SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

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• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 27, 1981
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 11/2-81: Soviet
Support for International
Terrorism and Revolutionary
Violence
:AN,
.0..
CIA CONTROL NO.
TS 815753 Final
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DOC. DATE 27 May 1981
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Director of o ecret
Central
Inteltigence
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Soviet Support for
International Terrorism
and Revolutionary Violence
Special National Intelligence Estimate
SN1E 1112-81
TS 813753
27 May 1981
Copy
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SNIE 11/2-81
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE
Information available as of 18 May 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
SECURITY NOTICE
The Director of Central Intelligence wishes to remind all recipients of this Special
National Intelligence Estimate of its sensitivity and of their responsibility for its proper
control and the protection of its contents.
It is not to be shown to or discussed with persons lacking the necessary security
clearance and need-to-know without his prior approval.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
? The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS
1
DISCUSSION
5
I. INTRODUCTION
5
A. Scope Note
5
B. Nature of the Evidence
5
II. THE USSR, REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE, AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
6
A. Soviet Interest in Revolutionary Violence and Terrorism as
Instruments of Soviet Foreign Policy
6
B. Soviet Infrastructure and Revolutionary Violence
7
C. Soviet Policy Toward Various Kinds of Revolutionary Violence
7
D. Soviet Activities That Benefit Terrorists
8
E. The Role of Soviet Allies, Associates, and Clients
11
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
13
A. For the USSR
13
B. For the United States
14
IV. CONCLUSIONS
17
ANNEX A': The Regional -Record: Soviet Links to Terrorists
19
ANNEX B: Training Camps in the USSR and Eastern Europe
27
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KEY JUDGMENTS
? The Soviets are deeply engaged in support of revolutionary vio-
lence worldwide. Such involvement is a basic tenet of Soviet
policy, pursued in the interests of weakening unfriendly societies,
destabilizing hostile regimes, and advancing Soviet interests.
? The USSR pursues different policies toward different types of
revolutionary groups that conduct terrorist activities (that is,
hijackings, assassinations, kidnapings, bombings, and the victim-
ization of innocent civilians).
? Whether terrorist tactics are used in the course of revolutionary
violence is largely a matter of indifference to the Soviets, who
have no scruples against them. The Soviet attitude is determined
by whether those tactics advance or harm Soviet interests in the
particular circumstances. Revolutionary groups that employ ter-
rorist tactics are simply one among the many instruments of So-
viet foreign policy.
? There is conclusive evidence that the USSR directly or indirectly
supports a large number of national insurgencies and some sepa-
ratist-irredentist 2 groups. Many of these entities, of both types,
carry out terrorist activities as part of their larger programs of
revolutionary violence. A notable example of Soviet involvement
is the case of El Salvador, where the Soviets have coordinated
and directly participated in the delivery of arms to revolutionary
groups that use terrorism as a basic tactic.
? Some revolutionary groups that employ terrorism do accept a
measure of Soviet control and direction, but many do not.
? The International Department of the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party has primary responsibility for managing
contacts with movements in opposition to established govern-
? National insurgencies are broad-based movements which seek to transform the fundamental political
orientation of a society by armed revolutionary means. Examples of such groups which the USSR supports
or has supported are SWAPO (in Namibia) and ZAPU (in the former Rhodesia).
2 Sevaratist-irredenast movements believe that they constitute nations without states and seek to assert
their national autonomy or independence. Examples of such movements which the USSR supports or has
supported are several of the Palestinian groups.
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ments. The KGB, the GRU, and the 10th Directorate of the Soviet
General Staff provide a broad range of military and paramilitary
training to members of revolutionary groups, in various camps in
the USSR and elsewhere, and provide arms and other assistance to
a wide spectrum of revolutionary groups in the world, particu-
larly Palestinians, Africans, and Latin Americans.' Much of this
support is readily utilizable in terrorist activities.
? The Soviets support certain allied or friendly governments and
entities?notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, East Eu-
ropean states, South Yemen, and Cuba?which in turn directly or
indirectly support the terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of
violent revolutionaries, including certain of the world's nihilistic
terrorist groups.'
? The USSR accepts these support actions of its allies and friends. It
does so on occasion because these actions also serve Soviet in-
terests and on other occasions because they are part of the price
to be paid for maintaining and increasing its influence with allies
and friends. The USSR has not made its backing for them contin-
gent on their desisting from aiding nihilistic terrorists or other
violent revolutionaries. In this sense, Moscow is wittingly provid-
ing support, albeit indirectly, to international terrorism.
? With respect to Soviet policy toward nihilistic, purely terrorist
groups; available evidence remains thin and in some respects
contradictory, even though the human intelligence collection
programs of the United States and its friends have been giving
this problem close scrutiny for some years.
? The activities of some of the nihilistic terrorist groups are carried
out by individuals trained by Soviet friends and allies that pro-
vide them with weapons; such terrorists have sometimes transited
Soviet Bloc nations. Yet the terrorist activities of these groups are
not coordinated by the Soviets.'
See annexes A and B for details.
Nihilists are small groups, with little public support, which rely almost exclusively on terrorist acts to
destroy existing institutions to make way for new ones. Leading examples are the Baader-Meinhof group in
Germany, the Japanese Red Army, and the Red Brigades in Italy, which profess the view that Western
institutions are their major antagonists.
Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine
Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe that the
Soviets do provide some coordination to nihilistic terrorists either directly through the contacts of Soviet
advisers with these terrorists in training camps in Middle Eastern countries, or elsewhere, or indirectly
through East European countries, Cubans, Palestinians, or other entities through which the Soviets work.
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? The Soviets have on occasion privately characterized certain ni-
hilistic terrorism as -criminal,- and have urged other revolution-
ary groups to cease and desist from terrorist acts the Soviets
considered -self-defeating.- 6
? Public protestations by the Soviets that they do not back terror-
ism are compromised by the indirect Soviet support received by
certain nihilistic terrorists, as well as by the direct support the
Soviets afford to national insurrections and separatist-irredentist
movements which conduct terrorist acts.
? The Soviet policy of differentiated support of various kinds of
revolutionary violence benefits Soviet overall interests at low risk
or cost, and without significant damage to Soviet prestige. It is
therefore likely to continue.
? There is no basis for supposing that the Soviets could be per-
suaded to join the West in genuine opposition to international
terrorism as a whole.
? The broader phenomenon of revolutionary violence is a more
significant and complex issue for the United States than is its
terrorist component per se. The severe instabilities that exist in
many settings in the Third World are chronic, will not soon be
overcome, and in many instances would continue to exist regard-
less of the USSR.
? There is no simple or single solution to these problems because of
the variety and complexity of circumstances leading to revolu-
tionary violence and terrorism. In every case, the indicated meas-
ures include a mixture of three approaches: reduction or elimina-
tion of external support, police and/or military action to combat
violence, and the opening of channels for peaceful change.
Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of
Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of
the Mr Force. They believe that this judgment is misleading. Moscow has not supported terroristic
activities which it considers counterproductive. The holders of this view note, however, that, as stated in
the fourth Key Judgment (page 1), on other occasions the Soviets have coordinated and directly partici-
pated in the delivery of arms to revolutionary groups that use terrorism as a basic tactic"
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope Note
1. This Estimate deals with the nature of Soviet
support for international terrorism, within the broader
framework of revolutionary, violence. The Estimate (a)
examines such support in several contexts and with
respect to various types of revolutionary, violence; (b)
indicates the degree to which the Soviets directly or
indirectly support international terrorism; (c) assesses
how international terrorism may contribute to Soviet
foreign policy objectives; (d) assesses the degree to
which the perpetrators of revolutionary violence,
particularly those who resort to terrorism, are depend-
ent on Soviet support; and (e) identifies the signifi-
cance for Soviet and for US interests of the several
variants of revolutionary violence.
2. Terrorism--hijackings, assassinations, kidnap-
ings, bombings, and other acts that victimize innocent
civilians?is a frequent component of revolutionary
violence; i.e., violence aimed at undermining or
overthrowing a political status quo. The demarcation
- between terrorism and guerrilla and paramilitary
activities is sometimes murky.
3. Revolutionary violence manifests itself in the
form of national insurgencies, separatist-irredentist
movements, and nihilistic groups.
0 ? National insurgencies are broad-based move-
ments which seek to transform the fundamental
orientation of a society, by armed revolutionary
means. Examples, of such groups which the USSR
supports or has supported are SWAPO (in
Namibia) and ZAPU (in the former Rhodesia).
? Separatist-irredentist movements believe that
they constitute nations without states and seek to
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assert their national autonomy or independence.
The Palestinian groups which the USSR supports
or has supported exemplify such movements.
Nihilists 'are small groups with little Public sup-
port which relyil almost exclusively on terrorist
acts to destroy existing institutions to make way
for new ones. Examples are the Baader-Meinhof
group in Germany, the Japanese, Red Army, and
the Red Brigades in Italy, which profess the view
that Western institutions are their major antago-
nists.
B. Nature of the E yidence
4'. ? Human L intelligence, particularly clandestine, is
the principal source of information.on Soviet assistance
1
to violent revolutionaires. The coverage of such revo-
lutionaries varies greatly by region. Evidence is fairly
good concerning Latin America, Africa; and the Mid-
dle East; it is less certain concerning Western Europe.
? Information
gives us
confidence in our judgments regarding Soviet
support for revolutionary, insurgencies in the
Third World that employ terrorism. - -
? Reporting on Soviet links
dentists is mixed.
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5. It should be noted that the differences of judg-
ment within the Intelligence Community on certain of
these matters relate primarily to the validity and inter-
pretation of the evidence and the degree to which cir-
cumstantial evidence and the logic of given situations
permit confident judgments beyond available docu-
mentation.
II. THE USSR, REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE,
AAND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
A. Soviet Interest in Revolutionary Violence
and Terrorism as Instruments of Soviet
Foreign Policy
6. The USSR and several countries with which it
has close ties are the principal backers of the revolu-
tionary violence that is such a prominent feature of
contemporary international politics. Moscow's leaders
' The Intelligence Community assigns more demanding criteria to
the accuracy of sourcing and reporting on these questions of terror-
ism than do most journalists. The publication of The Terror Net-
work by Claire Sterling and the selections in the press have created a
great deal of interest inside and outside the Intelligence Commu-
nity. Although well-written and extensively documented, amassing
information in public sources, the book is uneven and the reliility
of its sources varies widnly. Significant portions are correct; others
are incorrect or written without attending to important detail.
Sterling's conclusion is that the Soviets are not coordinating world-
wide terrorism from some central point, but that they are contribut-
ing to it in several ways. "It was never part of the Soviet design to
create and watch over native terrorist movements, still less attempt
to direct their day-to-day activities- (p. 291).
Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intel-
ligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army; the Director of Intelligence, Head-
quarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel-
ligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe it is inappropri-
ate to single out one publication of many on this subject. The last
sentence of footnote 7 is a selective quote. More appropriate quotes
of Sterling's conclusions are found on other pages of her book:
? "The whole point of the (Soviet) plan was to let the other
fellow do it, contributing to continental terror by proxy."
(page 292)
? "In effect, the Soviet Union had simply laid a loaded gun on
the table, leaving others to get on with it." (page 293)
Moreover, Soviet support for terrorism and revolutionary violence
has moved beyond the passive or indirect stage, and has become
more active, as is reflected in paragraph 42 of the Estimate,
describing Moscow's nurturing of terrorist movements in Latin
America.
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consider revolutionary groups that employ terrorist
tactics to be simply one among the many instruments
in the USSR's total foreign policy arsenal of diplo-
matic, economic, military, propaganda, and subversive
weapons. The combined purpose of these instruments
is to facilitate what Soviet leaders believe to be an
inevitable march of history toward a world -correla-
tion of forces" increasingly favorable to the USSR and
the Soviet Communist Party. To the degree that revo-
lutionary violence contributes to that process, it is sup-
ported. When terrorism occurs, it is accepted or op-
posed as circumstances dictate.
7. Revolutionary violence occurs in a variety of
contexts?broad insurgency movements in the Third
World (e.g., SWAPO in Namibia), ethnic and religious
separatism in the Third World and on the fringes of
Europe (e.g., the Armenians in Turkey and the
Basques in Spain), nihilism in Western Europe (e.g.,
the Red Brigades in Italy), and the covert terrorist
activities of states against one another (e.g., Libyan ter-
rorism against Egypt). In some cases, terrorism is an
offshoot of broader militant activities. But in other
cases (e.g., the European nihilists and several of the
Palestinian separatist groups) terrorism is a fundamen-
tal mode of operation.
8. Soviet support of revolutionary violence is
particularly generous in those situations where Soviet
leaders conclude that revolutionaries stand a good
chance of transforming an existing political system
into one that is more amenable to Moscow or less fa-
vorable to Western interests. Moscow prefers to refer
to these groups as -national liberation" movements.
Since the definition of -national liberation" is flexible
enough to cover the subversion of any regime disliked
by the Soviets, and since guerrilla tactics often include
terrorism, the net result is that the terrorist activities of
the groups receive substantial Soviet support. _ _ _
9. Moscow favors groups that are, or that can trans-
form themselves into or join with, mass movements
utilizing large-scale agitational, guerrilla, and para-
military tactics. It does so for several reasons:
? Such movements enjoy greater prospects for suc-
cess than small bands of ? terrorists because they
attract greater indigenous support and are more
likely to be regarded as legitimate expressions of
popular aspirations by the Third World and var-
ious elements in the West.
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? Such movements, because they need large-scale
military assistance, are more dependent on the
USSR than are small bands, and are therefore
more susceptible to Soviet influence.
10. The key factor in the Soviet calculus, however,
is clearly not a particular method of operation, such as
insurgency or terrorism, but what particular mixture
of diplomatic, military, economic, or subversive in-
struments best advances overall Soviet foreign policy
interests in each given situation and at each juncture in
time. Whether terrorism occurs in such situations is
largely a matter of indifference to the Soviets, who
have no particular scruples against it; what is of cen-
tral importance to them is that the tactics of those
whom they assist are effective in advancing broad
Soviet interests. When the opportunity is presented,
moreover, Moscow does not hesitate to seek political or
propaganda advantages from the activities of terror-
ists, as in the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and
the recent hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul.
11. Where the status or activities of particular revo-
lutionaries are deemed of lesser importance to Soviet
interests than are competing groups or good relations
with the host government, support to *them is usually
subordinated to the broader imperatives of overall
Soviet policy. The avowed position of the Soviets is
that they oppose terrorism, but this public position is
compromised by Soviet activities tha
use terrorism.
B. Soviet Infrastructure and Revolutionary
Violence
12. As in the case of all other aspects of Soviet for-
eign policy making, the ultimate locus of decisions
concerning Soviet support for movements in opposi-
tion to established governments is the Politburo of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The
Soviets give public support to various revolutionary
movements, and revolutionary leaders have regularly
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attended Soviet party congresses. Individual Politburo
members have met with the leaders of some groups
that have engaged in terrorist activities, including
Oliver Tambo of the ANC, Yasir Arafat of the PLO,
and Samuel Nujoma of SWAP0.9
13. Under the Politburo, all aspects of Soviet na-
tional security policy are coordinated by the Central
Committee bureaucracy. Within the Central Commit-
tee apparatus, the International Department of the
Central Committee has primary responsibility for the
day-to-day management of Soviet contacts with
nonruling Communist parties and revolutionary move-
ments abroad. The International Department (ID) is
run by Boris Ponomarev and Mikhail Suslov?the
chief Soviet ideologue, senior party secretary, and a
full Politburo member?and has long had responsibil-
ities in the area of Soviet relations with foreign Com-
munist parties and leftist movements. The ID is almost
certainly the principal link between the USSR's top
policymakers and those revolutionary movements
which the Soviets support. It is reasonable to assume
that the ID makes policy recommendations to the
Politburo concerning the terrorist activities of these
movements.
14. A number of Soviet embassies have ID per-
sonnel on their staffs.
they perform both a liaison and an advisory function
in contacts with foreign leftist movements and pro-
Soviet parties. The ID also appears to have responsibil-
ity for providing funds to such groups, though in some
instances the mechanics of passing funds have been
handled by the KGB.
15. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
appears to play a more limited role than the ID with
regard to Soviet contact with nonruling parties, both
Communist and non-Communist, and with illegal pro-
Soviet organizations. This reflects a division of labor
wherein the MFA is responsible for state-to-state rela-
tions with foreign governments, while the Central
Committee apparatus deals with foreign political par-
ties and movements.
C. Soviet Policy Toward Various Kinds of
Revolutionary Violence 10
16. Soviet support of national insurgencies is long-
standing. The Soviets seek to justify their support by
See annex A, paragraphs 13, 55, and 56.
"See annex A for greater detail.
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describing such insurgencies as "national liberation"
movements. There is abundant evidence of training of
Third World insurgents within the USSR as well as in
Cuba, South Yemen, various Palestinian camps, and
probably Eastern Europe. The Soviets also provide
large quantities of arms and considerable advice to
such insurgents and their patrons. Some of those
trained and equipped by the Soviets or their friends
and allies make their way into strictly terrorist groups.
17. The USSR also has ties with some groups in the
second general type of revolutionary movement, the
ethnic and religious separatists who constitute a wide-
spread source of revolutionary violence in contem-
porary politics and are major employers of terrorist
activities." Direct Soviet support goes largely to sepa-
ratists-irredentists that the Soviets believe will further
their foreign policy objectives in critical areas, such as
the Middle East. Fringe groups, however, also derive
benefit from Soviet largess to the extent that they at-
tend training camps in the USSR (and possibly Eastern
Europe), or in such countries as Cuba, Libya, and
South Yemen that have close relations with Moscow.
Also, East Bloc arms have been sent to the most violent
of the separatists by Warsaw Pact countries and by
groups and regimes with close political and military
ties to the USSR, like Fatah, Libya, Iraq, and Syria.
Certain separatist groups have also received funding
and false documents from regimes that enjoy close
relations with the USSR.
18. Soviet policy toward the third general type of
revolutionaries, the nihilistic, strictly terrorist groups,i2
is quite different. The USSR has often condemned
nihilistic terrorism in public and on occasion in pri-
vate. Soviet leaders apparently consider its main
practitioners to be uncontrollable adventurers whose
" Such groups view themselves as autonomous communities that
are victims of oppression. Whether they have links with the USSR or
not, all separatists share a self-perception of deprived nationhood.
Some are collections of exiles like the Croatian, Armenian, and
Moluccan separatists. Others function within large ethnic commu-
nities in their own countries?Northern Irish Catholics, Philippine
Moros, Iranian Kurds, or Spanish Basques. Separatists-irredentists
strive to create the conditions for civil or guerrilla warfare (as have
various Palestinian groups against Israel), but they also resort to ter-
rorism. Terrorism has been a major instrument in the arsenal of
separatist groups like the Basque ETA, the Armenian ASALA, and
the Provisional wing of the IRA.
12 For example, Baader-Meinhof, the Italian Red Brigades, the
Japanese Red Army.
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behavior antagonizes other governments unduly, pro-
vokes reaction damaging to their interests, and on
occasion endangers Soviet personnel or undermines
the Soviet objective of fomenting more broadly based
revolutionary movements. Nonetheless, some nihilists
appear in the training camps of Soviet friends, and
have received funding and East Bloc arms from a vari-
ety of sources. The Soviets have not made their sup-
port for these friends contingent on their desisting
from aiding nihilistic terrorism. In addition, individual
nihilists have appeared behind the Iron Curtain and
have found refuge in Eastern Europe and Cuba.
19. In recent years, a fourth type of terrorism has
become more pronounced?terrorism as a state in-
strument, notably in the Middle East against hostile
states and dissidents living abroad. There, terrorism
has been conducted between Syria and Iraq, and Israel
and the Palestinians. South Yemen has employed ter-
rorism against North Yemen and Oman; Libya has
used it against Egypt; and Syria has initiated terrorism
against Jordan. Libya, Syria, Iran, Chile, and Bulgaria
have terrorized dissidents living abroad. In a number
of cases, the regimes employing terrorism have close
relations with the USSR, and the Soviets have good
reason to share their dislike of some of the targets, such
as the Sadat government in Egypt.
D. Soviet Activities That Benefit Terrorists
20. The USSR and its allies and friends provide
military and political training for large numbers of
Third World activists; supply arms to nations and
organizations that back terrorists, without imposing or
implementing controls over use or transfer; and are
known on occasion to have permitted the transit of
terrorists though their territory and to have given
them safehaven.
_ _
21. Training. Thousands of Third World revolu-
tionaries have been provided military training within
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Such training includes
the use of weapons, sabotage, clandestine organization,
and communications?all of value to those interested
in conducting insurgencies, but of value as well to
would-be terrorists.
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29. In addition to the training of revolutionaries in
the USSR, the Soviets also provide advisers for training
facilities in other countries (Cuba, Libya, South Yem-
en). In these situations, the revolutionary groups in-
volved appoint the students, and the Soviets are fully
aware that some of the skills acquired have been used
to commit terrorist acts.
30. The Soviets, according to some allegations, get
assistance from Warsaw Pact allies in the training of
foreign insurgents.' 5 Such use of the East Bloc would
be advantageous to the USSR, by promoting both the
appearance and the reality of a unified Communist
effort to assist Third World revolutionary movements.
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To date, we have reports (largely unconfirmed) of a
number of training sites in Czechoslovakia, one in
Poland, and several?unspecified?in Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Romania.'6
31. The description of training
indicates that most instruction focuses on
paramilitary/guerrilla-type activities. Sources describe
instruction in small arms, small-unit tactics, the use of
explosives, communications, and intelligence gather-
ing." This training is more than adequate preparation
for most terrorist activities.
32. Arms Supplies. In recent years, the Soviets and
others have made extensive arms deliveries to the
Third World. One consequence of these arms transfers
has been the ready availability of weapons for terror-
ists. Major Soviet arms shipments go to Cuba, Libya,
and the Palestinians (via Syria). The Soviets are fully
aware that some of these are transferred to terrorists.
In the case of El Salvador the Soviets have coordinated
and directly participated in the delivery of arms to
guerrilla/terrorist groups. The support and encourage-
ment given by the Cubans to a broad range of Latin
American radical groups, the support by Libya and
South Yemen to various Palestinian and Third World
groups, and the links which those groups in turn have
with terrorist organizations facilitate access of these
groups to modern weapons and explosives. However,
small arms of multiple national origin are readily
available from a variety of sources to terrorist groups.
33. The most dramatic instances of Soviet-made
weapons ending up in the hands of terrorists involve
'e Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Mr Force. They believe that, although evidence
of terrorist training at sites in Eastern Europe is not as well
documented as reporting of sites in the Middle East, it should not
be evaluated as "largely unconfirmed." The holders of this view
believe that the reporting which is available supports their belief
that training of terrorists has taken place in Eastern Europe.
" There are only two reports indicating that the Soviets may go
beyond strictly guerrilla-type training.
Another report
claims that the Soviets were teaching techniques for attacking per-
sons from moving vehicles and the placing of explosives in various
places (including luggage in train stations), for hostage taking, and
for public intimidation.
TS 815753
the SA-7 man-portable antiaircraft missile.' 8 Two such
missiles were found in the pasession of a group of
Palestinian terrorists in Rome in September 1973; they
reportedly were to have been used to shoot down an
Israeli passenger plane as it landed in Rome. The mis-
siles probably had been given to the Syrians for more
conventional military use and subsequently found
their way into the hands of the Palestinian terrorists in
Italy. In January 1976 the Kenyans apprehended five
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) preparing to use SA-7s against an in-
coming Israeli airliner in Nairobi. In this case, the mis-
siles had been supplied by Libya and smuggled into
Nairobi with Somali assistance. SA-7s were used by the
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) forces in
Rhodesia twice, in 1978 and 1979, to shoot down Vis-
count passenger planes; the weapons had probably
been delivered to ZAPU by the Soviet Union via
Zambia or Angola. In November 1979 Italian authori-
ties found two SA-7 missiles in a van near the small
Adriatic port of Ortona. Three Italians in the van were
members of the nihilistic group Workers Autonomy; a
Jordanian involved in the incident was a PFLP mem-
ber. The issue of the ultimate destination of the mis-
siles was never resolved.
34. Although it is clear that many revolutionary
insurgents and separatists are the direct and indirect
recipients of Soviet arms, there is only limited in-
formation about the sources of arms to West European
As noted above, the PFLP appears
to be an arms conduit to the Workers Autonomy group
in Italy and also possibly to the Red Brigades, which
have used Czechoslovak arms.
35. Transit and Safehaven. Over the years, a
number of terrorists have traveled in the USSR and
Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany. PFLP
leaders, George Habbash and the late Wadi Haddad,
received medical treatment in Eastern Europe. A
Japanese Red Army activist, Black September orga-
nization members, PFLP terrorists, and a group of
"See annex A for Soviet criticism of terrorist attacks against civil-
ian targets.
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Arab terrorists carrying explosives were reportedly
identified in East Germany at different times. There
have been unconfirmed reports that members of the
Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof) have crossed into
East Germany. There has also been reporting
that members of the Italian Red Brigades have crossed
into Eastern Europe, notably Czechoslovakia, and
have been met and escorted by Czechoslovak officials.
However, the reliability of this reporting is open to
question,
E. The Role of Soviet Allies, Associates,
and Clients
37. The Soviets rely heavily on intermediaries in
their efforts to advance revolution, particularly in the
Third World. The most prominent are the Cubans, the
Palestinians, and the Libyans. South Yemen provides
camps and training to revolutionary forces targeted
against conservative Arab regimes and other govern-
ments. There are other conduits, including Vietnam,
North Korea, Syria, and Algeria, that at one time or
another have channeled Soviet arms and/or funds to
the perpetrators of revolutionary violence.
38. Moscow exerts varying degrees of control and
influence over its allies and friends, depending in part
on the target and region of activities. In Africa, for
example, even though the Cubans have some objec-
tives of their own, they basically follow Soviet direc-
tion, Cuba has
more leeway in Latin America, however, and supports
some Latin American revolutionaries at its own initia-
tive and discretion. By the same token, Libya's terror-
ist activities are likely staged at Qadhafi's own initia-
tive. The Soviets receive considerable infusions of hard
currency from their arms sales to Libya, and a number
of Soviet interests in promoting instability are served
when Qadhafi transfers funds and Soviet arms to revo-
lutionary forces in Africa, the Middle East, or
elsewhere.
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39. Eastern Europe. East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia, whose policies are carefully coordinated with
Moscow and are subject to its veto, have served most
frequently as Soviet partners in support of insurgency
and separatist movements which frequently use terror-
ism as well as engage in paramilitary operations. They
also support states that in turn engage in terrorism or
directly back terrorists. In addition, terrorists have
transited some East European countries. Bulgaria
smuggles arms on a large scale into Turkey, where the
weapons reach various criminals and terrorists.'9
40. Cuba. The USSR and Cuba are pursuing the
same objective?establishment of ideologically sympa-
thetic regimes in the Third World?and they work
closely together. Most Cuban policy is not directed or
controlled by the Soviets; however, if it were not for
the extensive Soviet military and economic aid to
Cuba, that country would be unable to engage in
large-scale operations outside its borders. In recent
years, Cuba has been in the lead in urging armed
struggle in Latin America, and the Soviets have be-
come more actively supportive of late. The Cubans,
and more recently the Soviets, clearly support orga-
nizations and groups in Latin America that use terror-
ism as a basic technique in their efforts to undermine
existing regimes.
41. There is substantial evidence that the Cubans
provide training to guerrillas and terrorists, both in
Cuba and elsewhere. The Cubans have persistently
trained Latin American revolutionaries in political
indoctrination, guerrilla warfare techniques, sabotage,
kidnaping, and assassination." Soviet involvement in
paramilitary training has recently expanded, with El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as priority tar-
gets. Soviet and Cuban cadres are training guerrilla
forces from these countries in the USSR, Cuba, and
other locations, and the Cubans are providing training
in Nicaragua.
42. The Cubans were the primary supporters of the
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Moscow facilitated
Havana's aid to the Sandinistas by promising to re-
place Cuban arms sent to the Nicaraguan guerrillas.
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The Soviet role in the Salvadoran rebellion has been
more conspicuous. Moscow has provided funding
assistance and has coordinated the weapons supply
from its allies, including East European countries,
Vietnam, and Ethiopia. The Soviets have facilitated
the quest for arms of El Salvador's Unified Revolution-
ary Directorate (DRU), an umbrella organization
comprising five guerrilla/terrorist groups. The Soviets
have urged Palestinian groups to provide training and
other support to the Salvadoran revolutionaries, and
have coordinated the support infrastructure abroad,
with assistance such as the provision of safehouses and
travel arrangements for Salvadoran rebel leaders. Fur-
thermore, Soviet TU-154s piloted by Soviet crews were
used in ferrying arms to Nicaragua for delivery to
Salvadoran insurgents.
43. In short, the USSR and Cuba appear to be
pursuing a long-term coordinated campaign to estab-
lish sympathetic Latin American regimes. In this ef-
fort, Cuba and other Soviet friends and allies are play-
ing the more direct roles in supporting revolutionary
groups. Intensified Soviet activity in this region por-
tends an increase in terrorist behavior there.
44. Libya. Libya is a major and direct supporter of
international terrorism and has purchased large quan-
tities of arms from the USSR. Although Libya is not
controlled by the USSR, Libyan and Soviet short-term
goals have often been complementary. Because the
current relationship benefits the USSR in a number of
ways, it is highly improbable that Moscow would seek
to pressure Libya to withdraw support from terrorists.
45. While Libya's oil revenues allow it to shop
widely for arms and development assistance, it has
spent heavily in the Soviet Bloc. Currently, there are
more than 1,000 Soviet and 24,000 East European
civilian technicians in Libya. Nearly 1,700 military
advisers from the Bloc are active in every branch of
the Libyan armed forces. The Soviets have sold Libya
quantities of weaponry far in excess of the capability
of the Libyan forces alone to use. Moscow has not re-
stricted the transfer of equipment?mainly light
arms?by the Libyans to third parties.
46. The Palestinians. The Soviets have long sup-
ported the Palestinians and their umbrella organiza-
tion, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Together with their East European allies, the Soviets
provide the single most important source of arms pur-
chased by the Palestinians. In the last 10 years alone,
the Soviets have provided thousands of Palestinians
with military and paramilitary training in facilities in
the USSR and elsewhere. Those trained have included
members of organizations such as the PFLP and the
Syrian-dominated Saiqa which have engaged in terror-
ist activities.
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volvement in revolutions on the other side of the world
is a price to be paid for Soviet arms.
50. El Salvador is the most prominent current tar-
get of the Palestinians in Latin America. During 1980,
Palestinians trained some 200 Salvadoran rebels in
Lebanon.
51. South Yemen. The Marxist People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Yemen?currently under Soviet tu-
telage and long a major crossroads for international
terrorists and radical insurgents?provides training,
weapons, transit, safehaven, forged passports, and
other services. For ideological and economic reasons,
Moscow has greater influence in the PDRY than in
any other country in the Middle East. The ruling
Yemeni Socialist Party is committed to a variety of
objectives with which the Soviets sympathize: the ex-
port of revolution to the Persian Gulf, rebellion in
Oman, subversion in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia,
and the promotion of radical causes in general. The
Aden regime signed a treaty of friendship and
cooperation with Moscow in 1979, holds observer sta-
tus in the Soviet Bloc's Council for Mutual Ecotiomic
Assistance (CEMA), and is dependent on., Bloc
assistance.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
A. For the USSR
53. Since the Bolshevik capture of power in Russia,
one of the principal, consistent tenets of Lenin, Stalin,
and their successors has been that the proletarian
TS 815753
workers of the West and the colonial or formerly colo-
nial peoples of what we now call the Third World are,
or will become, natural allies of the USSR and its
Communist Party. For Western workers that doctrine
has generally been invalidated by the failure of most
of them to be attracted to Soviet Communism to any
significant degree. But Soviet doctrinal faith with re-
spect to the Third World has substantially more to
sustain it. The enormous weaknesses of all kinds which
exist there are susceptible to Soviet exploitation?the
fragility of political, social, and economic institutions,
the many passionate tribal and ethnic separatist ambi-
tions, the many disputes between and among these
states, the experience of those countries with Western
but not with Soviet colonialism, the existence of the
rich US scapegoat, and widespread dissatisfaction with
certain US policies. All these offer visions to Moscow
of Communist advance, hurried along by Soviet
exploitation.
54. This prospect helps explain why the Soviets
have made such a concerted effort, for so many years,
to train Third World people of all walks of life. At
relatively little cost, but with consistent aim, these pro-
grams have been extended not only to Third World
leaders, military personnel, engineers, educators, and
the like, but to revolutionaries as well. Hence the
USSR has developed its wide-ranging programs of di-
rect and indirect support for many kinds of revolution-
ary violence in the Third World, in the expectation
that Soviet interests will be accordingly advanced. For
similar reasons of self-interest, Soviet policy is quite
different with respect to nihilistic, purely terrorist
groups. Many of them operate in a wholly different,
European setting, have little popular support, may
generate reactions that set back the fortunes of revolu-
tionary movements, engage in activities that could
harm Soviet installations and personnel, and may dam-
age relations with West European and some- Third
World countries.
55. Support of revolutionary violence, including its
terrorist component, provides Moscow with a means of
inciting or exploiting violent and destabilizing conflict
on a regional as well as global scale, with small risk of
US retaliation or direct military confrontation with the
United States. Terrorism in Third World regions has
frequently occurred in the initial stage of an insur-
gency. It is subsequently used in conjunction with
insurgent activities that are designed to undermine the
established government. The intent is to promote
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Soviet objectives and to expand Moscow's influence
and presence in areas of the Third World, including
those which supply oil and other vital raw materials or
which lie on the access routes to these strategic
resources.
56. Soviet support of revolutionary movements that
employ terrorism is sometimes an effective and cheap
means of fostering instability, thus confronting the
United States with a difficult choice: to aid shaky
authoritarian governments in the difficult problem of
establishing order over the long term, or to accept dis-
order and reduce the American presence. Also, where,
Soviet support of revolutionary movements aids their ?
accession to power, such regimes then provide the
Soviets with platforms and surrogates for beginning or
accelerating the terrorist-revolutionary cycle anew in
neighboring countries.
57. Soviet support for national insurgencies in the
Third World reflects a number of foreign policy aims.
These include:
? Establishment of anti-Western regimes 'sympa-
thetic to Soviet interests.
? Attempts to weaken or undermine governments
that are friendly to the United States, as in El
Salvador and elsewhere in Central America and
the Caribbean.
? Opportunities to acquire potential strategic
advantages, as in southern Africa and the Middle
East.
? The cultivating of ties to "future leaders," such
as Samuel Nujoma of SWAPO.
? The undercutting of competitive Chinese influ-
ence, and the cultivating of pro-Soviet factions of
insurgent movements, as in Soviet support for
ZAPU in Zimbabwe.
? The enhancing of the USSR's diplomatic stature
by supporting the "legitimate revolutionary as-
pirations" of "oppressed peoples," as reflected in
Soviet support for black nationalist insurgents op-
posed to the government of South Africa.
58. The Soviet Union has encouraged a few separat-
ist movements that threaten the stability of regimes
friendly to the United States or hostile to Moscow.
Even the threat of such encouragement provides Mos-
cow with leverage against countries like Yugoslavia
and Pakistan. On occasion, actual assistance may be
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rendered to separatists by Moscow in order to pressure
a regime to conform to Soviet wishes.
59. Soviet support for the PLO, the major separat-
ist-irredentist group receiving Soviet aid, derives from
both regional and international interests. It helps
assure Moscow of continuing diplomatic entree to the
Arab states in the Middle East and to Palestinian
supporters more broadly throughout North Africa. It
provides leverage for Moscow's campaign against the
Camp David accords. It allows the USSR to pose as the
patron of the struggle against Israel, in turn contribut-
ing to the dependence of some radical Arab states on
Soviet military aid and political support. It creates the
potential for undermining US influence among pro-
Western regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan,
that oppose Israeli policies. Indirectly, it may enhance
Moscow's ability to press for a more extensive Soviet
strategic presence in the region in the form of port
facilities, base rights, and military advisers. And it
gives Moscow another dimension in promoting revolu-
tion in Latin America. Given such a range of signifi-
cant advantages stemming from the Palestinian
connection, Soviet leaders appear for the most part to
look the other way with respect to Palestinian terrorist
activities, even some that do not profit Soviet interests.
B. For the United States
60. General US Interests. US policy has tradition-
ally been to encourage evolutionary change and non-
violent processes of reform, together with the free
international movement of persons, goods, and ideas?
looking toward a world markedly different from what
the Soviets prefer. Revolutionary violence and terror-
ism threaten to unleash sudden and dangerous crises,
which endanger the stability of friendly regimes,
preoccupy governments for prolonged periods of time
(as did the Iranian revolution and the subsequent sei
zure of the US Embassy in Tehran), and can lead to
outright regional warfare. Such violence places consid-
erable strain on a number of US allies and friends?
among them Israel, Great Britain, Turkey, Italy, Paki-
stan, Spain, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia.
Some of these governments may be overthrown by
violence, and others may be paralyzed. Or, revolution-
ary violence and terrorism may spread suddenly to
hitherto stable and peaceful countries, as in Uruguay
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, or perhaps Costa
Rica in the 1980s.
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a
a
61. The West continues to be the principal site of
international terrorism. In 1980 more than 30 percent
of all recorded incidents of international terrorism
took place in Western Europe. The symbols of Ameri-
can power and prosperity are by far the most frequent
targets of international terrorism. In 1980 there were
almost 300 attacks on Americans, including 113 in-
cidents involving US diplomats?the largest number of
attacks on diplomats on record. The widespread and
sustained nature of the terrorist threat to US interests is
illustrated by the fact that in 1980 Americans were the
victims of terrorist attacks in 51 countries, most fre-
quently in El Salvador, Turkey, the Philippines, West
Germany, and Colombia. With the notable exception
of Puerto Rico, the territory of the United States still
has been largely spared the ravages of international
terrorist violence."
62. International terrorists choose American targets
for several reasons. American personnel and property
are highly visible and vulnerable to terrorists. Addi-
tionally, most terrorists seek to undermine the existing
political and social order, and the United States is
identified as the world's leading status quo power, the
heart of international capitalism, and the ally or friend
of regimes that terrorists seek to overthrow. American
targets have high symbolic value for "anti-imperial-
ists," and attacks on Americans are particularly
embarrassing to host governments.
63. Terrorism also has a significantly detrimental
effect on private US interests. Because of the inability
of the United States or most governments to provide
adequate protection, US corporations have been
driven to adopting radical expedients to safeguard
their property and personnel." Currently, there are
about 40 private US counterterrorist firms that offer
an impressive panoply of services: electronic perimeter
defenses, information on terrorists, and even
paramilitary operations against terrorists. US-based
" American interests and citizens are not the only targets of inter-
national terrorism. The Soviets themselves have been occasional tar-
gets; 20 of their embassies have been attacked, and Aeroflot, the
Soviet state airline, has been the target of several attacks. In 1980, 41
known attacks were made upon Soviet citizens and installations (not
counting those in Afghanistan). This includes at least 14 Soviet mili-
tary officers assassinated in Syria. Turkey, Iraq, France, Iran, and
Israel were victims of many international terrorist attacks in 1980 as
well.
"In one case, Texas industrialist H. Ross Perot in 1978 organized
and carried out a private commando raid to free a number of his
employees from an Iranian prison.
TS 815753
corporations have reason to be concerned, as they were
forced to pay about $125 million in ransom alone dur-
ing the 1970s, They also incurred property damage
and other costs. Terrorism, moreover, has an inhibiting
effect on the flow of US investment abroad, and its
costs are calculated as part of "overhead" by firms
making investment decisions.
64. In all cases of revolutionary terrorism, impor-
tant resources are drained away to fight the terrorist
threat. And, if violence persists, elements in the af-
fected societies may, out of frustration, be tempted to
seek authoritarian solutions to their "terrorist prob-
lem." With the consequent radicalization of politics,
the way may then be open to the capture of power by
extremists of either left or right. Thus, revolutionary
violence and terrorism have played important roles in
provoking military takeovers in Turkey and Uruguay
and in the recent abortive Spanish coup.
65. The broader phenomenon of revolutionary vio-
lence is a more significant and complex issue for the
United States than its terrorist component per se. The
problem of revolutionary violence lies near the heart
of a general contradiction facing US policy in much of
the Third World: how best to defend US interests and
to support peaceful change where the choices are of-
ten between "friendly" but ineffective regimes and
other parties that might come to dominate tomorrow's
scene but are radical in nature and often hostile to US
interests. The severe instabilities that exist in many
settings are chronic; they will not soon be overcome;
and in many instances they would continue to exist
regardless of the USSR. As it is, however, these in-
stabilities?and the resulting contradictions for US
policy?are made more pronounced by Soviet
exploitation.
66. The problems for the United States are further
complicated in those settings where revolutionary
movements with some popular backing resort to ter-
rorist acts, as occurred, for example, in the case of the
ZANU, a movement led by the present Prime Minister
of Zimbabwe,24 and the Mau Mau in Kenya in the
1950s. In that region, moreover, the United States runs
the risk of antagonizing all of black Africa by appear-
ing to side with South Africa in its opposition to revo-
lutionary violence, thus inadvertently becoming tarred
as a supporter of apartheid.
" In the case of Zimbabwe it proved ironic that the USSR
happened to be backing the unsuccessful, rival revolutionary group
ZAPU.
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67. Revolutionary violence and terrorism are forms
of warfare that fall below the threshold of US conven-
tional and nuclear deterrence. Most governments,
including the US, are unable to deter terrorists. This
inability poses a significant challenge to US credibility
and prestige, and affects US ability to carry out
commitments to endangered friends or allies. The So-
viets are naturally aware of these US dilemmas and
seek to exploit promising revolutionary opportunities
as they arise, generally regardless of whether terrorism
is involved.
68. There is no simple or single solution to these
Problems because of the variety and complexity of cir-
cumstances leading to revolutionary violence and ter-
rorism. In every case, the indicated measures include a
mixture of three approaches: reduction or elimination
of external support, police and/or military action to
combat violence, and the opening of channels for
peaceful change.
69. Regional US Interests. Because of regional
variations in the levels of revolutionary violence and
terrorism, differences in the sources of such violence,
and differences in the degree of Soviet support, threats
to US interests vary considerably by region.
70. The most significant threats are in the Middle
East, where the Soviets are able to take advantage of
radical and conservative Arab nationalism and strong
criticism of US policies with respect to the Palestin-
ians. Terrorists might seriously threaten US interests in
this region by:
? Sabotaging petroleum facilities.
? Undermining conservative Arab governments
and destabilizing Egypt.
? Weakening Israeli security.
71. Latin America. Cuba?now assisted by Nicara-
gua?is in partnership with the USSR in fomenting
guerrilla/terrorist activity in this region, especially in
Central America and the Caribbean. The danger from
the US point of view .is due in part to the proximity of
the violence to the United States itself and to major
friends like Mexico and Venezuela. Revolutionary vio-
lence has been substantially reduced in recent years in
the larger countries of South America. Accordingly,
the key threats to US interests in this region include:
? Overthrowing the government of El Salvador.
? Destabilizing Guatemala, Honduras, and perhaps
Costa Rica.
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? Endangering the security of the Panama Canal.
? Promoting instability in the Caribbean and
installing additional radical regimes like that in
Grenada.
? Weakening democracy in Colombia and perhaps
eventually Venezuela.
? Creating substantial new pressures on Mexico in
the event of a significant expansion of radical
regimes in Central America.
72. Europe. The present military regime in Turkey
has reduced the incidence of revolutionary violence in
that country dramatically since assuming power last
September, although Turkish interests outside the
country are still major targets of Armenian terrorism.
In West Germany, the terrorist threat has been small
in recent years, although several recent attacks on US
installations may signal its revival, and continuing
disturbances by leftists in West Berlin will produce
social strains in that city. Spain may offer the greatest
opportunity for terrorists in the coming months,
largely because democratic institutions in that country
remain fragile and military figures may be tempted
once again to take matters into their own hands if ter-
rorism persists.
73. Africa. Soviet involvement in promoting revo-
lutionary violence in Africa is well documented, and
terrorism is taking place, especially in Namibia and
South Africa. Soviet assistance to the African National
Congress (ANC) and SWAPO continues without sur-
cease, and Cuba, East Germany, and Angola are part-
ners with the Soviet Union in promoting revolutionary
violence.
74. East Asia. The Soviets are assisting Vietnam in
its war of conquest against Cambodia, and support
Vietnamese raids into Thailand. Otherwise, Soviet in-
volvement in assisting revolutionary violence and ter--
rorism in East Asia is relatively small. There is good
evidence that the Soviets do not back the Japanese Red
Army or the Moro National Liberation Front in the
Philippines.
75. Support for International Efforts To Combat
Terrorism. The Soviets have adamantly refused to en-
dorse general legal efforts to combat terrorism, basing
their opposition on the claim that such conventions are
aimed at crippling -national liberation- forces. They
have been willing, however, to participate in legisla-
tion aimed at specific, well-defined acts of terrorism;
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this doubtless reflects a desire not to appear too
obstructionist and a perception that they too are vul-
- -
nerable to certain forms of terrorism.
76. The Soviets are unlikely to modify their refusal
to agree to general international measures condemning
terrorism. There are a number of reasons for this:
? They do not wish to forgo exploiting and creating
revolutionary opportunities.
? They want to avoid the condemnation in interna-
tional forums of friendly countries like Libya.
? They have an interest in supporting Third World
states that believe that US-supported definitions
of international terrorism would hamstring na-
tional insurgencies but exclude the -terrorist"
acts of governments like those of South Africa
and Chile.
77. The USSR has participated in several interna-
tional efforts to control aircraft hijacking and the tak-
ing of hostages: it has signed several conventions aimed
at combating hijacking, as well as a UN convention
concerning the protection of diplomats in 1973. The
Soviets also voted in December 1979 for an interna-
tional convention against the seizure of hostages, but
have not yet ratified it.
79. There is no basis for supposing that the Soviets
could be persuaded to join the West in opposing all
forms of international terrorism, since that position
would conflict with their basic backing of what they
call -national liberation- movements.
TS 8/5753
80. Even a complete withdrawal of Soviet support
would not put an end to international terrorism. Libya
and the extreme Palestinian groups have ample in-
dependent resources. The weapons needed for terrorist
activities are relatively cheap and readily available in
the world. Moreover, in the case of national
insurgencies and separatist movements, at least, the
basic causes of explosive tension would largely remain.
In the important case of Cuba, however, the Soviets
probably have it within their power to limit Cuban
support for terrorism?even though they show no
present signs of wanting to exercise such restraint.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
81. The deep-seated Soviet policy commitment
noted throughout this Estimate is to support -revo-
lutionary forces," including what the Soviets call
"national liberation movements,- by definition seen as
pro-Soviet and anti-US. Terrorism is but one tactic
used by the revolutionaries. Although it may fre-
quently be seen by Soviet leaders to be productive,
they do not support terrorism for its own sake, espe-
cially since Soviet complicity in terrorism could, in
some instances, cause problems for Soviet interests.
Nonetheless, the important considerations the Soviets
will continue to weigh in assessing their attitudes to-
ward the feasibility of support for terrorist activities
are the local conditions in which these activities occur,
the ability to mask Soviet involvement so as to main-
tain plausible denial, and whether the activities will be
effective, productive, and controlled.
82- We believe that these considerations affect the
degree to which the Soviet Union is prepared to in-
volve itself in support of terrorist activities. The higher
the cost in areas otherwise important to Moscow,
particularly where terrorists are not subject to Soviet
discipline and control and where the Soviets lack re-
sources to ensure the success of some of the _dubious
ventures involving terrorism, the more likely Soviet
leaders may be to examine closely the advantages of
given terrorist tactics. In sum, while raising the cost is
unlikely to deter Moscow from pursuit of its basic in-
terests as it sees them, it might in some instances per-
suade Soviet leaders to advise their clients to show
greater restraint in the use of terrorist methods.
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ANNEX A
THE REGIONAL RECORD: SOVIET LINKS TO TERRORISTS
I. MIDDLE EAST
1. The Middle East is a caldron of revolutionary
violence and international terrorism. Terrorism has as-
sumed a number of faces in this region, including
insurgency activity against Morocco, separatism-
irredentism in the cases of the Palestinians and the
Kurds, nihilism in the occasional forays of the Japa-
nese Red Army, and state terrorism by countries like
Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
2. Soviet behavior has a particularly strong impact
on international terrorist activity in the Middle East
because of the USSR's close relations with Libya, a
notorious backer of international terrorism; with South
Yemen, which supports and assists in the training of
members of numerous guerrilla/terrorist groups; and
with various Palestinian groups, which have been in-
volved in some of the most spectacular terrorist oper-
ations of the past decade.
3. The Soviets provide assistance, including training
and weapons support, to states and organizations
which they know conduct or support terrorist activi-
ties. The Soviets themselves do not direct these groups,
however, nor do they encourage specific terrorist oper-
ations. In some cases, they have advised their friends
and allies against the use of such tactics, although they
have acquiesced in their use.
Libya
4. In recent years, the USSR and Libya have devel-
oped a relationship based largely on Libya's ability
and willingness to pay hard currency for the large
quantities of arms it receives from the USSR. While
the ideologies and long-term objectives of the two na-
tions remain incompatible in many respects, they
share a number of goals, such as the undermining of
Egypt's President Sadat and the fostering of certain
radical and anti-Western elements in the Middle East
and Africa. The two nations frequently follow com-
plementary policies in the region.
TS 815753
5. Libya, the region's most active state supporter of
international terrorist groups, had supported terrorist
activities well before the significant improvement in
its relationship with the USSR in the mid-1970s. The
Soviets undoubtedly knew this and knew that some of
the weapons they sold to Qadhafi would be diverted
for terrorist purposes.
6. To our knowledge, the Soviets have not tried to
prevent Qadhafi from supporting terrorist activities.
Qadhafi would probably be unresponsive to any re-
quest that he not transfer their arms to international
terrorist groups, and the Soviets will probably continue
to accept his activities unless such Libyan-backed ter-
rorism provokes counterresponses that could endanger
their investment or interests in Libya and the region.
South Yemen
7. During the 1970s the USSR developed an in-
creasingly close relationship with South Yemen. The
two countries, although frequently differing over tac-
tics, share a commitment to support leftist and dis-
sident groups in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere.
Palestinian Groups
9. The Soviets have long provided political and ma-
terial support to the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), an umbrella organization which represents
many Palestinian groups, including several that engage
in terrorist activities. Several of these groups in turn
provide training and assistance to other groups, both in
the Middle East and elsewhere, that engage in
terrorism.
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10. Fatah, the largest group in the PLO, is headed
by Yasir Arafat, whose policy before 1973 was to en-
gage in terrorism both within Israel and internation-
ally. Since then, he has largely dissociated Fatah from
terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories.I
11. The Soviets have defended the right of the Pal-
estinians to conduct military operations within the ter-
ritory occupied by Israel since 1967, and they have
refused to criticize such operations publicly or to con-
demn publicly terrorist actions within Israel proper.
I Since then, however, the PFLP has been relatively
inactive, both within Israel and in international terror-
ism. This probably reflects the lack of an effective
operational leader rather than a policy shift, as
Habbash's health has been poor and Wadi Haddad,
leader of a PFLP splinter group which conducted ter-
rorist operations, died in March 1978.
15. In late 1978, Habbash visited the USSR for the
first time in five years; since then the Soviets have
increased their material support for his organization.
In return, the Soviets may be using the PFLP to main-
tain liaison with a number of revolutionary and sepa-
ratist groups.
- 16. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP) is used by the USSR in an intel-
ligence support capacity. It is the Marxist-Leninist
organization with the closest political and ideological
ties to the USSR of any Palestinian group. The DFLP
claims to oppose international terrorism, but tried to
conduct terrorist operations in Israel as recently as
March 1981.
12. The Soviets and East Europeans have trained
Fatah members and provided the organization with
arms. Fatah in return has acted as a surrogate for the
Soviets on various occasions, providing training and
assistance to other groups at Soviet behest.
Fatah has been training Central
American revolutionaries since at least 1979.
14. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine (PFLP) has been the most active Palestinian
group in international terrorism.
TS 815753
17. Saiqa is a Palestinian group controlled by Syria,
which supplies the group's arms and training and most
of its commanders. Members of Saiqa have been
trained in the USSR, presumably under Syrian spon-
sorship. In 1973, a Saiqa team hijacked a train carry-
ing Soviet Jewish emigres in an effort to close down -
Austrian emigre-processing camps: the terrorists
brought weapons into Czechoslovakia and boarded the
train in Bratislava, commandeering the train when it
passed into Austria; one of the Saiqa members had
been trained in the Soviet Union. Another Soviet-
trained Saiqa member was arrested in 1975 in Amr
sterdam, where he and others allegedly also planned to
hijack a train. Saiqa has also carried out attacks against
Egyptian and Turkish interests, and most recently may
have been involved in the kidnaping of a Jordanian
diplomat. In Saiqa's involvement in this kidnaping, the
group was acting at the behest of the Syrians and not
as a Palestinian group promoting Palestinian aims.
II. LATIN AMERICA
18. Revolutionary violence has erupted with par-
ticular force in Central America, mostly initiated by
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a
insurgency movements. These movements, as in El
Salvador, commonly resort to terrorism. Less signifi-
cant revolutionary violence has taken place recently in
South America, with Colombia a particular target of
insurgents who practice terrorism. Several Caribbean
nations are also potential targets for revolutionary
violence.
19. The Soviets have relied heavily on Cuba to ad-
vance their common objectives in Latin America. Re-
cently, the Soviets have become more directly in-
volved, providing both logistic support through
Nicaragua and propaganda support for armed revolu-
tion in El Salvador and Guatemala.
20. Cuba's support and encouragement of a wide
variety of guerrilla/terrorist groups are well docu-
mented and take the form of training, arms,
safehaven, and advice; Cuban support for groups that
it knows engage in terrorist operations is clear.'5
21. In 1979 the Soviets themselves became active
advocates of armed revolution as a means for leftist
forces to gain power in Latin America. They were
impressed by the victory in Nicaragua of the Cuban-
supported Sandinistas, whom they themselves had pre-
viously done little to assist, and they began to Welieve
that similar tactics might work elsewhere. They there-
fore began to shift from their position that the most
profitable revolutionary course lay with the traditional
Communist parties operating independently, and to
assert that the best course was cooperation with
political/military fronts such as the Sandinistas. This
led the Soviets privately to urge various Communist
parties (including those of El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic)
to establish military apparats, to prepare for armed
struggle, and to join with other leftist forces that were
already engaged in guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
22. Thus, Moscow's attention has been focused on
Central America, where it believes the greatest op-
portunities for successful revolution lie.
" Beginning in 1979, there was mounting evidence of Cuban sup-
port to such guerrilla/terrorist groups as the Chilean MIR, the Ar-
gentine Montoneros, and the Colombian M-19
However, the
clearest cases are Cuban support to guerrilla/terrorist groups in El
Salvador and Guatemala.
TS 815753
24. In urging the Communist parties to join
fied groups in both El Salvador and Guatemala, the
Soviets undoubtedly are aware that these groups use
terrorism as a basic tool for fund raising, political
intimidation, and direct elimination of the opposition.
The most significant member groups of the DRU have
long employed such tactics as kidnapings, assassina-
tions, and holding diplomatic installations and per-
sonnel hostage.
the uni-
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They agreed to begin setting the stage for possible
armed struggle in the Dominican Republic.
III. WESTERN EUROPE
26. Revolutionary violence in Western Europe has
largely assumed the form of separatist-irredentist and
nihilistic terrorism. As in other areas of the world, the
Soviets and their allies have been prepared to make
use of separatist dissatisfaction in countries of impor-
tance to them in order to provide them greater lever-
age against those governments. Thus, certain of the
Palestinians have contacts with the Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), an anti-
Turkish and anti-American group. Bulgaria has appar-
ently smuggled arms into Turkey on a large scale.
27. There have been widespread suspicions that the
USSR and other members of the East Bloc have aided
nihilistic terrorists in Western Europe, such as the Red
Brigades in Italy. And it is possible that some West
European nihilists have at times received indirect
Soviet support in the form of transit and safehaven in
Eastern Europe. However, there is little if any indica-
tion of direct Soviet or East European support for
nihilistic terrorists.
Italy (Red Brigades)
28. Charges of Soviet or Bloc support for Italian ter-
rorism have been frequent during the past nine years.
TS 8/5753
\ A Czechoslovak Skorpion
(submachinegun) was used in Moro's murder, but it is
not known how the weapon was acquired. Certain Pal-
estinians appear to have provided the Red Brigades
with a variety of weapons, including explosives,
handgrenades, and heavy machineguns.
30. BR members have been among the terrorists
trained in South Yemen, but allegations that they re-
ceived terrorist training at camps in Czechoslovakia
have not been substantiated.
Turkey
31. There is good evidence that the Soviets have
supported Turkish leftist groups directly, and terrorist
organizations may also have benefited from this aid.
Soviet assistance seems to have been primarily di-
rected to the Revolutionary Youth Union (Dev Genc),
a legal political group which in turn harbors two ter-
rorist organizations, Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) and
Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left).
32. In May 1980 a Soviet assistant army attache in
possession of a large number of Dev Yol posters was
arrested by Turkish authorities.
ur is oreign Min-
ister recently informed the US Secretary of State that
Turkey cannot confirm a direct Soviet role in foment-
ing Turkish terrorism.
33. There is large-scale smuggling of arms from
Bulgaria into Turkey, where the weapons reach var-
ious extremist and terrorist groups. Bulgaria's govern-
ment-run arms company, KINTEX, purchases West-
ern-made weapons and delivers them into Turkey.
Armenian Groups
34. The Soviets historically have tried to stay close
to emigre groups that represent their own national
minorities. They have had contacts with and have as-
sisted a number of Armenian parties and groups in
Lebanon, as well as in Europe.
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35. ASALA currently is the most active of all inter-
national terrorist groups. ASALA has attacked Turkish
diplomats and installations abroad and, since late
1979, has also embarked on a campaign against various
US and West European targets. ASALA's operations
are all highly professional, and few ASALA terrorists
have been captured.
36. In the past year, there have been reports that
Fatah, the PFLP, and other Palestinian groups support
ASALA.
West Germany (Baader-Meinhof)
37. The Baader-Meinhof/Red Army group repre-
sents a kind of terrorist adventuring that the Soviets
have criticized severely, both publicly and privately.
The gang has had extensive contacts with other West
European terrorist groups and with Middle Eastern
groups. Some Red Army members were trained in
South Yemen in the mid-1970s, and it is possibly that
they had contact with Soviet advisers there. Also, some
members may have used East Germany and Bulgaria
as escape routes.
United Kingdom
38. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
received brief Soviet propaganda support in 1971, and
the Czechoslovaks may have provided it with arms in
the same year. But two years later the group was de-
scribed by the KGB as a -criminal terrorist- organiza-
tion, and there are currently no direct Soviet contacts
with it.
Spain
39. ?The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
organization occasionally carries out international ter-
rorist attacks, although it prefers to target Spanish
security and government officials. Knowledgeable of-
ficials
have claimed that ETA
extremists may maintain indirect?but not direct?
contacts with the Soviets. Algeria, South Yemen, and
several Palestinian groups have trained ETA members.
TS 8/5753
The Curiel Apparat
40. Henri Curiel, assassinated in Paris in 1978,
formed his European-based clandestine Apparat
which has provided support to a wide variety of Third
World leftist revolutionary organizations. This support
has included false documents, financial aid, and
safehaven before and after operations, as well as some
illegal training in France in weapons and explosives.
The Apparat grew out of Curies involvement in
supporting the FLN (National Liberation Front) dur-
ing the war in Algeria. The Apparat has seldom, if
ever, functioned as a principal in terrorist operations;
its association with non-Communist and nonviolent
leaders, including clergymen, has tended to cloak the
nature and extent of its operations. The Apparat has
been less active since the death of Curiel, but it contin-
ues to function.
41.
Curiel was a founder of the Egyptian and Sudanese
Communist parties in the 1940s. Until his expulsion
from Egypt in 1950, he operated a bookstore which
was the only outlet for Soviet literature and propa-
ganda in that country. He also was a first cousin of
George Blake, the British intelligence officer who
worked for the KGB; sentenced for espionage, Blake
escaped in 1966 and now lives in Moscow.
42. During his years in Paris, Curiel was in contact
with the World Peace Council, the largest and most
active of the Soviet front organizations. Curiel's for-
mer deputy, Joyce Blau, one of the leaders of the
Apparat, stated that she attended a training course in
the USSR in 1966. One source with contacts to the
Apparat claimed in 1964 that he had been told by an
Apparat member that the organization received exten-
sive funding from Moscow in support of revolutionary
movements, and Ernest Mandel, head of the Trotsky-
ite Fourth International, stated in 1976 that Curiel
worked for the Soviets.
43. There is substantial controversy about whether
this information constitutes evidence of a Soviet link to
the Apparat. There could be several reasons for the
Soviets to maintain links to the Apparat or to try to
penetrate it. It provides a mechanism for supporting
potentially significant Third World revolutionary
groups without the need for direct commitment or
possible embarrassment. The Apparat is accepted by
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the entire spectrum of the extraparliamentary left, and
it is able to monitor the politics and activities of var-
ious leftist movements?to assess their effectiveness
and potential.
Carlos
44. Few international terrorists have been the sub-
ject of as much attention and speculation as Ilich
Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos), educated at Moscow's
Patrice Lumumba University in 1969-70. His exploits,
including his participation in the kidnaping of the
OPEC oil ministers in Vienna in 1976, have made him
notorious. Security services are so sensitive to his repu-
tation that simultaneous sightings of him in foreign
capitals have been reported frequently.
45. Carlos first surfaced publicly following his mur-
der of two French officers and an Arab informer in
Paris in 1975. A French investigation of that incident
resulted in the expulsion of several Cuban intelligence
officers from France, suggesting that he may have had
some contacts with them. There has been no subse-
quent indication of any Cuban connection.
46. After the Paris killings, Carlos sought sponsor-
ship by radical Arab states. He cooperated with Pal-
estinian terrorist leader Haddad as well as with the
Iraqis and Libyans.
47. While Carlos's connections with European and
Middle Eastern terrorists are uncontestable, his rela-
tionship with Soviet and East European services is
obscure.
IV. AFRICA
48. Africa is currently the site of a number of major
insurgency movements that resort to terrorism, includ-
ing those being waged in South Africa, Namibia, and
Angola. It is also the scene of separatist violence in
Ethiopia.
TS 815753
49. The Soviets have long been enthusiastic
supporters of revolutionary violence in Africa, and
have provided considerable equipment to insurgents
who have engaged in terrorism. On occasion, the So-
viets have privately criticized the efficacy of such ter-
rorist tactics, and they have tried to foster more
conventional paramilitary operations. Despite these
criticisms, the Soviets have not withdrawn their sup-
port from these groups.
Zimbabwe
50. During the late 1970s, the Soviets, East Europe-
ans, and Cubans greatly increased their direct assist-
ance to Joshua Nkomo's outlawed ZAPU (Zimbabwe
African People's Union). Soviet assistance included
training and advice as well as large quantities of arms,
usually delivered through Angola and Zambia. ZAPU,
while engaging primarily in guerrilla activities, also
committed a number of terrorist attacks within
Rhodesia, including the shooting down of two Vis-
count passenger planes with SA-7 missiles.
51. Beginning in 1977, the Soviets sought to in-
crease their influence in the Rhodesian situation by
transforming ZAPU into a conventional military force.
This decision was followed by deliveries of large quan-
tities of conventional heavy equipment to ZAPU and
by training in its use. The Soviets tried without success
to persuade ZAPU to target specific military and eco-
nomic objectives within the country, and were scath-
ing in their criticism of the organization's continuing
propensity to attack "soft" targets as being politically
counterproductive and militarily ineffective.
South Africa
52. African National Congress (ANC). The So-
viets have long supported the ANC, a mostly black
political/military movement dedicated to the over- -
throw of the South African Government. The ANC has
emerged as the most effective force among those fight-
ing against the South African regime, and it is sup-
ported by most members of the Organization of Af-
rican Unity (OAU), some West European countries,
and a number of public and private organizations.
53. In the face of South Africa's overwhelming
military superiority, the ANC has been able to mount
only infrequent hit-and-run raids, using a handful of
men in cross-border operations. The ANC has claimed
credit for about half the paramilitary and terrorist op-
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erations inside South Africa since 1975. It has set off a
series of bombs at several facilities belonging to the
South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation, and it
took a number of hostages during an abortive attempt
to rob a Pretoria bank in January 1980.
54. The ANC leadership has close ties with the out-
lawed, pro-Soviet South African Communist Party
(SACP). The Soviets are the major external source of
military assistance to the ANC, which also receives
funds from the Liberation Committee of the OAU.
Students from the group have gone to the USSR, and
ANC recruits have received military training in the
USSR, East Germany, Cuba, Angola, and possibly
Libya.
55. There have been numerous meetings between
Oliver Tambo, the current ANC leader, and Soviet
officials; in 1977, Tambo met with then Soviet Presi-
dent Podgorny and reportedly obtained promises of
increased military training and weaponry. Tambo has
claimed that his organization and the Soviets are
agreed on future strategy inside South Africa?that
they must begin to engage in "urban guerrilla war-
fare." ANC terrorists captured in South Africa report-
edly told South African security police that they had
been trained in "urban guerrilla warfare" in the USSR
and that the future targets were to be schools,
churches, and public establishments associated with
the Afrikaner population.
56. South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO). Since 1975, the Soviet Union has been the
principal military supporter of SWAPO. The Soviets,
with Angola's active cooperation, have provided
SWAPO with almost all of its military equipment.
SWAPO troops based in Angola have used this equip-
ment in their guerrilla raids into northern Namibia,
where operations are aimed at undermining the gov-
ernment's authority and its ability to maintain secu-
rity. SWAPO terrorist operations have included the
kidnaping as well as the killing of Namibians who co-
operate with territorial authorities.
57. Cuba and East Germany also provide valuable
support for SWAPO. Assisted by Angolan authorities,
the Cubans?and to a lesser extent the East Ger-
mans?distribute Soviet military equipment to guer-
rilla facilities and forces in Angola. Cuban advisers
provide substantial training to SWAPO cadres and
help in developing guerrilla tactics, and may assist in
planning cross-border operations into northern Namibia.
TS 8/5753
V. EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
58. The Soviets were major supporters of revolu-
tionary violence during the Vietnam war. Despite the
end of that war, revolutionary violence has continued
to plague Asia, largely in the form of insurgency and
separatist movements. Asia has also spawned a number
of nihilists like the members of the Japanese Red
Army. The principal focus of Soviet military assistance
in this region has been Indochina, where the USSR
supports Vietnam's efforts to suppress opposition to the
regime installed by Vietnam in Cambodia.
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
59. The JRA is a nihilistic group which is responsi-
ble for some of the most vicious terrorist incidents on
record. Although originally formed in Japan, the JRA
became associated with the PFLP in the early 1970s.
Most of its members are now based in the Middle East.
PFLP and JRA members have carried out combined
operations in the past, and periodically there are
reports that the JRA is again preparing for joint or
unilateral actions. The group has not carried out an
operation since 1977, but it retains connections with
support groups in Japan. Group leaders have recently
indicated interest in renewing activities in Japan.
60. In the early 1970s the KGB labeled the JRA
criminal terrorist organization,
The Philippines and Thailand
61. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is
a Muslim organization seeking independence for part
of the southern Philippines. While Libya has given
small arms to the group in the past, the level of this
assistance has declined over the past four years. Libya
has also trained members of the other Muslim insur-
gency in the Pacific area, the Pattani United Liber-
ation Organization based in southern Thailand.
Pakistan
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1UP StC.Nt I
63. The Soviets apparently approve of general PLA
activities, although they probably did not have
advance knowledge of the 2 March hijacking. Once
the plane was on the ground in Kabul, the Soviets tried
to exploit the incident to force Pakistan to deal with
the Soviet-dominated Kabul regime. There is evidence
that the Afghan regime aided the hijackers by allow-
ing them to rearm. It is not clear whether it provided
the hijackers with weapons or permitted them access
to weapons already in the plane's hold. It is unlikely
that the Kabul regime could have aided the hijackers
without Soviet knowledge and approval. The Soviets
helped arrange the plane's departure to Syria, and sub-
sequently some of the hijackers returned to Kabul.
a
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I LW Jtt..11t I
ANNEX B
TRAINING CAMPS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
I. THE USSR
1. A substantial body of evidence
indicates that the Soviet Union
has been training a diverse array of Third World revo-
lutionaries?largely from Africa, Latin America, and
the Middle East?at facilities in the USSR since at
least the mid-1960s.
2. The Soviet General Staff, through its Chief Intel-
ligence Directorate (GRU) and its 10th Directorate (for
foreign military assistance), is the executive body
responsible for most of the military and paramilitary
training. The International Department of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union has a coordinating and, in many cases, an or-
ganizing and management role in this activity. The
KGB also conducts some paramilitary training, but on
a relatively limited scale.
3. The type of instruction given to Third World
nationals varies, depending apparently on the cir-
cumstances and needs of the particular group being
trained
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II. EASTERN EUROPE
6. Available intelligence reporting on training cen-
ters in Eastern Europe has been limited and of ques-
tionable reliability. Likewise, open press sources are
not readily verifiable and frequently have been based
on secondhand information or rumor. No reliable re-
port indicates terrorist training as such in Eastern
Europe."
" Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Mr Force. They believe that this statement
underestimates both the range and quality of our reporting on
terrorist training camps in Eastern Europe.
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Their reliability varies, but taken together they lead
these agencies to believe that the East Europeans have long been
involved in training members of West European terrorist groups.
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7. We do not discount the possibility that Third
World nationals are being trained at East European
sites in paramilitary techniques. Our reporting on this
score, however, is frequently circumstantial and
attributable to secondary sources at best. In strong con-
trast to reporting on military and paramilitary training
sites in the USSR, it lacks convincing detail. Following
are examples of the sorts of reports that are currently
available:
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