IRAN'S SILKWORM ANTISHIP MISSILE CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700410001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 7- /3 r7 F11F
DOC NO Af A- /r) 97-2oo6 q
OIR 3
P $ PD
SUBJECT: Iran's Silkworm Antiship Missile Capability
NESA M 87-20069
Distribution:
1 - Janean Mann, State
1 - John Craig, State
1 - A. Peter Burleigh, State
1 - Lt. Cdr. William Miner, ISA, DOD
1 - Cmdr. Ruth Shaughnessy, JCS, DOD
1 - Roger Pajak, Treasury
1 DIA
1 -
1 - NIO/NESA
1 -. C/PES
1 - C/NE/ARN
6 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/PG/I
1 - NESA/PG/I/Rys
1 - Chrono
DI/NESA/PG/O (1Jul87)
n~F
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2 July 1981
SUBJECT: Iran's Silkworm Antiship Missile Capability
Tehran became interested in acquiring the Chinese-made
Silkworm antiship missile after Iranian military and political
officials visited Beijing in the late summer of 1985
Despite Iranian reservations about
the quality of the weapon, the Revolutionary Guard signed a
contract later that year to purchase several hundred Silkworm
missiles and 48 launchers (12 batteries of 4 launchers each),
Both the
Revolutionary Guard and the Iranian Navy were to receive the
missiles. The Iranians intended to use the missiles to counter
new frigates that Italy was building for Iraq and that were
scheduled for delivery in 1986.
So far, fo
launcher vehicles, 20 missile crates, and the related radar and
support vehicles have been seen during unloading operations at
the port. Tehran may have received additional missiles and
launchers
We believe that the rest of the
This paper was prepared byl (Iran-Iraq Branch,
Persian Gulf Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Iran-Iraq Branch, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
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Silkworm launchers and missiles s ecified in the contract will
arrive in Iran later this year. 25X1
at least four possible prepared Silkworm launch- 25X1
sites--two on Qeshm Island and two at Kuhestak--near the Strait
of Hormuz. 25X1
Strategy and Operations
We believe Tehran views the Silkworm as giving substance to
its claim that Iran has a sophisticated weapon that can sink
ships. In many ways the Silkworm combines the range, destructive
power, and expendability lacking in other Iranian antiship
weapons. These capabilities support Iran's overall strategy of
attacking tankers to coerce the Gulf states into reducing their
political and economic support for Iraq and more recently to
weaken the Gulf states' support for increased superpower presence
in the Gulf. Tehran probably also hopes that the threat posed by
the missile against US warships will intensify debate in
Washington, eventually forcin the United States to withdraw its
naval presence from the Gulf.
The Silkworm's 1,100 pound high-explosive warhead is likely
to seriously damage or sink warships or tankers. It has an
armor-piercing capability and is over three times the weight of
the Exocet warhead that severely damaged the USS Stark. In the
1967 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt sank an Israeli destroyer with two
missiles similar to the Silkworm. We estimate that one Silkworm
could cause sufficient hull damage or fires to sink even the
largest supertanker. We believe the missile has a 50 to 70
percent chance of hitting a larger ship that is not protected by
passive or active countermeasures.
We believe the chance of an unauthorized firing of a Silkworm
is low.
Iran's Navy probably would be less zealous
than the Guard in its willingness to fire a Silkworm, especially
against a US ship. Nonetheless, if ordered, we believe that the
Naval units would launch the missile. The religious fervor and
anti-US sentiments of the Revolutionary Guard make it more
dangerous, but there is little evidence that the Guard undertakes
unauthorized activities. Instead, the evidence suggests that the
Guard has been brought more closely under the control of the
central government in recent years. Some analyts in the
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intelligence community, while recognizing the institutionali-
zation of the Guard, cannot entirely discount the possibility
that a local Guard commander might act independently to_attack a
US-flag ship, especially if hostilities already were underway.
Although Navy personnel probably are more technically
competent than Revolutionary Guards, we believe both services are
capable of firing the Silkworm.
The
Revolutionary Guard's lack of educated personnel and difficulty
operating technical systems in the past suggest that the Guard is
more likely to make mistakes that would reduce the effectiveness
of the Silkworm.
Warning
Iranian leaders are unlikely to give any public indication
that they are preparing to use the Silkworm. Instead, their
public statements probably will remain ambigious to hide their
intentions and allow them to justify and carry out a variety of
actions. Statements by US officials concerning possible
preemptive strikes will make Tehran especially careful not to
give any sign that it is preparing to use the missiles.
We believe little or no tactical warning would be evident
that a Silkworm missile was being prepared for launch. On the
basis of statements of Iranian officials we believe Tehran is
aware of efforts and would
take precautions to hide the Silkworms and preparations for
launch. The wheeled launcher can be moved and launched from any
flat area along the coast. Prepared positions--such as the two
sites near the Strait of Hormuz--are not needed for a launch.
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Although Iran is most likely to fire a Silkworm from sites on
or near the Iranian mainland, Tehran may try to use other
locations to surprise or reduce warning to targets and extend the
Silkworm's capabilities. Iran could, for example, put a Silkworm
launcher and launch equipment onto a large barge or ship to carry
out shipping attacks from unexpected directions anywhere in the
Gulf. Launching a Silkworm from a ship would reduce the
effectiveness of the missile, but we believe it still would have
a considerable chance of hitting a target. Tehran might deploy
missile launchers and radars to Farsi Island, in the central
Gulf, from which Silkworms would have the range to hit any ship
attempting to reach Kuwait. The Iranians also could place a
Silkworm launcher on one of their large offshore oil platforms in
Neutralizing the Silkworm
We believe the Silkworm threat would be difficult to
eliminate with air or naval attacks on Iran. Because of the
unlikelihood that all the launchers and associated equipment
would be found, a single or even repeated strikes probably would
not destroy and might not even significantly reduce Iran's
capability to attack ships with Silkworms. Tehran already may
have dispersed the Silkworms throughout the Bandar-e Abbas
area--and perhaps other parts of Iran--to reduce the chance that
all missiles could be destroyed in a preemptive attack. Even if
the location of a launcher were known--for example after a
launch--the Iranians would need less than two hours to dismantle
a launcher and might be able to move it before an effective air
or naval attack could be launched.
Prospects
The Silkworm is the least likely option Iran would use in the
range of options it has to attack shipping in the Gulf. The
Silkworm's high potential to heavily damage or sink a ship and
its inability to strike specific targets among a group of ships
may make the Iranians reluctant to use it before they have tried
other measures. Among its other options, Iran could increase its
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mining of sea lanes because such activities would allow Tehran to
deny responsibility and thus reduce the likelihood of US
retaliation. Iran might try to use small, maneuverable speed
boats armed with light weapons in quick harassing raids on ships.
If such measures failed to influence US activities, we believe
Tehran would consider attacks by small civilian aircraft, fighter
aircraft, or Iranian warships.
If backed into a corner, we believe Iran's initial use of a
Silkworm would be against a commercial ship or, should it occur,
an unescorted US flag tanker traveling to or from Kuwait. Tehran
might decide to strike a non-US tanker to demonstrate the
Silkworm's capabilities and Iran's resolve while avoiding a
direct attack on US ships. If the Iranians decide to attack
escorted ships, we believe they would prefer to use the Silkworm
against tankers rather than the nearby US warship escorts. The
Silkworm's poor target discrimination capability, however,
increases the likelihood that an escort warship might be struck.
Iran probably would deliberately target Silkworms against US
warships only after a US air or naval attack on Iranian
territory.
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Iranian Capabilities To Attack Shipping
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Silkworm Antiship Cruise Missile
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S;ilkworm lig t Mro i e.
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