MOSCOW TURNS ITS ATTENTION TO LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DATE y 7
DOC NO ~S)1/ /1'1
Washington, aC20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OIR
10 April 1987
P $ PD
Moscow Turns Its Attention To Latin America
Summary
General Secretary Gorbachev's proposed tour through Latin
America--probably in late 1987 or early 1988--will be the most
dramatic example of Moscow's new attention to the area.
the General Secretary stated
that Soviet foreign policy should not be "locked in by an
obsession with the Soviet-US relationship" and that Moscow should
"broaden" its relations with the Latin American countries. Under
Gorbachev, a new policy is emerging that places greater emphasis
on state-to-state relations with the region's most important
political and economic powers, especially Brazil and Argentina,
and the expansion or renewal of ties with states such as
Guatamala where they were broken in the 1950s.
The Soviets have capitalized on the emergence of democratic
governments in the region. In the past, the military governments
in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay were standoffish about contact
with Moscow and forced the Soviets to keep an extremely low
profile in their countries. Now, however, the Soviets have been
able to increase the number of high level exchanges, raise the
visibility of their personnel posted to the region, and
aggressively court public opinion and attention. For example, a
Soviet deputy foreign minister has made two swings through the
area in less than a year, and Moscow's ambassadors in the region
have begun to hold press conferences on a regular basis. In
addition, the Soviets play on such issues as the Latin American
debt, the continued controversy over the Falklands Islands, and
the desire for a regional solution to problems in Central
America. The Soviet effort is aided in part by the needs of
regional leaders to placate leftist and nationalist elements in
their own electorates.
Moscow's search for broader contacts in the region has not
affected its commitments to Cuba and Nicaragua. The value of
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis
Comments and queries are
welcome and may e a resse o e Chief, Third World Activities
Division
SOV M 87-20041X
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Warsaw Pact military aid to Nicaragua, for example, increased by
over 100 percent last year, with Moscow providing the lion's
share. In fact, Moscow appears to believe that its new approach
can win immediate political payoffs for its clients especially in
aiding the consolidation of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua
and in accelerating the reintegration of Cuba into the diplomatic
mainstream of hemispheric affairs.
Moscow will undoubtedly use whatever new influence it can
muster to further its other objectives in the area, such as
encouraging Latin American opposition to US policies and eroding
US political influence in the region. In particular, by
portraying themselves as supporting a regional solution to the
problems in Central America, the Soviets may be increasingly
effective in manipulating local opposition to US intervention in
Nicaragua, possibly cutting off US policy options there and
institutionalizing Soviet influence on the American mainland.
The Soviets also will work to overthrow the Pinochet regime in
Chile and to expand profitable trade relations.
Under General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet diplomacy has been
increasingly visible throughout the Third World. Senior Soviet
Foreign Ministry officials have visited their areas of
responsibility more frequently and hosted their regional
counterparts in Moscow. Within the last year Deputy Foreign
Minister Rogachev has made repeated trips through the Far East,
Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin has made the rounds through
Africa, and First Deputy Minister Petrovskiy and Deputy Vorontsov
have toured the Middle East.
At the same time,
the General Secretary stated
that Soviet foreign policy should not be "locked in by an
obsession with the Soviet-US relationship" and that Moscow should
also develop relations with Third World countries--such as those
in Latin America--on their own merits. At one point last
summer, the MFA's spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov proudly unveiled a
map in Moscow, complete with varicolored little flags, that
pinpointed the farflung travels of Foreign Ministry staffers.
Latin America can boast of many such flags. Within the last
year Moscow has appeared as diplomatically active in this region
as in the Middle East--an area that clearly overshadows it in
strategic importance. under
Gorbachev a new policy is emerging in the Foreign Ministry which
places greater emphasis on political ties with Latin American
countries. The General Secretary's proposed visit to the
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region--in late 1987 or early 1988--confirms this trend.
It Wasn't Always This Way...
Overriding all other
considerations in keeping the Soviet profile low was Moscow's
perception that the United States had special prerogatives in the
area and that it would probably respond strongly to any perceived
encroachments by the USSR. The majority of Latin governments, in
turn, were standoffish about contact with Moscow and thus
opportunities for the Soviets to expand their influence in the
region were limited.
From the 1960s until the beginning of this decade, Moscow
gave only sporadic attention to Latin America. The Kremlin
concentrated on diplomatic and commercial dealings--including
some military hardware sales--and only selectively supported
communist and leftist opposition groups. During the 1970s, for
instance, Moscow provided concessionary terms to the leftist
military government of Peru for the purchase of Soviet tanks,
airplanes, and other military items, but it declined to build on
this base by providing much economic assistance. Moscow also
failed to provide economic sustenance to the troubled regime of
Salvador Allende in Chile. At the same time, because of Cuba's
internal economic problems and highly publicized failures such as
Che Guevara's attempt to bring revolution to Bolivia, the Soviets
actively discouraged Castro's efforts to export revolution to the
Latin American mainland.
Only in the early 1980s did Moscow achieve some limited
expansion of influence through increased trade arrangements. In
Brazil and Uruguay, Moscow bought raw materials such as coffee
and wool and when the US refused to sell wheat to the Soviet
Union, Argentina became an alternative source. Official Soviet
trade statistics indicate that Latin American earnings from trade
with Moscow reached a high of approximately $4.2 billion around
1981.
Overall state-to-state access remained limited, however,
until the mid-1980s, when the important states of Argentina and
Brazil shed their military leadership and became civilian-ruled
democracies. At the same time, the pressure of mounting
international debts stimulated Latin interest in further
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expanding trade--and it was hoped, profit--with the USSR.I 25X1
Moscow found additional encouragement in the 1979 Sandinista
victory in Nicaragua, which caused it to rethink the efficacy of
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revolution in Latin America and to identify emerging targets of
opportunity elsewhere in the hemisphere. In the early 1980s, the
Soviets expanded their previously limited assistance to
opposition leftists to include paramilitary training, increased
funding, and massive propaganda support, although even this aid
was granted selectively according to the Kremlin's perception of
opportunity. While assistance to El Salvador and Guatemala, for
example, has declined from a high in 1981-82, Moscow's support to
the Communist Party of Chile has grown slowly but steadily,
consistent with Moscow's judgment that violent revolution is a
viable opportunity there. Finally, the survival of the
Sandinista regime--despite US hostility--gave Moscow additional
encouragement to broaden ties with Latin America. In effect, by
the mid-1980s, Moscow had a growing sense that it could expand
its influence in Latin America through overt trade and diplomacy
and selective covert subversion without risk of serious
penalty.
Under Gorbachev: What's New?
Although the Latin Americans have been more receptive than
in the past, we believe that the intensity of the recent drive
for increased ties originated with Moscow. Soviet MFA Latin
expert Laptev claimed last January that Latin America's wealth,
dynamism, and increasing independence from the US called for a
new Soviet effort to increase Moscow's profile in the region.
Soviet objectives in Latin America have not altered
discernibly since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. Moscow
remains committed to Cuba, to the survival of the Sandinista
revolution, to the overthrow of Pinochet in Chile, and to
expanding profitable trade relations.
Under Gorbachev, however, the Kremlin has significantly
increased its efforts to strengthen official state-to-state ties,
especially with the region's most important economic and
political powers. Moscow also is attempting to sponsor the
expansion or renewal of ties with states such as Guatemala where
they were broken in the 1950s. The Soviets are aware, however,
that some of these goals are not realizable in the short term.
The Soviet-Latin American economic relationship, for example, is
still in a building stage and real profit is some years off.
Political Payoffs. For now, however, Gorbachev presumably
contemplates significant political payoffs--both regional and
international--at a small cost in expanding contact with Latin
America. He is seeking to:
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? Increase anti-Americanism and neutralize US political
clout in the area.
? Reinforce the legitimacy of the USSR as an actor in
Western Hemispheric affairs--thus further assaulting the
Monroe Doctrine and gaining greater political access
within Latin America.
? Draw US attention away from areas, such as the Middle
East, that are of more importance to the USSR, and
possibly compel the United States to redirect military and
economic assistance back to this hemisphere.
? Aid the consolidation of the Sandinista regime by playing
on regional concerns about US military support for the
Nicaraguan insurgents and portraying Moscow as supportive
of regional peace initiatives.
Enlist regional support for Soviet positions on
disarmament issues such as SDI and project this support
into international fora such as the UN or the Non Aligned
Movement (NAM).
The Soviets will probably have some success with these
objectives. Although the Latin American leaders to a large
extent seek to avoid involvement in East-West tensions and are
careful in discussing issues such as Central America that would
pose a direct risk to their relations with Washington, Moscow
realizes that they also have internal political agendas and must
work with nationalistic and leftist elements in their own
electorates. The fear that the United States might take military
action against the Sandinistas, for example, is widely held in
Latin America; several states, such as Peru, Uruguay, and
Argentina, have been vocal in denouncing aspects of US policy
toward Nicaragua. Although these views are hardly identical to
Moscow's, the Soviets have become skillful at manipulating such
positions so that the Latins appear to be in alignment with
Moscow.
Economic Benefits. Although Moscow is more interested in
immediate political gain in its competition with the United
States, it hopes that its initiatives will also foster long-term
trade expansion. But in the short term these hopes are likely to
be disappointed. The Latin Americans will probably continue to
find standard Soviet trade terms--countertrade or barter and
insistence on greater balance--unattractive and the Soviet trade
bureaucracy unresponsive. For example, although the Soviets
signed a long term grain agreement with Argentina in January
1986, they angered Buenos Aires by waiting until early this year
to begin fulfilling their commitments. In February Foreign
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Minister Komplektov disappointed the Uruguayans by refusing to
increase Soviet purchases of Uruguayan goods.
Moscow also continues to make offers to sell military
hardware for both economic benefits and the increased contacts
that such deals would create. The Soviets have reportedly made
several offers to supply combat aircraft to the Argentines
They invited Argentine officers
to Peru to test Soviet equipment and in late 1986 hosted a group
of students and staff from Argentina's Higher Military Air
College in the USSR. Early this year Moscow offered to provide
the Uruguayan Air Force with an aerial demonstration for its Air
Force Day ceremonies this March, but Montevideo declined the
offer. We believe that most Latin countries are leery of
entangling themselves with military hardware deals with the
Soviet Union. Moscow, however, will probably continue its
efforts to entice Latin nations to purchase Soviet hardware.
Initial offers probably would include helicopters or transport
aircraft for civil/commercial use by regional airlines.
Support for Revolution. Moscow selectively supports
revolutionary movements in Latin America and may believe that
this goal too will ultimately be well served by increased state-
to-state ties in the region. For the time being, it has
apparently given priority to the survival of the Sandinista
regime over the aspirations of other revolutionary groups in
Central America--Soviet economic aid to Nicaragua reached an all-
time high of $560 million in 1985 and 1986, while assistance to
other Central American revolutionaries has declined.
The Kremlin has also thrown its weight behind the overthrow
of Chile's President Pinochet, by violence if necessary. Moscow
may believe that regional dislike of Pinochet is so great that
there will be few repercussions to its active support of leftist
revolution in Chile. Although the Soviets appear to be letting
Havana take the lead in arming and training Chilean
revolutionaries, they have openly backed the Chilean Communist
Party's violent tactics since 1980
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Public Diplomacy: A New Veneer?
In its efforts to increase contacts with Latin America,
Moscow has sponsored an unprecedented series of bilateral
meetings with regional leaders:
? Argentine President Alfonsin visited Moscow in late 1986
and Presidents Sanguinetti of Uruguay and de la Madrid of
Mexico are on the agenda this year.
? In the last year and a half the Foreign Ministers of
Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina have visited the USSR.
Mexico's Foreign Minister Sepulveda is reportedly
scheduled to go to the USSR in April.
? Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov has made two
swings through the region, visiting Peru, Venezuela, and
Cuba last summer and returning in February 1987 to visit
Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico.
? Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Mexico last October
and is reportedly scheduled to visit Brazil, Uruguay, and
possibly Peru this fall.
Soviet delegations have increased markedly in number and
prestige compared to five to 10 years ago. Until 1984 the
highest ranking Soviet visitors to Latin America were the
Secretary General of the Soviet MFA who visited Peru, Colombia,
Argentina, Brazil, and Panama in the course of several trips and
the Minister of Culture who visited Mexico in 1982. Mexican
President Lopez-Portillo visited Moscow in 1978, but his visit
came at Mexican initiative and was neither preceded nor followed
by any other significant visits. Between 1976 and 1983 the
average number of economic or political exchanges per year
between Moscow and the Latin countries (excluding Cuba and
Nicaragua) was 13. In the period from 1984 through 1986, this
average jumped to 26 per year. By 1986 Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Mexico were the most frequent participants in exchanges with
the USSR.
Along with the expansion of its diplomatic initiatives in
Latin America, Moscow is stepping up its efforts at fostering a
positive image. Soviet personnel posted to the region are more
visible, actively courting public opinion and attention.
The US Embassy in Caracas reported
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that the Soviet Ambassador there has used full- a e
advertisements to get his message across
In
Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, Soviet diplomats have
begun to hold press conferences on a regular basis. As a prelude
to the Gorbachev visit, Moscow has been sponsoring working tours
of the USSR for selected journalists from Latin America.
The Gorbachev Visit
A Gorbachev visit to the area--where the General Secretary
would trade the prestige of his presence for possible concessions
from the Latins--would enhance these new initiatives
dramatically. If Moscow can get the itinerary that it desires--
including a fall summit with President Reagan--Gorbachev would
proceed from the US to Mexico, and then swing through Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and probably Peru. The General Secretary's
plane almost certainly would make a refueling stop in Cuba, where
we would expect him to have talks. Moscow, however, could use
the technical excuse to downplay the significance of his stay in
Havana. Unless Gorbachev feels pushed to make a dramatic gesture
of support for Nicaragua, we do not believe that he will stop
there; reporting indicates that the Soviet trip planners are
aware of the highly provocative nature of such a visit to both
the US and other regional states.
Everything, however, is not going Moscow's way and some
states--notably Argentina and Brazil--have important agenda items
of their own to accomplish during the latter months of 1987.
Some states are reluctant to schedule Gorbachev's trip during
Moscow's preferred timeframe and the trip could easily be delayed
until 1988. If scheduling problems continue, moreover, there is
an outside chance that Gorbachev may contemplate two trips: one
this fall consisting of a visit to Mexico City and to the United
States for a summit and another, perhaps in early 1988, for a
swing through South America.
Outlook
The Gorbachev visit probably will take place, but the
results will be mixed. In some--perhaps most--stops, Gorbachev
is likely to come away with only cultural or scientific
agreements, increased embassy slots, or low-volume economic
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deals. Because of internal pressure from varied interest groups
and concern for Washington's reaction, we expect the Latin
governments will remain cautious in discussing issues such as
Central America, and the final communiques may only emphasize
areas of generalized political agreement--such as consensus on
the need for regional solutions to problems in Central America or
on disarmament initiatives such as the Delhi Six or the South
Atlantic Zone of Peace. Moscow has long been aware, however,
that small advances such as these lay the ground work for greater
influence in the future.
Although less likely--because of potential opposition from
the United States and other regional actors--Gorbachev might
decide to make a dramatic sign of support for the Sandinistas and
stop in Nicaragua. We believe Gorbachev would consider this
option if the United States were to rebuff Soviet overtures for a
summit or if he is displeased with the progress of US-Soviet
bilaterals. He might attempt to portray such a visit as part of
Moscow's support for regional peace initiatives such as
Contadora, especially if the recent momentum stimulated by
developments such as Costa Rica's peace proposal move the
negotiations toward-an agreement. Moscow would probably
calculate, however, that such a visit would increase
Congressional support for the Nicaraguan insurgents as occurred
when Daniel Ortega made his ill-timed visit to Moscow in spring
1985.
In the near term, Moscow will undoubtedly use whatever new
influence it can muster to encourage Latin American opposition to
US policies and to erode US political influence in the region.
In particular, by portraying themselves as supporting a regional
solution to the problems in Central America, the Soviets may be
increasingly effective in manipulating local opposition to US
intervention in Nicaragua, possibly cutting off US policy options
there and institutionalizing Soviet influence on the American
mainland.
The reintegration of Cuba into the diplomatic mainstream of
hemispheric affairs will probably also accelerate under Moscow's
expanding umbrella of contacts. Havana has begun a series of
moves that parallel Moscow's efforts to reduce US political clout
in the area, such as President Castro's attempts to rally
regional solidarity on the issue of Latin American debt.
Moreover, there are indications that Castro--like Gorbachev--is
planning travel to the new democracies, especially Brazil and
Argentina.
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Annex: Gorbachev's Potential Itinerary
Mexico. Soviet MFA spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov acknowleged
during a press conference last December that there would be a
visit to Mexico--a high-priority stop--but said that no dates
had been determined. Some Mexican officials reportedly
believe that Moscow would like to link Gorbachev's stop in
Mexico Cit with a summit meeting with Reagan in the United
tates.
Uruguay. Gorbachev and Uruguayan President Sanguinetti have
officially agreed to exchange visits and Komplektov
apparently worked to formalize the dates. In February
Sanguinetti's special assistant informed the US Embassy in
Montevideo that Gorbachev's visit was tentatively scheduled
for next November. We believe that Moscow may be using
Sanguinetti's compliance as a lure to gain the agreement of
the more reluctant--but more important--states of Argentina
and Brazil.
Brazil. Brasilia a ears reluctant to commit itself to a
Gorbachev visit.
There have been no official statements in Moscow or
Brasilia confirming the visit.
Argentina. During his visit to Moscow late last year,
President Alfonsin officially invited Gorbachev to Buenos
Aires. Gorbachev accepted, and, according to the US Embassy
in Buenos Aires, the Argentine Foreign Ministry has confirmed
that the only question pending resolution is the exact date
of the visit. Nevertheless, a Soviet Embassy official in
Havana implied that there was a special problem in scheduling
the visit to Argentina. According to the US Embassy in
Moscow, Argentine diplomatic officials there claim that
Alfonsin will be tied up with local elections during fall
1987 and a visit by Gorbachev would be impossible then.
Peru. Until recently, little effort had been made to
incorporate Peru into Gorbachev's itinerary, but there has
been speculation in the Peruvian media that the visit would
take place. Despite Moscow's economic and military ties to
Lima, the terrorist problem--especially the direct targeting
of Soviet interests there--may discourage a visit by the
General Secretary.
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Cuba. We have no reporting beyond press speculation
indicating that Cuba is on Gorbachev's agenda, but it would
be a breach of protocol for Gorbachev to exclude Havana from
his itinerary. In addition, Gorbachev's plane would almost
certainly refuel in Havana. No Soviet leader has been to
Cuba since Brezhnev visited in 1974.
Nicaragua. Nicaraguan media have speculated that Managua
will be a stopover for Gorbachev, but Moscow has given no
indication that Nicaragua will be included.
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SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
NSC
Dr. Fritz W. Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President for
European and Soviet Affairs, NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
Raymond F. Burghardt
Special Assistant to the President for
Latin American Affairs, NSC
Room 391, Old EOB
William Perry
Director for Latin American Affairs
NSC
Room 393, Old EOB
George Van Eron
Director Secretariat
NSC
Room 381, Old EOB
Ronald C. St. Martin
Senior Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
Colonel Tyrus W. Cobb
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 361, Old EOB
The Honorable Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
National Security Affairs, NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
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SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
The Honorable Anne Armstrong
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Room 340, Old EOD
Peter R. Sommer
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 361, EOB
Paula J. Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 368, EOB
Peter W. Rodman
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
The White House
Michael K. Bohn
Director, Situation Room
West Wing White House
Lieutenant General Colin Powell, USA
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Room 4E808, The Pentagon
Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 42E812, The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
Col. David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3A948, The Pentagon
Nestor D. Sanchez
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Inter-American Affairs
Room 4C800, The Pentagon
Col. John A. Cash
DIO for Latin America
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political
and Military Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2A520, The Pentagon
Dr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director of Net Assessment
Department of Defense
Room 3A930, The Pentagon
Donald C. Latham
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Command, Control, Communications/Intelligence
Room 3E172, The Pentagon
Ronald H. Stivers
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), OSD
Room 2E812, The Pentagon
Lt General John H. Moellering
Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E872, The Pentagon
Vice Admiral Powell Carter, Director
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E936, The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
It General Dale A. Vesser
Director, J-5 (Plans and Policy)
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, The Pentagon
Peter P. Herrick
ANIO/W
National Warning Staff
Room 1C921, The Pentagon
Maj General Schuyler H. Bissell, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Room 4A932, The Pentagon
RADM William 0. Studeman
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Room 5C600, The Pentagon
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Room 4E808, The Pentagon
State
Thomas Simons
Deputy Assistant for Secretary of State
European/Canadian Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
Steve Coffey
Special Assistant for Under Secretary Armacost
Room 7244
Department of State
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
Elliott Abrams
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Room 6263
Department of State
Robert Gelbard
Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America
Room 6263
Department of State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
Department of State
Richard H. Melton
Director, Central America and Panama
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Room 4917
Department of State
Peter Askin
Director of Central American and Panamanian Affairs
(Lac/Cap)
Room 5258A
Department of State
John J. Taylor
Deputy Assistant, Secretary for Intelligence and Coordination
Room 6534
Department of State
Richard N. Holwill
Director of Caribbean Affairs
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Room 3248
Department of State
Henry S. Myers
Executive Assistant to the Director, INR
Room 6531
Department of State
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3 25X1
SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
Mark R. Parris
Director, of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
Room 4217
Department of State
Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SEE
Room 4758
Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843
Department of State
Richard A. Clarke
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Affairs
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6535
Department of State
Office of Soviet Political Affairs
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
(INR/SEE/FP)
Room 4225
Department of State
E. Raymond Platig
Director, Long Range Assessments, INR
Room 6842
Department of State
David G. Smith
Chief, INR/IAA/SA
Room 7637
Department of State
Richard H. Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311
Department of State
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP9OTO0114R000800160001-3 25X1
SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
External Distribution
V. James Fazio, Jr.
INR-IS
Room 6510A
Department of State
Robert Fouche
Director, INR/IAA
Room 7538
Department of State
Arthur P. Shankle, Jr.
Director, Mexico
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Room 4258
Department of State
Everett Briggs
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Room 6263
Department of State
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
Room 6531
Department of State
GCO/NSA
PO 532
2W1111 Fort Meade, Md.
D/NSA Special Assistant
Q42
Room Fort Meade, Md.
Other
DIA/RTS-2C2
Bolling AFB
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3 25X1
I I
SUBJECT: Moscow Turns Its Attention to Latin America
Internal Distribution
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
1 - ED/DCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - Senior Review Panel
6 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
1 - Vice Chairman, NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 - NI0/USSR
1 - NIO/LA
1 - PDB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - OCA/DDI Rep.
1 - DI Rep., CINCLANT
1 - DI REP., CINCSOUTH
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/LA
1 - D/ALA
1 - ALA/MCD/CUB
1 - D/OIA
1 - C/OIA/TWFD/ALA
1 - C/OIA/IID/ATB
1 - OIA/IID/AT
1 - OIA/TWFD/AL
1 - OIA/TWFD/ALA
1 - D/OGI
1 - C/OGI/ISID/AT
1 - C/OGI/ISID/IT
1 - OGI/ISID/AT
1 - OGI/ISID/AT
1 - D/NPIC
1 - C/NPIC/IEG/TWFD
1 - D/SOVA
1 - DD/SOVA
1 - SA/SOVA
1 - C/SOVA Executive Staff
1 - C/ES/CIB
1 - C/SOVA/RIG
1 - C/SOVA/NIG
1 - C/NIG/DPD
1 - C/NIG/EPD
1 - C/SOVA/SIG
1 - C/SIG/FSD
1 - C/SIG/SPD
1 - C/SOVA/DEIG
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3 25X1
1 - C/DEIG/DED
1 - C/DEIG/DID
1 - C/SOVA/TWA
1 - C/SOYA/TWA/A
1 - C/SOYA/TWA/AFLAME
1 - C/SOVA/TWA/FA
1 - AFLAME Chrono
2 - SOVA/TWA/AFLAM
2 - SOVA/TWA/AFLAM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000800160001-3