INDIA-US ANTINARCOTICS COOPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700530001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 9, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3
DATE IO -1_ -~/ T- ~C
DOC NO q1
OIR 3
P$ PD I
JIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 October 1987
India-US Antinarcotics Cooperation
Summary
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi has become more receptive to US suggestions
for increased cooperation on narcotics as he has become aware how India fits
into the illicit international drug trade. Gandhi has identified two areas
where he hopes to expand bilateral cooperation--drug interdiction and drug
abuse treatment. He is concerned that India is rapidly becoming a major
conduit for Asian heroin, a development that also is ding India's
fast-growing domestic appetite for heroin.
New Delhi and Islamabad have responded to strong encouragement from
Washington to cooperate in combating illicit drug flows and have explored ways
to reduce cross-border drug trafficking. Mutual suspicions and a reluctance
to share sensitive information, however, limit effective-antinarcotics
cooperation. Gandhi faces entrenched domestic opposition to his
well-supported plans to curtail the drug trade in India
This memorandum was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and E the Office of
Global Issues at the request of the National Security Council. Information as
of 8 October 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are
l
d
we
come an
may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
NESA M 87 20091
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3
Gandhi is likely to accept US offers of technical training to improve
India's drug interdiction efforts and to design appropriate drug abuse
prevention and treatment programs. Technological enhancement of India's
existing port of entry security programs, training in drug treatment
techniques for public health care providers, and drug education materials are
likely to be especially welcomed. Gandhi's administration, however, will
remain leery of allowing US private or governmental agencies to become deeply
{evol
d t
'----Li- ____-_ .
I
di
ve
o
n
an
US-Indian antinarcotics cooperation is most effective and most likely to
expand in the area of interdicting drugs destined for Western--including
US--markets. The Indians probably will be interested in technical training in
enf
t
d
orcemen
an
drug identification.
New Delhi is concerned that it is rapidly becoming a major conduit for
Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin because of India's long, porous borders,
its location between the world's two largest heroin-producing regions, and its
sophisticated communication and transportation networks. Since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, drug traffickers have altered their routes to move
increasing amounts of heroin through Pakistan and India. Although reliable
data do not exist, we judge that half the approximately 12 tons of Southwest
Asian heroin that reaches the West each year transits India. In 1986 the
Government of India seized 2,500 kilograms of heroin--almost all captured near
the Pakistani border--including the world's largest single heroin seizure of
604 kilograms. Furthermore, the India route appears increasingly attractive
to Southeast Asian heroin traffickers seeking to avoid greater enforcement
efforts and competition along traditional routes through Thailand and Burma.
New Delhi recognizes that some domestically-produced opium is entering the
domestic black market, but it is skeptical that large quantities of domestic
opium are flowing into the international drug trade. India is the world's
largest exporter of legal opium gum--some 600 metric.tons annually--roughly
one-third of which is sold to US pharmaceutical companies. Contrary to
India's position, we believe this domestic production is also an expanding
source for illicit opiates. licensed poppy
farmers obtain yields two to three times the government-imposed maximum of 32
kilograms/per hectare and sell the excess to traffickers. In addition, r
illicit poppy cultivation--from licensed farmers increasing their fields after
government inspection or unlicensed farmers cultivating poppy outside legal
areas--feeds the blackmarket. Using this opium and readily available domestic
precursor chemicals, Indian traffickers are refining heroin to sell on the
local market, and in a few cases, to the international trade. The improving
quality of the Indian product will soon make it competitime in international
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3
Slow Going with Pakistan
At the encouragement of Washington, both New Delhi and Islamabad have
publicized antinarcotics programs as a key area for increased bilateral
cooperation since early in 1986, and several exploratory sessions have been
held. Senior Indian and Pakistani officials have agreed that cooperation
between antinarcotics officials and border security forces are the necessary
first steps toward increased border interdiction. Both governments have also
encouraged the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to make
regional cooperation in antidrug work a priority issue.
But in our judgment, New Delhi's and Islamabad's suspicions and
conflicting national interests tangential to the antidrug effort have
obstructed effective antinarcotics cooperation. Neither country has been
willing to share the sensitive intelligence regarding troop placements, border
security tactics, and the involvement of high-level officials in drug
trafficking that is crucial to the long-term success of drug interdiction.
US Help With Domestic Drug Abuse?
The rise in drug trafficking through India has led to an explosion of
domestic heroin addiction since 1980. We estimate India currently has some
500,000 heroin addicts primarily in New Delhi and Bombay, and addiction is
spreading to smaller cities and towns. The Government of India has made some
effort to step up narcotics control, passing a comprehensive national drug
bill in 1985 which mandates tougher sentences for convicted drug pushers and
created an antinarcotics squad to step up interdiction efforts.
Although New Delhi has made efforts to increase Indian antinarcotics
effectiveness, the central government is unable--or, in several instances,
unwilling--to institute the far-reaching bureaucratic changes necessary to
significantly reduce the level of drug activity in the country. Indian drug
enforcement is largely in the hands of state police, security, customs, and
finance officials who are unresponsive to federal government direction and
have limited access to central government or foreign assistance. The much-
publicized national Narcotics Control Board established over a year ago has
yet to demonstrate its institutional independence or its ability to function
in key drug trafficking regions, such as the Northeast states and Tamil-Nadu.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700530001-3
Outlook
Gandhi probably will seek US help in developing drug treatment programs
that do not involve US officials or private agencies working in India. He may
welcome access to US expertise in developing video and film spots or other
educational materials to increase public awareness of the risks of drug use
similar to US-designed products used in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand. He may
also be interested in training in detoxification techniques appropriate for
We believe Gandhi will face opposition and foot dropping at home to his
domestic antidru efforts.
IIslamabad and New
Delhi probably will be content to seek maximum public relations value from
only minimal compliance with any bilateral agreement on drug interdiction for
the foreseeable future to appease international pressure for some movement on
25X1'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3 25X1
SUBJECT: India-US Antinarcotics Cooperation
NESA M 87- 20091
External Distribution
Ms. Shirin R. Tahir-Kehli
National Security Council
Room 392
Old Executive Office Building
Internal Distribution
1 - DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
1 - Executive Registry
1 -DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/MESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/LDA
1 - DDO/NE
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - CPAS/ISS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CCB
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/SO/D/NESA
1 - DC/SO/D/NESA
1 - C/SO/A/NESA
1 - C/SO/PB/NESA
1 - C/SO/S/NESA
1 - C/PG/NESA
1 - C/AI/NESA
1 - C/IA/NESA
1 - C/IA/I/NESA
7D60
7D60
7E44
7E44
7E48
2G1 1
2G1 1
2G25
1H19
6C40
7F24
7F30
7G50
7607
2G1 1
6G02
6G17
6G17
6G17
6G17
6G17
7COO
6G02
6G17
6
1 Typescript File/NESA/SO/S 6G17
1 -- NESA/PPS Source Copy 6G02
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700530001-3