ISRAEL: POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700770001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700770001-7 25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 December 1987
Israel: Political-Military Situation
Summary
Israel is enjoying a period of unprecedented strategic security as the
array of its likely Arab foes has shrunk considerably. Eevnt is nemmitted
to the 1979 peace treaty, Jordan's I military
is in no position to threaten Israel, Iraq remains bogged down in its
costly war with Iran, and Syria--the lone active confrontation state--is
battling severe economic troubles.
Nevertheless, the two major components of the National Unity
Government--Labor and Likud--have fundamental differences on nearly every
major security and foreign policy issue. These deep divisions have been
underscored recently by the bitter and protracted debates leading to the
decision in late August to scrap the Lavi fighter aircraft program,
disagreements over the seriousness of the Syrian threat and how to respond
to Syrian-abetted terrorism in Lebanon, and diverging interpretations of
the Arab Summit in Amman last month. Despite rhetorical differences over
Moscow's role in future Arab-Israeli peace talks, Likud and Labor agree
that the Soviets must first reestablish full di lomatic ties and allow a
much larger number of Soviet Jews to emigrate.
* * * * * * * *
This memorandum was prepared by
Israel Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis. Information as of 3 December 1987 was used in its
preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief.
Arab-Israeli Division'
the
NESA M 87-2011
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Recovering From Lavi
US Embassy reporting stresses that Defense Minister Rabin, Labor's
leading opponent of the Lavi fighter aircraft program, sees the decision to
cancel Lavi as a longterm plus for Israel, but also views the decision as a
significant concession to the US and expects bilateral defense-related
cooperation to deepen. He particularly wants US help to ameliorate the
high unemployment stemming from Lavi's cancellation by increasing joint
ventures in weapons development, cutting the price on Israel's upcoming
purchase of 75 advanced F-16s, and helping minimize contract termination
costs with US firms, particularly Pratt and Whitney.
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will be har USL nit coy tne decision to cancel Lavi.
IAI--Israel's aeronautics giant--will be forced to fire as many as 3,000
workers, nearly 15 percent of its workforce. But the full impact has been
minimized and delayed with Israel's decision to allot IAI its full
complement of Lavi funding this year and to promise the firm $100 million
in annual government subsidies for the next several years to help defray
defunct Lavi contracts. Rabin also hopes that recent US decisions to
increase the portion of US grant aid Israel can spend domestically from
$300 million to $400 million and to allow greater Israeli cooperation in
producing F-16 components will employ a large number of employees
previously working on Lavi. Rabin also remains hopeful that Tel Aviv will
secure additional US funding for high technology programs through Israel's
involvement in SDI. 25X1
Former Minister-without-Portfolio Arens--who resigned over the Lavi
decision--and Commerce Minister Sharon to want to keep the Lavi issue alive
until the national election scheduled for November 1988. They have
publicly blamed the Labor Party for what they describe as the action most
damaging to Israel's national security since the 1973 war. Nevertheless,
the long-term political impact of halting Lavi will be marginal and is
unlikely to shift the advantage to either party in next year's election if
Rabin's efforts to find alternative jobs for those displaced by Lavi's
cancellation prove successful.
Strategic Planning in View of Syrian Problems
The Israelis have openly acknowledged the decreased threat they face
and have taken advantage of their improved security to cut defense
spending. Defense Minister Rabin and new Chief-of-Staff Lt. Gen. Dan
Shomron advocate paring manpower within the Israel Defense Force and
focusing on new more so y to make the military more
efficient,
several squadrons of aging Kfir
and A-4 fig ii.ez aircralt nave been deactivated, one armored division has
been disbanded, and manpower at all levels--especially staff positions and
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among the middle-level officer ranks, has been reduced. At the same time,
however, the Israelis continue to modify and upgrade existing weapons, such
as improved armor and a recently perfected 120mm gun for the
indigenously-produced Merkava tank and a variety of stand-off precision
guided weapons such as Popeye, which would allow Israeli aircraft to attack
targets deep inside Syrian territory without coming within range of most
Syrian surface-to-air missiles.
In our view, the most likely scenario for a near-term Israeli-Syrian
conflict is in Lebanon--particularly as the result of further
Syrian-sponsored terrorist attacks on northern Israel akin to the 25
November Palestinian attack there against a military settlement that left
six soldiers dead and seven others wounded. Peres and Rabin and their
Labor party allies undoubtedly oppose extreme responses to such attacks, in
part for fear that a strong Syrian response could escalate into a direct
military confrontation. But Prime Minister Shamir and his Likud colleagues
take a more hardline stance toward the Syrians and almost certainly favor
massive attacks on Palestinian bases in Lebanon and possibly also on
Palestinian training facilities in Syria. They are less concerned about
aggravating tension with Damascus, wishing instead to show Assad that
Israel remains determined to defend its national interests.
Reaction to Amman Summit
Israel's reaction to the recent Arab summit in Amman has been divided
along party lines. Labor party supporters-- led by Foreign Minister
Peres--have publicly welcomed the summit's endorsement of an international
conference on Arab-Israeli peace. Prime Minister Shamir and his Likud
bloc, however, have rejected the resolutions of the Arab meeting as making
no contribution to peace. The summit, by itself, had no dramatic impact on
Israeli attitudes toward peace and the Arab world.
Peres and other supporters of the international conference concept have
been encouraged by the summit's qualified approval of the idea, but they
still lack the necessary strength in the Israeli cabinet and Knesset to
gain government approval for a conference. Laborites view the Amman
conclave as a diplomatic victory for King Hussein and other Arab moderates.
Peres also has pointed publicly to the resolution allowing League members
to reestablish relations with Egypt as an encouraging sign that Arab states
are coming to terms with Israel's existence.
Likud bloc leader Shamir has rejected the summit's resolutions on
negotiations as non-starters and reiterated his call for direct
negotiations with Arab states. Shamir welcomed the Arabs' acceptance of
Egypt back into the Arab fold, but at the same time expressed concern that
Cairo would distance itself further from Israel to placate other Arab
states.
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Israeli-Soviet Relations
Since 1985 contacts between Tel Aviv and Moscow have increased
considerably. Israeli and Soviet officials have met frequently in recent
months, and a Soviet consular delegation has been in Israel since July.
Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Israel in the immediate aftermath of
the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and from 1967 throu h
openly-acknowledged bilateral contacts were rare.
Soviet interest in an improved relationship followed quickly upon
renewed regional efforts toward peace talks beginning in 1985 and shows
Moscow's strong desire not to be excluded from Arab-Israeli negotiations.
The Israeli government has pledged repeatedly that it would allow Soviet
participation in such talks only if Moscow first reestablishes diplomatic
relations and permits large-scale emigration of Soviet Jews.
Likud and its allies remain extremely skeptical of Soviet intentions in
the Middle East. They believe that Moscow desires the perpetuation of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, since it gives them opportunities for influence in
the region by supporting Arab states hostile to Israel. Likud is doubtful
that Moscow will reestablish relations or allow massive Jewish emigration.
Even if the Soviets meet these Israeli preconditions, Likud would seek to
circumscribe Moscow's role in Arab-Israeli peace talks. Peres and other
Labor leaders have taken a somewhat softer public line on relations with
Moscow, but like Likud probably regard reestablishment of full diplomatic
relations and a major longterm increase in Soviet Jewish emigration as
preconditions for Soviet participation in an international conference on
Middle East peace.
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SUBJECT: Israel: Political-Military Situation
NESA M 87-20118
Distribution
External
1
1 - Richard A. Tropp (Agency
for International
Internal
1 - DIR/DCl/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2,- MESA/PPS (1 copy to analyst for sourcing)
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
1
1
1 - Typescript File
DI/NESA/AI/I
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Development)
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