
as-s?
30-'J4
sa-s~
:o-u
~s-~?
10-14
6-f
0-4
1960
Male 1 Female
6543210123456
MILLIONS
7e-7~~
70 -741
4o4o
ss-soy
ao-a4+
sa-to
:o-u ~
~a-? ~
~o-u ~
s-~
0-4
1980
Male ~, Female
6543210123456
MILLIONS
7s-? a
70-74
i8-~~
ao-a4
4o-~4a
:s-s~
ao-a4
:s-:s
:o-u
1~-H
~o-u
a-?
0-4
2000
Male .~., Female
65432-10123456
MILLIONS
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FIGURE SB
MEXICO: AGE DISTRIBUTIONS
19fi0
1980
2000
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25X1
-_J
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25X1=
FIGURE 6
COMPARATIVE LABOR FORCE PROJECTIONS
TOTAL LABOR FORCE t~-BOR FoRCE/`foTAL PoPUt~-TION
400 -{~'~DEX: 1960=100
60 RCENT
MEXICO
r---~---r----- --T-----~ Q ~ -r - T_`T~,-_l
1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
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ss -~
so -~
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
FIGURE 7
COMPARATIVE URBANIZATION TRENDS
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FIGURE 8
Mexico: Population Distribution by Region
1960
1980
2000
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