THE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
onfidentla
:6-440 gal
The Transportation Network
in Southern Africa
A Research Paper
NOT MICROFILMED
Per Deb Entry
?C-onfidential?
ALA 85-10027
March 1985
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Transportation Network
in Southern Africa
A Research Paper
This research paper is based on a studY
sponsored by
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, Africa
Division, ALA
Confidential
ALA 85-10027
March 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 12 February 1985
was used in this report.
The Transportation Network
in Southern Africa
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The transportation network in southern Africa could function as a single
system with rail lines, roads, and ports integrally linked. In practice,
however, key transport corridors to the east and west coasts are disrupted
by insurgency or are otherwise unreliable, preventing the network from
operating as an integrated whole. As a result, much of the region's trade
moves along the "Southern Route" of north-south rail lines running from
the Zairian Copper Belt to South African ports.
The transportation dependence of the black states of the region also
includes their use of South African equipment. South African freight cars
are used in nearly all of the black states, as are South African locomotives
in several. states. An equipment recall by Pretoria would, in our view,
strangle the economies of the landlocked states.
We believe that Pretoria's transportation dominance reflects both natural
advantages and deliberate policy. South Africa has seven of the 14 major
ports in the region, and they, and the rail and road lines that serve them,
are more developed and better run than any of the others. In our view, Pre-
toria allows other states to use its transportation system and to lease its
equipment for several purposes: to earn foreign exchange, to perpetuate
black African dependence, and to enhance its ability to use transportation
leverage for broader political and military purposes.
Nine of the black states in the region 'formed the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to overcome this
stranglehold by Pretoria and to promote their economic development. The
SADCC plans no major new links because much of the region already has
excess transportation capacity. Instead, the group aims to reopen lines that
could divert traffic from the "Southern Route" through South Africa and
to rehabilitate and upgrade the existing transportation infrastructure.
In our view, the short-term prospects for implementing this strategy are
gloomy. The insurgencies in Mozambique and Angola would have to end,
and massive investment in equipment and training of personnel would be
required. The SADCC has had difficulty raising transportation develop-
ment funds, and the transportation systems of several of the member
states?particularly the coastal ones?have deteriorated further since
initial cost estimates were made.
' Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe 25X1
111
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ALA 85-10027
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We believe that the longer term prospects for the SADCC's transportation
independence are also poor. While it might be possible for the black states
eventually to develop a transportation system independent of South Africa,
we doubt that the SADCC will ever do so because most of the black states
would be unwilling to forgo the economic benefits of trading with South
Africa.
Even if the insurgencies in Mozambique and Angola end, which would
open vital east-west routes, we believe that South Africa would still
maintain considerable leverage over the transport and more general
economic options available to the black states. Although their economic
vulnerability would decline, we believe some measure of dependence would
continue, as now, in inverse proportion to their distance from South Africa.
In our judgment, the virtual stranglehold that Pretoria has over the
transportation network in southern Africa limits both the choices available
to the black states and US policy options for promoting peaceful change
and stability. Even so, we believe that US support for SADCC transporta-
tion projects?such as rehabilitating neglected national rail, road, and
harbor facilities as well as links between SADCC member states?would
not only contribute directly to the black states' development but also,
ironically, indirectly foster increased SADCC trade with South Africa.
This, in turn, would create greater economic interdependence between
Pretoria and the black states, possibly reducing hostility in the region.
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Contents
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Page
Key Judgments
111
Scope Note
Introduction
1
Major Components of the Network
1
Railroads
1
Highways
2
Coastal Ports
2
Inland Waterways
4
Pipelines
4
The Role of Each State
5
South Africa
5
East Coast States
8
West Coast States
9
Landlocked States
11
The Feasibility of a System Independent of South Africa
13
Prospects
14
Implications for the United States
15
Appendixes
A. Ports and Route Choices (by Country)
17
B. Trade Relations With South Africa
21
C. Zambian Copper Shipments
23
D. Financial Progress of the SATCC
25
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Figure 1
Major Transportation Links in Southern Africa
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South
Atlantic
Ocean
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Saldanha
Cape Townkr-L\_z__,
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East London
Port Elizabeth
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Major port
The "Southern Route"
Railroad
Major road link
Road
Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC)
500 Kilometers
500 Miles
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The Transportation Network
in Southern Africa
Introduction
The transportation network in southern Africa poten-
tially could function as a single, integrated system
extending from the Zairian port of Matadi on the
west coast and the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam
on the east coast to the ports of South Africa (figure
1). The linchpin of a unified regional transport system
interlinking roads, ports, and other components would
be the rail lines. Because these lines are almost all the
same gauge, rolling stock would be interchangeable so
that any rail line that is short of locomotives or freight
cars could lease the needed equipment from neighbor-
ing lines. In theory, therefore, a variety of routing
options would be possible, with Angolan, Mozambi-
can, and Tanzanian ports handling traffic for several
countries.
In practice, of course, this has not occurred. On the
east coast, the Mozambican ports of Nacala and
Beira usually are isolated by insurgent activity, and
the rail line from Zimbabwe to Maputo is essentially
closed for the same reason. On the west coast, the
Benguela railroad is disrupted and the Angolan port
of Lobito inaccessible because of insurgency. Trans-
portation lines to Matadi and Dar es Salaam are
inefficient and unreliable because they lack the neces-
sary equipment and skilled personnel to handle traffic
effectively and safely. As a result, much of the
region's trade moves along the "Southern Route" of
rail lines running from the Zairian Copper Belt to
South African ports.
This paper examines the transportation network of
southern Africa in terms of its major functional
components and the facilities in each state. It assesses
the extent to which the network constitutes an inte-
grated system, the degree to which that system is
dependent on South Africa, the feasibility of the goal
of the black states to develop a system independent of
South Africa, prospects for change and for future
problems, and the implications for the United States.
1
Major Components of the Network
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The surface transportation network in southern Afri-
ca consists of five major components: railroads, high-
ways, coastal ports, inland waterways, and pipelines.
For each category, the efficiency, reliability, and level
of development is higher in South Africa than in any
of the black-ruled states.
Railroads
The railroads are the transportation lifelines of the
region, but all of the region's railroads outside of
South Africa face serious problems, including:
? Impassable routes because of insurgency.
? Track in disrepair because of either war, poor
maintenance, or poor design.
? Short trains?often less than 30 cars in length?
necessitated by poor track design, including steep
grades and short turning radii.
? Lack of skilled labor.
? Lack of spare parts.
? Poor communications and signaling.
? Freight car shortages, particularly for handling
petroleum, chemicals, containers, and refrigerated
cargo.
? Lack of working locomotives.
? Theft.
These problems tend to increase the dependence of the
black states on South Africa. Although the "Southern
Route" is usually more expensive than potential alter-
natives, it is often the only one that functions. Even
when alternatives exist, the "Southern Route" is more
reliable and efficient, a critical consideration for
imports such as fertilizer that must be delivered at
specific times. In addition, South African freight cars
are used extensively throughout the region, and loco-
motives have been leased by various black states from
the South African Transport Services (SATS), a state-
run enterprise.
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Several states face serious backhaul problems because
they tend to import more than they export and
because they use one port for exports and another for
imports. Zambia, for example, prefers to export most
of its copper through Dar es Salaam. The freight cars
that carry Zambian copper often return to the Copper
Belt empty, however, because Lusaka prefers to get
most of its vital imports either from or through South
Africa. Lusaka views Dar es Salaam as too unreliable
to handle imports that must be purchased with pre-
cious foreign exchange. As a result, Zambia must
export about 10,000 metric tons of copper per month
via the "Southern Route" to limit the cost of sending
empty freight cars to South Africa, even though
shorter alternative routes exist.
The South African railway system suffers from few of
the ills of its neighbors: it is highly efficient, the track
is well maintained, and there are few if any shortages
of freight cars, locomotives, or spare parts. The South
Africans continue to upgrade their system with exten-
sive electrification, double tracking, siding extension,
and the move to air brakes, which allows for trains of
up to 200 cars in length.
Highways
Roads supplement the rail system throughout the
region and are used primarily for transporting agri-
cultural products and local commerce, although the
Tanzam Highway and to a lesser degree the Botzam
Highway are major carriers of international traffic.
Zambia's Great East Road from Lusaka to Chipata
has become an important carrier of Malawian imports
and exports because of the effective closure of Beira
and Nacala.
Maintenance of roads varies from state to state. Most
major roads in Zambia and Zimbabwe are passable in
all seasons, for example, and speeds in excess of 100
kilometers (over 60 miles) per hour are easily attain-
able. In Tanzania, on the other hand, all major roads,
except the Tanzam Highway, are so poorly main-
tained that they are nearly impassable even in the dry
season from June to August.
In addition to poor maintenance, highway traffic is
hindered by roads often stressed beyond design stan-
dards by overloaded trucks in violation of seldom
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enforced weight limits. Consequently, vehicles and
roads are subjected to excessive wear and tear. Spare
parts, particularly tires, are difficult to obtain, and
fuel is expensive when available.
Nonetheless, road transport is growing in use, often at
the expense of railroads. Road transport allows more
flexibility in scheduling and route choice and in some
states, such as Malawi and Mozambique, is more
reliable. In most states, road transport operates with
little government interference, whereas the railways
often operate for political as well as economic reasons.
Rail officials in South Africa, Zambia, and Zimba-
bwe are seeking regulation of road haulers to reduce
their loss of traffic.
South Africa's road system is far better than the
highways in the black-ruled states. Limited-access
highways are common in the Transvaal and around
major urban centers in other areas. This contrasts
sharply with the rest of the region, where a major
road consists of two lanes and must be shared by all:
motor vehicles, bicycles, animal-drawn carts, pedestri-
ans, and livestock.
Coastal Ports
The ports of southern Africa are shallow by world
standards (except Richards Bay) and few in number,
considering the size of the region. The average maxi-
mum channel depth of 10 to 12 meters severely limits
the size of ships that can use them. In the United
States, for example, 50,000-ton grain ships are com-
mon, while the largest grain ships that even South
Africa's well-run ports can handle are less than
30,000 tons in capacity. Other limitations include
siltation, particularly at Beira, Mozambique, and the
west coast's lack of breakwaters and natural barriers
to protect harbors from high winds and waves.
The ports of the black-ruled states suffer from a lack
of modern equipment and skilled labor, poor mainte-
nance, the deterioration of physical infrastructure,
poor management, inadequate storage, and theft.
They have had particular difficulty keeping pace with
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Figure 2. Crane construction
for containers at Maputo
the boom in container traffic and are only now
beginning to commission equjpment, to restructure
storage areas, and to learn ma fiagement practices for
the efficient handling of containers (figure 2).
By contrast, South African ports have adapted quick-
ly to containerization, and their entire infrastructure
surpasses that found at ports in the black states. The
efficient management of port operations ensures that
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ships are loaded and unloaded rapidly and keeps theft
at a relatively low level (figure 3). South Africa also
benefits from its location and the fact that it has seven
major ports?more than any other state in Africa.
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Figure 3. Container area at Durban.
Inland Waterways
River traffic in the region is limited because most
rivers are not navigable for any significant distance.
The major exceptions are the Zaire and Kasai Rivers,
which form part of the Voie Nationale, a rail-river-
rail route that runs from the Zairian Copper Belt to
the coastal port of Matadi.
The tonnages carried on the lakes in the region are
small when compared with rail and road movements.
Lake Tanganyika links Tanzania with Zaire and
Burundi, and Lake Nyasa handles Malawian traffic
and a very small amount of Tanzanian traffic.
Malawi's northern lake port of Karonga on Lake
Nyasa is now linked by road to the rail-road-pipeline
corridor running from Dar es Salaam to Zambia,
which could lead to a significant increase in Malawi's
use of the lake.
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Pipelines
Three of the four major pipelines in the region that
carry crude oil are in South Africa; the other serves
Zambia from Dar es Salaam. A fifth pipeline from
Beira in Mozambique to the Zimbabwean town of
Mutare carries refined petroleum because the refinery
at Mutare is no longer operational.
The pipeline across Mozambique has been subject to
periodic disruption. In October 1981, an explosion
destroyed portions of a bridge northwest of Beira that
supports the pipeline. The sabotage delayed reopening
the pipeline, which had been closed since 1965 be-
cause of the Rhodesian Civil War, until June 1982,
according to press reports. In addition, the destruction
of many of the oil storage tanks at Beira in December
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1982 disrupted the pipeline for at least another
month. In our view, South African interests have been
served by attacks on the pipeline that made Zimba-
bwe at least temporarily dependent on the "Southern
Route" for its oil supplies.
The Role of Each State
South Africa
The South Africans view transportation as an aspect
of foreign policy, labeling it "Transportation Diplo-
macy" (figure 4). South African eagerness to lease its
rolling stock to neighboring black states and to have
them use South African rail lines and ports reflects, in
our view, Pretoria's interest in increasing regional
trade, perpetuating the dependence of the black
states, and encouraging them to give at least unoffi-
cial recognition to the white regime.
We believe the South Africans use transportation
leverage as both a carrot and a stick in their relations
with their black neighbors. Cooperation with South
Africa has led to the development of new transporta-
tion infrastructures in Mozambique, Botswana, Mala-
wi, and Swaziland and has alleviated equipment
shortages in several states, including Zambia. On the
other hand, Pretoria has subjected several states to
transportation blackmail?for example, Zimbabwe in
1981, when Pretoria sought to compel Harare to
establish normal diplomatic relations by the recall of
South African locomotives. Pretoria will be capable of
"transportation diplomacy" so long as the black states
use South African rolling stock, highways, ports,
railways, capital, and expertise and need South Africa
as a market and as a source of imports.
The dependence of the black states on South African
transportation has several facets:
? The use of South Africa's rail lines, ports, and
highways. All the black states except Angola, Tan-
zania, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Lesotho rely
heavily on the port of East London for exports and
imports. In addition, Durban handles imports for
Zimbabwe and Malawi. Dependence on South Afri-
can highways is greatest for the BLS states (Botswa-
na, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and decreases for the
other states the greater their distance from South
Africa.
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? The use of South African rolling stock, including
freight cars, locomotives, trucks, and spare parts
(figure 5). SATS freight cars are used by every
railroad in the region, except those in Tanzania and
Angola. SATS owns approximately 200,000 of the
estimated 350,000 freight cars in the region. Loco-
motives are leased to Botswana, Swaziland, Zaire,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. South Africa's truck fleet
is important to Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique,
Malawi, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. South
Africa can supply spare parts and equipment to the
region cheaper than any overseas supplier.
? The use of South African personnel to help run the
transport sector, particularly in Swaziland and Mo-
zambique (especially in Maputo). Zambia's use of
South African locomotives also involves South Afri-
can personnel.
Besides these direct dependencies on the South Afri-
can transportation system, some black states in the
region have other transport links with South Africa,
notably:
? Mozambique's dependence on revenues from South
Africa's use of the port at Maputo and the rail line
from it to Komatipoort. Swaziland will soon benefit
similarly from South African goods passing across
its borders.
? Dependence on South African capital and expertise
for transport development, particularly in Swazi-
land, Mozambique, and Botswana. South African
capital is funding an expansion of the railroad
system in Swaziland and some port rehabilitation in
Maputo. South African engineers are also being
used in road planning in Swaziland and in helping
Botswana select a new route to South Africa for
coal exports.
? Dependence on South Africa as a source of imports.
As of 1980, the BLS states received approximately
90 percent of their imports from South Africa. For
nearly all states in the region, South Africa is an
important source of agricultural inputs, manufac-
tured goods, and transport equipment.
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Figure 4. Pretoria's view of its
transportation links
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Figure 5. Goods train bound for Zambia composed of South
African freight cars.
South Africa's high density of rail lines largely re-
flects heavy construction in the late 19th and early
20th centuries resulting from the competition between
the British and the Afrikaners for control of the area.
This legacy gives South Africa a substantial margin
of transportation security. Since there are usually
several routing options between major centers, South
Africa would suffer less disruption from a given link's
closure than any other state in the region.
The seven major ports of South Africa are highly
specialized:
? Richards Bay, which was developed in the 1970s for
the export of coal, handles more tonnage than any
port in Africa. It was developed to relieve the
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congestion that would have occurred at Durban
during a period of rapid expansion of coal exports.
? Durban is South Africa's most important port in
terms of the value of exports and imports. Durban
handles primarily general cargo in containers.
? East London is the major terminus of the "Southern
Route," handling traffic for Zaire, Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi.
? Agricultural shipments dominate Port Elizabeth's
traffic, particularly grains from Cape Province and
the Orange Free State.
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? Cape Town also serves the agricultural hinterland
but specializes in fruits rather than grains.
? Saldanha, developed in the 1970s for the export of
iron ore and the import of petroleum, has proved
unprofitable because iron ore exports have been less
than expected.
? The port of Walvis Bay, in South Africa's exclave in
Namibia, is the base for a major fishing industry
and handles Namibian imports and exports.
Facilities for importing crude oil exist at at least three
ports (Durban, Richards Bay, and Saldanha), and a
major pipeline leads inland from Durban.
Road transport facilities, rolling stock, and tonnages
in South Africa dwarf those found in the black states.
Within South Africa, private haulers have taken
traffic from the rail lines and the port-to-port shipping
industry, leading SATS to seek increased regulation
of the private sector.
East Coast States
Tanzania and Mozambique are the region's only
black states with ports on the Indian Ocean. The
former has no direct trade with South Africa, but the
latter is in the unique position of handling some South
African exports because of its proximity to South
Africa's industrial heartland in the Transvaal.
Tanzania's role in the region's transport network
involves mainly rail traffic and the use of the port at
Dar es Salaam. Two rail lines serve Dar es Salaam:
the Tazara and the main line of the Tanzania Rail-
way Corporation (TRC). The Tazara, which was built
by the Chinese between 1970 and 1975, serves Zam-
bia primarily, while the main line of the TRC serves
western Tanzania, Zaire, and Burundi. Both carry
copper exports to the port at Dar. The port has the
potential for serving Zambia, Zaire, Burundi, Rwan-
da, and Malawi, as well as Tanzania, but the facilities
there, as in much of the rest of the country, are in an
advanced state of deterioration.
Traffic through the port has recently been quite low
because of the worldwide recession and Tanzania's
own steep economic decline. Consequently, congestion
at the port, which was a serious problem in the late
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1970s and early 1980s, has eased. Although the recent
period of slow demand could have been used to
complete much-needed rehabilitation and improve-
ment of the port?developing container- and grain-
handling facilities, repaving the area, adding new
storage sheds, and providing management training?
little has been done. The port and the rail lines serving
it could now handle an increase in traffic, but a more-
than-25-percent increase probably would lead again
to congestion at the port.
Operations on the Tazara have long been below the
government's expectations for many reasons, includ-
ing poor design, poor management, a poorly trained
staff, disruptions in 1979 from both Rhodesian bomb-
ings and floods, and Chinese-supplied locomotives of
insufficient power. Since 1982, many of these prob-
lems have been addressed?new locomotives have
been purchased, track has been repaired, and the
Chinese are helping to run the line?and traffic on the
Tazara has increased. Although the Tazara now
carries over 70 percent of Zambia's copper exports,
and for two months of 1984 the figure was 100
percent, the total tonnage is well below the peak year
of 1977 (appendix C).
The main line of the TRC carries copper exports from
Zaire. The copper is loaded at Kigoma after crossing
Lake Tanganyika by barge. The TRC carries approxi-
mately 55,000 tons of copper per year, about one-sixth
of the Tazara's present load. TRC officials indicate
that the line could carry up to twice its present
tonnage if the buildup in traffic were slow.
With one exception, roads in Tanzania are in very
poor condition, largely because of lack of maintenance
and the nonenforcement of weight limits. The excep-
tion is the Tanzam Highway, which now carries just
over 75,000 tons of copper per year, down from almost
170,000 tons in 1980. Other commodities shipped on
this road include maize, wheat, and fertilizer. The
Tanzam Highway roughly parallels the Tazara and
the Dar-Ndola oil pipeline, and together they form an
important transport corridor from Dar to Zambia. A
new road from Karonga in northern Malawi taps into
this corridor at Mbeya in southwestern Tanzania.
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The development of Mozambique's transport facilities
is the key to transportation independence from South
Africa for Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Mozambican routes are in
disarray, however, because of the ongoing insurgency,
the lack of skilled labor, the deterioration of the
infrastructure, and equipment shortages. Until the
security situation improves and massive investment
occurs in ports, railways, roads, and the training of
personnel, Mozambique will not become a viable
alternative to the "Southern Route."
Maputo, the capital, was the busiest port on the east
African coast before 1975, with mostly South African
traffic. The port area requires some new equipment
and rehabilitation but appears to be in fairly good
shape and has excess capacity. The port has rail
connections with Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and South
Africa. Insurgent attacks have closed the Limpopo
rail line to Zimbabwe, however, and have limited the
use of the rail lines to South Africa and Swaziland to
daylight hours only.
Signing the Nkomati accord with South Africa last
spring led Maputo to expect more South African
traffic and investment at the port, a hope that has
been only partially realized. The two countries subse-
quently signed a transport agreement that, if imple-
mented, could gradually restore Maputo as a major
port for the Transvaal. A South African firm has
completed an approximately $4 million investment in
a new citrus cooling facility at the port.
Insurgent activity has largely closed the port of Beira
to rail and road traffic, although refined petroleum
products continue to pass through the pipeline to
Zimbabwe. The port at Beira used to serve Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Malawi, and the coal and sugar areas of
central Mozambique. It is plagued by heavy siltation
and must undergo frequent dredging.
The northern port of Nacala has the best natural
harbor in east Africa, but the insurgency has rendered
it, too, inaccessible. Malawi had depended heavily on
Nacala but now must route its traffic through South
Africa. Attempts to rehabilitate the rail line to Mala-
wi have been thwarted by insurgent attacks.
9
The insurgency also severely restricts movement with-
in Mozambique. When Malawi tried to ship 50,000
tons of maize to Zimbabwe by road via Tete province
last summer, the truck convoy?which had Zimbab-
wean Army escorts?was attacked by insurgents and
three drivers were shot, one fatally, according to the
Chief Economic Officer at the US Embassy in
Maputo.
West Coast States
The ports of Zaire, Angola, and Namibia are active,
but not as important to the region's international
trade as those on the east coast.
Copper dominates the land transport pattern of Zaire
(higher-valued cobalt is shipped by air), using three
routes to the sea: the Voie Nationale to Matadi on the
Atlantic; the route through eastern Zaire to Lake
Tanganyika and onward to Dar es Salaam; and the
"Southern Route" to East London. The Benguela
railroad, which before 1975 carried most of Zaire's
copper, remains closed because of the civil war in
Angola.
The Voie Nationale is a rail-river-rail route that runs
from the copper belt to Matadi and lies completely
within Zaire. Copper is the major export carried,
while imports consist of petroleum, manufactured
goods, and agricultural products. The Voie Nationale
is in need of new locomotives, freight cars, spare parts,
track rehabilitation, better management, training of
staff, worker discipline, and security against theft.
The ports of Matadi and Kinshasa also need upgrad-
ing. The World Bank has supplied funds for rebuild-
ing docks and wharfs at both ports. Better lighting
and increased security and fire protection are also
planned.
The route to Dar es Salaam separates from the Voie
Nationale at Kamina and proceeds to the port of
Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika. Copper is then shipped
by barge to Kigoma, where it meets the TRC. Ap-
proximately 5,000 tons of copper exports per month
are shipped to Dar es Salaam via this route.
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Kamina, the major internal transshipment point for
Zaire, has become a major bottleneck. Freight cars sit
on sidings for two or more months because of a lack of
locomotives, poor management, and diesel fuel
shortages.
Although the "Southern Route" to East London is the
longest route to the sea (3,775 kilometers from Lu-
bumbashi), it still provides the most reliable supply of
imports and is more efficient than the shorter, alter-
nate routes. It usually carries about 25,000 tons of
Zairian imports and 20,000 tons of Zairian copper
exports each month. Traffic from the north could be
diverted at Bulawayo in Zimbabwe to the Mozambi-
can ports of Beira and Maputo if those routes were
open.
Since independence, Zaire's road system has deterio-
rated badly. Press reports estimate that less than 30
percent of the road system is passable throughout the
year largely because of lack of maintenance.
Angola shares many of the same transportation char-
acteristics as Mozambique:
? It once provided a major export route for other
states.
? A return to an important role in regional transporta-
tion must await the settlement of the country's civil
war.
? Its transport infrastructure has badly deteriorated.
? Its personnel are poorly trained.
? Three rail lines run inland from the coast, providing
little north-south integration.
The Benguela railroad carried 2.5 million tons of
traffic in 1973 but now handles only about one-fifth
that figure, nearly all local. The insurgency also has
hastened the deterioration of the line. The Benguela
was originally built to carry copper exports from the
Zairian Copper Belt, although it has also carried
Zambian copper.
Once security permits, plans for rehabilitating the
Benguela include the acquisition of new freight cars,
improved signaling, the development of maintenance
facilities, technical training and assistance, and reha-
bilitation of rails and the railbed.
Confidential
The ports of Lobito and Luanda also are slated for
rehabilitation and expansion of capacity:
? Lobito must develop new wharfs and ore-handling
facilities if it is to regain a major role in copper
exports once the Benguela railroad opens. A 995-
meter wharf that was under construction by the
Portuguese at the time of Angolan independence in
1975 has yet to be completed.
? The port of Luanda is congested because it handles
most of the government's imports but lacks the
necessary equipment for the expeditious handling of
container and RO/RO (roll-on/roll-off) vessels.
Grain silos for handling needed food imports are
also lacking, and manpower training is needed.
South African Transport Services runs the transport
system of Namibia. South African officials indicate
that the rail system runs at a constant loss, in part
because it covers long distances and has very high
maintenance and construction costs.
The rail network consists of a main line running from
South Africa (Namibia's only external rail link)
northward to Tsumeb and two east-west spurs. The
northern spur runs from Walvis Bay to Gobabis and
has been designated as the western section of the
proposed Trans-Kalahari Railroad, which we doubt
will ever be built (see discussion under Botswana
below). In any case, the line between Gobabis and
Walvis Bay would need heavier rails and an upgrad-
ing of the rail bed to handle tonnages of Botswanan
coal large enough to justify the proposed line.
Walvis Bay, which is claimed by and governed as part
of South Africa, handles 97 percent of Namibia's
overseas traffic. With no breakwaters or natural
barriers, the port is exposed, shallow, and unable to
handle large coal ships?a requirement of the pro-
posed Trans-Kalahari rail line. Even with these draw-
backs, Walvis Bay is better than the less-developed
alternatives of Swakopmund and Luderitz, the ports
incontestably part of Namibia.
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Landlocked States
The landlocked states are particularly affected by
bottlenecks and political upheavals in other countries
because their economies are heavily dependent on
transport facilities in those states. Because many of
the landlocked states are transport corridors for other
countries, they themselves also can become
bottlenecks.
Zambia has used different routes to the sea as politi-
cal conditions in the region have changed or as
bottlenecks in other states have arisen. At present,
Zambia uses only two transport corridors for its
overseas traffic: the "Southern Route" to East Lon-
don and the Tazara-Tanzam corridor to Dar es
Salaam.
Lusaka's dependence on the "Southern Route" for
vital imports has increased Zambia's dependence on
South African equipment and personnel. Zambia
Railways leased 16 South African locomotives last
year to handle traffic from East London. Zimbabwe,
Zaire, and Malawi also benefit from Lusaka's access
to SATS equipment.
The Tazara carries most of Zambia's copper exports.
It is shorter and cheaper than the "Southern Route,"
and Zambia can pay for its use in kwacha rather than
hard currency.
The Tazara could also serve as an alternative carrier
of Zaire's copper exports, but this routing has yet to
be used. Lusaka may wish to retain the Tazara for
itself and thereby to maximize Zaire's use of Zambia
Railways.
Road traffic also is important in Zambia. The eastern
half of the country has a good system of paved roads,
most of which parallel the rail lines and carry primari-
ly agricultural traffic, although the Tanzam Highway
also carries copper exports. Zambia has good road
connections with Botswana, Zimbabwe, and the Zair-
ian Copper Belt, but road connections to Angola and
Namibia are incapable of carrying heavy traffic and
are passable only during the dry season from May to
August.
Malawi historically has been primarily dependent on
the transport facilities in Mozambique, but the effec-
tive closure of the Mozambican ports of Beira and
11
Nacala has forced Lilongwe to use Zambia's Great
East Road to tap into the "Southern Route" to South
Africa. This multimodal route is long, expensive, and
leads to unprofitable exports and more expensive
imports.
Malawi has tried with little success to diversify its
transportation links. The greatest volume of interna-
tional freight is still carried by truck from Lilongwe to
Lusaka and then by rail to East London or Durban,
but this route is hampered by the inconsistent perfor-
mance of Zambia Railways and poor transshipment
facilities and transport management in Lusaka. The
road route from Blantyre across Mozambique to
Harare, in combination with a rail connection from
Harare to Beira, would be much shorter and cheaper,
but most shippers avoid this route because of security
hazards. A circuitous but generally reliable route for
the import of fuel and general merchandise involves
rail shipment from Durban to Harare followed by
road delivery through Lusaka to Lilongwe. A shorter
but more dangerous variation uses the same rail
connection followed by road access across Mozam-
bique to Blantyre.
Malawi probably can now ship some goods through
Tanzania to Dar es Salaam because a new, temporary
road from Mbeya, Tanzania, southward to the Mala-
wian lake port of Karonga was officially opened in
early December, giving Malawi access to the Tazara
Railroad, the Tanzam Highway, and the Dar-Ndola
pipeline. The US Embassy in Lilongwe is skeptical,
however, that this new link will pick up much of the
slack because of the poor condition of the temporary
road, poor transshipment facilities at Mbeya, and
deteriorated conditions at Dar es Salaam.
Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa
reflects its proximity as a landlocked state and the
legacy of relations between Pretoria and the preinde-
pendence white regime in Salisbury. For example,
several South African firms have major investments
in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe's transportation dependence on South Af-
rica is even more pronounced because the Mozambi-
can transport corridors to Beira and Maputo have
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been disrupted by insurgency. As a result, nearly 90
percent of Zimbabwe's exports go to or through South
Africa. For the 12-month period ending 30 June 1983,
the connections from Zimbabwe to South Africa via
Beitbridge and Botswana handled 83 percent of port-
bound trains, according to statistics published by the
National Railways of Zimbabwe. Even traffic bound
for Maputo must now pass through South Africa.
Zimbabwe has the best transport infrastructure of all
the black-ruled states in the region, and it has main-
tained and even upgraded these facilities since inde-
pendence. Skilled white personnel who left the rail
lines have been replaced by Indian and Pakistani
expatriate workers brought in under a World Bank
program. The National Railways of Zimbabwe has
also purchased new locomotives and is much less
dependent on South African engines. These changes,
coupled with the recent economic recession and
drought have led to excess capacity in both the rail
and road sectors, but a large corn harvest could tax
the system.
The transportation network in Botswana is concen-
trated in the eastern part of the country, with rail and
road connections to South Africa and Zimbabwe and
the Botzam Highway from Francistown to the Zambi-
an border. The government of Botswana would like to
upgrade the entire rail line but lacks sufficient funds.
The Chinese are upgrading the railbed from Gabo-
rone to the South African border.
Gaborone plans to take over ownership of the rail line
in Botswana, which is owned and operated by the
National Railways of Zimbabwe. Although the take-
over was originally scheduled for this year, economic
woes have delayed it until 1987. Motivated by nation-
al pride rather than economics, Botswana lacks the
labor force to run the operation on its own and will, in
our view, have to depend on expatriates for training
and management.
Gaborone also is considering a new rail link with
South Africa. This line, which will carry coal exports,
will most likely connect with the South African
system at Ellisras. SATS aided Botswana in choosing
this alternative.
Confidential
We doubt that the Trans-Kalahari rail link with
Namibia, which has been proposed for the export of
Botswanan coal, will ever be built. It would be very
costly to construct and maintain; alternatives exist
(particularly through South Africa); and the demand
for Botswanan coal is uncertain because its high water
content limits its commercial appeal.
The Botzam Highway, which was recently paved with
US assistance, leads to a bottleneck at Kazungula on
the Zambezi River. There is no bridge over the river,
so trucks and other vehicles must be ferried across.
Construction of a bridge that would alleviate the
bottleneck must await determination of the exact
meeting point of the borders of Botswana, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Namibia at the river crossing.
Because of its location, Lesotho must ship all its goods
through South Africa. The major roads lie in the
western half of the country and lead to industrial
areas in South Africa. Most roads within Lesotho are
gravel.
Several projects are under way to upgrade roads. The
most important is the Southern Perimeter Road,
which would allow travel from the western part of the
country to the east without passing through the
Transkei?the former South African homeland whose
"independence" is recognized only by Pretoria.
A 1.2-kilometer rail line, which is owned and operated
by SATS, runs from the border with South Africa to
Maseru. The government of Lesotho hopes to develop
a container terminal at Maseru to handle containers
brought in by rail.
Swaziland Railways is managed by South African
personnel supplied by SATS. The original rail line in
Swaziland was used for the export of iron ore and ran
from the mines in the western part of the country to
Mozambique. Because the iron ore has been depleted,
the line carries mainly agricultural products.
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Swaziland is developing a north-south rail line that
will connect with the South African rail system at
each end. The southern portion of the line runs from
central Swaziland to the border town of Golela and
was built in the late 1970s. The northern portion is
being constructed with SATS aid and, upon comple-
tion, will connect with the South African town of
Komatipoort near the Mozambican border. Designed
to carry South African phosphates as well as some
Swazi agricultural products to Richard's Bay, the line
also will give Pretoria new leverage when dealing with
Mozambique. Should relations between Maputo and
Pretoria become strained, South Africa could divert
goods destined for Maputo to Richard's Bay or other
South African ports.
Swaziland's external road traffic is dominated by
imports from and exports to South Africa, with the
major traffic generators being tourism, timber, lum-
ber, and sugar. Although there is a dense road
network in Swaziland, most roads are unpaved. South
African capital and expertise would probably be
needed if Mbabane is to expand its paved road
network substantially.
The Feasibility of a System
Independent of South Africa
The Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC) was formed by nine black states
in 1980 to promote the economic development of its
members and to overcome their transportation de-
pendence on South Africa. The SADCC states aim to
cut their use of the South African transport system by
90 percent by the year 2000.
An independent transportation system for the black-
ruled states would be a prerequisite for effective
economic sanctions against South Africa. Without
such a system, in our judgment, most sanctions
imposed against South Africa would hurt the black
states more than Pretoria.
The most important transport corridors for an inde-
pendent system would be those that lead to Lobito on
the west coast and to Dar es Salaam, Nacala, Beira,
and Maputo on the east coast. These ports and the
transport corridors leading to them have the potential
13
for handling most of the traffic of Zaire, Zambia,
Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Botswana?countries that
depend on South Africa for access to the sea.
The development of these transport corridors?reha-
bilitating routes and ports, purchasing equipment, and
training personnel?must await the ending of the civil
wars in Angola and Mozambique and massive finan-
cial and technical aid. Thus far, however, the SADCC
has had only limited success in securing pledges,
having obtained:
? Six percent of required funding for rehabilitating
Dar es Salaam and the corridors serving it.
? Eighteen percent of the funds to rehabilitate the
port of Beira and the rail and road lines serving it.
? Twenty percent and 22 percent of the funds re-
quired for Lobito and Maputo, respectively (see
appendix D).
Most of these funds were pledged before 1981. The
transportation systems of the black states, except
Zimbabwe, probably are deteriorating faster than
funds for their rehabilitation and improvement have
been acquired.
The projects targeted by the SADCC's Transport and
Communications Commission (SATCC) nevertheless
address many of the transport problems facing the
black states:
? Poor maintenance of rail, road, and port facilities.
The approach of many countries seems to be "use it
till it breaks." Preventive maintenance in many
states is almost nonexistent.
? Shortage of spare parts, largely owing to lack of
foresight, poor management, and lack of foreign
exchange.
? Absence of up-to-date, functioning equipment for
railway signaling, communications, locomotives,
freight cars, container-handling facilities at ports,
and storage facilities. The shortage of railway roll-
ing stock in particular has increased direct depend-
ence on South Africa.
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? Lack of skilled labor. Training programs and facili-
ties are desperately needed in several countries
because the colonial powers generally failed to train
the local labor force to take over skilled positions;
skilled personnel usually left after independence;
and transport systems were often turned over to the
local labor force after minimal training.
Overcoming unreliability and inefficiency is perhaps
the most difficult of these tasks because it requires the
development of a skilled, disciplined labor force.
While equipment can be purchased and delivered
relatively quickly, the education of the labor force
takes far longer.
Prospects
We believe the SADCC's stated aim of cutting its
transportation dependence on South Africa by 90
percent by the year 2000 is unrealistic and incompati-
ble with SADCC's goal of economic development. If
the black states are to prosper economically, they
probably cannot escape dependence on South African
transport facilities and on South Africa more general-
ly as a market for their goods and as a source of
supply for expertise, training, technology, and manu-
factured goods for their economic development.
The development of an alternative transportation
system for the black states would require a revolution-
ary change in the region's trading patterns?one that
is almost certainly beyond the capabilities of the black
states either individually or collectively:
? South Africa is the major trading partner for
several of the SADCC states, particularly for the
imports of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimba-
bwe, and Malawi.
? Mozambique, Zaire, and Zambia also do business
with South Africa.
We see little prospect for fundamental change in these
trading patterns because most of the black states
would be unwilling to forgo the economic benefits of
trading with South Africa. We believe, therefore, that
for most black states transportation dependence on
South Africa will continue well into the next century.
Confidential
While the members of SADCC express allegiance to
the goals of economic development and transport
independence from South Africa, for most?if not
all?it is the former that takes precedence. As we
have noted:
? Botswana is considering a new rail link to South
Africa.
? Swaziland is constructing a new rail link to South
Africa.
? Mozambique is actively courting South African
traffic and investment.
? Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe rely
on South African locomotives; so does Zaire, which
is not a member of SADCC.
? Zimbabwe and the BLS states would suffer cata-
strophic economic losses if they broke transport and
trade ties with South Africa, and it would be against
the economic interests of Mozambique and, in
varying degrees, several of the other black states to
do so.
The most likely prospect, therefore, is for the eventual
rehabilitation of transport links within several states,
though not as soon or as many as the SADCC plans,
and for the easier movement of goods between mem-
ber states. For states north of the Zambezi River, this
could lead to less dependence on the South African
transport system. For those that border on South
Africa, even reducing transport ties will remain diffi-
cult for years.
Indeed, SADCC projects may lead to increased trade
with South Africa. For example, Pretoria originally
opposed the Botzam Highway, believing it might
reduce South Africa's influence in Botswana, but the
road instead has increased trade between South Afri-
ca and Zambia, and Botswana is no less dependent on
South Africa.
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The southern African transportation network does not
require major new links. Existing rail and road op-
tions have been sufficient for users to adapt to the
disruptions the region has experienced over the past
two decades. Even with several ports now inaccessible,
the functioning ports, highways,and railways?with
the exception of Zambia Railways?have excess
capacity.
The transport network has enough capacity to handle
even the most optimistic traffic projections through
the year 2000, assuming adequate maintenance and
no further major disruptions of existing facilities. The
only possible exceptions may be handling of corn for
export at harvesttime and port capacities for handling
coal. South Africa has substantially increased its coal-
handling facilities during the past decade, and it is
about to embark on a major investment program for
better handling of corn exports.
Barring civil war in South Africa or a general region-
al conflagration, the South African transportation
system is likely to remain the most developed, effi-
cient, and reliable in southern Africa. Given the
problems on alternate routes, its strengths are likely to
perpetuate the present pattern of strong north-south
and weak east-west trade and transport flows, at least
until there is stability in Mozambique and Angola. If
alternative transport routes are developed, South Af-
rica would probably continue to be a market for the
exports of the black states, a source of their imports,
and an important supplier of rolling stock.
Moreover, even if the civil wars in Mozambique and
Angola come to an end, opening up alternative east-
west routes that are now largely closed to the black
states, we believe that South Africa will maintain
considerable leverage over the transport and more
general economic options available to the black states.
The degree of dependence may decrease, but we
believe some measure of dependence will continue, as
now, in inverse proportion to their distance from
South Africa.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, the virtual stranglehold that Pre-
toria has over the transportation network in southern
Africa limits both the choices available to the black
states and US policy options for promoting peaceful
15
change and stability in the region. Western assistance
for the development of alternative transportation
routes for the black states will not alter their depen-
dence on South Africa as a source of imports, a
market for exports, and a supplier of rolling stock. US
and other donor support for SADCC transportation
projects would, however, help the black states directly
by aiding their development and indirectly foster
increased SADCC trade with South Africa and great-
er economic interdependence between Pretoria and
the black states.
In our view, any country that supports the SADCC
has to recognize that the organization's basic goals?
economic development and independence from South
Africa?are incompatible and that transportation in-
dependence from South Africa will probably never be
achieved. We believe that support for SADCC pro-
motes interdependence more than SADCC's purport-
ed goal of independence and that it contributes to
greater stability and peaceful change in southern
Africa.
Opportunities for US participation in near-term re-
gional transport projects probably will be greatest in
interior rather than coastal states. Three of the four
major east-west corridors (those to Lobito, Nacala,
and Beira) pass through areas of insurgency while the
fourth (to Dar es Salaam) is in a country that has
squandered foreign aid to the point that the United
States cannot, by law, provide further assistance.
Opportunities for US trade, aid, and investment in the
southern African transportation network seem best in
the provision of spare parts and new equipment. Such
needs are strong in all modes of surface transportation
and in all of the states in the region except South
Africa. Because much of US trade with Africa from
the Zairian Copper Belt south passes through South
Africa, maintaining this access probably will be nec-
essary if the United States is to continue to do
business with and to provide assistance to most states
in the region.
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Appendix A
Ports and Route Choices (by Country)
Ports
Transport Foreign Coun- Status Comments
Corridor tries Through
Which Goods
Must Pass
Angola (exclud- Lobito
ing Cabinda)
Local highway
and Benguela
railroad
Serving only
local traffic.
Luanda
Local rail and Major port
highway for imports;
congested.
Namibe
Local rail and
highway
Serving only local
traffic.
Routes are subject to disrup-
tion. The government does not
control eastern half of country,
nor much of the south.
Botswana East London South Africa South Africa Functioning. New rail link to South Africa at
Ellisras is planned. Trans-Kala-
hari rail line unlikely to prove
feasible.
Lesotho
Little overseas
trade
South Africa South Africa
Malawi Beira Rail and road Mozambique Nonfunctional.
Dar es Salaam Road and rail Tanzania Opened in A new, temporary road makes
December. Dar es Salaam accessible for
limited quantities.
East London or Road to Lusaka, Zambia, Zimba- Main route avail-
Durban then "Southern bwe, Botswana, able.
Route" and South Africa
Nacala
Rail and road Mozambique Nonfunctional.
Mozambique Beira CFM (Mozambi- Serving mostly
can Railways) local traffic.
Central line
All transport lines are subject
to disruption.
Maputo CFM South line Serves local and
international
traffic.
Nacala
CFM North line Serving only local
traffic.
Namibia Walvis Bay Local rail and See comment Handles 97 per- Rail connection is with South
road cent of Namibian Africa. Walvis Bay is claimed
port traffic; a by and governed as part of
shallow, exposed South Africa.
port; run by
SATS.
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Ports and Route Choices (by Country) (continued)
Ports
Transport Foreign Coun- Status Comments
Corridor tries Through
Which Goods
Must Pass
South Africa Cape Town
Serves agricul- All ports served by road and
tural hinterland; rail.
major container
cooling facilities.
Durban
East London
Most important
in South Africa.
Terminus of the
"Southern
Route": impor-
tant handler of
copper exports
and imports for
black states.
Agricultural goods, particularly
sugar, are also handled.
Maputo
Ressano Garcia Mozambique Handles ores and
Line (rail line fruits. Trains run
from Komati- only during day-
poort to Maputo) light hours to
avoid insurgents.
Port Elizabeth
Major grain-
exporting port.
Richards Bay
Major coal-
exporting port.
Saldanha Bay
Used for export-
ing iron ore and
importing oil.
Swaziland Maputo Goba Line (rail Mozambique Trains run only New north-south line will make
line from Swazi during daylight South African ports accessible.
border to hours to avoid in-
Maputo) surgent attacks.
Line needs main-
tenance.
Tanzania Dar es Salaam TRC, Tazara, Major port; has The road system in Tanzania is
and Tanzam excess capacity; in very bad shape; much of the
Highway in need of reha- country is difficult to reach.
bilitation.
Mtwara Local road Serves local
needs; could
serve Malawi
some day.
Tanga TRC and road Secondary port;
handles agricul-
tural goods.
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Ports and Route Choices (by Country) (continued)
Ports
Transport
Corridor
Foreign Coun-
tries Through
Which Goods
Must Pass
Status
Comments
Zaire
Dar es Salaam
Rail to Lake
Tanganyika,
barge to Kigoma,
rail (TRC) to Dar
Tanzania
Functioning.
5,000 tons of copper per month.
East London
"Southern
Route"
Zambia, Zimba-
bwe, Botswana,
and South Africa
Major route for
exports and
imports.
20,000 tons of copper exports
per month, 25,000 tons of im-
ports. Traffic on the "Southern
Route" could be routed from
Bulawayo to Mozambican
ports.
Lobito
Benguela
Angola
Nonfunctioning.
Shortest route to sea from
Lubumbashi.
Matadi
Voie Nationale
Functioning.
Zambia
Dar es Salaam
Tazara and Tan- Tanzania
zam Highway
Tazara is now the
primary route for
copper exports.
Zambia has the potential to de-
velop routes, some multimodal,
to Nacala and Beira.
East London
"Southern
Route"
Zimbabwe,
Botswana, and
South Africa
Primary route for
imports, some ex-
ports; traction in
Zambia a prob-
lem.
"Southern Route" traffic could
be diverted at Bulawayo to Mo-
zambican ports.
Zimbabwe
Beira
Rail, road, and
pipeline
Mozambique
Rail and road
traffic is general-
ly disrupted.
Maputo
Rail via Limpopo
Line or Beit-
bridge
Mozambique or
South Africa and
Mozambique
Limpopo Line is
nonfunctional.
East London
"Southern
Route"
Botswana, South
Africa
Major route
used. National
Railways of Zim-
babwe to turn
over ownership of
Botswana rail
line to Gaborone
in 1987.
Durban is sometimes used.
r@i,r of4'
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Appendix B
Trade Relations With South Africa
Trade relations between the black states and South
Africa are an important form of interdependence but
are difficult to measure. South Africa does not pub-
lish statistics for its exports to individual African
countries because it knows this would embarrass them
and hinder future trade. The most plausible estimates
of South African trade with the SADCC states that
we have found in the unclassified literature appear in
the table.
G. M. E. Leistner, the Director of the Africa Institute
of South Africa, has suggested that trade figures for
some countries may actually be twice the reported
figures. The import figures in the table for several
countries?particularly Mozambique, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe?are almost certainly too low. Countries
often buy South African goods from third parties,
which also distorts the figures.
By contrast, according to official South African sta-
tistics for 1981, 11 percent (by value) of South African
exports were to the rest of Africa, and only 2 percent
of its imports were from the rest of Africa. For certain
commodities and sectors of the economy, however,
African nations are an important market for South
Africa. According to Leistner,2 in 1979 the following
proportion of key South African exports went to other
African countries:
? Fifty-seven percent of exported machinery.
? Fifty-four percent of South African exports of plas-
tics and rubber.
? Forty-eight percent of all exports of stone and
glassware.
? Thirty-five percent of transport and related
equipment.
If the SADCC's drive for efficiency in transport is
successful, it should make markets for these products
more accessible and may increase trade between
Pretoria and the black states.
'G. M. E. Leistner, "Economic Relations Among Southern African
States," Geojournal, Supplementary Issue 2, 1981, pp. 85-93.
21
Table 1 Percent
South African Trade
Exports to Imports From
South Africa (1980) South Africa (1980) a
Botswana
Lesotho
Mozambique
Zambia
8
95
5
NEGL
88
90
15
7
Zimbabwe 20
40
Malawi
4 40
Swaziland
20 90
Tanzania NEGL
NEGL
Angola
NEGL NEGL
a Roger Leys and Arne Tostensen, "Regional Cooperation in
Southern Africa: The Southern African Coordination Conference,"
The Review of African Political Economy, vol. 27, 1982, pp. 52-71.
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Appendix C
Zambian Copper
Zambia has used Dar es Salaam
the major exporting ports for its copper
The following data obtained from
indicate the relative importance of
For each route, we have the following
US dollars per metric tons:
Shipments
and East London as
Table 2
since 1976.
Zambian Copper Shipments
the World Bank
each route.
in
Thousand metric tons
comparisons
To Dar es Salaam
To East London
Via
Tanzam
Via
Tazara
Railroad
Via the
"Southern
Route"
Distance 2,200 2,050 3,250
(km)
Days to 11 19
Port
Cost to 101 97 148
Port
Highway
1976 291
190
24
1977 154
395
1978 113
389
58
1979 140
148
261
1980 169
237
178
1981 109
270
148
1982 80
295
137
1983 78
340
137
23
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Appendix D
Financial Progress of the SATCC
The Southern Africa Transportation and Communications Commission (SATCC)
published the following cost estimates for its various transport projects in a 1984
report. Because delays in implementing programs will increase costs, the estimated
cost figures may be too low.
According to the SATCC, the status of projects in key sectors was:
Estimated
Costs
(Million
US $)
Additional
Foreign
Capital
Needed
Percent
Pledged
Percent
Under
Discussion
Percent
Remaining
Operational coordination
and training
12.2
39
36
25
Roads
826
621
20
15
65
Railways
978
827
24
18
58
Ports and water
transport
661
494
10
10
80
Civil aviation
100
80
52
16
32
Telecommunications
277
236
56
26
18
Clearly, the need for money is greatest in the roads, railways, and ports. These
tend to be capital intensive projects most crucial to the future trade of the region.
According to the SATCC, the status of projects by area was:
Estimated Additional Percent Percent Percent
Costs Foreign Pledged Under Remaining
(Million Capital Discussion
US $) Needed
Maputo Port System
716
571
22
10
68
Beira Port System
524
419
18
8
74
Nacala Port System
238
185
43
8
49
Dar es Salaam Port System
411
301
6
43
51
Lobito Port System
168
163
20
80
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