LIBYA: TRIBALISM IN THE QADHAFI REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600580001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 4, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DOC NO LM A 97-200
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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
04 November 1987
Libya: Tribalism in the Qadhafi Regime
Summary
Pervasive tribal loyalties have thwarted Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadha-
fi's goal of creating a nation that owes allegiance to his ideals alone.
However, he has exploited those loyalties selectively to create a firm base
of support and has used them to weaken rival tribal groupings. He is
strongly supported by his own Qadhafa tribe and its neighbors, which to-
gether form one of Libya's principal tribal confederations.
Isolated failures to co-opt alternative tribal power centers have resulted in
coup attempts, and tribal loyalties will almost certainly play a role in
alignments in any near-term succession scenario. The strongest challenge
to Qadhafi's power will probably come from a member of the tribal con-
federation from the Libyan coastal area that has historically been opposed
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of Leadership Analysis. It is
based on research done in preparation for a larger study on tribalism and tribal ties as a
force of change and stability in Libya. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Near
East/North Africa Branch, Asia/Near East Division, LDA
LDA M 87-20083
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to his own. We believe exiled leaders of Libya's dissident community, who
are not cut from the Bedouin mold, have little chance of garnering support
from any important tribal faction.
Before Libya became independent in 1951, the country's tribes operated to a large de-
gree as autonomous political, economic, and military entities. According to academic
studies, about 85 percent of the country's one million people were then identified as
members of a nomadic or seminomadic tribe--true nomads accounted for only about 3
percent of the total. All members were intensely loyal to the tribe, which was the ulti-
mate guarantor of their survival. The loyalties of a small urban population were limited
to the extended family.
Nationhood and subsequent modernizing influences have not significantly changed this
picture. We believe that on a practical level the average Libyan's loyalty to the tribal
unit and its leaders continues to transcend fealty to the state or to national leaders.
tribal or clan
identity still serves as a useful tool for categorizing people according to their social
status and political niche. Since taking power in 1969, Qadhafi has undermined or
banned most other traditional means of association in Libyan society, such as religious
brotherhoods and lodges, effectively making kinship an informal communication network
and an affiliation of last resort.
We have identified over 100 Arabic- and Berber-speaking tribes in Libya, many of which
continue along traditional patterns of social and economic organization despite a pro-
nounced trend toward urbanization.
rural migrants who flocked to Libya's urban areas during the oil boom of
the 1960s have generally maintained tribal customs, congregating in large family and
clan groups to ease the rural-urban transition, as well as for protection. Even many
part-time government functionaries continue to live in rural areas and divide their work
week between city jobs and traditional agricultural labor, further binding rural-urban tri-
bal links. Only among the best educated urbanites--a relatively small segment of the
society--do these ties appear to attenuate.
In the countryside, Qadhafi's revolution has halted a move away from tribal land owner-
ship, which began when the economic focus of the country shifted from agriculture to
oil. In keeping with his austere socialist revolution, Qadhafi has publicly advocated the
formation of communal agricultural and business ventures. As a result, in some cases
land tenure has reverted to the tribes after private land title records were destroyed by
Qadhafi's radical cadre.
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al-fawqi (interior confederation).'
We believe Qadhafi retains a strong sense of his own tribal identity, even though he has
sought to create' a new Libyan nation that owes allegiance to his social and political
ideals rather than to tribe and family. He is a member of the most prominent clan of
the cohesive and traditionally important Qadhafa tribe. The tribe claims descent from a
local holy man and therefore is one of the religiously significant tribal classes of North
African tribes known as Marabutin. Revered by their neighbors, Marabutin tribes are
trusted as an impartial third party to arbitrate tribal disputes. As such, the Qadhafa have
enjoyed a special status within a prominent coalition of nomadic tribes in Libya, the saff
As a leader capable of pragmatism, Qadhafi recognizes the utility of the tribal social or-
der in creating a firm base of support from which he can safely implement his revolu-
tionary domestic policies. We believe he has increasingly behaved like a traditional tri-
bal leader. For example, he has turned to fellow tribesmen and close family members to
manage the extensive bureaucracy of the revolutionary committees, which are supposed
to instill revolutionary fervor in the populace. Since the early days of his regime, Qa-
dhafi has also used tribal supporters to staff his personal security forces.
southern Gulf of Sidra coastal area.
To our knowledge, he has resorted to this extreme secur-
ity measure only once before; weapons were distributed to many of these same tribes in
1975, following the fracture of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the body Qa-
dhafi set up to govern Libya after his coup in 1969. He has also rewarded his support-
ers by locating numerous economic projects in the Qadhafa tribal heartland near the
Qadhafi has sometimes sought to exploit tribal relations to promote his radical foreign
policy initiatives. His public remarks reflect an underlying tribal motivation for the
annexation of the Aozou Strip and occupation of northern Chad. He has specifically
noted the migration pattern of the saff al-fawqi, whose tribes of reputedly powerful,
war-faring conquerors for the last 150 years have wandered from the Gulf of Sidra to
Lake Chad, deep in the Saharan interior. (We believe he also seeks to protect his own
tribesmen. he has been reluctant to commit Qadhafa
tribesmen to taking a combat role in the current fighting to regain the saff's alleged an-
cient territory, probably to avoid a dangerous depletion in their ranks.) Qadhafi has also
their sovereignty.
In the interest of mutual self-preservation, Libyan tribes continue to form tribal con-
federations. Scholars have identified three primary tribal groupings. Besides the in-
terior confederation, another historically significant tribal confederation is the saff al-
bahr (coastal confederation) of northwestern Libya, dominated by the Magarha tribe.
The Sa'adi, or noble, tribes of northeastern Cyrenaica, which are dominated by the
Bara'sa tribe, have also banded together when faced with extraregional threats to
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used tribesmen from the border areas of neighboring states such as Tunisia and Egypt
in past attempts to destabilize those countries.
Manipulating Tribal Ties
We believe that Qadhafi has worked methodically, to a large degree successfully, at
strengthening his own position and weakening rival tribal groupings using Bedouin tac-
tics--arranging marriages and filling some sensitive positions with political eunuchs.
several members of his immediate family
have married into other significant tribes and prominent urban families within Libya, in
effect amalgamating alternative power centers.
In 1980, Qadhafi arranged the marriage of his brother-in-law, Mas'ud 'Abd al-Hafiz, to
the sister of Chadian faction leader Goukouni Weddeye. The tribally oriented Chadian
community almost certainly recognized the direct marriage link between the Chadians
and their Libyan sponsors as a politically significant gesture on Qadhafi's part. 'Abd al-
Hafiz commanded Libyan forces that occupied northern Chad shortly thereafter.
Qadhafi has personally used marriage to diffuse opposition. After taking power he was
threatened by a strong collection of tribes, dominated by the Bara'sa in the eastern Cy-
renaican region, an area that has traditionally opposed most forms of extraregional rule.
Qadhafi, who had married a local woman of his family's choosing after the coup, appar-
ently divorced her to marry a Bara'sa woman. This second marriage was viewed at the
time as an effort to cement relations between Qadhafi's
ruling clique and the Cyrenaican tribes over which the Bara'sa act as suzerain.
While Qadhafa and loyal members of other tribes dominate key regime posts, in some
cases Qadhafi has elevated social outcasts to positions of influence. In doing so, he
denies increased influence to the Qadhafa's rival tribes. Currently Libya's external intel-
ligence service head, the Armed Forces Commander in Chief, and the commander of Li-
byan forces in Chad are of black African descent. We believe that in promoting these
minorities to command levels, Qadhafi has deliberately filled sensitive posts with men
who have little chance of mustering support for a coup.
Tribal loyalties will play a role in any near-term succession scenario, we believe. Since
taking power Qadhafi has fought off coup attempts led by men who would ultimately
have had to draw on tribal networks to consolidate their position. In our view, these
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attempts represent isolated failures on Qadhafi's part to successfully co-opt alternative
tribal power centers. he has probably preempted
other rebellions by detaining men whose tribal support bases represented a threat to the
regime, in effect holding them hostage against such an attempt.
We believe the greatest potential tribal challenge to Qadhafi's rule could come from
members of the saff al-bahr, which represent a close-knit base of support for coup
plotters. Led by the Magarha tribe of the nominal number-two man in the Qadhafi re-
gime, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, this saff is composed of a cross section of Libya's traditional
rural and urban communities.
Several urban components of
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the saff al-bahr, such as groups from the Misratah area, are heavily engaged in com-
merce in Libya, and we judge that they are especially dissatisfied with Qadhafi's radical
economic policies. This sentiment is shared by their urban, settled relatives in Cyrenai-
ca. Widespread public dissatisfaction with Qadhafi's economic policies and handling of
the war in Chad heightens the prospect that a well-placed saff member, drawing on tri-
bal contacts, could build a broad conspiracy against the regime.
Qadhafi has used his characteristic two-pronged approach in dealing with the potential
challenge from the Magarha. On the one hand, he has cultivated the Magarha, as evi-
denced by his highly public relationship with Jallud and the arranged marriage of a Ma-
garha, 'Abdallah Sanussi, to the sister of Qadhafi's wife. He has also sought to identify
and eliminate incipient challen es.
Although the Magarha tribe, or portions of it, was probably armed along with other loyal
tribes earlier this year, we do not see this as signaling any significant change in the Li-
byan leader's relations with it. In our view, this measure is more a sign of Qadhafi's
growing fear and desperation over Libya's failed military venture in Chad than confi-
dence that he has successfully integrated the Magarha into his political sphere.
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Ithe leaders of Libya's exiled dissident com-
munity--including Muhammad al-Maqaryaf and 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni--are urban so-
cialites who have little chance of garnering more than nominal tribal support for their
cause. With few exceptions, the Bedouins and their first-generation urban cousins re-
main poorly disposed toward this type of established urban elite. Even though Huni has
some supporters tribally related to him,
most of the group's members are professionals currently loyal to Qadhafi and dependent
on him for their careers.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Selected Terms, Tribes, and Tribesmen
'Abid - Sa'adi tribe of Cyrenaica.
'Ailat Fayid - A very small and declining Cyrenaican Sa'adi tribe. Its lands are reportedly
being expropriated by the 'Ubaydat and the Hasa.
'Arafa - Sa'adi tribe centered on the Cyrenaican town of al-Mari.
Awlad Abu Sayf - A prominent Marabut tribe, it is allied with Berber elements of the
south central Jabal Nafusah to its north but does not involve itself in regional conflicts.
Recurrent land disputes with the Warfalla and the Zintan mark the fiercely independent
tribe's history.
Awlad Sulayman - The personal prestige of its leaders and warfaring prowess of this
small but powerful tribe distinguish it from other interior tribes. Portions of the tribe
emigrated to the Lake Chad region after being driven from the Surt basin by Turkish rul-
ers in the 18th century. The tribe, a member of the saff al-fawqi, centers on the Hun/
Waddan Oases region. (Notable tribesmen: Prominent regime revolutionary 'Abd al-Sa-
lam Zadma.)
'Awaqir - Sa'adi tribe second in size only to the 'Ubaydat. It is strategically centered in
and around Banghazi.
Bara'sa - The tribe, whose members held most of the high-level administrative posts
under the monarchy, is accepted as the preeminent tribe of the Cyrenaican Sa'adi. It is
centered on the religiously significant town of al-Bayda. (Notable tribesmen: Foreign
Minister Jadallah 'Azzuz al-Talhi; the Farkash family--Qadhafi's in-laws--whose mem-
bers have governed the region and commanded its security forces; and nominal security
forces head Ahmad Muqassabi.)
Darsa - Cyrenaican Sa'adi tribe.
Farjian - A member of the saff al-bahr situated west of Surt.
Fawaqir - A Marabut tribe of western Cyrenaica.
Hasa - A small, cohesive Sa'adi tribe of Cyrenaica. Its reputation is tainted by its col-
laboration with Italian occupation authorities.
Hasawna - True nomads of the Fezzan region who have traditionally aligned themselves
with the saff al-fawqi in regional conflicts.
Madan - Member of the saff al-bahr located east of Surt.
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Magarba - Strictly classed as a Cyrenaican Sa'adi, the tribe actually is more closely
aligned with the saff al-fawqi and is a neighbor of the Qadhafa. Almost all oil wells and
terminals are located on their tribal land. (Notable tribesmen: Two men named Mu-
hammad al-Magaryaf--one heads the opposition National Front for the Salvation of Lib-
ya; the other, now deceased, was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council.)
Marabut (PI. Marabutin) - A tribe that claims descent from a holy man and is revered by
other tribes as religiously significant. Marabuts are trusted by neighbors as impartial
third parties to mediate tribal disputes.
Minifa - A Marabut client tribe of the 'Ubaydat that gained fame resisting the Italian oc-
cupation under Libyan national hero 'Umar al-Mukhtar.
Magarha - Forced from the southern Fezzan region by the migrating Aulad Sulayman in
the 18th century, the tribe is today located in Mizdah and to the north of Sabha. The
tribe tactically allies itself with the saff al-bahr, and in the past fought with Turkish rul-
ers based in Tripoli against regional foes. (Notable tribesmen: Libya's number-two man,
'Abd al-Salam Jallud; Qadhafi's brother-in-law 'Abdallah Sanussi; and regime radicals
Sa'id Rashid and 'Izz al-Din al-Hinshari.)
Mujabra - A product of the caravan trade that depended on the oases of eastern Libya,
Mujabra members are of black African descent. Tribal fragments are located in Ajdabiya,
Awjilah, Jalu, and al-Kufrah. (Notable tribesmen: Armed Forces Commander in Chief
Abu Bakr Yunis Jabr and External Security Authority head Ibrahim Bishari.)
Qadhafa - A Marabut tribe claiming descent from a holy man buried in Gharyan, it broke
off from the Warfalla, its mother tribe, in the 1700s and moved east to the Surt basin. A
member of the saff al-fawqi. (Notable tribesmen: Qadhafi; Surt military region com-
mander Mas'ud 'Abd al-Hafiz; security force head Khalifa Hunaysh; Green Book theorist
Ahmad Ibrahim; Revolutionary Committee Bureau Operations Room head 'Ali Kilani; de
facto RCB head Muhammad Majdhub; Qadhafi's office manager, Ahmad Ramadhan al-
Qadhafi; and key Qadhafi aides Ahmad and Sayid Qadhaf al-Dam.)
Sa'adi - Descendents of the second wave of Arab invaders who entered Libya in the
11th century and settled in the Cyrenaican region, they are the nine noble tribes who
own the land by right of conquest. All other tribes in the Cyrenaican region are, in
theory if not in practice, client tribes of the Sa'adi.
Saff al-Bahr (the coastal confederation) - The saff and its allies were bonded by a cara-
van trade stretching from the African interior to distribution points along the Tripolitani-
an coast. In the past, its members cooperated with Tripoli's Turkish rulers, who sought
to extend their authority to the interior.
Saff al-Fawqi (the interior confederation) - The tribes of this saff historically shared
grazing land in the upper wadis, or riverbeds, of the southwestern Gulf of Sidra coastal
area. Its members, seeking to control the caravan trade in western Libya, fought and
were defeated by Turkish authorities in the 18th century.
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'Ubaydat - The largest Cyrenaican Sa'adi tribe in terms of territory and numbers, it tends
to behave as several tribes because of its geographic diversity. Tough and bellicose, it
pushed the Awlad 'Ali into Egypt's western desert.
Warfalla - Numerically the largest and most powerful tribe of the saff al-fawqi, it is
centered on Bani Walid. (Notable tribesmen: Prominent Military Intelligence official 'Ali
al-Fayturi and security force head AI-Nadi Imbarish.)
Zintan - As recently as the 1960s it was described as an important warrior tribe and a
continual threat to peace in the northwestern Tripolitanian region. It has traditionally
aligned with the saff al-fawqi.
Zuwaya - Numerically larger than its host tribe, the Magarba, it ranges from Ajdabiya to
the Jalu oasis.
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Primary Libyan Tribal Groups and Tribes
aSawkanad ? Waddiih
lz~ Sabha J L
Fe/zzan
Gulf
of
Sidra
Q
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P
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0 80 Kilometers
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0 80 Miles
Sa'adi
allies
Saff al-bahr
allies
Saff al-fawqi
allies
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 LIBYA: TRIBALISM IN THE QADHAFI REGIME
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1 - Michael Ussery, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East
and South Asia Affairs, State
1 - Wendy Chamberlin, Director, NEA Regional Affairs, State
1 - Aaron D. Miller, Policy Planning Staff, State
1 - Mary Ann Casey, Director, NEA/AFN, State
1 - Sharon Weiner, NEA/AFN, State
1 - Janine Mann, INR/NESA/NAP, State
1 - Judy Byrd, INR/NESA/NAP, State
1 - Col. Walter Lang, DI0/ME, Pentagon
1 - Edward Gnehm, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Near East South Asian Affairs
1 - DIA
1 - DIA
1 - DIA
1 - Maj. Eric Kraemer, HQDA, ODCSINT
1 - Jim Meason, NAVOPINTCEN
1 - FBIS/NERD
1 - C/MENA
1 - CPAS/White House
1 - NSA
1 - NSA
1 - NSA
1 - NSA
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - Kate Hall NI0/A/L
1 - DDO/NE
1 - C/PES
1 - C/NID/PDB
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/OGI/GD
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NESA/AI/D
1 - C/NESA/AI/E
5 - C/NESA/AI/M
1 - D/LDA
1 - DD/LDA
1 - C/LDA/RS 1H19
1 - C/LDA/AN 1H18
1 - DC/LDA/AN 1H46
1 - C/LDA/AN/NENA 1H46
1 - C/LDA/PPD 5GO
1 - LDA/PPD
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CTC/STB
CTC/PAE
OIA/TWFD
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