CASTRO S REACH INTO THE THIRD WORLD: THE CUBAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000300070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
Secret
C/ 85-10134/S
July 1985
Copy ~ 4 9
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Secret
Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
Secret
G/ 85-10134/5
July 1985
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 30 March ! 985
was used in this report.
Assistance Program
Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Western government programs.
Over the last decade Fidel Castro has made Cuba's economic assistance
program an important vehicle for exercising influence in the Third World.
Some 20,000 Cuban technicians operate within 32 non-Communist LDCs,
and Cuba hosts more than 26,000 students from about 75 Third World
countries. In terms of technicians abroad, this program is larger than most
Cuba's rapid success in building this major program is because of several
factors:
? The Castro regime has been able to respond quickly to politically
favorable developments in Third World countries. For example, within a
month of the Sandinista's victory, Cuban personnel were arriving in
Nicaragua.
? Havana gets its foot in the door by playing on its Third World credentials
and starting with minimal, low-key forms of assistance-for example,
scholarships to attend Cuban schools. Cuba has successfully exploited its
cultural heritage by placing approximately two-thirds of its overseas
civilian technicians in 10 Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking countries.
in terms of generosity.
? The Cuban program is designed to meet the needs of many Third World
countries. Cuba concentrates on providing the services of personnel often
in short supply in most LDCs-teachers, doctors, and construction
workers. The Cubans generally require that recipient countries pick up
only the local costs of Cuban personnel, plus transportation expenses.
Among Communist aid donors, only the Chinese program is comparable
Because Cuba's assistance program relies heavily on the provision of
expertise that it has in abundance and incurs almost no hard currency
expenditures, it presents only a minimal drain on the Cuban economy and
is acost-effective vehicle for establishing a substantial Cuban presence in
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Important payoffs of this
presence include:
Ideological influence in several Third World planning ministries. The
Cubans have placed 1,000 to 1,500 technicians in the ministries and
planning agencies of more than 20 Third World countries. In Angola,
Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and
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GI 85-10!34/S
July 1985
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Principe, South Yemen, and Tanzania, Havana has been able to place
substantial numbers of these experts in decisionmaking positions for
extended periods of time.
? A long-term investment in Third World influence through the education
in Cuba of thousands of LDC students. Most of these individuals are
beginning to return home, many after almost a decade in Cuban schools.
As they advance in their careers, the possibilities for Cuban access and
influence will increase significantly.
? The development and consolidation of a number of leftist regimes.
Activities in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua account for
most Cuban assistance. In Nicaragua, Cuba's economic assistance has
made significant contributions to that country's military preparedness,
and in recent years has provided 60 percent of its rural teaching force
and 10 percent of its entire educational corps.
? Political footholds in many Third World countries-particularly in
Africa. Modest programs in such countries as Burkina, Ghana, and
Guyana probably will expand in the next few years.
? Hard currency earnings. From countries that have substantial oil reve-
nues-Angola, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya-Cuba charges for the provision
of technical personnel; such fees totaled $100 million last year.
The Cuban program is an important complement to those of the other
Communist Bloc countries. By concentrating on the provision of technical
personnel at the grassroots, Cuban aid adds an extra dimension to the
efforts of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union
does not bankroll the Cuban program and formal high-level coordination
with other assistance efforts is the exception rather than the rule, Cuba oc-
casionally supplies technicians for Bloc-sponsored projects and is involved
in the limited coordination of activities in the field.
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Despite the program's successes, translating economic assistance into
durable Cuban influence in the Third World has been difficult. Many
Cuban economic technicians-construction and medical workers-are
neither well positioned nor well prepared to act as political emissaries, and
LDC dissatisfaction with Cuban personnel surfaces frequently. Further,
many Third World governments approach their dealings with a "buyer's
market" mentality and seek to maximize Cuban aid while resisting Cuban
political leverage. Finally, internal political developments and external
factors beyond Cuba's control have in recent years forced Cuban pullouts
from Chile, Grenada, Iraq, Jamaica, and Somalia.
Nonetheless, Castro seems satisfied with the results of his economic
assistance program, and we expect that he will continue to search actively
for new opportunities to use aid for political benefit. Significant expansion
of the economic assistance program depends largely upon the prospects for
new Cuban-supported revolutions. Excluding such developments, we see
only modest opportunities for expansion of the Cuban program-with
Havana taking advantage of new opportunities-primarily in Sub-Saharan
Africa, as the future of some currently large contingents becomes more
uncertain. We anticipate that Cuban hard currency needs will make
Havana more aggressive in exploiting opportunities for providing technical
personnel on a commercial basis in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America.
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Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
The direction of Cuba's foreign policy-including the
provision of economic assistance-begins and ends
with Fidel Castro. Castro's need to sustain his self-
image as a successful revolutionary is a primary
motivator of his international activism. Up through
the 1960s, Castro focused on sponsoring armed expe-
ditions abroad to try to overthrow Latin American
regimes. More recently, he has broadened his ap-
proach to include more internationally acceptable
ways to prove the depth of his revolutionary commit-
Although Castro's commitment to Third World aid
has ideological roots, other factors are important as
well:
? Castro proudly claims Cuba is the preeminent Third
World country in education and public health, and
its economic assistance program advertises these
and other accomplishments of the revolution in a
positive manner.
?. Castro also hopes the assistance program will main-
tain asense of revolutionary mission and divert
popular attention away from domestic problems.
Castro has reminded technicians going overseas that
their work is "a moral duty, a revolutionary duty, a
duty of principle, a duty of conscience, an ideologi-
cal duty."
Castro undoubtedly expects that economic assis-
tance will encourage the development of pro-Cuban
regimes and policies.
Revolutionary struggle in the 1960s:
? The only road to socialism is insurrection.
? Create "two, three, many Vietnams" in Latin
America.
? Armed expeditions.
? A handful ojmedical and agricultural personnel in
a few African countries.
? International isolation.
From confrontation to cooperation in the early 1970s:
? International legitimization through good will.
? Quest for broader diplomatic and trade relations.
? Minor emergency relief from natural disasters for
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru.
? More opportunities for small numbers of personnel
in Africa.
? Less than 1,500 Cuban civilians in 11 Third World
countries in 1975.
Rapid expansion in the second haljojthe 1970s:
? Angola, then Mozambique, and Ethiopia in Africa.
? Jamaica, Grenada, and finally Nicaragua in Latin
America.
? Large-scale teaching and medical contingents.
? Construction for profit in Libya and Iraq.
? Wide proliferation ojsmall-scale aid to Africa.
Setbacks and new opportunities since 1980:
? Departure from Jamaica, Grenada, Suriname.
? Rebel attacks in Nicaragua and Angola.
? War-related removal ojmost personnel from Iraq.
? Repayments problems with Angola and Libya.
? Minor setbacks, yet seven new recipients in Africa.
? In several countries where Havana charges for its
technicians, the program helps satisfy Cuban for-
eign exchange needs. Castro openly admits that
Cuba sends its technical services personnel abroad
partly to help with Cuba's foreign debt difficulties.
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Table 1
Cuban Economic Technicians in the Third World, 1984 a
225
20
Sub-Saharan Africa
9,060
Angola
6,000
Benin
30
Ten years ago Havana had less than 1,500 economic
assistance personnel in only I 1 countries. As favorable
political changes occurred in the LDCs-a few with
the aid of Cuban military assistance-Cuba moved
with impressive speed to help consolidate these re-
gimes through economic assistance relationships.
From 1974 through 1979 Havana sent thousands of
civilian technicians to Angola and-in rapid succes-
sion-to Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.
Working relationships were also forged with Libya
and Iraq. By 1981, 23,000 Cuban technicians were
operating in 28 LDCs.
Since then, Havana has established a new presence in
six more LDCs, but the program has also experienced
a number of setbacks. Today, there are about 4,000
fewer Cuban civilians abroad than there were four
100
100
years ago. The newly elected Seaga government asked
all of the estimated 650 Cuban technicians to depart
Jamaica in 198 L In the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq
war caused Havana to pull from Iraq about 90
percent of its estimated 3,500 workers. The ouster of
Cuban technicians from Grenada in 1983 was accom-
panied by Suriname's rejection of what was then a
promising relationship with Havana. In Nicaragua,
the phasing out of teachers helped cause the Cuban
civilian presence last year to drop by almost 1,000
from its high of 6,200 three years ago.
Last year the Cuban economic assistance program
placed almost 20,000 technicians in 32 non-Commu-
nist Third World countries (table 1). More than three-
fourths were African states; only Nicaragua and, to a
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lesser extent, Guyana and Mexico hosted significant
numbers of Cuban technicians in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Angola topped the list with an estimated 6,000
Cuban civilians, Nicaragua had 5,300, and Libya had
about 3,500. Ethiopia and Mozambique also had
substantial, but smaller, contingents. Although
Havana charged fees for about one-half of its person-
nel, these assistance-for-hire technicians were present
in only four countries.
Primarily Technical Services
Unlike the assistance programs of both Western
donors and other Communist nations, the Cuban
effort has focused on the provision of technical serv-
ices, as opposed to material or financial aid. In fact,
the Cuban program sponsors more economic techni-
cians abroad than most Western governments. We
estimate that less than 25 percent of Cuban aid has
been grants of capital goods and other materials.
Usually, recipient countries procure the materials
Cuban technicians use, often from Cuba itself. Cuba
has made substantial grants of material aid only to
Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua-the poorer coun-
tries it considers important targets. Even in these
countries, the amounts and types of such aid repre-
sent, by Western standards, only token commitments
and consist of such items as light industrial facilities,
supplies for construction projects, fishing boats,
breeding stock and equipment for animal husbandry
centers, school materials, foodstuffs, clothing, and
medical supplies. It is even more rare for the Cubans
to provide credits. We are aware of only two in-
stances-Nicaragua and Grenada-where Havana
financed projects, $50 million and $11 million, respec-
tively. Moreover, earlier this year Castro announced
Cuba would convert the Nicaraguan loan to a grant.
More than three-fourths of the Cuban economic
technicians in the Third World work in three occupa-
tional categories: public health, education, and con-
struction (figure 1). Cuban expertise in each of these
sectors is rather basic. Although many LDCs appeal
for specialists, most of the doctors among the more
than 2,000 Cuban medical personnel abroad are
general practitioners. Moreover, about 10 percent are
students who are completing their internship require-
ment while serving abroad. In the education field,
most Cuban teachers teach at the primary and sec-
ondary levels or conduct adult literacy training. At
Figure 1
Sectoral Distribution of Cuban Economic
Technicians in LDCs, 1984
Third World universities they often teach practical
subjects such as agronomy, veterinary science, engi-
neering, and general medicine. The limited skills of
Havana's construction personnel usually restrict their
activities to manual labor on large industrial projects
and simple construction work, such as housing,
schools, roads, bridges, and small-scale irrigation
systems.
The other one-fourth of the Cuban technicians per-
form avariety of advisory services; most work on
agricultural problems in remote areas. Typically, only
a few Cubans work directly for middle- and high-level
decisionmakers in Third World ministries and plan-
ning agencies; but in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
and Nicaragua the number of Cuban technicians in
planning agencies is substantial.
Training LDC Students in Cuba
Havana also invites large numbers of Third World
students to Cuba, usually on fully paid scholarships.
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Figure 2
Third World Countries With Students in Cuba, 1984
Guyana
Number of Students
500 and above
- less than 500
Nuic: PLO has Icss Than 500 stuJents
We estimate the number of students-from more
than 75 countries-at more than 26,000 (table 2). The
program is highly focused geographically: about
three-fourths of all foreign students in Cuba come
from Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and
Nicaragua.' Five other African countries, as well as
South Yemen, currently have 500 or more students in
Cuba (figure 2).
.Like the rest of the Cuban economic assistance effort,
the student program accelerated only in the late
1970s. `A large part of the growth-total Third World
enrollment has tripled in the last 10 years-is attrib-
utable to the establishment of schools on the so-called
Isle of Youth, just south of western Cuba. Currently,
21 of the island's 60 schools are set aside for foreign-
ers; each school can accommodate about 600 students
for eight years at a time and the curriculum centers
on the blending of academic training and agricultural
labor. The first foreign students arrived there in 1977;
last year there were some 12,000 elementary and high
school students from 1 1 Third World countries.
Postsecondary foreign students in Cuba enroll in
Cuban universities (especially the University of Ha-
vana), technical schools operated by government min-
istries, and schools run by the party and associated
political organizations. The academic and technical
programs typically deal with such common Third
World problems as basic education, public health,
agriculture, and infrastructure development. Up to
500 students are enrolled in programs that emphasize
ideology, political organization, journalism, and
propaganda.
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Table 2
Third World Students in Cuba, 1984 a
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Cuban economic assistance complements other Com-
munist Bloc activities in the LDCs. Generally,
Havana sends people, and larger Bloc programs
finance more expensive and capital-intensive projects.
Havana has specialized in educational assistance-
Third World students constitute almost 1 percent of
the total student population in Cuba. Only Havana
places large teaching contingents in individual LDCs.
Several Third World countries-Angola and Nicara-
gua are the best examples-have substantially more
Cuban than other Bloc technicians.
Some coordination of Cuban activities with other Bloc
programs occurs as well. In Africa, Cuban personnel
in recent years have worked jointly with the East
Germans and Bulgarians. We believe that Castro uses
his assistance program to demonstrate to Moscow that
its support of Cuba is a worthwhile investment.
There is little evidence that the USSR bankrolls
Cuban economic assistance efforts or that Cuban
activities are planned in Moscow. Havana's program
does not need much outside help because it is a low-
cost operation. Most of Cuba's foreign projects re-
quire only the simple technologies and skills indige-
nous to Cuba. Although Cuba's substantial domestic
investment in public health and education-which
enables Castro to send thousands of teachers and
doctors abroad-would have been impossible without
funds derived from Soviet trade subsidies, we believe
these decisions were Castro's and not Moscow's.
Moreover, there is occasional friction between the
Soviets and Cubans on aid issues.
Political considerations often join with economic reali-
ties to make Cuba an attractive source of economic
assistance to Third World countries. Political sympa-
thies underlie most of Havana's success in creating
aid-based ties to the Third World. Within four
months of the leftist Rawlings coup in 1982, for
example, Ghana signed the initial aid agreement with
Cuba that Havana had pursued for several years
without success. In the absence of strong ideological
bonds, however, Third World countries often cite the
promotion of South-South solidarity or nonaligned
credentials as the driving factor. Some leaders openly
admire Cuba's capability for activism in the Third
World.
Among economic factors, Cuba offers assistance well
suited to Third World economies and charges little or
nothing for it. In the field of education, Havana
specializes in delivering basic instruction, such as
literacy training, to remote areas. Most Cuban medi-
cal technicians provide routine care to rural populaces
that usually have infrequent access to medical ser-
vices. In construction work, Havana focuses on simple
housing,. school, and road projects.
These services appeal to financially strapped LDCs
because Havana usually sends its personnel free of
charge. Cuba pays the salaries of its technicians in
Cuban pesos, and the host country is obligated to
provide the necessary materials and equipment, food,
housing, a personal spending allowance, and local and
international transportation. Among Communist aid
donors, only the Chinese program is comparable in
terms of generosity. In lieu of providing much materi-
al assistance or financing, Havana often helps LDCs
procure supplies for Cuban aid projects at the cheap-
est possible price on the open market. We believe that
in countries that can afford to pay-Algeria, Angola,
Iraq, and Libya-Cuban charges often are well below
market rates.
Havana also has some sociocultural advantages over a
number of other aid donors. Cuba has successfully
exploited cultural heritage by placing approximately
two-thirds of its overseas civilian technicians in 10
Portuguese- or Spanish-speaking countries. Cubans
also are more accustomed than Western or even other
Bloc technicians to the deprivations often encountered
while serving in an LDC. Several years ago, Iraq
wanted Cuban doctors because they were the only
ones willing to work outside the capital (see photos at
the back).
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Cuba has used military assistance-mainly personnel
and training support-to Third World regimes in
tandem with its economic assistance program. Such
assistance helps strengthen existing Cuban relations
with recipient countries through their military estab-
lishments. In Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua,
where Cuban support contributes to the survival of
Marxist regimes, the military program is more im-
portant than the economic program.
The military effort places more than twice as many
personnel abroad as the economic program, but only
in about one-haU'as many countries. Last year the
Cubans had more than 43,000 soldiers and advisers
in the Third World. Angola is by far the largest
recipient, followed by Ethiopia and Nicaragua. A
better perspective on the relative dimensions of the
two programs, however, is revealed by the fact that, (J'
Havana's estimated 35,000 plus military personnel
were to return homelrom Angola, Cuban civilians in
the Third World would outnumber their military
counterparts by almost 3 to 1.
We estimate that the cumulative value of Cuban
economic aid to the Third World to date amounts to
more than $400 million, averaging about $75 million
annually in recent years (figure 3). This includes the
value of service personnel sent overseas (based on
domestic Cuban wage scales), donated goods and
materials, and aid credits. These costs entail almost
no hard currency expenditures, however, because
Havana normally loses only the peso wages of its
overseas personnel, plus whatever benefit their ser-
vices would have produced at home. Moreover, Cuban
hard currency contracts with a few LDCs more than
offset the costs of its aid to the rest of the Third
World. The large number of personnel trained as a
result of the postrevolutionary concentration on the
education, agriculture, and public health sectors pro-
vides Castro with a ready supply of technicians. In
addition to the cost of technical services, Cuba also
contributes limited amounts of material aid to LDCs.
Usually this consists either of products Cuba has an
Cuban economic and military assistance often pro-
ceed hand in hand, although many LDCs consider the
acceptance of civilian aid a less controversial, and
thus easier, step to take. The result is that Havana's
economic program covers more countries. In the cases
of Angola and Nicaragua, however, military aid
preceded economic ties and helped bring to power
regimeslavorably disposed to close Cuban ties, in-
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comparatively lower profile of Cuban economic assis-
tance activities in general also makes them less
subject to disruption than the military program. In
Angola, for example, succes.Ff'ul negotiationslor the
removal of Cuban personnel would still leave some
6,000 civilian technicians in place to advance Cuban
interests.
Occasionally, the distinction between Cuban military
and economic assistance activities has become
blurred. In Nicaragua, for example, civilian construc-
tion workers have helped with the military's new
Punta Huete airfield.
adequate supply of (cement or sugar, for example) or
small amounts of goods such as medicine, food, or
clothing
Cuban economic assistance to Nicaragua, because of
the substantial amount of material aid and large
numbers of technicians, currently accounts for three-
fourths of Havana's total aid to the Third World.
Deliveries to Nicaragua to date include a 13,000-ton
merchant ship; heavy machinery and other construc-
tion materials; fishing boats; prefabricated housing
plants; and agricultural, railroad, light industrial, and
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Cuban Techniques for Creating
an Aid Relationship
The Cubans use a wide range of methods in the Third
World to improve their image, expand bilateral com-
munications, and thereby pave the way for a physical
presence through aid ties. These techniques often rely
on innocuous themes and so are diffccult for even
skeptical LDCs to spurn.
Havana often begins by urging better diplomatic
relations. A consular convention or other type of
foreign relations cooperation agreement may follow.
Simultaneously, Cuba usually seeks expanded trade
ties, best of all in a trade agreement. A routine civil
aviation agreement can ease bilateral travel.
The next steps forward are low-level bilateral ex-
changes in politically neutral realms. Friendship
societies, sports, performing arts, and science ex-
changes are favorites. A delegation may be invited to
visit Cuba to witness the revolution's progress, the
hoped Jor result being a limited cooperation agree-
ment. Last year at least one dozen LDCs without aid
ties to Cuba signed agreements with Havana. Many
of these accords include fully paid scholarships to
Cuba for LDC trainees.
[f an LDC is judged to have immediate or special
needs, Havana will focus its initial aid overtures on
those areas. In the wake of natural disasters, Cuba
has delivered small amounts of emergency relief aid
to a number of countries-including Bolivia, Ecua-
dor, Peru, and even Nicaragua prior to the fall of
Somoza. Cuba has also provided personal security
assistance to Third World leaders
Establishment of a Joint Commission for Economic
and Scientific-Technical Cooperation cements
Cuban-LDC aid relationships and is the primary
mechanism for decisions on the provision of Cuban
personnel and other aid. The commission is a perma-
nent body that schedules annual meetings. The entire
range of activities is discussed, and a formal protocol
specifying the upcoming year's program is signed.
Cuba currently has joint commissions with 29 LDCs
(table 3J.
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Cuba trys to limit the cost of educating foreign
students by training them in Cuba. We estimate Cuba
currently budgets the peso equivalent of about $10
million annually for this part of the program. Most
students receive full scholarships that include tuition,
educational materials, room and board, clothing, and
medical care. The accommodations, food, and other
provisions of the scholarships are rudimentary at best.
Some scholarships also are funded by the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance.
The Isle of Youth students-accounting for nearly 50
percent of the Third World students in Cuba-are
less of a burden for Havana than those enrolled in
universities and technical schools, and may even be
profitable. As much as one-third of the faculty at the
Isle of Youth schools is provided by the participating
Third World countries. The students are responsible
for the basic maintenance of their facilities and are
required to donate 18 hours of agricultural work every
week in surrounding citrus groves, according to open
sources. Cuban Education Minister Fernandez him-
self has openly estimated that, after the initial three
years of operation, the agricultural output from Isle of
Youth schools more than offsets construction costs
and operating expenses.
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Table 3
Cuban-LDC Joint Commissions
for Economic Cooperation
Date
Estab-
lished
Date
Estab-
lished
Algeria
1979
Libya
1977
Angola
1976
Madagascar
1979
Argentina
1984
Mali
1982
Burkina
1983
Mauritania
1983
Cape Verde
1979
Mozambique
1977
Chile
1971 a
Nicaragua
1980
Congo
1979
Nigeria
1981
Ethiopia
1977
Peru
1973
Ghana
1982
Seychelles
1980
Grenada
1979 a
South Yemen
1977
Guinea
1979
Spain
1983
Guinea-Bissau
1978
Suriname
1982 a
The assistance program has been instrumental in
providing Castro with an impressive reach into the
Third World-32 countries at present and 40 over the
years. Cuban ties to many of these countries would
exist even in the absence of economic assistance; the
aid provides Cuba with a broader range of fronts on
which to make an impact. Through the physical
presence of technicians, Havana transmits its views on
domestic and international issues to host-country na-
tionals. Joint economic cooperation commissions bring
together a wide range of middle- and high-level
representatives from both sides. For Third World
leaders, economic assistance is a tangible demonstra-
tion of support that lends credibility to Cuban profes-
sions of commitment.
Teachers potentially are Havana's best instruments
for influencing the popular masses in the Third
Figure 3
Cuban Economic Programs in the
Third World, 1975-84
.Hard currency
charges to
Algeria, Angola,
Iraq, and Libya
World. Castro has openly stated that Cuban educa-
tional assistance is intended to exert long-term influ-
ence in the Third World. In Angola last year, accord-
ing to the Cuban press, Cuban teachers were active in
16 of the country's 18 provinces, teaching an estimat-
ed 100,000 students. The Cubans incorporate leftist
viewpoints in their lessons; the books they use reflect
Cuban ideology and are often translations of Cuban
texts. Open sources indicate Cuban educational ex-
perts used the Cuban model to help shape the organi-
zation of school systems in Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau,
Nicaragua, South Yemen, and Tanzania.
Another important vehicle for influence is the esti-
mated 1,000 to 1,500 Cuban technicians placed in the
ministries and planning agencies of more than 20
Third World countries. Working with the recipient
country's middle- and high-level professionals on a
daily basis, they assist in economic planning, trade
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In addition to the estimated $400 million worth of
aid that Cuba has provided to the Third World, it
has also provided assistance for a fee. Havana's
activities in Algeria, Angola, Iraq, and Libya-where
the Cubans charge a hard currency fee-represent an
economic plus. Payments from these oil-producing
countries-ranging from $4,800 to $18,000 a year per
technician-go directly to Havana and more than
cover associated costs. We estimate that Cuban
charges to these countries last year totaled nearly
$100 million.
Havana's actual annual receipts from these activities
are difficult to quantify because of reported repay-
ments problems. A January announcement by Presi-
dent dos Santos indicates that Cuba probably. has
deferred Angolan payments for economic assistance.
In any case,
Havana is aggressively pursuing
assistance for-hire arrangements with at least four
new clients, and we believe its hard currency earnings
from such activities will increase.
Trade expansion and the reduction of domestic un-
employment are additional benefits of Cuban pro-
grams, whether performed without charge or for
payment. Many Third World recipients of Cuban
technicians buy the necessary materials and equip-
ment from Havana, and Cuban officials incorporate
the export of associated goods into their aid propos-
als. The dispatch of personnel overseas also slightly
reduces domestic unemployment, a side benefit for a
country whose rapidly growing work force is already
underemployed:
development, agricultural reorganization, mass com-
munications, labor relations, and sociocultural affairs.
In several countries-for example, Angola, Congo,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sao
Tome and Principe, South Yemen, and Tanzania-
Havana has been able to place substantial numbers of
these experts in decisionmaking positions for extended
periods of time.
Cuba has used several facets of its educational assis-
tance program to try to convert routine academic and
technical training into influence. Many Third World
students enrolled in Cuban ro rams receive olitical
trainin .
On the Isle of Youth, Havana
attempts to indoctrinate thousands of younger, more
impressionable students through awork-study regi-
men-unique among educational assistance pro-
grams-that can last for up to eight years for each
student.
The full impact of the Third World student program
will not register for another five to 10 years. Most of
the initial group of Isle of Youth students have been
back in their home countries less than two years, and
students with academic promise (those most likely to
find influential jobs) have continued on into the
Cuban university system. We already are aware of a
limited number of Cuban successes. For example,
Guyana's Agriculture and Health Ministers are both
alumni of the Cuban educational system; Health
Minister Van West-Charles, President Burnham's
son-in-law, heads up the economic cooperation com-
mission between the two countries. In Ghana, a key
adviser to the ruling Provisional National Defense
Council is a Cuban alumnus.
A variety of factors-ranging. from inefficiencies in
the aid effort to internal political factors-combine to
set limits on translating Cuban economic assistance
into durable influence in the Third World.
We estimate that less than one-half of the Cuban
civilians in the Third World are good candidates to
function as effective purveyors of pro-Cuban views.
More than 40 percent of the Cuban overseas work
force is made up of construction workers and, al-
though their activities contribute to a favorable image
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Secret
Cuban assistance to Nicaragua-totaling nearly
$300 million to date-has contributed significantly
to the consolidation of the Sandinista regime over the
last.five years. Havana's economic support has in-
creased Managua's military strength. New or im-
proved roads built by Cubans facilitate arms trans-
fers and the deployment of troops to.f~ght rebel
forces. Similar benefits derive from Cuban improve-
ments to the national railroad system. Cuban person-
nel are helping with construction work on at least jive
airfields, including Punta Huete-soon to be the
The Cubans have also had a particularly strong
impact on the Nicaraguan educational system. The
large contingent ojprimary and secondary school
teachers-which at one time constituted 60 percent of
the rural teachinglorce and 10 percent of the coun-
try's entire educational corps-has used texts with
pro-Cuban Marxist content. Havana also has hosted
well over 5,000 Nicaraguan students in extended
academic programs, most ojwhich include political
subjects. Of this number, more than 1,000 are teen-
agers on the Isle ojYouth where, as one Nicaraguan
student has openly explained, the work-study regi-
men is "the implementation ojthe Leninist concept to
form the new Soviet man. " In addition, Cuba has
trained large numbers ojNicaraguans in shorter,
vocational courses that have increased the country's
pool of technical skills. Havana also has supplied
higher level advisers to the Ministry of Education,
who have probably helped reshape the overall organi-
zation and direction of the national educational
system.
Hundreds ojCuban personnel have been placed at the 25X1
central decisionmaking level in nearly every other
sector of Nicaraguan society. Through economic
planning agreements, Cuban advisers probably have 25X1
encouraged the gradual growth of state control of the
economy. The Cubans are extensively involved in the
Nicaraguan communications system. These activities
rangelrom the installation ojmicrowave and other
kinds of equipment to the provision of critiques and
recommendations on the national communications
network. Close ties exist between the Cuban Commu-
nist Party and the Sandinista National Liberation
Front, and we believe Cubans have advised on the
development of Nicaraguan mass organizations.
of Cuba, they are only marginal instruments of
influence:
? They often operate in sparsely populated areas and
their daily routines leave little time for political
activities.
? The workers live in self-contained camps close to
their job sites, and ost are
primarily motivated by material rewar s o "inter-
nationalist" tours of duty, such as overseas bonuses
and greater access to consumer goods.
politically unsophisticated compared with
Although the Castro regime screens other economic
technicians-teachers, medical personnel, and techni-
cal advisers-in terms of political qualifications,
many of these technicians are not well positioned to
exert influence. For example,
medical personnel typically confine them-
selves to the provision of medical services. Although
this can promote a positive impression of Cuba,
indigenous populations
sometimes resent the Cuban presence because they
provide the technicians with food and lodging, and the
Cuban medical skills often are severely limited. More-
over, our analysis,
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that about three-fourths
of the Cuban technicians who are not involved in
public health, education, or construction work at the
grassroots in a strictly technical capacity.
The quality of its personnel and the terms under
which Cuba provides aid frequently reduce the politi-
cal mileage Havana is able to extract. In Ethiopia, the
completion of one of Cuba's largest aid projects was
held up for six months because Addis Ababa could
not supply the necessary materials. Complaints about
Cuban technicians are not uncommon. Although it is
unusual for client dissatisfaction to lead to the remov-
al of Cuban personnel, complaints can hamper the full
development of the relations. Over the years, a num-
ber of Third World recipients have characterized
Cuban teachers as incompetent and too political.
Hard currency transportation expenses have led to the
refusal of scholarships and technicians.
Our information on Cuban-LDC aid relationships
also indicates that Cuban aggressiveness, as well as a
"buyer's market" mentality on the part of a number
of recipient countries, works against the program's
success. Despite years of assistance from Cuba, some
Third World countries try to use the importance
Havana attaches to its aid program as leverage to
negotiate more favorable terms for Cuban assistance.
Burundi, Uganda, and Ghana are recent examples.
Cuba occasionally finds itself in adversarial bargain-
ing sessions, even with regimes in which it has
invested a significant amount of time and resources.
Finally, developments beyond Havana's research can
quickly erode gains from the resources expended in an
aid program. Internal political dynamics or external
factors over the years have forced Cuban pullouts
from Chile, Grenada, Iraq, Jamaica, Somalia, and
Suriname. More recently, domestic insurrections in
Nicaragua and Angola have disrupted the implemen-
tation of Cuban assistance.
LDC Students Sometimes Alienated
The student program also has problems that may
substantially reduce the amount of influence Havana
expects to develop over time. Although some students
Soldiers or Civilians:
Cuban Economic Technicians Abroad
Although Cuban economic technicians in the Third
World truly are civilians, Havana makes no secret of
the fact that it expects its personnel abroad to be able
to use small arms to defend themselves. Most Cuban
technicians-male and female-have undergone at
least basic small-arms familiarization training. Be-
fore leaving Cuba civilians assigned abroad often
receive an intensive military training course lasting
four to six weeks.
Over the past 18 months, growing fears of direct US
involvement in Nicaragua and rebel activities in that
country as well as in Angola have led Havana to
place considerably greater emphasis on the military
side of its civilian aid program. Other than Angola
and Nicaragua, there is little evidence that changes
are being implemented elsewhere.
are alienated by the political indoctrination in their
Cuban educations, the physical labor requirements
and lack of personal amenities also leave some stu-
dents disenchanted with the Castro regime. Serious
student problems-including riots-have plagued the
Isle of Youth program almost from its inception.
We believe Castro's personal motivations are as
strong as ever and will continue to keep the program
alive as long as he is in power. His strong desire to be
a major actor on the world stage means that he is
committed to the aid program, regardless of economic
or other costs. We believe reverses in recent years may
cause him to value even more the successful Third
World relationships he retains and to strengthen his
resolve to exploit opportunities for new ones.
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Secret
Table 4
Pending Offers of Cuban Assistance Since 1983
e Countries that currently have either negligible or no assistance-
based ties to Cuba.
The future of some of the existing large-scale Cuban
civilian contingents abroad has grown more uncertain
in recent years. Regional talks in southern Africa
have not improved the prospects for the Cuban civil-
ians there. Angolan negotiations with Pretoria have
put more distance between Castro and President dos
Santos. In addition, the rebel bombing of a Cuban
barracks last April may have made it more difficult to
recruit personnel to work in that country. Although
neither situation has led to cuts in the number of
Cuban civilians in those countries, any turn away
from the Communist Bloc and toward the West that
grows out of regional accommodation would work
against their extended stay. In Nicaragua, Cuban-
trained Nicaraguans this year will replace Cuban
primary and secondary school teachers, thereby per-
manently reducing Havana's presence by 1,600. Fi-
nally, the nature of the Cuban involvement in Grena-
da revealed by the intervention has probably made
potential recipients much more reluctant to accept
Havana will follow through on opportunities for
small-scale assistance, but probably will experience
additional setbacks in some existing minor programs.
Low-profiled assistance programs are less controver-
sial from both Cuban and Third World perspectives,
and new chances for such activities will continue to
arise, mostly in Africa. We believe a current list of
likely candidates for positive Cuban aid developments
includes Burkina, Ghana, Guyana, Mauritania, Zaire,
and Zambia (table 4). We foresee only small-scale or
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slowly growing aid to these countries
tive, Third World countries. Nonetheless, dissatisfac-
tion with Cuban assistance, never an uncommon
phenomenon, probably will lead a number of Third
World clients to curtail Havana's activities.
Cuban leaders have placed stronger emphasis on the
provision of economic technicians to Third World
countries as a way of increasing hard currency remit-
tances and making marginal reductions in domestic
unemployment. Havana appears to have focused on
the lucrative Middle Eastern market-apparently be-
lieving that declining oil revenues will not damage the
opportunities for its projects, which tend to be small
scale and inexpensive. Cuba also has been trying to
break into the Latin American construction market.
Cuban economic assistance will continue to consist
overwhelmingly of basic technical services, rather
than turnkey projects with financial assistance. The
Cuban economy will not support significant increases
in aid financing in the near term. The only large
turnkey projects we are aware of Havana discussing
are sugar refinery construction or rehabilitations,
such as that in Nicaragua, but without Cuban financ-
ing. Cuba will continue to provide smaller light
industry facilities. Because of the scarcity of highly
trained technical experts in Cuba, Havana will limit
itself to the provision of laborers and midlevel
technicians.
We believe the Third World student program will
grow despite its various problems. The rate of accep-
tance of scholarship offers has not diminished, and
offers to additional countries and those that now have
only limited numbers of students continue to grow. In
addition, as some Isle of Youth students have moved
on to Cuban universities or technical institutes, a new
generation has begun to take their places. This year
Havana plans to open four new Isle of Youth schools,
and we believe at least some positions probably will be
open to foreigners. As in the past, many Third World
regimes will continue to view small numbers of Cuban
scholarships as a harmless way to add to their limited
technical expertise. For its part, Cuba will find it
easier to accommodate foreign students in the future,
as demographic changes cause domestic enrollments
to drop.
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Typical Elements of the Cuban Program
Shaping popular opinion:a Nicaraguan-Cuban
film crew.
Even in construction work the message is not lost: a
joint CubmrJamaican construction ream.
An emphasis on revolutionary esprit de corps: Curia lnrernarional
the ?Che Guevara Contingent" of Cuban
teachers arrives in Angola.
Concenbation orr simple projects: bridges in . Granma Weekle Reviee~
Nicaragua.
For the defense of friendly regimes: students at the Cuba lnrernarimial
Cuban-built military school in Huambo, Angola.
Making an impression on the young: a Cubnn
reacher in a makeshift rlassroont, rural Nicaragua.
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Secret
Secret
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