COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES: ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000300090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
and Capabilities
Philippines: Organization
Sort
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Communist Insurgency in the
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For Data Entry
GI 85-10149
June 1985
Copy 3 3 7
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
R Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and reviewed by the US
Embassy in Manila
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency
Center, OGI,
Secret
GI 85-10149
June 1985
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Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities
Key Judgments The Communist insurgency in the Philippines now presents a formidable
Information available challenge to the Marcos government and US strategic and political
as of 30 May 1985 interests in Asia. Moreover, the insurgency is capable of growing more
was used in this report.
rapidly in the next two years than at anytime in the past. The Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's
Army (NPA), have seized the initiative in the countryside and are
preparing to bring their revolution to Manila. The insurgents have not,
however, been seriously contested militarily or politically by the govern-
ment. This absence of sustained counterinsurgent pressure has allowed the
Communists a free hand in many areas of the country and has left their po-
tential vulnerabilities unexploited.
Party leaders are pursuing a dual military and political strategy aimed at
achieving a stalemate on the battlefield while forming a broad political
alliance with the anti-Marcos opposition. The party is in a strong position
to gain politically from the malaise now prevalent throughout Philippine
society and the government's unwillingness to undertake political and
economic reforms. Party leaders hope to seize power by joining with the
moderate opposition in a post-Marcos coalition government they intend.to
dominate. To this end, they plan to participate in the 1986 nationwide
elections and support candidates whom they can co-opt.
The Communists have assembled an extensive and sophisticated clandes-
tine political/military organization over the last 16 years that is waging
protracted guerrilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively
controlling villages inhabited by at least 5 million people, and contesting
control of villages inhabited by another 5.5 million:
? The CPP- His a tightly knit organization
with a coherent ideology, centralized leadership, an effec
tive propaganda apparatus, and the discipline and patience required for a
protracted struggle.
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? The National Democratic Front (NDF), through its organizing and
propaganda activities, has been in the forefront of the Communists' legal
effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to the Marcos
Secret
GI 85-10149
June 1985
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has become a credible military force that is rapidly gaining
experience and confidence and is capable of fielding guerrilla battalions
in many parts of the country. NPA attacks against the government are
characterized by effective command and control, secure communications,
good intelligence, sound guerrilla tactics, and effective adaptation 'to the
Philippine environment.
The Communists are sensitive to the misgivings of many Filipinos about
uniting with Marxist revolutionaries. Consequently, their propaganda-a
clever mixture of Marxism, Catholic liberation theology, and traditional
Philippine values-is careful to emphasize the nationalist aspects of their
struggle. They frequently cite Nicaragua as an example of a revolution in
which Marxist-Leninists combined with a moderate opposition to success-
fully overthrow a dictator. Popular support for the Marcos government is
at an alltime low, and party propagandists are exploiting this to their
advantage.
Despite its formidable organization and successful performance, the
CPP/NPA has weaknesses. A charismatic leader capable of galvanizing
popular support for the revolution has yet to appear, its anti-American
rhetoric rings hollow with many Filipinos, and the party's emphasis on
nationalism over Communism has drawn to its banner many individuals
lacking in ideological commitment. However, the most serious CPP/NPA
liability is the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to provide arms,
ammunition, and other war materiel to the guerrillas. Although a small
number of weapons are now being smuggled into the Philippines by the
NPA, we believe the guerrillas lack the equipment to sustain an offensive
of even a week's duration and the combined-arms capability required to
attack well-defended military targets. The Communists have so far
eschewed foreign support, and the isolated character of the Philippines
severely complicates establishing a reliable logistic network or foreign
Although
extensive cooperation between the Communists and the Muslim Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) could help ease this problem, we
believe there is little prospect for more than token cooperation between
them.
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Key Judgments
The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities
3
Regular Units-Regular Mobile Forces
17
Regular Units-Armed City Partisans
17
Irregular Units-People's Guerrillas
20
Irregular Units-People's Militia
20
Key Insurgent Strengths
24
Key Insurgent Vulnerabilities
26
Projecting Near-Term Capabilities
C.
D.
E.
Communist Analysis of Philippine Society
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47
55 25X1
59
Chronology of Key Events
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Scope Note This assessment is intended to serve as a model for analyzing the
organization and capabilities of a politically organized insurgency. In this
case, we examine a well-developed insurgent organization, the Communist
Party of the Philippines; its military arm, the New People's Army; and
united front activities that attempt to mask the radical nature of the
movement and broaden its appeal. The paper does not systematically
compare the performance of the insurgents against the Philippine military,
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Figure 1
CPP/NPA Communist Administrative Areas, 1985
. First-order administrative
boundary
Second-order
administrative boundary
1. Zambales PPC
2. Tar/ac PPC
3. Nueva Ecija PPC
4. Pampanga
6. Bataan PPC Luzon
South Metro Manila
China .
:705191 (A02387) 5-8
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Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines: Organization
and Capabilities
Since its founding in 1968, the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military element, the
New People's Army (NPA), have consistently demon-
strated slow but steady growth. During the past two
years, they have taken advantage of increasing popu-
lar discontent with the Marcos government to swell
their ranks. The NPA now aggressively attacks the
government's Armed Forces, increasing both the
number and sophistication of tactical operations,
while the party maneuvers to seize political power in a
post-Marcos government. This paper reviews the par-
ty's political and military strategy and examines
current insurgent organization, capabilities, and per-
formance.
Yenan; they believed to do so was only to invite
government offensives that the CPP/NPA could not
hope to repel. Instead, guerrilla fronts were initiated
throughout the Philippines-especially on the larger
islands that would provide easy escape and conceal-
ment
In 1981 party leaders decided that with the lifting of
martial law the time was ripe to reactivate the urban
underground that had been decimated by government
security forces. Urban guerrilla units, dormant since
1972, were reactivated in Mindanao to assassinate
government supporters and demonstrate the perva-
siveness of the CPP/NPA. Urban united front activi-
ties, whose purpose is to broaden the base of support
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for the revolution, have since mushroomed in an 25X1
attempt to win over the Philippine middle class,
largely alienated from the government following the
Aquino assassination.
The CPP/NPA has most closely followed the political
and guerrilla strategy of protracted revolutionary
warfare developed by Mao Zedong and articulated by
party founder Jose Maria Sison in documents still
used in teaching all party members. As in Mao's
revolution, the Communist insurgency in the Philip-
pines emphasizes the importance of building a base of
support in the countryside among the peasant popula-
tion. It also has an urban component, however, that is
increasing in size and importance. All NPA military
activity is controlled by the Communist Party's politi-
cal leadership, which has generally stressed organiza-
tion and recruitment over direct military action. The
Communists' military strategy is complemented by a
political program in which party members and front
groups work to undermine the Marcos government
and legitimize their own organization.
Commu-
nist leaders have also demonstrated an ability to adapt
Maoist strategy to the geography and politics of the
Philippines. Following setbacks in 1972 in the Caga-
yan Valley, the leadership decided. not to establish
permanently liberated zones in imitation of Mao in
Another of the Communists' strategies is to achieve
political power by presenting themselves as national-
ists and joining with the moderate opposition in a
post-Marcos coalition government. This is now evi-
dent from Embassy reporting and the public state-
ments of party-controlled front organizations that
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now actively promote this concept. Tobroaden its
popular appeal, the party frequently-cites Nicaragua
as an example of a revolution in which both Marxist-
Leninists and a moderate opposition successfully
united to overthrow a dictator. The Sandinista regime
is portrayed as a state where the Christian plea for
social justice has been realized. In our judgment, this
analogy particularly appeals to many Filipino Catho-
lics who oppose the Marcos regime but have misgiv-
ings about uniting with Communist revolutionaries.
The newly formed organization, Bayan (the Nation),
is the Communists' latest attempt to portray party
willingness to join forces with moderates in a
coalition.
The party's consolidation plan is another aspect of
CPP strategy, which though not well publicized is
taught to all cadres. According to Sison's writings,
once the Communists come to power they plan a
subsequent "socialist revolution" to consolidate Com-
munism in Philippine society. Although united front
tactics and coalition government proposals are expedi-
ent now in forging a broad alliance, once the People's
Democratic Republic of the Philippines has been
established the party alone will be responsible for
transforming the society into a "proletarian dictator-
ship." Presumably, at this time the "blood debt to the
people" owed by the landlord class will be avenged. F
Party strategists maintain that theirs is an "unfin-
ished revolution." The Communists insist that the
Philippine people were never really liberated-not in
February 1945 or July 1946 nor, for that matter, in
1898. They were simply transferred from Spanish, to
American, to Japanese, and then, following the grant-
ing of nominal independence, to neocolonial domina-
tion. The United States is now .identified as the
principal enemy of the Philippine people, and Presi-
dent Marcos is depicted as a puppet carrying out the
mandates of Washington. We believe the anti-Ameri-
can rhetoric may ring hollow with many. Filipinos, but
the appeal to nationalism "and independence from
foreign dictates does not.
We believe the Communists recognize that they lack
the capability to defeat the government militarily and
would settle for a stalemate on the battlefield. ~
It is in the political sphere that we believe the
Communists, now see their most advantageous pros-
pects. Our analysis `of.Embassy reporting leads us to
believe that, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Marcos regime, the CPP is skillfully maneuvering for
a role in any, government that might be formed should
the President die in office and is actively promoting
the concept of a coalition government in which it
would legally participate. In a switch from its previous
position advocating a boycott of elections, the 25X1
CPP/NPA also intends to actively participate in the
1986 nationwide local elections.
The Insurgent Organization and Capabilities
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To implement their strategy, the Philippine Commu-
nists have assembled an effective, clandestine politi-
cal-military organization that wages protracted guer-
rilla war along 56 to 60 fronts nationwide, effectively
controls villages-inhabited by at least 5 million people,
and contests control of villages inhabited by another
5.5 million. For the purpose of this paper, we use the
term Communist-controlled village to mean areas
where:
? A Communist "shadow government" has been
established.
? Communist peasant, women, and youth associations 25X1
are functioning.
? Most of the population is sympathetic and gives
material support to the insurgents.
? At least 50 percent of the population can be mobi-
lized for protest actions.
? NPA militia units may be present
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Figure 2. This poster publicizing the new UP-dominated united
front, 'Sayan "(The Nation), is now plastered on walls throughout
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,~.. ~ ~awerx~ms~c
Tryl iv
.a
Figure 3. Communist propaganda attempts to equate party mem-
bers arrested or killed with opposition leaders such as Ninoy
Aquino, murdered at Manila airport in 1983. At this protest in
Manila, radical students carried a billboard picturing leading
cadres-including Central Committee members Johnny Escandor
The CPPH His a tight-
ly knit organization led by professionals who are well
trained and highly disciplined. The National Demo-
cratic Front (NDF), the party's main united front
organ, is in the forefront of the Communists' legal
effort to form a broad alliance of Filipinos opposed to
the Marcos government.
The Communists' organizational model-with its par-
allel party, united front, and military echelons-is
very similar to other Communist insurgent organiza-
tions we have seen during the last 50 years. Neither
the party organization itself, the distinctive organiza-
tional practices it follows, the subsidiary organizations
it has set up, nor the conceptual framework it has
pursued in evolving its forces and in contending with
the government is unique. Rather, the Communist
organization in the Philippines is a synthesis of orga- 25X1
nizational principles and operational procedures
evolved in China, Vietnam, and elsewhere.
The Party
As with all Communist parties, the CPP/NPA is
under the firm control of a small number of highly
dedicated leaders, or cadres, who make all important
decisions regarding ideology, strategy, and manage-
ment of the party. These cadres form the Central
Committee. the Executive Committee, and the Polit-
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buroWe base this judgment on the 25X6
analysis of more than a decade of party decisionmak-
ing and leadership behavior as documented in Embas-
sy reporting. This committee structure is duplicated
from the national level down to the village, called a
barangay or barrio,
implemented by barrio committees, the NPA at each 25X1
level is under the command of both the local party
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committee and higher level NPA commands, and
united front activities are directed by a similar inter-
locking command structure. Such a system of com-
mand and control provides local flexibility in imple-
menting orders from above.
The CPP is organized along both territorial and
functional lines and, since 1984, by rural and urban
responsibilities as well. Six Regional Commissions,
each headed by a Central Committee member, were
created in the 1980s to cope with the geographic
spread of the party and to ensure that all subordinate
committees operate in accordance with the party line
set by the Central Committee. Five functional com-
missions oversee party activities in the areas of propa-
ganda, military affairs, united front activities, and
"mass movement" organizations.
Since its founding, the CPP has stressed organization-
al efforts and recruitment in rural areas rather than
military activities.
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e believe nearly. all party members are
highly motivated and dedicated to the revolution; few
cadres have defected:
Parallel to "the party.'structure for full members, but
separate and ' distinct from it, is the party youth
organization, the Kabataang Makabayan (KM).' F
The KM serves as a training '
school for future party members and allows the party
access to the enthusiasm and dedication of young
radicals. Some as young as 13 are admitted to the
KM after a careful assessment and become eligible
for party membership at age 18.
The United Front
In our view, united front organizing has heretofore
been the weak link in this Communist insurgency.
The party's efforts to form a broad alliance of Filipi-
nos opposed to the Marcos government have suffered
setbacks repeatedly. In addition to an ideological bias
favoring rural organization and a reluctance of many
Filipinos to join a Communist movement, the long
period of martial law (1972-8 1) made all overt opposi-
tion activities very difficult. Since 1979, government
security forces have captured or killed many key
cadres connected with these efforts: Sixto Carlos,
Horacio Morales, Isagani Serrano, Edgar Jopson, and
Mila Aguilar Roque.
' The KM is distinct from the League of Filipino Students, the
CPP's legal mass organization for youth, which appeals, with little
Marketing Nationalism, Not Communism
The unofficial national anthem of the CPP/NPA is
Bayan Ko (My Country), which conveys a strong
sense of nationalism and anticolonialism with a
subtle. blend of anti-Americanism while omitting any
mention of Communist ideology. The song originated
during the Philippine-American war, but the party,
has changed the words and`popularized this version.
Today it can be heard at most,moderate and radical
opposition gatherings, always sung in Pilipino.?
Bayan Ko (My Country)
In my golden land of Philippines.
Fragrant flowers filled the morning breeze.
Loving fingers built a paradise,
A resting place for humankind.
One day foreign ships and strangers came,
Seeking out our wealth and beauty.
Left our people bound in chains,
Our hearts in misery.
Birds go winging freely through the sky.
Try to cage them and they surely cry.
Take away a people's liberty,
Sons and daughters live to set them free.
Soon one day our trials will be done.
Night will fade and golden morning come.
Now, my life and love
I give to set my country free.
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Figure 6
CPP/NPA Flagsa
Flag of the hoped-for People's Democratic Republic of
the Philippines.
A
The same flag is used by the Maoist Sendero Luminoso
insurgents in Peru.
' CPP=Communist Party of the Philippines.
NPA=New People's Army.
party leaders realize this weakness and are now
concentrating their attention on united front activities
to ensure a role for the party in any successor
government. The CPP/NPA has begun to scatter
party cells, infiltrating the leadership of some organi-
zations, forming new ones seemingly independent of
the party when necessary, and establishing alliances
throughout Philippine society in support of the party's
revolutionary objectives.
Embassy reporting from a well-informed
source, which we believe to be fairly accurate, indi-
cates that the party now has about 5,800 members
working in urban united front activities nationwide,
with 2,800 active in Manila. The same source asserted
that there are now 38,600 urban activists in the
National Democratic Front-a claim that the Embas-
sy believes may be exaggerated.
The party's control over the activities of the NDF is
accomplished by clandestine cells of three to five
persons who work together to broaden the base of
support for the CPP/NPA revolution. Cadres use as a
guide the 12-point program contained in the NDF
manifesto of 1 January 1973. In urban areas, the
cadres are to forge links with labor federations and
unions, teachers associations, student organizations,
and professional and civic organizations. In rural
areas, the cell is to conduct social investigations
among peasants and farmworkers and eventually help
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recruit NPA guerrillas.
In villages controlled by the party, united front activi-
ties take the form of mass organizations run by village
cadres with members drawn from the village popula-
tion-farmers, women, youth. Membership in these
associations is voluntary, but the Village Party Com-
mittee makes every effort to involve every family; fear
undoubtedly contributes to association ranks. How-
ever constituted, this is the "mass base" that grows
food for the NPA and, at times, can be mobilized to
support protests.
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The party publishes directly and through the NDF a
wide variety of periodicals in the Philippines and
abroad that serve as the prime source of information
and propaganda for party members and sympathizers.
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Figure 9. This advertisement for an NDF-produced movie that was
filmed in Mexico in 1984 emphasizes US-supplied military equip-
ment being used against Philippine children.
areas, probably the most important source of informa-
tion on all matters are the ubiquitous "blackboard
newspapers." Run by priests and nuns, the latest
"news" is quickly spread from a centralized location
to a network of barrio blackboards by schoolteachers
and children. In many cases, this "news" includes a
heavy dose of party propaganda.
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The New People's Army
The NPA is a military organization characterized by
effective leadership and operational security, sound
command and control, and strict discipline. The NPA
is made up of both full-time regulars and part-time
irregulars. We estimate that there are now probably
about 15,000 to 16,500 regulars organized in infantry
battalions and urban guerrilla units. Local guerrilla
units and village militia make up the irregulars,
estimate at between 15,000 and
Regular Units-Regular Mobile Forces. The Regular
Mobile Forces are 'the best trained, equipped, and
organized guerrillas. These uniformed forces are re-
sponsible for most of the newsworthy raids and am-
bushes. NPA regulars operate at three levels-dis-
trict, guerrilla front, and regional-under the
direction of the respective party committees.
Main Regional Guerrilla Units (MRGUs) and Sec-
ondary Regional Guerrilla Units (SRGUs) are each
equivalent to a regular company of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and normally confine operations to
the 56 to 60 guerrilla fronts now active throughout the
country. According to Embassy reporting, the MRGU
is a mobile force that can link up anytime with an
SRGU, forming a combined force to conduct guerrilla
operations in the latter's area. Within the past.two
years, the NPA has frequently combined such forces
to successfully attack poorly defended government
targets. MRGUs in Mindanao can now field 200 to
300 men (and in Northeast Mindanao, an additional
squad armed with four M60 machineguns), but units
of this size are still in their formative stages in most
regions. Operations involving 100 to 200 guerrillas are
the norm throughout the rest of the country.
Regular Units Armed City Partisans. The NPA
uses classic urban guerrilla tactics to bring the war to
the cities.
killing police, other government employees, and in-
formers whom the party identifies in its propaganda
as responsible for abuses of the. people. Commonly
called sparrow units, these assassins attack like spar-
rows, diving in pairs for food one after the other, so
that if one misses, the second does not.
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Irregular Units-People's Guerrillas. In municipal-
ities and barangays where the party is contesting
control or is already firmly entrenched, local guerrilla
squads of 10 to 20 irregulars are formed by the NPA,
both to support regular insur ent military forces and
to operate independently.
Philippines.
Irregular Units-People's Militia.
that the NPA uses every means possible to supply its
guerrillas, including reloading spent shell casings.
Apparently, ammunition shortages are not a major
However, should military action increase,
Although they have few firearms and receive only
limited military training, members of the village
militia are the eyes and ears of the insurgent move-
ment within the village, providing tactical intelligence
on all aspects of,the local scene, according to Embassy
reports. Training for the militia emphasizes political
indoctrination. The village militia also supports NPA
operations by playing a part in the flexible insurgent
logistic system. The militia members provide a labor
force for the transport and storage of food and
equipment, serve as guides for guerrillas traveling
through the area, and are a source of recruits for
regular NPA units.
Arms and Ammunition. Embassy reporting indicates
that nearly all firearms used by the NPA have been
purchased, stolen, or captured from the Philippine
Armed Forces. We believe that the insurgents now
have about 10,000 high-power rifles and an unknown
but limited quantity of grenade launchers and ma-
chineguns. They recently acquired a few 60-mm
mortars and a 90-mm recoilless rifle but would need
many more of these kinds of artillery for combat
support against well-defended targets
NPA.
maintaining weapons and supplying adequate ammu-
nition would become an important problem for the
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Some former Armed Forces noncommissioned officers
have joined the NPA and serve as training instructors,
according to press reports. Training generally takes
place at base camps located in remote areas and, in
several cases, includes an obstacle course that meets
US Army specifications. If the NPA follows classic
guerrilla procedures, new recruits will be quickly
included in combat operations-albeit in minor, less
dangerous capacities-to acquire on-the-job training
and boost their confidence.
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Key Insurgent Strengths
The CPP/NPA organizational infrastructure is now
firmly in place and growing. Moreover, its perfor-
mance over the past several years has been impressive.
Embassy reporting of CPP/NPA activities and our
analysis reveal
strengths in a number of key areas that combine to
make these insurgents a formidable opponent:
? Coherent ideology. The party has a coherent, well-
articulated ideology that emphasizes nationalism
and anti-imperialism. First articulated by Jose Ma-
ria Sison, the CPP through its publications and
courses presents a program that combines Marxism-
Leninism and Catholic liberation theology, all in the
guise of traditional Philippine nationalism.
? Effective political leadership. Through the Politbu-
ro, the Executive Committee, and the Central Com-
mittee, the CPP provides strong direction to subor-
dinate cadres nationwide. Effectiveness can be
judged by the absence of factionalism and-with
one exception-high-level defections, and the mini-
mal effects on operations caused by the capture of
senior cadres.
? Patience. Aware of the Huk's premature switch to
conventional warfare, party literature repeatedly
stresses the protracted nature of this revolution to
prepare followers for an indeterminate period of
guerrilla warfare. We believe the party is quick to
learn from mistakes and has been content to work
slowly but steadily at establishing a popular base of
support in the countryside:
? Strong command and control. The CPP/NPA fol-
lows the standard Marxist-Leninist policy of "Dem-
ocratic Centralism." This policy provides consider-
able autonomy to local leadership as long as they
adhere to Central Committee directives. Senior
cadres are frequently reassigned,
is strict and very effective.
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Is This Really a Communist Revolution?
? Sound guerrilla tactics. The NPA effectively uses
classic guerrilla tactics and demonstrates a good
military combat capability. Over the last several
years, the NPA has cautiously escalated the number
of operations to provide combat experience for
guerrillas with minimal risks.
? Effective use of environment. The CPP/NPA has
focused guerrilla activity in areas where the terrain
provides cover and escape. As early as 1974, Sison
saw the insular nature of the Philippines as a
potential asset for the insurgents. He realized that
the growth of guerrilla fronts on all the larger
islands would stretch thin the capabilities of the
Armed Forces while making it almost impossible to
defeat the CPP/NPA in any one campaign.
? Popular support. Both the party and the NPA have
demonstrated an ability to recruit and to mobilize
the population in support of their cause. While
coercion is sometimes used,
any people voluntarily cooperate with
the insurgents at considerable risk of government
retribution.
? Fffective propaganda. The CPP has infiltrated
man o osition or anizations
to secure
avorable coverage or its cause an iscredit the
Marcos government and the Armed Forces. This
covert propaganda campaign has been effective both
in the Philippines and abroad.
? Momentum. The CPP/NPA has gradually built a
momentum-a combination of its own initiative and
government inaction-that could take years to re-
verse.
Analysts are divided over the degree of commitment
to Communism of NPA guerrillas, party sympathiz-
ers, the rural population living in areas now con-
trolled by the CPP/NPA, and the population at large.
Some analysts believe that many, if not most, of these
people may be cooperating with the insurgents be-
cause of human rights abuses by the military, griev-
ances against the Marcos government, or the lack of
improvement in rural standards of living. The issue is
central to US concerns because, like the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua, the commitment to Marxist-Leninist-
Mao Zedong ideology will largely determine whether
the Philippines would become a Communist state
should the revolution succeed. It also affects the
effort required to dissi ate support for revolution and
defeat the insurgency.
hardcore
CPP/NPA members are ideologically committed'
Communists who are determined to bring a Marxist
government to power-even if they have to impose it
from the top. Moreover, in areas controlled by the
party, there are indications that some people cooper-
ate voluntarily, not just out of fear. Although we
cannot gauge the attitudes of most rural dwellers, we
believe that the longer an area is under Communist
control-and we estimate that at least 5 million
people now live in CPP/NPA-controlled areas-the
stronger the popular commitment to the party and the
revolution is likely to become. However, the party is
sensitive to the lack of strong commitments to any
ideology on the part of most Filipinos and the
peasants' almost exclusive concerns with local issues.
Thus, the party stresses anti-Marcos themes, nation-
alism, land reform, and abuses by the military while
downplaying Communist rhetoric (appendix CJ
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Despite their extensive organization and the strengths
their performance has shown, the CPP/NPA has a
number of current and potential vulnerabilities. In
combination, these shortcomings have hindered insur-
gent expansion and provided the government with
several key targets for exploitation.
The lack of foreign support is the key weakness of the
CPP/NPA.
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Beyond the absence of a reliable logistic pipeline to
support a guerrilla war, other CPP/NPA weaknesses
include:
? No foreign sanctuary. The Philippines is geographi-
cally isolated-a situation almost unique in the
world-and neither Malaysia nor Indonesia, the
nearest countries, will permit Communist insurgent
bases on their soil. The CPP has so far used the
island's environment to their advantage by forcing
the government to confront them on several fronts
and by establishing bases in remote mountainous
terrain found throughout the Philippines. However,
should the government's counterinsurgent effort in-
tensify, the Communists-like the Huks of 30 years
ago-could find their lack of sanctuary a serious
liability.
? Penchant for paperwork. The Communists keep
detailed records and files that are regularly discov-
ered when cadres are captured at their homes or
safehouses. When compromised, such information
provides government security forces with a better
understanding of the insurgent organization, mem-
bership, and plans.
? No charismatic leader. The CPP/NPA has no one
of the stature of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, or
Fidel Castro. The Central Committee and senior
cadres in prison are virtually unknown to the public.
Were a popular non-Communist leader-with the
charisma of Magsaysay-to emerge in the post-
Marcos era, he might attract considerable popular
support away from the Communists.
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? Anti-American rhetoric. Party propaganda portrays
the United States as an imperialist nation and the
sole prop supporting the Marcos government. But
we believe America and Americans are favorably
regarded by most Filipinos, and this propaganda
rings hollow.
? Non-Communist elements in the NPA. In the at-
tempt to stress nationalism over Communism, the
party appears to have accepted under its banner
many individuals who have a grudge against the
government but lack ideological commitment to
Communism. In Kalinga Apayao, several hundred
guerrillas belonging to an ethnic minority recently
defected from the NPA but continue to war against
the government. Similarly, in Palawan the
CPP/NPA has not been able to establish a front
because of the activities of a renegade NPA band,
according to Embassy reports.
? No combined-arms capability. The NPA has dem-
onstrated an ability to use small-unit guerrilla tac-
tics effectively but to date has not used combined
arms-the coordination of different types of mili-
tary units-in its operations. Should the Commu-
nists decide to attack well-defended military instal-
lations, they will find it necessary to use direct and
indirect fire from machine guns and mortars to
support their assault force.
NPA Military Performance
Analysis of CPP/NPA-initiated actions from 1973
through January 1985 reveals that the level of insur-
gent activity has increased steadily over the last
decade with a significant upsurge in 1984-80 per-
cent of the more than 5,000 violent incidents were
initiated by the NPA in 1984. Last year there were 12
times more violent incidents than 10 years earlier and
107 percent more than in 1983. Much of this sudden
increase last year occurred during two months-in
January, when there was a national plebiscite, and in
May, when parliamentary elections were held.
other areas where the NPA is strong. Raids, which
net the guerrillas favorable publicity and firearms,
increased by 53 percent in the past year-216 were
NPA units nationwide now regularly attack military
targets, and, in our judgment, the guerrillas have
gradually gained the combat experience and confi-
dence necessary to sustain the revolution's momen-
tum. In 1984 NPA raids and ambushes involving 100
to 200 guerrillas became more common in most
regions of the Philippines, especially in Mindanao and
weakly defended targets in such numbers, the NPA is
virtually assured a tactical and propaganda victory.
Most guerrilla-initiated military activity is focused on
assassinations and assaults upon individuals to acquire
weapons. Such incidents now occur nationwide.
Insurgent losses are increasing but at a
much smaller rate than might be expected given their
more aggressive posture.
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The Rural Control Situation'
For more than 15 years, the party and the NPA have
concentrated. their efforts on organizing the Philippine
village population in support of the revolution.
ing rate.
forts are now yielding dividends, and villages are
being won over to the Communists' side at an increas-
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The Communist Land Reform Program
There are few immediate rewards the Communists
can offer poor, indifferent farmers to gain their active
support. In China and Vietnam, the Communists
enacted land reform in areas they controlled during
the revolution. This is occurring in the Philippines,
but details rarely surface. In 1982, however, a party
propagandist claimed that the CPP land reform
program had already directly benefited 44,000 people
in the Cagayan Valley of Northeastern Luzon. Al-
though such claims cannot be accepted at face val-
ue-the numbers are undoubtedly exaggerated-they
provide valuable insights into the variety of tangible
rewards the party claims to have provided to some
rural poor.-
* 6,754 farmers had stopped paying land rent to
landlords or amortization to the government.
? 2,526 tenants had had their land rents lowered
substantially-in many cases the new rent was only
a tenth of the crop.
? 434 tenants understated yields and secretly lowered
the rent they pay to recalcitrant landlords.
? 536 landless laborers had their wages raised.
? 505 landless families had been allotted farms taken
from the excess lands of rich or middle peasants.
? 225 farmers had rental prices on farm machinery
reduced.
? 295 families had interest on their debts lowered. -
? 73 farmers were given farm animals confiscated
from landlords.
a rapidly deteriorating situation in
parts o the country.) we
believe the Communists have consolidated their con-
trol of 24 more villages in Bataan and Zambales
Provinces and the 16 municipalities in the mountains
of Abra; and that the military is on the verge of
ceding the mountainous interior of the island of
Negros and Samar to the CPP/NPA. The Embassy
recently interviewed a local official of Molave in
Zamboanga del Sur who indicated that he believes the
Communists control all 22 barangays in that munici-
Projecting Near-Term Capabilities
In assessing insurgent capabilities and prospects over
the next two years, four variables will be critical: the
performance of the Philippine Armed Forces and
government, popular support, the role of the Catholic
Church, and foreign arms supplies:
? The guerrillas' prospects are largely dependent on
whether the Philippine Government and the Armed
Forces can initiate meaningful political, economic,
and military reforms to regain the initiative and
reverse a rapidly deteriorating situation.
? Popular support will be critical because it directly
affects CPP/NPA ability to recruit and retain
combatants, maintain momentum, and convince
skeptical middle-class urban dwellers that the fu-
ture of the country lies with them.
? The increasing alienation of Catholic priests and
nuns from the government and their support for
radical change is providing increased credibility and
legitimacy to the Communist Party's appeal.
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? Foreign arms supplies will determine whether the
guerrillas will have enough arms and ammunition to
sustain offensive actions, defend base areas, and
mount conventional attacks against the Armed
Forces.
Party efforts to join ranks with the MNLF insurgents
have not, and probably will not, succeed. The MNLF
is beset with defections, financial problems, and fac-
tionalism along ethnolinguistic lines. Nur Misuari,
leader of the largest and most radical group, the
Tausug Muslims,
We believe the Communist insurgency has the poten-
tial to grow more rapidly during the next two years
than at any time in the past. The Communist Party is
now in a strong position to benefit from the malaise
prevalent throughout Philippine society: popular sup-
port for the Marcos government is at an alltime low;
the record of the last few years leads us to conclude
that the prospects for meaningful political reforms
under this regime are slight; the military's response to
urban terror by the NPA is to step up extralegal
killings, which further damages its reputation; and the
economic crisis is expected to erode standards of
living further in the next two years. Given the Armed
Forces' lack of logistics, their poor leadership, and the
politicized nature of the officer corps, it is unlikely
that the military's performance will improve enough
to stem increased NPA activity. The elections planned
for 1986 and 1.987 are likely to be the most conten-
tious and violent in Philippine history-probably driv-
ing more people into the ranks of the Communist
Party.
The NPA probably will grow in numbers, gradually
escalate military actions, and improve its military
tactics to include assaults against well-defended tar-
gets and night operations. If present trends continue
unchecked, government forces may soon be forced to
.cede de facto control of the rural highlands to the
Communists in many regions of the country. But the
Communists cannot hope to defeat the Armed Forces
in the near future and will be unable to sustain an
offensive of even a few weeks' duration without
substantially more arms and ammunition than they
now possess.
If party leaders have been able to arrange for weapons
purchases abroad, as now seems likely, they must also
arrange for numerous clandestine arms deliveries to
various islands in the archipelago. We believe it will
be difficult, but not impossible, to sustain such a
logistic pipeline over time; as the deliveries increase,
interdiction could become easier.
commands itt e
allegiance among Muslim guerrillas outside of Sulu.
Communist propaganda aimed at the Muslim com-
munity has not been able to overcome longstanding
Christian-Muslim hatreds. Although Misuari may
help arrange arms purchases for the NPA, we believe
there will be little cooperation between the two insur-
gent groups in the next two years. Moreover, as the
NPA increases activity in MNLF areas of operations
in Mindanao and presents a threat to established
MNLF extortion activities, there will be even more
friction and enmity between the rival insurgent
Support for the party by Catholic clergy and nuns is
growing, largely because of human rights abuses by
the Constabulary, police, and Civilian Home Defense
Forces. If alienated, nuns and priests would provide a
highly dedicated and professional work force for party
and united front activities. Father Balweg, a rebel
priest and NPA commander, is now a popular folk
hero. Analogies between the Philippines and Nicara-
gua-where the revolution succeeded in toppling the
Somoza dictatorship with the assistance of religious
radicals-are becoming more common in the Philip-
pines. We believe government attempts to isolate
religious radicals and regain the support of priests and
nuns will be futile without military reforms to curtail
abuses of the population.
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Threat to US Military Facilities
We do not consider the principal threat to US bases in
the Philippines to be military. Rather, party propa-
ganda opposing American use of the Clark and Subic
bases aims to make continued US use of the bases
politically untenable for any future government. Party
propaganda decries "US imperialism" and cites the
presence of US military facilities on Philippine soil as
the most visible manifestation of America's imperial-
ist intentions and an affront to Philippine sovereignty.
Repeated use of this propaganda theme over the last
decade has helped polarize most opposition politicians.
Today, those who do not oppose the bases are accused
of being unpatriotic and "tools of the CIA." To avoid
such charges, any successor government may have to
demand either renegotiation of the bases agreement
on terms more favorable to the Philippines or the
abrogation of the agreement.
A direct military attack on one of the bases is
possible-and threats of military or terrorist action
have been received-but the NPA is much more
likely to selectively target US personnel or attempt to
place bombs in US installations. Direct assaults
against the bases by guerrilla units in the near future
would be counterproductive and costly. The NPA
leadership is aware of their limited firepower, lack of
fire support, and the difficulty of secretly massing
Suspected CPP/NPA Attacks
Against US Personnel a
1969
3 July Two airmen wounded near main gate of
Clark Air Base by automatic weapons
fired from a moving vehicle.
31 July Four airmen injured by a grenade
thrown from a,, moving vehicle in
Angeles City.
4 August Six airmen wounded by an explosive
device thrown from a moving vehicle in
Angeles City.
1970
21 January Car bomb exploded outside the Joint
US Military Advisory Group Head-
quarters in Quezon City.
31 January US Navy seaman attending a fiesta
with his wife and children shot and
killed in Bamban.
24 March USAF officer wounded by gunfire while
driving near Clark Air Base.
1971
March
1974
13 April
Two US airmen tied up, beaten, and
shot to death in a remote section of
Clark Air Base.
Bomb exploded in an Angeles City
nightclub frequented by Americans.
Antenna of a US Navy communications
site adjoining Camp O'Donnell
bombed.
Base.
Three US Navy officers shot and killed
while traveling by jeep through an un-
improved area at Subic Bay Naval
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troops for a surprise attack in Central Luzon. Party
leaders also realize that such actions would justify
increased US military actions.
Threat to US Personnel
Assassination of US personnel, on the other hand,
could easily be accomplished by trained NPA sparrow
units and has, in the past, been sanctioned by the
party leaders-the same leaders who now control the
party.
Rodolfo Salas and Juanito Rivera both participated in
the killing of US servicemen in the early 1970s.
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Appendix C
Communist Analysis of
Philippine Society
In 1970 Jose Maria Sison published an analysis of 25X1
social classes in the Philippines in Philippine Society
and Revolution. Today, his ideas are still taught to all
CPP members and form the basis for deciding a
person's eligibility for party membership. Table C-1
summarizes the essence of this class analysis. The
terminology frequently appears in party propaganda
and opposition publications, but the meanings are not To win the support of a broad spectrum of Philippine 25X1
clearly understood by most analysts. Modeled after
Mao's analysis of China's prerevolutionary society,
this analysis shows the enemies and targets of the
society, the party tailors its propaganda to appeal to
Communist revolution and makes the point that land-
lords "owe a blood debt to the people" that must be
satisfied at some future date-a fact that rarely 25X1
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Today, the party leadership is making a concerted
effort to broaden its base of support by including as
many groups as possible in allied united front organi-
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Communist Class Analysis of Philippine Society
Political Attitude
Landlords
Big, middle, small Landowners; leaseholders/con- Own vast tract of land; exact Most backward and reaction- Target of the revolution; owe a
cessionaires; managers and pro- onerous land rent; lend money ary; main obstacle to change; blood debt to the people
moters of farm cooperatives; at usurous rates; increase land main social base of imperialism;
those who assist in collecting rents arbitrarily resist the revolution violently
rent or managing estates;
usurers
Bourgeoisie
Comprador big bourgeoisie Fifty big families (Sorianos, Ties to big landlords wealth de- Control the present political Target of the revolution
Ayalas, Zobels, et al); principal rived from export of local raw system; violently opposed to the
trading and financial agents of materials and import of finished revolution
US imperialism; bureaucrat products
capitalists; managers, lawyers,
big accountants, highly paid re-
actionary publicists, and intel-
lectuals in service of big
bourgeoisie
Middle bourgeoisie (national Businessmen interested in "na- Fettered by feudalism but many Inconsistent attitude toward Limited participation in revolu-
bourgeoisie) tionalist industrialization"; belong to landlord class revolution (leftists support revo- tion possible
manufacturers lution, rightists oppose it)
Petty bourgeoisie Teachers, student youth, low- Possess small amount of proper- Susceptible to counterrevolu- Motive force of the revolution
income professionals, office ty; limited and fixed income tionary ideas and reliable ally of working
clerks and lower government of- class
ficials, small businessmen,
skilled workers
Upper
Middle
Just make ends meet Abusive of imperalists; tenden- Must be won over to the
cy to stay neutral; doubt effec- revolution
tiveness of revolution
In debt; falling incomes Leftwing; welcome the Intelligencia are the spearhead
revolution of the revolution
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Rich peasants (rural 5 percent of rural population; Income exceeds needs; some are Often side with reactionaries Should not be prematurely tar-
bourgeoisie) own their land and rent to minor landlords geted; encourage grain or cash
others contribution from them; must
be removed from political lead-
ership of barrios
Middle peasants (rural petty 15 to 20 percent of rural Self-sufficient; live austerely Willing to join; welcome agri-
bourgeoisie) population cultural cooperation and social-
ism; reliable ally; important
motive force of the revolution
Follow opinions of upper-
middle and rich peasants in
good times
Poor peasants and 75 to 80 percent of rural popu- Own no land; often obliged to Most reliable ally of proletariat; Biggest motive force of revolu-
farm workers lation; tenants sell their labor; often in debt can be aroused and mobilized to tion; because the land problem
smash landlords, imperalists, is their essential problem, it is
comprador big bourgeoisie, bu- main problem of the revolution;
reaucrat capitalists main source for NPA
15 percent of total manpower in Own no means of production; Always willing to exercise their Leading force of the revolution
Philippines; industrial workers; extremely oppressed by US im- clan leadership and strike down
farm workers perialism, local capitalism, and oppressors and exploiters
feudalism
Unemployed and underem- Irregular and insufficient Eager to fight in revolution A motive force of the revolution
ployed: dock workers, market income
cargadores, pedicab drivers,
jeepney drivers, and restaurant
helpers
Lumpen proletariat Dregs of society-thieves, rob- Resort to antisocial acts to Easily bought off by the enemy; They can become source of rov-
bers, prostitutes, vagrants (often make a living some can be remolded ing rebel bands and anarchist
found in slums) ideology
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Appendix H
Chronology of Key Events
Three Franciscan priests-Fathers Burgos, Gomez, and Tamora-executed by the
Spanish colonial government for inciting the Cavite Mutiny. Catholics in the CPP
refer to the historical precedent of these "martyrs" in justifying the involvement of
religious in the Communist revolution.
1880-1890s "Propaganda Movement" initiated by a small group of intelligentsia to introduce
ideas of European liberalism, including national self-determination into the
Philippines. This movement set the stage for the revolution of 1896 and a
precedent for a "second propaganda movement" to revise Communist ideology
(that is, Sison's attempt to introduce Maoist principles into the PKP) in the 1960s.
Insurgency against the Spanish colonial government begins following the execution
of the novelist, physician, and political thinker Jose Rizal by the Spanish. The
insurgency is started by Andres Bonifacio-regarded as a "proletarian hero" by
the Communists-who had organized workers in the slums of Manila.
1899-1902 Following the surrender of the Spanish in the Spanish-American War, the United
States wages massive counterinsurgency effort against the guerrilla forces of
Emilio Aguinaldo. 150,000 US soldiers fought the guerrillas; more than 4,000
were killed. The Communists today portray themselves as the standard bearers of
the 1896 "unfinished" revolution.
7 November 1930 Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) established by Crisanto Evangelista.
Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon-Hukbalahap (Anti-Japanese People's Army),
the armed wing of the PKP, wages guerrilla war against the Japanese in Central
Luzon.
PKP wages armed insurgency in Central Luzon against the Philippine Govern-
ment. The guerrilla organization crumbles with the surrender of leader Luis Taruc
in May 1954.
30 November 1964 Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) (KM) founded by Jose Maria Sison
and other young PKP radicals to lead the movement to revitalize the PKP known
now as the "Second Propaganda Movement." By 1966 the KM claimed 10,000
members throughout the Philippines.
11 September 1967 League of Filipino Students, a front organization for the KM, founded ostensibly
to protest rising school tuition fees.
First major theoretical document of the CPP revolution published, Jose Maria
Sison's Struggle for National Democracy. Reprinted in 1972 by Amado Hernan-
dez Memorial Foundation, Quezon City.
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Young radicals in the PKP compile a document, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the
Party," enumerating the political, ideological, and organizational mistakes of the
PKP in an attempt to wrest leadership from the party's old guard.
A new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) founded by dissident young
radical cadres in the PKP who desire armed struggle based on the strategy and
tactics of Mao Zedong.
Young radical Muslims led by Nurullaji Misuari-a colleague of Jose Maria
Sison at the University of the Philippines and in the KM-split from the Moro In-
dependence Movement and form the Moro National Liberation Front.
The New People's Army (NPA) founded as the military arm of the CPP. Under
the leadership of Bernabe Buscayno, "Commander Dante," the NPA begins with
60 men and women and 35 old firearms in Tarlac, Central Luzon.
1970 Lt. Victor Corpus, instructor at the Philippine Military Academy, defects to the
NPA after raiding the academy armory.
The CPP/NPA expands into Isabela Province (Cagayan Valley).
30 July 1970 CPP leader Jose Maria Sison's Philippine Society and Revolution published in
both English and Pilipino editions and immediately becomes the ideological primer
for the CPP. (Reprinted by the Chinese Communist newspaper Ta Kung Pao in
Hong Kong in 1971 and by International Association of Filipino Patriots,
Oakland, California, in 1979.)
1971 CPP/NPA expands into Southern Luzon-the Bicol and Southern Tagalog
regions.
February 1972 Catholics for National Liberation (CNL) founded by CPP member and admirer of
Mao Zedong, Father Edicio de la Torre, as an organization of Christians in
support of the NDF and Communist insurgency.
22 April 1972 Sison's Pomeroy's Portrait: Revisionist Renegade published by Revolutionary
School of Mao Tsetung Thought.
July 1972 "Karagatan" arms shipment intercepted.
22 September 1972 Marcos government declares martial law following large, violent student demon-
strations in Manila.
Fall 1972 MNLF initiates insurgency in Western Mindanao.
1973 CPP/NPA expands into Samar, Panay, Negros, and Mindanao.
April 1973 CPP creates the Preparatory Commission for the National Democratic Front
(NDF) and issues a manifesto endorsing armed struggle and a 10-point program.
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CPP/NPA claims to be operating in 34 provinces.
PKP leadership surrenders formally to Marcos.
High point of the MNLF insurgency.
More than 1,000 residents of Tondo, the Philippines' largest slum, march to
Malacanang Palace to protest a government plan to raze their homes. Led by
ZOTO (Zone One Tondo Association), a CPP-infiltrated group.
Sison publishes Specific Characteristics of Our People's War, which outlines the
strategy for waging Maoist people's war in the Philippine archipelago. Reprinted
in 1979 by International Association of Filipino Patriots, Oakland, California.
1975 CPP/NPA expands into Quezon and Aurora Provinces.
"Nine independent unions and a number of small workers' groups" unite to form
the Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (Alliance of Filipino Workers) (BMP), a
CPP-infiltrated labor organization. A Catholic "workers' mass" is held to mark
the occasion.
Marcos government reestablishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic
of China. Chinese support for the CPP/NPA wanes.
October 1975 The CPP-infiltrated labor group, BMP, leads a workers' strike at La Tondena
Corp. distillery to test a government proclamation forbidding strikes in essential
industries. Workers seize the factory, 400 are arrested, and three days later the
government allows management to grant the workers' demands. Before the year
ended, workers in 26 major firms went on strike. The BMP had reportedly grown
to 130 unions with some 80,000 members.
1975 CPP claims that this year its urban underground was responsible for more than
400 strikes, with the support of students, religious, and the urban poor.
1976 NPA leader Bernabe Buscayno, Commander Dante, captured.
CPP/NPA expands into Ilocos-Cordillera-Pangasinan areas of Northern Luzon.
The party claims to be operating in all 12 regions of the Philippines with 20
guerrilla fronts.
December 1976 The Marcos government signs an agreement with the MNLF in Tripoli providing
for Moro autonomy. A nine-month cease-fire with the MNLF follows.
Early 1977
Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the CPP organization for party youth banned at the
imposition of martial law, revived.
1977 Makibaka published in London as an annotated collection of documents on the
revolution from 1972 to 1977. Reprinted in 1978 by Filippenengroep Netherlands
in Amsterdam.
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April 1977 ZOTO leader Trinidad Herrera arrested. A year later she runs for parliament in
national elections and subsequently goes underground.
July/August 1977 Student protests and boycotts erupt at 25 major colleges and universities.
12 November 1977 NDF Preparatory Commission reissued its 10-point program with more detailed
analysis of conditions, more precise statement of goals, and more specific tasks to
be accomplished.
1977 Horacio "Boy" Morales defects to the CPP/NPA. (He was captured in 1982.)
October/ November 1980 Permanent People's Tribunal-sponsored by European radicals and the
CPP/NPA and MNLF-meets at the University of Antwerp, Belgium, and
condemns the Philippine Government. Proceedings are published in London in
1981.
Early 1981 Marcos ends martial law just before visit of Pope John Paul II.
1981 Government initiates KKK Program to aid the rural population economically. The
program yields few results.
1982 Government initiates Oplan Katatagan, an integrated counterinsurgency program
that produces few results.
21 August 1983 Aquino assassination leads to first major protests in .more than a decade.
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Secret
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