THE OUTLOOK FOR SUDDEN CHANGE IN KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
Central
Intelligence
G4 SOT GiVF 4~1T
The Outlook for
Sudden Change in
Key Developing Countries
National InteWgence Estimate
NIE 7-86
January 1986
ropy 4 9 0
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
N I E 7-86
THE OUTLOOK FOR
SUDDEN CHANGE IN
KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Infurnuitiim a~~ailuhli~ us cif I(i J;unuir~ 19N(i ~~;i>
usrd in thi~ ~n
aPpr~~~e~~ nn t~in~ i~ala? ~~~ tie V~aliunu~ F~u~i~iaii
Inl~~Ilik~~nc~~ 13nard-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
CONTENTS
Nagf~
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KF,1' JUDG~IENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
Category A :....................................................................................... 11
(1) The Philippines ........................................................................... 1 1
The Nicaraguan InsurgencY??????????????.?...? ................................... 12
(2) Iran and the Persian Gulf .......................................................... 12
Iraq .............................................................................................. 1-I
I ~ebanon ....................................................................................... 1-I
S~~ria ............................................................................................. 1 Fi
I.il~ya ............................................................................................ 1 f~
El Salvador (domestic affairs) .................................................... 1 G
Honduras (domestic affairs) ....................................................... 17
Guatemala ................................................................................... 17
Panama ........................................................................................ 17
Pakistan ....................................................................................... 1S
(3) Smaller Persian Gulf States ........................................................ 1S
Jordan .......................................................................................... 19
I'~gYpt ........................................................................................... 19
Saudi Arabia ................................................................................ 19
Turkey ......................................................................................... 19
G retie e .......................................................................................... 19
(:yprus ......................................................................................... 20
Argentina ..................................................................................... 20
I3razil ............................................................................................ 20
Mexico ......................................................................................... 21
South Korea ................................................................................. 21
I rt cl i a ............................................................................................. 22
South Africa ................................................................................ 22
(;ategory I3 :........................................................................................ 22
(1) Liberia ......................................................................................... 22
Nigeria ......................................................................................... 23
Strdan ........................................................................................... 23
(2) Mozambique ................................................................................ 2~I
Ttrrtisia ......................................................................................... 2f~
iii
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
Page
(3) Angola .......................................................................................... 26
Ethiopia ....................................................................................... 26
Kenya ........................................................................................... 28
Zaire ............................................................................................. 28
Chile ............................................................................................. 28
Colombia ..................................................................................... 3U
Peru .............................................................................................. 30
Jamaica ........................................................................................ 31
Category C :....................................................................................... 31
The Caribbean Basin .................................................................. 31
Malta ............................................................................................ 31
C;had ............................................................................................ 32
1\Tiger ............................................................................................ .32
Senegal ......................................................................................... 33
Evaluation of Judgments of NIE i-8~ ............................................ 33
~~
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate updates, revises, and somewhat changes the scope
and categories of NIE r-85, The Outlook for Sudden Political Change
in I~c~y Non-Comm2~nist Developing Countries, of February 1985.
The present Estimate categorizes those countries or regional situa-
tions of geopolitical importance to the United States where, over the
nest t~~~o years or so, sudden change could either damage important US
interests, provide new opportunities for advancing US interests, or
transform some previously secondary issue into one demanding high-
level US policymaking attention. It treats those areas-primarily in the
developing world-where pronounced internal instabilities or regional
tensions may be the source of significant sudden change. It does not in-
clude stable, highly developed friendly countries, or China, or the
USSR, or countries that are so closely aligned with the USSR and so
highly authoritarian that their prospects for sudden change are virtually
nil in the time frame of this Estimate.'
The factors this Estimate considers in determining the subject
countries' geopolitical importance to the United States include: strategic
maritime choke points; major oil producers; major debtors; key US allies
or friends; geographic proximity to the United States; areas of tradition-
al, substantial US or Allied influence; presence of important CS
Government communications or other technical facilities; and impor-
tant US military access agreements or possible future US military
involvement. These criteria have been established by the Intelligence
Community for the purpose of making the NIE's judgments and should
not be interpreted as suggesting that any particular US policies be
adopted.
Our concept of "sudden change" refers specifically to develop-
ments requiring US policymakers' attention in order to adjust to new sit-
uations of significant threat or opportunity-developments such as the
abrupt appearance of new leaders or important new economic configu-
rations or stresses; the eccentricity and whim of individual leaders; the
sudden major injection of the USSR's or an associate's influence into a
given setting; those developments concerning terrorism and narcotics
trafficking that materially affect political stability; or the sudden major
aggravation of some local issue by regional tensions. With respect to the
''T'hus, the Hstiina~e does u~~t include Japan, m~~st of ',CATO, Israel. the \t'arsa~~ Pact countries, Ciihu.
\ton~;olia_ Aurth Korea, and Vietnam; it does include tiouth Africa. Greece. l'urke~.:~n~ola, A9orarnhi~~ue.
l?thiopiu, and tiicara~;ua.
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
last-named development, the Estimate focuses mainly on specific
countries, but, where applicable, treats likely hotspot issues of a more
transnational nature: for example, the clash of Syrian and Israeli
interests in Lebanon, the Cyprus conflict, and the spillover from the
Nicaraguan insurgency. Our concept of sudden change also includes
significant policy departures by governments, as well as more "classi-
cal" political upheavals such as coups, unanticipated electoral upsets,
and assassinations.
As contrasted with NIE 7-85, the present Estimate (1) treats certain
Marxist and pro-Soviet countries; (2) places added emphasis on possible
positive-as well as harmful-change; and (3) differentiates more
clearly some of the earlier Estimate's categorizations concerning coun-
tries or situations of policy concern.
2
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
KEY JUDGMENTS
:~s ~~~as the case in our previous Estimate (NIE i -85) on sudden
change, published in Februar~~ 1985, we remain extremely concerned
about the prospects for sudden change in the Philippines and Sudan,
where the situations have continued to deteriorate seriously. We are also
ver~~ concerned about Liberia, where an aborted coup in November
1985 demonstrated Head of State Doe's weakening grip on power.
?~1oreover, political conditions still are unstable in Nigeria despite a
coup in August 1985 that threw out an unpopular regime.
The current Estimate adds 10 new countries and hvo regional
topics covering areas or situations of special importance to US policy-
"The Nicaraguan Insurgency" and `The Caribbean Basin." With the
strengthening of militar~~ capabilities on the part of both the Sandinistas
and the insurgents, the fighting in Nicaragua will widen and escalate;
this is not likely to result in the overthrow of the regime but could lead
to greater regional instability and possible changes in Managua's
negotiating approach. In the Caribbean Basin, severe economic troubles
and the associated political trauma will strain the stability of conserva-
tive governments and provide more opportunities for opposition leftist
elements-and, behind them, Cuba, Libya, and the USSR.
Of the 10 new countries we have added, several, such as MoNarn-
~~iq~~e, Ethiopia, and Angola, have been included because of changes in
methodology since the previous Estimate, as discussed in the Scope
Note. Sudden change in some of these countries, as well as in Lih~a,
~~}~~~~}~ is treated for the first time in this Estimate, could provide new
opportunities for the United States. South Africa has been added
because of new instabilities there, the worldwide publicity given them,
and tl~e consequent pressures on US policymaking. We have added
SoT~th tiorea because opposition to President Chun is growing; and
Zaire because the leadership skills of President Mobutu Sese Seko, one
of the United States' closest allies in Africa, will be sharply tested over
the nest two years as he struggles to cope with economic austerity and
increased Libyan subversion.
Our judgments are categorized below and summarized in the map
(figure 1) on page 7 and the tabulation on page 9.
Cate~or~ A. Countries or regional situations of high geopolitical
iinp~~rtance to the United States and in which during the next two years
or so there is:
(1) a bettor than even chance that there will be sudden change
affecting key US interests:
"I'he Philippines
The Nicaraguan Insurgency
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
(3)
(2) an even or somewhat lesser chance (30- to 50-percent) of such
change:
Iran and the Persian Gulf
Iraq
Lebanon
Syria
Libya
EI Salvador (domestic affairs)
Honduras (domestic affairs)
Guatemala
Panama
Pakistan
only a 10- to 30-percent chance of such change, but where the
interplay of particular political, economic, and social forces
could affect US interests:
Smaller Persian Gulf states
Jordan
Egypt
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Greece
Cypnzs
Argentina
Brazil
Metico
South Korea
India
South Africa
Cate.~ory B. Countries or regional situations of some, but lesser,
geopolitical importance to the United States and in which during the
next. two years or so there is:
(1)
a better than even chance that there will be sudden change
affecting key US interests:
Liberia
1\'igeria
Sudan
(2) an even or somewhat lesser chance (30- to 50-percent) of such
change:
Mozambique
Tunisia
4
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
~.;) only a 1O- to ,3U-percent chance of such change, lnrt s~~here the in-
terpla~~ of particular political, economic, and social forces could
affect l~S interests:
Angola
I',tlllopla
h('nya
'Loire
(;bile'
(;olrnnhia
Peru
)amain
C~ntc~~~orr~ C. Countries or regional situations not of pronounced
geopolitical significance at the moment but where there is at least a 30-
percent chance that radical forces, backed by such hostile states as
(:uha. the Soviet Union, or Libya, could significantly increase their
influence, requiring high-level attention by US or other Western
leaders:
The Caribbean Rosin (minor islands, Dominican Republic,
Ilaiti, Dominica, Guyana, and Suriname)
Malta
(;had
1 iger
Senegal
Our Evaluation of the Judgments of NIE 7-85
~'~%IF, ~-~~5 rather accurately anticipated:
- "I'he controlling do~~~nhill slide of events in the Philippines.
- 't'he coups in Suda~l and Nigeria.
- '['he strides President Duarte ~~?ould make in ~~~inning popular
support in F:1 Salvador, as illustrated in the Christian Demo-
crats~ landslide victory in the legislative and municipal elections
last 'March.
- "I~he victor~~ of Alan Garcia in the Peruvian elections this past
April and the tact that YerTr ~rrnlld become a more difficult
negotiating partner for the United States and the international
crnnmunit~~.
1'hr 1)ryu~h~ 1>irrrlur ~~ir Inh?flf;;rnrr, Crntral Intc~ll[~~?nn' at;rnry. lu~lit?r~~v lh~~ f~~rrrs al nark in
( 7nL plurr it u~ (alr~nr'u R~~'I- lir jnrf~~~e Ihu( inrr~~a~ing pnlari~atirni n?s~dlin~ Jrrnu Presidwit Pinu~~h~~l~~
intrrni.vte!rnr~~_ fhr nine/rral~~e~ drlrrrninulirn~ M fr~rr~~ a pu~itiral nr;;nliuliurt, and IAr rnpnritil n( thr
('nrnnnmiel.v !o r?Irralr ih~~ Irrrl nJ rinlrn~~r iiirld a :i(1- ro SO-prrr~~n! ~~Aanrr ~~~r ~~~i~nifirant rhunt~r in Ih~~
~inlifiral ryualir~n
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
- That President Barletta would resign under pressure from
defense chief Noriega in Yanamn.
NIE ~ -~5 u~as sonzc>rchc~t ouerl ~ pessinlistie in ias dE>scri~~tion of
lik~~lt~ ~uents in GrePC~, Pnkistn~2, Ct~~rz~s, L~~hnnon, end ~r~entina:
- In Grc~ec~, Papandreau did not have to rely on the support of
the Communist Part~~ in his reelection.
- President Zia's political position in Pakistnn has turned rnrt to he
somewhat stronger than depicted; however, pressures persist on
'Lia to restrict or stop support to the Afghan resistance.
- ~~'e now think the probahilit~~ for sudden change in the C~prz~s
conflict is onl~~ 10- to 30-percent It ~~ as previoush~ placed in a
category of 30- to 50-percent chance of sudden change. V~~hile
open military conflict is not likely-, neither is a negotiated
settlement
- Primarily because of the Israeli withdrawal, we believe the
chance for sudden change in Le2~anon adverse to US interests to
he somewhat less. However, the continuing conflict between
Israeli and Syrian interests in Lebanon, aggravated h~~ continued
resistance b~~ various Lebanese armed factions to Israel's contin-
ued presence in South Lebanon, provides a significant opporhl-
nity~ for a crisis deterimental to US interests.
-The minority, alternative view held by the Director of the
llefense Intelligence Agency and chiefs of the militar~~ service
intelligence organizations in our previous Estimate concerning
.-~rgc~nti~tn (onl~~ a 10- to 30-percent chance of sudden change)
has now become t}ie present Estimates position. Previously, the
majorih of the Intelligence Community placed Argentina in a
category of 30- to 50-percent chance of change. President
Alfonsin enjoys rather broad political support, and the opposi-
tion PPT'On1St Party is divided and on the defensive.
NIE i-85 so~~iezehnf unde~~stnted tjte UotE~ntial for instaE~ilitt~ in
Li~~c~ria, and, as described previously, our concern about developments
in this crn~ntry has grown.
b
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011!12107 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
Figure 1
The Probability for Sudden Change in Key Developing Countries During the Next Two Years or So
Countn or regional situation ?"here there is .. .
...abetter than e',~en
chance .. .
...that there will he a sudden change affecting CS interests
... an even or some?hat
lesser chance (30-50?/n) .. .
~ Turkey ~-'
Gi ~:2 ~`^
Malta =y~YPrus r~ yri
sia Lebano
"`~ -'~_ See figure 4{. IreQ Iran
~.~ ~~~ r ; 1 dan
~~ Ku ait
Libya Egypt
GuatemalaNicaragua
EI Salvador See figure 3
Jamaica
~a
~~~ ~ HQ,nduras
Angola
See (figure 6
~mbig4e
ee hgure 5
Countn or regional situation not of pronounced geopolitical significance
at the moment but where there is at least a 30% chance that radical farces,
backed b~~ such hostile states as Cuba, the So~~iet Union, or Libt~a, could
significantly increase their influence, requiring high-IeFel attention b~ US or
other Western leaders.
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011!12107 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
Summary of Judgments: Outlook for Sudden Change
CatcKon' :1
t11iK11 Keopolilical importance)
(I) Prospects for change better than
50 percent
I'he Philippines
? 'nc~ tiicarlKUa^ InsurKenc~
(13) :)0 to 50 percent
Irut and the Persian Gulf_
Iran
- Lebanon
Syria
? Lila
1{I Salvador (domestic affairs)
Ilonduras (domestic affairsl
Guatemala.
Panama
Pakistan
Smaller Persian Gulf statec
Jordan
I .tip pt
Saudi Arabia
lllrke~ _. - -
- Grccce?
(:yprus
ArKentln8
Brazil
\lcsico
? South Korea
India
? South Africa
CategoryB
_-- -_
(Some Keopolitical importance)
(1) Prospects for change better than
50 percent
t Liberia
1'iKeria
Sudan
? Tt1ozarnbique
TuntS18
? AnKOIa
? Ethiopia
l~enya
? Zaire
___
Chile
? Colombia
Pent
Jamaica
+ JudKment of the probability for sudden chanKe raised since
l }? ~ `iS
JudKme?nt of the probability for sudden change lowered
? Countn~ or reKional situation newl~~ included
Category' C
(Not of pnnu,unced Kellpolilicul sit;nific:uuc at
the nutlnrnl but hasinK ul Icasl a 311-tx?rccnl
chana? that radical inrct?s, bucked by such hos-
tile states as Cuba. the Sociel l'niun. In~ I.ihyu.
could siKnificantly incn?use? their inllul?nce)
? The Carrihhean Basin
Malta
Churl
? 1'iKer
? SeneKal
Countries listed in 5IE 7-85 that have been
removed from this Estimate
Israel
__ --
Costa Rica
-- -__ _ _.
Boli, is
TuKoslasia
S1oroc?co
Gn~ana ~>
Se~nc~lles
Suriname n
Dominica n
Sri Lanka
Hong bong (colony)
Sce alternative vie? expressed in foutnnt,?s 2 and ._
~ Snhstnned under discussion of the Caribbean Basin.
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
Figure 2
The Philippines: Areas of Communist Influence
0 150 Kilometers
0 150 Miles
South
China
Sea
~~~
Visay~n
Islan~~~ ^^l
Puerto
Princess
Zamboanga'
r_ ~ .~
~~, ~
r~,
MalsyilA \-
InAgptsfs `~v,~
Indonesia ,~
~~
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07 :CIA-RDP90T00155R000100130002-7
DISCUSSION
Since February 1985, when we issued our previous Estimate on sudden change
(NIF r-85), we have revised our judgments, sti hick are grouped into the categories that
make up the main headings for this discussion.
Category A(1)
Countries or regional situations of high geopolitical
importance to the United States and in which
during the next two years or so there is a better than
c~cen chance that there will he sudden change
affecting key US interests
The Philippines
1. The most disturbing Third World trend since
tilE i-85 has been the serious, continuing deteriora-
tion of the Philippine security, political, and economic
situation:
- 'hhe Communist New Peoples Army conducted
several successful, large-scale attacks against
Philippine military units in mid-1985, particular-
ly in the Negros, Samar, Bicol, and Cagayan
Valley areas; and the party has been laying the
groundwork to begin a campaign of urban terror-
ism in Manila while continuing its terrorist cam-
paign in the cities of Davao and Cebu. (See figure
2 for areas of Communist influence.) The mili-
tary's effectiveness against the insurgents has
been hampered by widespread corruption,
equipment shortages, weak logistics, low morale,
and command and control problems.
- The economy continues to suffer under a $26
billion foreign debt and the effects of a severe
financial crisis. Philippine economists estimate
that national output fell by 4.6 percent in the
first half of 1985, following on the heels of a 5.3-
percent decline in 1984. Bankruptcies and busi-
ness closings are widespread, and unemployment
has reached 15 percent-about 3 million people.
While International Monetary Fund (IMF) dis-
bursements have resumed, they may be halted
again it the Philippines is found to be out of line
with IMF recommendations. The economic
squeeze has increased official corruption, which
has further undermined the governments credi-
hilit~.
- President 1~9arcos survived his health crisis of last
winter, but his condition continues to deteriorate.
-Growing frustration with i~larcos~s authoritarian
rule and myriad economic and social problems
may threaten the Presidents tight grip on po~~?er.
- Military support for Marcos is eroding. vt'hile the
group within the military that calls itself "The
1~lovement for Keform of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines" still is committed to the system,
we believe this support would erode if Marcos
continues to shy away from reforms and General
Ver remains in de facto control of the armed
forces.
- President Marcos~s dramatic call for an earl~~
presidential election is intended to deflect US
pressure for broader reform. While the uuxlerale
Aquino-Laurel opposition ticket offers Murc