OUTLOOK FOR US-CHINA MILITARY RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000100880001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
February 12, 1987
Outlook for US-China Military Relations
Summary
Despite the recent ouster of Hu Yaobang as Chairman of the
Chinese Communist Party and the growing criticism of reformists in the
party by orthodox conservatives, we believe that prospects remain good
for steady improvement in the US-China defense relationship, albeit at a
somewhat slower pace than anticipated before Hu's demise. Over the next
two years, Beijing will probably approve new operational exchanges,
purchase additional US military hardware through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program, and continue to exchange visits by high-level
defense officials. Nevertheless, we expect Beijing to carefully calculate the
costs and benefits of each step because of its concern over US-Taiwan
military links and the impact of US-China military ties on its relations with
the Third World and the Soviet Union
This memorandum was prepared Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 12 February 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, International Security, China,
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US-China military relations entered a new stage last fall as Beijing signaled its
willingness to expand cooperation in all three areas of the defense
relationship--high-level leadership visits, functional exchanges, and technology transfer:
? Secretary of Defense Weinberger's second trip to China in October was highly
successful, with the Chinese treating the Secretary as an "old friend" and
downplaying differences on technology transfer and Taiwan.
? Beijing also signed the letter of acceptance for its first major FMS purchase from
the United States in October--a $500 million deal for 55 avionics packages for
China's F-8 fighters--and accepted US terms that allowed the first US Navy port
Where Next in the Relationship?
Until the political situation in Beijing stabilizes, Chinese defense officials
managing US-China military relations will almost certainly proceed cautiously:
? In several recent press articles, conservatives have criticized the United States as
the model from which China's reformers drew their inspiration.
? US-China naval relations have cooled somewhat in the aftermath of Hu's
dismissal. Beijing indicated last month that the Chinese Navy would not be able
to conduct a planned port call to Honolulu in May 1987; the first Chinese Navy
ship visit to the United States is now likely to occur in 1988.
? Hu, however, was not well-liked by China's top generals, and his dismissal
probably will have only minimal impact on the military unless Deng is unable to
rein in the conservatives and the entire reform program is threatened
We believe that prospects are still good for steady expansion in the US-China
defense relationship, albeit at a somewhat slower pace, than anticipated before Hu's
demise:
? Beijing will probably approve operational exchanges that go beyond those of the
past. The US Navy will probably be given at least one, possibly two, ship visits
this year, and the US Air Force F-16 demonstration team could perform in China
this fall. The Chinese military has also for the first time expressed strong
interest in having its officers attend US military schools, and limited exchanges
may take place in the next two years.
? China is moving into significant arms procurement programs from the United
States for all branches of its conventional forces. A letter of acceptance for $62
million worth of artillery-locating radars for the Army will be presented to Beijing
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in March, and a $100 million deal for the coproduction of the Mk 46 Mod 2 ASW
torpedo for the Navy is in the final stages of negotiation.
? The Chinese continue to be enthusiastic about the exchange of visits by
high-level defense officials. US Marine Corps Commandant Kelley and CINCPAC
Admiral Hays are scheduled to visit China this spring. Deputy Chief of the
Chinese General Staff Xu Xin--a strong candidate for Defense Minister--will visit
the United States in March, and Chinese Air Force Commander Wang Hai will visit
in May
We believe China's interest in expanding relations with the US military increases
Beijing's need to demonstrate to the world--and the Third World in particular--that it
follows an "independent" foreign policy. Beijing probably has not decided how far to go
in expanding defense relations with the United States, and we expect the Chinese to
consider the costs and benefits of each step in the relationship:
? Beijing remains concerned about US-Taiwan military links but will probably try to
avoid a public spat, which would offer little prospect of changing US policy and
would jeopardize access to US military technology.
? China suffered a loss of influence in the late 1970s, when many Third World
states came to see China as an agent of US foreign policy. As a result, China
probably will try to uphold its Third World credentials by criticizing US policy on
arms control, the Middle East, southern Africa, and Central America.
? Sino-Soviet contacts may also expand as US-China military contacts grow and
become more public. We expect Beijing to continue to strengthen trade ties to
Moscow and to try to maintain some semblance of balance between high-level
US and Soviet exchanges.
? For the same reason, the Chinese almost certainly will seek opportunities to
publicly downplay the significance of expanding US-China military contacts and
deny that US-China relations are directed against the Soviet Union.
We are struck by how far US-China military relations have come since 1983,
when Beijing first authorized a few young officers to explore the acquisition of US
military technology and opening a defense relationship with Washington. We also
believe that with careful management of the constraints this relationship can expand
further during the next two years:
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? Our judgment rests ultimately on Beijing's satisfaction with the overall US-China
relationship and the consensus in Beijing that Moscow will continue to pose a
significant threat to China well into the next century.
? Moreover, we believe the US-China military relationship will not be adversely
affected by changes in the PLA. Almost every senior military officer has been
exposed to--and by and large favorably impressed with--the US military, and the
next generation of commanders appears ready to continue moving forward with
the United State
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