DO WE WANT GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 4, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
Fritz - this is a very thoughtful
response of the kind intended by
my question - which clearly does not
have a yes-no answer. I suppose
the problem is in the definition
of "succeed" - we know our definition
but are not so sure of G's.
I may want to share this later with
the V.P.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
STA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (OptiOnal)
Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?
FROM:
Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
EXTENSION
NO.
NIC #03256-88
DATE
4 November 1988
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
Executive Registry
0 4 NOV
1988 .
\)\.\P--
2.
3.
(i DDC 1
1lu5.)
6
IN
4.
Cra
5.
(?1/ DCI
00-4 .
"/ 7
ktve
s. InAA,1-14,Atit4?
itia-if alit.s E q 'EL
K:0,;(4). tNOR-44?4,,,
7.
Ai AVVI, LA.4..::444A? ....
8.
Wks:4A> C414
dot
_,
9.
4 (5),N-
b
1147rN
w avn
'1A4r4 04/?Eriirtn.0 ii)
,c 1......1,1,4mA-lk,q,141.6640.
10.
45::
a
sita.1_,A4., 4.
? un.
- Fritz W. Ermarth
C/NIC 7E47 HQS
V.A0441Rd (rIA.11... dotawmANSIn. QM-.
041.)`.. -Krt. se Sigu.,
1 2.
1
13.
lt? /Ia.; .14-Aeca baS%
ttI 9.
14.
-
15.
EXE
RE
CI
-
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
SylE T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
S ET
The Director of Central Intelligence
WashinemDC.20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Di rector of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?
NIC #03256-88
4 November 1988
At the off-site, you asked whether we want Gorbachev to succeed. I
wasn't quite satisfied with my response and the ensuing discussion, so I'd
like to try again in this memo.
I cannot improve on Bob Gates' formulation: If success means a more
effective version of the Soviet system as we know it historically and
currently, the answer is "NO." We would face an intensified security
challenge because of improved Soviet tactics in the international sphere and
a strengthened Soviet economy; while under a revived system of one-party
rule, the Soviet citizen would enjoy no guaranteed expansion of human and
political rights, whatever the transient pleasures of glasnost.
On the other hand, if success means irreversible trends toward a more
liberal, tolerant, decentralized, and open society--undoing many features of
Russian-Soviet poli ti cal culture we discussed then the answer
is "YES." As Westerners, we are inclined to believe that any reform which
makes the USSR more efficient and productive must, per force, make it freer.
The trouble and promise of the Gorbachev reform effort--for us as well
as many Soviets who share our values--is that it harbors both possibilities,
as well as possibilities for failure that bring out the very worst in the
Russi an-Soviet poli ti cal tradi ti on. Grim possi bi li ti es include a
conservative reaction that could, in the extreme, be violent and
repressive. Intelligent Soviets do not rule this out, and neither should
we. Were we observing the lively politics and vibrant cultural life of the
USSR in the 1920s, we would have found it hard to imagine a return even to
the relatively mild autocracy of the tsarist era, not to mention the
megadeath brutality of Stalinism.
Cl By Signer
Decl OADR
Derived fm Multiple
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
SECRET
The possibilities of failure also include that of violent social
revolution in which the nationalities as well as the haves and have-nots in
the society go after each other. Such upheavals usually destroy first those
fragile few who believe in law, tolerance, and the protection of the
individual from the state. Social revolution seems much more likely to
produce a new brand of autocracy than a more liberal, law-governed state.
Moreover, a replay of the Russian Revolution and Civil War in the nuclear
era could be dangerous.
Our task as intelligence officers is to track as best we can the trends
which are shaping the unfolding possibilities. Many conflicting trends are
at work at the same time. To track them, we must pay more attention to what
leaders and audible spokesmen are saying, but also as best we can to what
largely silent, fearful, and resentful masses of the population are
thinking. This is not easy for the Soviet leadership; it's even harder for
us. But neither the Kremlin nor the CIA can afford to be surprised on this
front. To succeed at this, we must be exceptionally efficient in exploiting
the outpouring of published information under glasnost.
A second task--the one I stressed in my remarks is managerially
easier, but politically and intellectually challenging enough: that is, to
keep visible events in the USSR in a historical and cultural perspective for
our customers, to highlight the significance of the new and different while
constantly reminding of the deep cultural obstacles to orderly
liberalization. So far, I think we've fulfilled this second task pretty
well because of the expertise and professionalism of the Soviet-watchers in
our intelligence community. Having somewhat underestimated the pace at
which Gorbachev, for his own power-political reasons, would radicalize the
political agenda is a less grave sin than prematurely assuming that the
reform process is already on the high road to success.
This, then, leaves the policy question of how the United States should
try to influence the form of and prospects for "success" of the Gorbachev
reform era. I'll offer my personal view.
First, our main legitimate preoccupation should be to exploit the
outreach of Soviet policy for our own security interests, remaining wary
that the long-term effects of various deals could run against our interests,
e.g., promoting "denuclearization" of Western Europe. Our biggest problem
will be maintaining the integrity of the structures that keep the peace,
such as NATO, the nuclear deterrent, our worldwide military capability, in
the face of a seductive and soporific Soviet diplomacy. These structures
cannot be rebuilt as fast as Moscow could revert to "old thinking" and
threatening ways.
Second, we have to realize that our ability to influence Soviet internal
evolution is marginal, but not zero. The political, moral, economic, and
military health of the West is itself a powerful stimulus to liberalizing
2
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
SECRET
reform in the USSR, as it has been for Russia over several centuries. The
Russians envy and fear us, as Kennan once said, for what we are, not for
what we do. But the envy and fear are accompanied by a desire to emulate
which is, on balance, healthy. The West must remain something to be
emulated because it cannot be overcome.
Third, we must emphasize those interactions which promote the
liberalizing of the society, not the strengthening of the Soviet state. For
this reason, our own programs for creating subterranean tunnels to get
Western information and ideas into the USSR are, if anything, more important
in the era of glasnost than ever. They put pressure on the system in the
right direction. They also prepare for the all-too-probable day when the
conservative reaction sets in and our modest programs become, once again,
the main bearers of glasnost in the USSR. Striking the right balance in our
official and overt policies on behalf of freedom in the USSR is not easy.
For example, bargaining with the Soviet government about freer dissemination
of Western publications is a worthy effort, but it risks our admission that
control of the press is a legitimate government function. Or take the
example of the Moscow human rights conference: Some would expect that the
West's acceptance of this idea would spur Moscow to new steps, such as
releasing all political prisoners and formally abolishing politically
repressive laws. But others fear that such a conference would put the stamp
of Western acceptance on a system still far less free than Pinochet's Chile
or Greece under the colonels.
Finally, the question of economic support. Odom's admonition to applaud
but not finance perestroika is sound to a first approximation. But we need
not be too dogmatic about how this works out in practice. I can imagine
circumstances in which the progress of political and economic reforms has
reached the point where, assuming we ourselves can afford it, we might well
consider programs to help improve the lot of the Soviet consumer. We have
to gauge very carefully the difference between help that spurs reform and
liberalization, on the one hand, and measures that help the regime avoid
reform and preserve resource allocation patterns threatening to us, on the
other. Here again intelligence analysis of Soviet internal, military, and
foreign policy developments will be critical; and our policy problem in
practice is likely to be, not whether we should help Gorbachev, but whether
we should try to stop others from doing so. Over the decades, the USSR has
received a lot of help from the West, as Imperial Russia did before it.
Hoover's famine relief in the 1920s saved many lives and helped to
consolidate Soviet power. Lend-lease helped defeat Hitler and bring Soviet
power to the heart of Europe. Western capital and technology transferred to
the USSR in the 1930s helped to build the Stalinist economic order, and in
the 1950s to restore it after the war. This ambiguous history is something
that we should not forget.
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
SECRET
To understand and remember the lessons of history is, perhaps, the
bottom line. Those lessons do not condemn us to ?a stingy, closed-minded
reaction to Gorbachev. They allow us to respond positively while keeping
our powder dry. Striking this balance will test our intelligence and
maturity as severely and more subtly than all the challenges of the Cold War
so far.
4
SECRET
Fri W. Ermarth
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2
SECRET
NIC #03256-88
4 November 1988
SUBJECT: Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?
DCl/C/NIC:FWErmarth:bha(4Nov88)
Di stri buti on:
DCI
DDCI
SA/DCI
ER
ExDi r
D/PAO
DDO
DDI
D/SOVA
D/EURA
C/SE/DO
VC/NIC
NIO/USSR
NIO/ECON
25X1
(PPS) 25X1
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/08: CIA-RDP90T00435R000100110008-2