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S}a~nitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 '_ ~ ` ~l Intelligence Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence in Developing Countries ~' ~eQF 1~~ E~ Secret CI 85-10076 March 1985 n~~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Directorate of Secret Intelligence in Developing Countries Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence Office of Central Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI, on of Global Issues, with the a This paper was prepared by (Office Secret GI 85-10076 March 1985 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Summary Iq/ormation available as q(1 March 1985 was used in this report. in Developing Countries Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence key Third World countries. .Soviet ,success in establishing relationships with. Third World media has yielded substantial .payoffs including: ? Significantly influencing the editorial line or placing its own stories in more than 50 major Third. World newspapers. ? Recruiting important editors, publishers, and information ministers in ? Placing KGB operatives overseas as "correspondents"; 60 25X1 to 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are KGB. 25X1 veloping country media. Media relationships are developed through one or more of the following techniques: ? Extensive development assistance to fledgling wire services, print media, and government information ministries. ? Journalism training for veteran and apprentice newsmen. ? Cultivating individual newsmen with cash, entertainment, scholarships, duty-free goods, and free vacations. ? Supporting the expansion of regional wire services in South Asia, Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. ? Maintaining visibility at UNESCO as an advocate of a larger role for de- the Western media. These approaches are working. The Soviet overseas media has over 260 .correspondents in 71 developing countries; TASS alone has acquired 18 new clients since 1982. The Soviets' international front for journalists, in turn, claims to have trained over 300 newspersons in recent years. Working through UNESCO, Moscow has sponsored new regional wire services and shifted the debate on a "new world information order" to alleged abuses of compelled the US Embassy to issue a denial. Soviet.ability to use this influence is evidenced, in turn, by the success of specific media placement efforts: ? The spate of reporting of US involvement in Indira Gandhi's assassina- tion required the State Department to publicly deny any US role. ? Nigerian press reports in 1983 that the United States was intervening in the Nigerian elections prompted the US Ambassador to protest directly to the Soviet Ambassador in Lagos. ? Reports of alleged coup plotting by the United States in Ghana in 1984 Secret GI 85-10076 March 1985 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Moscow's efforts have been unsuccessful in Cameroon, Colombia, Djibouti; Liberia, Nigeria, and Zambia-countries reportedly more sensitive to Soviet abuses of press access or concerned over Soviet media serving as ha- vens for KGB operations. We expect Moscow's effort to build an overseas media presence to continue expanding. Novosti inaugurated a special wire service for developing- country news agencies just last year. built a new school to train Latin American journalists, reflecting the high priority Moscow has placed on Soviet media objectives in this region. ~ 25X1 25X1 .~ 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Figure 1 TASS and Novosti News Services in Developing Countries Afghanistan - ? ? Guinea-Bissau ? ? Nigeria Algeria ? ? Guyana ? Pakistan Angola ? ? India ? Panama Argentina ? ? Indonesia ? ? P.D.R.Y. (S. Yemen) Bangladesh ? Iran ? ? Peru Benin ? ? Iraq ? ? Philippines Bolivia ? ? Jordan ? ? Senegal Botswana ? ~ ? Kenya ? Sierra Leone Brazil ? ? Kuwait ? ? Singapore Burma ? ? Lebanon ? Sri Lanka Cameroon ? Liberia ? ? Sudan C.A.R. (Central Afr. Rep.) ? ? Libya ? Suriname Colombia ?~ ? Madagascar ? ? Syria Congo ? Malaysia ? ? Tanzania Costa Rica ? ? Mali ? Thailand Cyprus ? Mauritania ? ~ Togo Dominican Republic ? Mauritius ? ? Tunisia Ecuador ? ? Mexico ? ? Uganda Egypt ? ? Morocco ? ? Venezuela Ethiopia ? ? Mozambique ? ? Y.A.R. (N. Yemen) Gabon ? Nepal ? ? Zambia Ghana ? ? Nicaragua ? Zimbabwe Guinea Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Background 1 Pattern of Coverage 1 Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media 3 Media Development Assistance 3 Journalism Training and Recruitment 4 Cultivation of Journalists ~ 6 Support for Independent Regional News Services 6 UNESCO Visibility 7 Program Effectiveness 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Reshaping the News: Moscow's Media Presence in Developing Countries ~ The USSR is undertaking a sustained effort to gain access to the media of developing countries and expects significant payoffs at relatively little cost. Specifically, the Soviets hope their efforts will: ? Help place Soviet propaganda in host-country media. Encourage anti-West coverage. ? Provide cover for KGB operations. Pattern of Coverage The Soviets have a substantial media presence in the Third World-over 260 Soviet correspondents in 71 developing countries (table 1). TASS, the government news agency, and Novosti, the Central Committee news and features agency, have the largest represen- tation. Eight other Soviet media organizations have limited but direct representation in developing country capitals (table 2). Moscow has posted the largest number of Soviet correspondents to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India, and Peru-which together account for over one- fourth of Soviet media representation in developing countries: ? Eight Soviet news organizations have a total of 15 correspondents in Afghanistan. They not only pro- vide Soviet domestic audiences with war news, but also service Afghan media, all of which are govern- ment controlled, with foreign news and feature materials, according to US embassy reporting. ? Six Soviet press agencies with 15 correspondents are resident in Algeria. Although the Algerian Govern- ment departs substantively from Soviet views on many international political issues, the US embassy accounts for the large Soviet media presence by suggesting that compatible ideologies and common rhetoric facilitate media exchanges. ? Mubarak has allowed a sizable Soviet press contin- gent to return-six Soviet media agencies maintain 15 correspondents in Cairo. Within broad con- straints, Novosti and TASS can issue press releases, disseminate feature materials, and cultivate Egyp- tian journalists, civic leaders, and government officials. ? India accommodates the Soviets' largest overseas press contingent: 18 correspondents representing at least four news organizations. Soviet media have developed close working relationships with Indian wire services, urban dailies, and the vernacular press. ? .Twelve Soviet correspondents from six news agen- cies are in Peru, a disproportionately large contin- gent for a small country. The contingent's size is a legacy from the period of leftist military rule (1968- 80) when friendly diplomatic relations prevailed between Peru and the USSR, according to US embassy reporting. 25X1 Soviet media representation in developing countries has expanded significantly in the last 15 years. The number of news bureaus operated by TASS in devel- oping countries has risen from 46 in 1970 to 66 in 1985. Novosti has 47 news bureaus in those countries compared with 16 in 1970. The Soviets now have TASS or Novosti bureaus in 67 developing countries altogether, 24 more than in 1970. More bureaus have been added in Africa than in any other region, . increasing the number from 16 in 1970 to 31 in 1985. The Soviets have added five news bureaus in Latin America in the same period. 25X1 Soviet media personnel in developing countries are directed not only by their Moscow offices, but also by Central Committee advisers at Soviet embassies. These advisers provide them with guidance and in- structions for propaganda in host countries and review their work Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Table 1 Soviet Correspondents Posted to Developing Countries (10 Soviet Media) e Total 26 6 Afghanistan I S Algeria 1 5 Angola 4 Argentina 1 Kuwait 4 Lebanon 10 Liberia 2 Libya 2 Madagascar 4 Nicaragua - 5 Nigeria 7 Pakistan 1 0 Panama 1 Peru 1 2 Philippines 5 Senegal 3 Sierra Leone 1 Singapore 3 Sri Lanka 2 Sudan 3 3 Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 2 2 Zambia 4 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Table 2 Soviet Overseas Media TASS, government news 90 agency Novosti, Central Committee's 55 news and features agency Izvestiya, government daily 10 Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 2 armed forces' daily Moscow TV Novoye Vremya (New TimesJ, Central Committee's world af- fairs weekly Pravda, Party daily 21 Radio Moscow, all union radio 14 Trud, Soviet trade unions' daily 2 Zhurnalist, Soviet journalists' 1 monthly Unidentified media organiza- 62 lion Developing Countries Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media The Soviets are using five principal approaches to nurture their relations with the media of developing countries: ? Development assistance. ? Journalism training and recruitment. ? Cultivation of Soviet-friendly journalists. ? Support for independent, regional news services. ? UNESCO visibility Media Development Assistance The Soviets are vigorously competing with Western media services by providing the print and broadcast media of developing countries with services and equip- ment at little or no cost.' In Liberia, for example, the ' This approach to media assistance by the Soviets was discussed in May 1981 at a conference in Kiev, USSR, among East Bloc UNESCO national commissions, QI'he commissions agreed that the Bloc should aggres- sively promote technical aid to developing-country media, offer them no-strings-attached financial aid, and give high priority to Projecting Soviet Views In addition to developing direct ties with Third World media, the USSR publishes and broadcasts extensively in developing countries. Novosti, by its own account, produces 60 journals in 45 languages along with foreign-language books and films. Over 70 percent oJSoviet international radiobroadcasts, con- ducted in 38 languages, are directed toward develop- ing countries, principally toward East and South Asia, the Middle East, and North f1frica, according to USIA. Radio Moscow's world service in English .broadcasts 24 hours a day on all shortwave bands. Radio stations of the Soviet Asian republics broad- cast to the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Radio Peace and Progress, sponsored by the Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace, broadcasts to developing countries on Radio Moscow frequencies. national news agency can subscribe to TASS for $1,000 per year as compared with Agence France Presse for $23,000 per year, according to USIS. TASS pronouncements and US embassy reporting indicate, that the standard TASS aid package for developing-country news agencies currently includes: ? A subscription to TASS world or regional news service. ? Installation of radio receivers and radio photocopiers. ? Maintenance and spare parts provided by TASS engineers. ? Journalism training for news agency personnel. The Soviets subsidize the entire package, and negoti- ate aformal aid agreement with the client, either through TASS representatives or the Soviet Ambas- sador. The agreement usually leads to an exchange of correspondents between capitals, with the cost of a client news agency's Moscow bureau, in some cases, underwritten by Moscow. Secret ~'~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 The KGB has co-opted Soviet overseas media offices either by placing its own people with journalist cover or by requiring the cooperation of legitimate Soviet journalists. KGB o,~icials use their journalist cover to access political leaders in developing countries, recruit agents in the government and media, and promote Soviet perspectives of international political issues. A observes that many legitimate So- many Novosti bureau chiefs are KGB. All Novosti personnel in a news bureau, (f'not KGB themselves, are expected to facilitate KGB recruitment ejforts, defectors report. They help the KGB by identifying potentially helpful host-country nationals, making introductions, and providing background ir~1ormation about personalities, issues, and relationships among denizens. The KGB originally stctfjed Novoye Vremya overseas bureaus in their entirety. In the 1970s the Central vet ~ourna fists are posted to obscure capitals of little news value to service KGB disirtlormation require- ments. Most commonly, the KGB uses TASS, Novosti, and Novoye Vremya (New Times). Defectors report that the KGB and associated Soviet clandestine services staff as much as 70 to 80 percent. of TASS bureau personnel. In a typical six person TASS foreign news bureau, three reporters may be KGB, two GRU, and one, usual! the bureau chief; a full-time, trained journalist TASS re- portedly is a pr erre K B cover, possi ly because TASS does not require correspondents to byline stories, a practice enabling the lack of journalistic productivity by KGB "correspondents" to go unob- served. Novosti has close and extensive connections with the KGB both at the managerial level in Moscow and at foreign news bureaus in the field. Defectors state that TASS has negotiated news exchange agreements with 71 developing countries, 18 just since 1982, the UK Foreign Office reports. The July 1984 agreement with Sierra Leone is typical. According to US embassy reporting, TASS agreed to provide its English- language African news service to the Ministry of Information in Freetown and to furnish free radio receiving equipment. The Soviet State Committee for Vocational Training will train an unspecified number of Sierra Leone journalists in the USSR. Committee posted some legitimate inurnalists to Novoye Vremya bureaus, but that 0 of 12 Novoye Vremya corre- spon ents a roa were KGB. The KGB also uses the foreign news bureau of Izvestiya, Trud, and Soviet radiofor cover, although not as extensively as it uses TASS and Novosti. It does not use Soviet TV because Soviet TV correspon- dents'laces are well known by television audiences in the USSR, and these correspondents must be techni- cally proficient in electronics. It rarely uses Pravda to avoid embarrassment to the party in the event of exposure, according to defectors. Journalism Training and Recruitment Extensive training programs for developing-country journalists teach the Soviet model of journalism- serving state interests, politicizing the news, and expecting an ideological commitment from journal- ists. One program is administered by Soviet embas- sies, which offer scholarships for journalism studies in the USSR. Nominations are made by Ministries of 25X1 . y 25X1 225X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Figure 2. IOJ trainingjor Jour- nalists oJ'developing countries attending the Werner Lambert Institute in East Berlin Education. The Soviet Government pays all expenses except transportation, which the Ministries are ex- pected to sponsor, according to US embassy reporting. Another program is contained in the TASS media aid package. US embassies also report a third program of short-term training in developing countries for jour- nalists in print media and electronic journalism. The Soviets also use the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) to train developing-country journal- ists. The IOJ has five schools in the Eastern Bloc and Cuba: The IOJ Center of Professional Education of Jour- nalists in Budapest for radio and television journalists. The Werner Lambert Institute in East Berlin for print media journalists. The Georji Dimitrov International Institute of Jour- nalists in Sofia for journalists in economic and agricultural reporting. The Julius Fucik School of Solidarity in Prague for newscasters. The Jose Marti International Institute of Journal- ism in Havana for apprentice journalists. The IOJ also operates a cooperative program with a journalism school in Bucharest and a training center for Arab journalists in Baghdad. The IOJ further attempts to cultivate media organiza- tions and Ministries of Information directly through "world conferences" attended by editors, publishers, heads of news agencies, radio station managers, and ministers of information. These meetings publicize Soviet policies on world issues and promote the Soviet model of journalism with an elite media audience. The conferences also help the IOJ Secretariat make contacts, possibly leading to TASS development assis- tance, Novosti influence in the local media, or candi- date students for IOJ schools. Nationals of 90 developing countries responded to IOJ invitations to the most recent conference cosponsored Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 How the IOJAttempts To I~luence - Third World Journalists Geza Rybka, Director o,1'the IOJ Center in Budapest, describes the Center's method for posing Soviet news stories as alternatives to Western news reports, in effect placing propaganda on a par with news: Every student knows that there are four or five big news agencies that have monopolized the news flow allover the world. The students are usually aware of the fact that, until now, especially in foreign matters, they used to think the way UPI or Reuters thought. We simply try to open their eyes to the fact that there is another side to the story, there are other parts of the world, and that there are also other sources of information in the world that one can use for journalistic work. The teacher tries to suggest ideas like this: Did you hear a week ago what BBC said? And do you know what TASS wrote then? Try to compare it all-and you will get a basis for writing a good article. We introduced a new practice recently that every day the students listen alternately to Radio Mos- cow and BBC news. They compare the two, draw their own conclusions, and then report on some internationally important subject. So we try very tactfully, if I may say so, but very honestly to explain to students that a new informa- tion order is necessary and that it means also not accepting one agency exclusively as a source of information. The Democratic Journalist April 1984 with the North Korean Journalists' Union in 1983, the "World Conference of Journalists Against Imperi- alism and for Friendship and Peace" in Pyongyang, North Korea. The Pyongyang Times reported a large attendance from developing countries represented by: ? Thirty-one dailies and weeklies. ? Nine news agencies. ? Twenty-two Ministries of Information. ? Twenty-eight radio stations, publishing houses, in- stitutes of journalism, and universities. Cultivation of Journalists The Soviets take pains to follow up the ties developed in training programs and otherwise ensure that Soviet-supplied news is actually placed in the print .media of developing countries and, where possible, in the broadcast media. Novosti correspondents pay salaries or subsidize vaca- tions, cars, or duty-free goods to induce reporters, editors, or publishers to print unattributed stories and features favorable to Soviet points of view. The Soviets also attempt to dissuade news agency editors from using.Western wire service releases. They pay host-country journalists according to the "quality" of their work or their status in the hierarchy of their The.Novosti grant program for foreign journalists subsidizes two- or three-week visits to the USSR. The Novosti overseas correspondents who administer the program invite relatively young influential journalists, politicians, and artists who could not be considered While in the USSR, grantees meet selected Soviet Government officials and are entertained lav- ishly. They travel to Moscow, Leningrad, and another Soviet republic. Not extracting any firm commit- ments, Novosti nevertheless reportedly expects grant recipients to take away a more favorable impression of the USSR. Support for Independent Regional News Services Moscow has also supported regional news agencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for displacing the Western press. Soviet media endorsed the appearance of the nonaligned news agency pool in 1976 (now 25X1 . J 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Figure 3. Opening ojthe IOJ Forum for Peace in Paris on the rJPh anniversary oJ'the UNESCO Declaration on Mass Media. From leJ't to right, Kaarle Nordenstreng, !OJ pres- ident; Jiri Kubka, Secretary General; and Cerard Gatinot, presidium member called NAMEDIA), the Pan African News Agency (PANA) in 1979, the Organization of Asian News Agencies (DANA) in 1981, and the Latin American Agency for Special Information Services (ALASEI) in 1983. The IOJ endorsed the Association of ASEAN News Agencies as well. Moscow News, a Novosti publication, alleges that these regional news services are "breaking the monopoly" of the "big four" West- ern wire services. The Soviets offer substantial material aid to the nonaligned news agencies. TASS provides communi- cation links to NAMEDIA and OANA. Mexico City. ALASEI currently has contracted with 19 Latin American newspapers and news agencies to provide news services and information. UNESCO Visibility The Soviets have used UNESCO to demonstrate their support for the aspirations of developing countries in the media field.2 Specifically, the Soviets have pro- moted their model of journalism at UNESCO, at- tempted to discredit Western media, and cultivated 25X1 the caucuses of developing countries that parallel their views, according to US embassy reporting. ~~ tant ideological targets, Moscow regards UNESCO as one of its most impor- The Soviet delegation, in observing an Soviet fronts are directly involved in establishing some of these agencies. For example, the Federation of Latin American Newsmen (FELAP), regional affili- ate of the IOJ and previously headed by a Peruvian Communist journalist, organized ALASEI, exponential growth of the UNESCO publications budget in recent years, targeted the UNESCO infor- mation services as a vehicle for disseminating Soviet ' UNESCO sets standards and guidelines for the development of new media organizations in developing countries, funds confer- ences, and publishes studies and reports, several of which recently have encouraged realignment of world news production and dissem- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 propaganda to developing countries In 1972 the Soviets were the first to propose a so- called New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in a UNESCO General Conference. NWICO, as defined in UNESCO studies, would require governments to take responsibility for news printed or broadcast on their territory which, in turn,. would lead to licensing journalists working in their countries. Under NWICO, journalists would be guid- ed by codes of conduct prohibiting stories offensive to host governments. UNESCO's International Program for Development of Communications (IPDC) is particularly important to the Soviets. TASS Deputy Director General Krasi- kov, in a 1983 Pravda article, stated that the IPDC is useful to them for monitoring mass media in develop- ing countries as well as the alleged intrusion of the Western press in those countries, for helping to shape developing countries' information policies, influencing the allocation of multilateral aid, and creating a "new world media order" on an "anti-imperialistic founda- tion." IPDC provides seed money for developing news agencies at the regional level. Both NAMEDIA and PANA are partially funded by UNESCO. USIS reporting indicates that, aside from subscribers, UNESCO currently is PANA's only patron. The Soviets' methods and approaches for acquiring access to local media in the developing world have proved effective. In the formal aid agreements of 1984, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau agreed to restrict Western wire service reporting on the Soviet Union in favor of TASS reporting on the subject. Guyana and Suriname, additional aid recipients, have experienced a noticeable increase in the volume of Soviet press material appearing in local print and broadcast media, according to US embassy reporting. use TASS in combination with Western services. TASS's offers of a world news service at little or no cost have been particularly successful in Africa in cases where media cannot afford the cost or do not have the foreign exchange for a Western wire service. USIS reporting indicates.that a considerable portion of African print media, as well as a few radio stations, State Department and USIS post observers suggest the Soviets can place stories in more than 50 non-.Communist dailies and weeklies in developing countries. These outlets range from leftist newspapers in Mexico City, EI Dia (circulation 75,000) and Uno Mas Uno (circulation 70,000), used occasionally, to the pro-Soviet, Indian newspaper Blitz (circulation 350,000) and the magazine Link (circulation 12,000), used frequently (see table 3). Some are published by national liberation fronts. Several print Eastern Bloc and Cuban material as well as Soviet. The Soviets have access to all of these by having cultivated individual journalists who usual- ly print what is asked of them. Soviet .recruitment of individual senior journalists has enlisted some important people: ? Bargis Hamud Bargis, Director General of the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), works closely with the KGB resident in Kuwait, the US embassy reports. He supported the Soviet position in the international debate over the US embargo of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, arguing, for example, that the Soviets, by contrast with the United States, never mix politics with sports. His agency is influen- tial in the Gulf states as a news source: USIS reporting from Bahrain indicates that KUNA's Moscow bureau often carries Soviet stories that circulate in the Gulf. ? Yvonne Harewood-Benn, Minister of Public Service and Information in Guyana, has instructed editors of the state-owned Guyana Chronicle, the country's only daily, to use at least three or four TASS and Cuban Prensa Latina news items in each edition, allegedly to balance AP reports. She has apparently also urged the editors to use AP for "disaster news" or for quoting critics of US foreign policy, according to US embassy reporting. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Table 3 Pro-Soviet Print Media in Developing Countries and Estimated Circulation a Bahrain Al-Faqir NA Malaysia Chung Kuo Pao 42,000 Al-Jamahir Al-Shabiba Al Sh NA NA Mali L'Essor 40,000 - arara NA i Bangladesh Maur tius Horizons Nouveaux 4 500 Gonokantha 5,000 Nouveau Militant , 10 000 to 15 000 Sangbad 30,000 , , Brazil Mexico El Dia 75 000 Correio Brasilense 70,000 El National , 80,000 Cameroon El Sol de Mexico 95,000 Cameroon Tribune 20,000 El Universal 200,000 Cyprus Excelsior 184,000 Ta Nea . 3,000 Uno Mas Uno 70,000 Dominican Republic La Noticia NA Nepal Naya SamaJ 3,000 Samaya 18 000 Ecuador The Commoner , 7 000 Periodico Del Mediodia Siempre Nueva NA NA Nicaragua , Gh Barricada 40,000 ana Ghanaian Times Independent Echo 150,000 30,000 Peru El Diario de Marka 90,000 People's Evening News 40,000 El Observador 100,000 La Republica 200 000 Guyana Cartel , 10,000 initially Chronicle ' 60;000 , India Philippines Business Day 31 000 Blitz 350,000 Evening Post , 70 000 Bombay Daily 140,000 , Business Standard Hindustan Times 21,000 250,000 Seychelles Nation 4,000 Link 12,000 Sierra Leone News Today NA For Di People NA Patriot 34,000 New Times NA RajasthatyPatrika 120;000 Syria Statesman 220,000 Al Bath 25,000 Indonesia - Tishrin 35,000 Merdeka 130,000 Tanzania` Jordan Daily News 39,000 Ad-Dustur 65,000 Uhuru " 100,000 e Excluding pro-Soviet Communist Party and "vanguard" ruling revolutionary party publications. Source: The Europa Yearbook, 1983.. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 ? Aruna Asaf Ali, editorial board chairman of the Indian newspaper, Patriot, is closely associated with the Soviets in New Delhi. In December 1984 she reportedly collaborated with them in publishing articles on the Hardgrave Study, allegedly a "se- cret" study by a US academic on the future of India without Indira Gandhi, completed eight weeks be- fore the assassination. Publication of the articles is part of recent Soviet disinformation efforts to impli- cate the United States in Gandhi's death. ? Ahmedul Kabir, owner and editor of the Bangla- desh daily, Sangbad, reportedly has acquired a fortune through lucrative business contracts with the USSR. He follows Moscow's media line includ- ing the Gandhi assassination disinformation. Sang- bad is a daily supporting the political left in Bangladesh. ? Junius Lubis, the pro-Soviet managing editor of Merdeka (circulation 130,000), an Indonesian daily, recently reacquired this position after being relieved of it in the early 1980s when he was accused of accepting fees for placing Soviet stories in the paper. The paper itself has a history of financial problems, relieved in the 1970s by a loan from the Moscow Narodny bank in Singapore. The Soviets have helped to shape the UNESCO debate over realignment of international news services to focus almost exclusively on the alleged "colonial mentality" and "disaster news" orientation of the Western media and diverted attention from their own politicized, censored press. Successive Soviet draft resolutions at UNESCO General Conferences appeal to the pride of developing countries in establishing independent news agencies. Since several delegations represent governments that exercise political control over their domestic media, the Soviet resolutions, coupled with active lobbying in the corridors, win support, according to US embassy sources. Public Perceptions In terms of effectiveness with respect to a particular country, one of the clearest payoffs for the Soviets is Peru. US embassy reporting indicates noticeable Sovi- et access to the Peruvian media. The Soviets have invested heavily in Peru; they have 12 correspondents from Soviet print media, radio, and television in Lima in addition to a large Novosti bureau, said to be their best in Latin America. They entertain local journal- ists regularly and offer them "fees" to use Soviet stories and features. They are particularly influential in three Lima dailies and a weekly, all of which are financed by a Peruvian construction entrepreneur friendly to the Soviets: ? EI Diario de Marka. Although editorially indepen- dent as a leftist paper, it is the most outspoken and effective anti-US element in the Peruvian news media and consistently supports Soviet propaganda themes in its news coverage. the paper is not doing well financially ? El Observador. The Novosti bureau gave it special attention during a period of financial difficulty in 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret 1983, providing free East German newsprint and cash channeled through Bulgarian intermediaries, the paper reciprocated with blatantly pro-Soviet stories. The director of the paper previously worked at IOJ headquarters in Prague. ? La Republica. It frequently publishes pro-Soviet stories and is the most widely read daily in Peru, the US embassy reports. The same Peruvian magnate reportedly asked the Soviet Ambassador for finan- cial assistance to purchase additional shares of La Republica stock, however, to allow him to preserve a particularly leftist editorial line. ? Cartel. It has a hardline, pro-Soviet orientation and is intended to answer Caaretas, a popular non- communist Peruvian weekly, It draws on Novosti telex services and specially written stories for weekly publication. Writers cultivated through the Soviet-Peru Cultural Association publish anti-US features. The Soviets have been successful in Congo. During the 12 years when the United States had no diplomat- ic relations with Congo, 1965-77, Soviet and Eastern Bloc access to the Congolese media grew noticeably, according to the US Embassy. Currently, Congolese journalists accept IOJ scholarships to the East Berlin school for print media journalists, East German jour- nalists conduct seminars for them in Congo, and the Ministry of Information employs Soviet media advis- ers. The national news agency subscribes to TASS and ADN, the East German news service. Coverage of US social issues and foreign policy is highly selective and critical. French satellite TV news and . nearby Zairean programing help correct the Soviet version of world news, but Congolese print media frequently use Soviet stories. USIS post observer reporting suggests several other Soviet successes: ? The Botswana news agency used free TASS stories to reduce operating costs. ? Radio Mali, the country's only station, takes stories directly from the resident Radio Moscow correspon- dent with what observers report is a significant impact on listeners. The Soviets have relatively greater access to print media than to radio and TV in developing countries. Host governments tend to treat radio and TV as more valuable political resources and reserve themlor their own use. Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates, for example, ban Soviet me- dia from using their radio and TV but will allow them to print stories in local newspapers. ~Qfrican countries generally have the same attitude. In India, the Soviets can access the independent print media more handily than they can access government- controlled radio and TV. However, a few countries are exceptions: Syria and North Yemen allow the Soviets access to all media; both countries take direct news feed from Soviet TV. Radio Mali and Burundi radio also accept stories and features from resident Soviet correspondents. The Soviets do not seem to try as hard with TV as with radio. They have more competition on TVfrom American entertainment programing and, in ~gfrica, from the French overseas news service. TV audiences are smaller than radio audiences (with the exception of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Ma- laysia, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have more TV sets than radios: see table 4J. Soviet media agencies have relatively greater access in a few countries with radio than with TV, except possibly Syria and North Yemen. 25X1 25X1 25X1 ? TASS provides Shihata, the Tanzanian news agency, with its world news service at a concession- ary price, which, together with the political inclina- tions of editors, produces more news of Soviet origin than Reuters-origin appearing in the press. 25X1 ? Soviet-attributed advertisements in daily papers have increased both in Costa Rica and Ecuador, which, in the post observers' judgment, affects public opinion toward US Central American policies. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Table 4 Radios and TVs in Developing Countries e Angola 130 22 Benin 68 13 Botswana 7$ NA Burkina 116 15 Cameroon 780 NA Central African Republic 85 NA Chad 75 NA Congo 96 5 Djibouti 18 11 Ethiopia 2,000 36 Gabon 100 20 Gambia, The 100 NA Ghana 2,000 71 Guinea 125 8 Guinea-Bissau 20 NA Ivory Coast 800 562 Kenya 580 75 Liberia 330 35 Madagascar 910 71 Malawi 500 NA Mali 102 NA Mauritius 95 NA Mozambique 275 1 Niger 160 11 Nigeria 5,800 457 Senegal 320 50 Sierra Leone 100 21 Somalia 95 NA Sudan 1,400 109 Tanzania 2,000 9 Togo 190 8 Uganda 280 75 Zaire 500 12 Zambia 150 76 Zimbabwe 200 97 Asia Afghanistan 135 13 Bangladesh 770 252 Bhutan 12 NA Brunei 50 30 India 22,000 b 2,095 Indonesia 6,550 3,000 Laos 225 NA Malaysia 250 1,040 Mauritius 115 85 Nepal 300 NA Pakistan 1,500 1,000 Philippines 2,185 955 Singapore 490 421 Sri Lanka 3,000 50 Thailand 7,200 3,000 Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South America - Argentina 10,000 5,910 Bahamas, The 115 50 Barbados 191 52 Belize 71 NA Bolivia 480 386 Brazil 17,500 12,425 Chile 3,250 2,643 Colombia 3,025 1,800 Costa Rica 190 450 Dominican Republic 225 388 Ecuador 1,800 135 El Salvador 900 300 French Guiana 40 10 Grenada 50 NA Guatemala 500 202 Guyana 300 NA Haiti 120 30 Honduras 1,535 135 Jamaica 857 200 Mexico 21,000 7,550 Netherlands Antilles 175 57 Nicaragua 200 127 Panama 290 227 Paraguay 198 81 Peru 2,200 860 St. Lucia 90 3 Suriname 185 3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Table 4 Thousands Radios and TVs in Developing Countries e (continued) Caribbean, Mexico, Central and Soutb America (continued) Trinidad and Tobago 355 300 Uruguay 1,655 368 Venezuela 5,000 2,000 Middle East and Nortb Africa Algeria 3,500 1,325 Bahrain 140 121 Cyprus 400 111 Egypt 8,000 3;850 Iran 7,500 2,000 Iraq 2,200 535 Israel 1,050 600 Jordan 546 201 Kuwait 710 575 Lebanon 1,500 450 Libya 165 170 Oman 250 45 Qatar 75 110 Saudi Arabia ? 2,700 3,500 Syria 1,800 405 Tunisia 1,124 291 United Arab Emirates 100 100 Yemen Arab Republic 110 27 Yemen, People's Democratic 111 37 The Soviets have excellent access to the non-Commu- nist print media and news agencies of India. The vernacular-language press is particularly vulnerable to Soviet influence because many of the papers are resource poor. The Soviets provide them with cash, entertainment, and paid advertisements from Indian firms trading with the USSR. Other forms of induct;- ment include- scholarships to sons and daughters of low-ranking journalists for study in the USSR, prom- ises of better paying jobs through Soviet and Commu- nist Party contacts in India, and regular supplies of scotch, according to embassy reporting. The Indian wire service, Press Trust of India (PTI), has been called Press TASS of India because of closeness with TASS both in Moscow and New Delhi as well as frequent association with Soviet disinforma- tion. US embassy reporting indicates that a number of pro-Soviet journalists are present in PTI. Another wire service, India Press Agency (IPA), specializing in news features, frequently conveys Soviet disinforma- tion. IPA is managed and staffed with journalists trained at Link and Patriot, two pro-Soviet publica- tions. In part because of the Soviets' co-opting some devel- oping country media, US Government agencies as well as private-sector firms face an increasingly hos- tile press in developing countries in which the Soviets Republic of have created working relationships with local and e Estimated by World Radio TV Handbook, 1984. national media. India, particularly, has many newspa- n Handbook figure may be low because of the absence of an official pers hostile toward the United States editorially. The Government of India statistic. ? TASS and Novosti have close ties with the Syrian media which allow prominent play for Soviet stories, usually attacks on US Middle East policies, Soviet-aided print media of Congo-Brazzaville have produced distorted reporting about the United States for several years with the result that the Congolese public does not have an accurate or balanced under- standing of US domestic or foreign policies, the US Embassy reports. The Western wire services are experiencing rising competition from TASS in developing countries. Comparative costs of a subsidized service versus a 25X1 25X1 25X1 ? The pro-Soviet bias of North Yemeni editors, trained via scholarships to schools in the USSR, enables TASS to make front page news and commentary. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Moscow's eJ3"ort to access the media in developing countries directly competes with the "bigfour" West- ern wire services which, until the 1970s, were the sole source ojforeign newslor many such countries. The Associated Press (APJ, in New York; United Press International (UPIJ, in Washington; Reuters, in Lon- don; and Agence France Presse (AFP), in Paris, have news bureaus in over 100 developing countries and are highly competitive. All but government-owned AFP are owned by cooperative press associations. The Soviets also compete with the Chinese agency, Xinhua, in several African and Asian countries and with the Yugoslav news service, Tanjug, which is influential in nonaligned regional news services. service at market prices are a disincentive for develop- ing news agencies to use the Western wire services. The differential assures TASS of access to new clients. The Western wire services usually require payments in hard currency, which many developing countries lack. Constraints The. Soviets, however, have not had easy access to all developing-country media. Some countries have taken reprisals against the Soviet overseas media for fla- grant abuses of their trade: ? Zambia initially tolerated a Novosti correspondent's behavior in Lusaka in the late 1970s. He took a high-visibility approach in propagandizing Zambi- ans by mailing Soviet publications to educational institutions, holding lectures and discussions on . Soviet propaganda themes, and instructing Soviet teachers in Zambian schools. He gave SWAPO and African National Congress offices in Lusaka type- writers, copiers, and editorial assistance for their monthly newsletters. Finally, Zambian authorities accused him of instigating student demonstrations at the University of Zambia, and expelled him, ? Cameroon limits importation of Soviet propaganda material, but the Novosti office smuggled Soviet magazines into the country via Aeroflot in disregard of Cameroonian regulations. In 1978, when Aeroflot delivered magazines in cartons marked "pharma- ceuticals," the Cameroon customs service confiscat- ed them, severely criticized the Soviets, and warned of harsher actions if further incidents occurred, Moscow. In addition, policy differences with host governments may limit Soviet media activity. In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan forced the Soviets to close their Karachi information office, the US Embassy reported. Further, the Soviets some- times impede their own efforts with bureaucratic inertia. Nigeria recently abrogated a news exchange agreement with TASS because of Soviet bureaucratic delays in opening a Nigerian news agency bureau in The reputation TASS and Novosti have as havens for KGB operations precedes them in some countries: 25X1 ~~ ? Djibouti studiously ignored the TASS media aid 25X1 package when the Soviet Ambassador offered it to 25X1 the government in May 1984, ? Mauritius refused TASS facilities in 1980 when the Soviet Ambassador requested them, according to US embassy reporting. Another limiting factor on the Soviets' ability to influence developing media is a lack of commitment by some journalists whom they have attempted to cultivate. Some of the senior journalists whom IOJ has entertained at its "world conferences" may have 25X1, ~. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 accepted invitations simply to take advantage of the free airfare and accommodations. The Malian vice president of IOJ, for example, not only attended the Pyongyang conference in 1983, but also has accepted USIA travel grants, the US embassy reports. Similar- ly, trainees who enroll in IOJ or USSR schools for an education in journalism may be there because they lacked other scholarship options. Outlook We fully expect the Soviets to continue to increase their media presence in developing countries: ? TASS gained four new clients in 1984 for media development assistance and almost certainly will solicit additional ones in 1985. ? The Novosti visitor program for developing-country journalists will expand under the patronage of the Soviet Central Committee. ? Novosti has a new wire service, dedicated to devel- oping-country news agencies, inaugurated in 1983. ? IOJ programs appear to be slated for expansion; the Havana school, in particular, will increase the num- ber of its Latin American students; IOJ African members are lobbying for a new IOJ school in Africa The Soviet effort occurs when several governments of developing countries are independently creating ob- stacles for Western reporters in their countries. Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda, and Zambia have denied visas to Western reporters assigned to cover wars, coups, or economic conditions in their countries within the last year, according to the West- ern press. If reporters are allowed entry, they are closely monitored. For example, Iraqi taxi drivers, working for the Information Ministry, have prevented Western press photographers from taking pictures of economic conditions suggesting poverty or backward- ness in Iraq. Iraq also has confiscated foreign journa- lists' typewriters at the airport. Western reporters' access to several African countries is encumbered with lengthy visa hassles. Latin American countries remain relatively open to the Western media, al- though Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador require for- eign reporters to register with government-sponsored journalists' organizations. Under these conditions, the Soviet effort creates additional obstacles for Western media access. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 Secret Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/19 :CIA-RDP90T01298R000300010001-0 1