THIRD WORLD LEADERSHIP DEATH AND POLITICAL STABILITY

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Confidential
Third World Leadership Death
and Political Stability
Confidential
GI 85-10105
August 1985
Copy L O 9
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~ ~e~
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Third World Leadership Death
and Political Stability
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Instability Center, OGI,
Confidential
Gf 85-10205
August 1985
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Applying the findings of the survey of past cases, this study also examines
38 countries headed by authoritarian leaders in 1984 and identifies 12
cases for which the risk of significant. postdeath instability is high (see
figure 6 foldout at back). US interests.are substantial in about two-thirds of
these high-risk cases-Chile, Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines, Soma-
lia, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia. Conversely, the study assesses the odds for
postdeath instability as low in 11 countries, of which only three-Oman,
North Korea, and Vietnam-are of major importance strategically or
economically.
This study does not assess whether a leader will die in office but only the
likelihood that unrest will occur if he dies. A high level of predeath
instability-that is, unrest occurring now-could be a precursor to a
military coup that removes the leader from power and precludes his dying
in office. Thus, for example, the initial contract study concluded that
Sudan had a high potential for postdeath unrest, but it could not foresee
that President Nimeiri would be ousted in April 1985.
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Overview
Information available
as q/'31 December 1984
was used in this report.
and Political Stability
Third World Leadership Death
This contract study examines the link between political instability and the
death of long-tenure authoritarian leaders in the Third World. The first
part surveys 22 historical cases of authoritarian leadership death and
concludes that three factors are closely associated with postdeath unrest:
r Previous instability. The greater the unrest before a leader's death, the
more extensive it was after his death. Moreover, postdeath political
violence usually did not occur when there was no evidence of discon-
tent-such as strikes or demonstrations-before an authoritarian leader
died.
? Duration in power. The longer the leader's tenure, the greater was the
probability of unrest after his death.
? Level of social organization. The more extensive the social organization
in a society-such as labor- unions, political parties, and churches-the
more likely was violence to break out after the authoritarian leader died.
In countries with low levels of social organization, organizing antiregime
protests was more difficult.
Economic development, as measured by indexes such as calorie consump-
tion and urbanization, had only a modest relationship to the level of
postdeath instability. Other factors that one might expect to play a key
role-the existence of a succession mechanism, the leader's age, whether
his death was anticipated, and the type of regime-did not correlate with
postdeath instability.
Some of these findings challenge commonly held assumptions about the
causes of political instability. For example, the first observation-that
predeath instability correlates strongly with postdeath instability-refutes
the belief that unrest will abate after an unpopular leader leaves the scene.
It also calls into question the notion that significant antiregime sentiment
could well up within a society and not be manifested openly until the
authoritarian leader dies. Similarly, the strong positive correlation between
the level of social organization and political instability tends to dispel the
perception that less developed countries with rudimentary political systems
are more likely to experience political violence than are more advanced
societies.
25X1
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The Record of Instability 1
Reasons for Variations in Instability 1
Predeath Instability 2
Social Organization 3
Noninfluential Factors: Age, Succession, and the Regime 4
Likelihood of Instability in Countries With Current 5
Long-Term Authoritarian Leaders
The Philippines 9
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Third World Leadership Death
and Political Stability
Thirty-eight authoritarian Third World regimes are
currently led by individuals who have been iri power
for 10 years or more.' Whether friendly or antagonis-
tic to US interests, many of these regimes, including
Cuba, Indonesia, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, North
Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, Tunisia, and Zaire, are important to the United
States. US interests could be significantly affected by
the degree, nature, timing, and consequences of politi-
cal instability following the death of leaders in these
countries. This study-focusing on authoritarian lead-
ers in power for 10 years or more-attempts to shed
light on the extent to which the death of long-tenure
leaders generates political instability.
wide variations in when and how much political
instability occurred. During the first year following
the leader's death, for example, no instability oc-
curred in eight of the cases, and extensive instability
occurred in only five. Within four years of the leader's
death, however, the change, was substantially more
marked:
? Fifteen countries experienced coups or coup at-
tempts, mass turbulence, guerrilla terrorism, or
combinations of all three.Z
? Civil conflict, usually of a limited character involy-
ing armed forces versus local groups, occurred in
four countries-China, Dominican Republic, South
Korea, and Yugoslavia.
? Revolution, involving major social upheaval, oc-
curred only in Portugal.
In this study, we examine the instability following the
death of 221ong-duration authoritarian leaders and
identify the principal precipitating factors. The analy-
sis of past cases includes all long-duration leaders of
authoritarian states who died in office from natural or .
accidental causes since World War II (table 1). We
exclude instances in which political instability led to
the death of leaders, as in organized-coups d'etat. In
addition, we look at the 38 current cases of long-
duration authoritarian leaders for the presence or
absence of those factors most likely to lead to instabil-
ity. This 'paper concludes with detailed discussions of
three current cases of particular interest and impor-
tance~yria, Tunisia, and the Philippines.. .
The death of along-duration authoritarian leader has
not always been followed by significant political tur-
moil. Among the 22 cases we examined, there were
' The study surveys leaders in power through December 1984. It
has not been revised to reflect eithei the deaths of Enver Hoxha of
Albania and Forbes Burnham of Guyana or the ouster of Sudan's
Gaafar Nimeiri in 1985, although the study did assess the prospects
for instability following the departure of these leaders.
Our analysis shows that-of the many variables.influ-
encing the form, extent, and timing of developments
after the death of an authoritarian leader-three key
factors are closely related to the degree of instability
that arises:
? The types and degree of instability before the death
of the leader.
? The tenure of. the leader in power.
? The level of social organization in the society,
which, in turn, often reflects the society's overall
level of socioeconomic development.
These three factors interact with and reinforce each
other and-to a significant degree-determine the
level of postdeath instability. When societies that have
'Coups or coup attempts occurred in Bhutan, China, Dominican
Republic, Egypt (Nasser), Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Panama, Portu-
gal, and South Korea; mass turbulence oceurred`in Dominican
Republic, Egypt (Nasser), Egypt (Sadat), Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal,
Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Yugoslavia; and guerrilla
terrorism occurred in China, Dominican Republic, Egypt (Sadat),
Haiti, Panama, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Yugoslavia.
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Table 1
Authoritarian Leaders Ruling for 10 Years or Longer
Who Died in Office, 1945-84
been ruled by a single authoritarian leader over a long
period achieve greater economic development and
social mobilization and organization, the political
system becomes too confining for the increasingly
complex and participatory society. As a result, various
forms of unrest manifest themselves while the leader
is still in power, in some cases leading to the over-
throw of the leader. If the leader dies in office,
instability generally continues after his death. If the
society has a high level of social-political organiza-
tion, turmoil is likely to be more extreme and
widespread.
Predeatb Instability
The level of instability in the year after the death of
an authoritarian leader correlates more closely with
the level of predeath instability than with any other
variable we examined (figure 1). In seven of nine cases
of no predeath unrest, there was no postdeath instabil-
ity; in the other two, only limited instability occurred.
Correspondingly, in five of seven cases of serious
predeath unrest, postdeath instability was extensive,
and in the other two it was moderate. The forms of
postdeath instability also correlate fairly high with the
forms of predeath instability.
Duration in Power
The level of instability in the year after a leader's
death is strongly associated with the number of years
he has been in power (figure 2). The deaths of the four
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Figure 1
Predeath Instability and Instability
First Year After Death
~ Portugal
Spain
Dominican
Republic
South Korea
Guineiti
Yugoslavia China
Egypt Egypt.:
(Nasser) (Sadat)'
Kenya Haiti
Nepal Panama
Kuwait
Swaziland
Liberia
Vietnam
Nicaragua Algeria
Bhutan
Taiwan
organization in a society can be measured as to: (1)
how numerous and complex the social organizations
are, and (2) how autonomous those organizations are
from control by the state. It is difficult to devise any
single quantitative measure of the extent and autono-
my of social organization. We have, however, classi-
fied our 22 countries into three general categories of
high, medium, or low levels of social organization in
terms of extent and autonomy. In doing this, we have
paid special attention to the strength and role of labor
unions and political parties.
Eleven countries were classified as having low levels
of social organization, five as having medium levels,
and six as having high levels. Ten of the 11 countries
with low levels of social organization experienced no
or limited postdeath instability. Five of the six with
high levels of social organization experienced exten-
sive or moderate postdeath instability. Greater insta-
bility occurred in countries where social organizations
were able to mobilize their constituents-South Ko-
rea, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, and the Dominican
Republic-than in countries-for example, Nepal,
Swaziland, Liberia, Saudi Arabia-that lacked such
groupings.
A Partial Factor: Economic Development
The overall level of economic development in a society
had only a modest positive relation to the level of
postdeath instability in the 22 historical cases. In
general, countries at higher levels of economic devel-
opment had widely varying levels of postdeath insta-
bility, while countries at low levels of development
had low levels of instability. The higher the level of
development, the greater the likelihood that unrest
would occur.
leaders in power for more than 30 years were followed
by extensive instability in three cases (Portugal,.
Spain, Dominican Republic) and moderate instability
in the fourth (Yugoslavia). At the. other extreme, the
deaths of seven leaders in power for 10 to 14 years
were followed in three cases by no instability (Swazi-
land, Algeria, Saudi Arabia), in.three cases by only
limited instability (Haiti, Panama, Kuwait), and in a "
single case (Egypt-Sadat) by moderate instability. In
general, the earlier authoritarian leaders die in office
the less instability follows their death:
Social Organization
An extraordinarily strong correlation exists between
the overall level of social organization in a society and
the level of instability following the death of an
authoritarian leader (figure 3).' The level of social
' Social organizations include such groupings as labor unions,
political parties, interest groups, churches, cooperatives, and
universities.
The modest positive relation is reflected in compari-
sons of postdeath instability with indexes of economic
development. Uneven income distribution distorts the
value of using per capita GDP to measure develop-
ment, but other indexes show a stronger correlation
with postdeath unrest (see figure 4 foldout at back):
? Most of the countries where per capita calorie
consumption was high experienced either extensive
or moderate. postdeath instability.
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Figure 2 ,.
Years in Power and Instability
First Year After Death
Egypt (Sadat)
Egypt (Nassei}
Panama
Ham
Kuwait
Nepal
Kenya
None
Algeria
Swaziland ~
Vietnam ,!
j'
10 - 14
Yeais in power
Spain
Dominican Republic
Portugal
Nicaragua Liberia
~,/Bhu at n Taiwan
? Largely urban societies varied greatly in their levels
of postdeath unrest, while most of the societies that
are overwhelmingly rural had no or limited instabil-
ity.
? Countries with predominantly literate populations
had varying levels of postdeath unrest; while most of
the societies with low rates of literacy had limited or
no postdeath instability.
? In five of the six countries with high annual per
capita economic growth rates, instability was either
moderate or extensive.
Noninfluential~Factors: Age,
Succession, and the Regime -
Our study shows no relationship between postdeath
instability and various aspects of the authoritarian
leader and his regime=factors one might expect to
affect instability (see figure 5 foldout at back). The
age of a leader at the time of his death has no effect
on the extent of postdeath instability. Nor, more
generally, is the degree to which a leader's death was
anticipated or unexpected related to postdeath insta-
bility. In addition, no association was found between
the broad institutional character of the regime and
the extent of postdeath instability. More extreme and
less extreme degrees of instability after the deaths of
leaders have occurred in about equal measure in
Communist regimes, tightly controlled authoritarian
regimes, and authoritarian regimes that allow some
freedoms. Finally, there appears to be no significant
relationship between the existence of succession ar-
rangements and postdeath instability.
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Lonnaential
Figure 3
Social Organization and Instability
First Year After Death
Portugal
Spain.
Dominican
Republic
South Korea
Yugoslavia Egypt
Egypt (Sadat)
(Nasser)
China
Nepal
Kenya
Haiti
Kuwait
Swaziland Algeria
Liberia Taiwan
Vietnam
Nicaragua
Saudi Arabia
Bhutan
Low Medium High
Social organization
Likelihood of Instability in Countries With
Current Long-Term Authoritarian Leaders
The number of authoritarian leaders in power for 10
years or more has been increasing in recent years. At
present there are 38 such leaders, and in 1985 the
current leaders of Taiwan and Madagascar also will
have been in power for 10 years (table 2). Exactly half
of the 38 current leaders are at least 60 years old,
including 10 who are 70 or older. Although a number
of the leaders may leave office voluntarily or be
overthrown, more long-term authoritarian leaders are
likely to die in office during the next two decades than
during the past two decades.
Using our findings from the 22 historical cases as a
basis for estimation, we ranked the 38 current cases
on each of the three major factors most closely related
to postdeath instability. We then added the assigned
numerical values for a composite estimate of the
probability that significant instability will follow a
leader's death. The three indexes-predeath instabil-
ity, level of social organization, and duration in
power-were weighted equally for purposes of aggre-
gate estimation. The measurement of predeath insta-
bility and social organization in each case is necessar-
ily general and subjective. Table 3 summarizes the
calculations that were made and the results; because
of their simplified nature, the calculations should be
viewed as a starting point for more detailed country
analysis.
The case studies that. follow explore how, in addition
to our three principal variables, other factors bear on
developments that follow a leader's death. These
include variables that, when very roughly aggregated
or characterized for purposes of broad comparison,
did not appear closely related to results in the 22 past
cases but that might have an effect in a particular
case (for example, the nature of the regime and
succession arrangements). Consideration of economic,
social, and demographic trends may also yield a more
complete basis for estimation. The case studies also
include an assessment of factors that are unique in
character and cannot be reliably aggregated, such as
external influences on predeath and postdeath
developments.
Tunisia, the Philippines, and Syria are among the
countries we have identified as having a high potential
for significant postdeath instability. There is a strong
possibility that all three leaders could die in the near
future because of age or illness. The risk of postdeath
instability, however, is calculated somewhat different-
ly in each case on the basis of the three key factors:
? Duration in power of the current leader is a more
important factor in. the case of Tunisia.
? Predeath instability is more significant for the
Philippines and Syria.
? The level of social organization, important in all
three cases, is probably most so in the Philippines.
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Table 2
Long-Duration Authoritarian Leaders in Office, 1984
Country
Leader
Born
Assumed
Power
Years in
Power
Age
Albania
Enver Hoxha
1908
1944
40
76
Bahrain
Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa
1933
1961
23
51
Benin
Mathieu Kerekou
1933
1972
12
51
Bhutan
Jigme Singye Wangchuck
1955
1972
12
29
Burma ~
U Ne Win
1911
1962
22
73
Chile
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
1915
1973
11
69
Cuba
Fidel Castro Ruz
1927
1959
25
57
Gabon
El Hadj Omar Bongo
1935
1967
17
49
Gambia, The
Dawda Kairaba Jawara
1924
1965
19 ~
60
Guyana
Forbes Burnham
1923
1966
18
61
Haiti
Jean-Claude Duvalier
1951
1971
13
33
Indonesia
Soeharto
1921
1966
18
63
Ivory Coast ~
Felix Houphouet-Boigny
1905
1960
24
79
Jordan
Hussein I
1935
1953
31
49
Korea, North
Kim Il-song
1912
1948
36
72
Lesotho
Leabua Jonathan
1914
1965
19
70
Libya
Mu`ammar Qadhafi
1942
1969
15
42
Malawi
Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda
1906
1963
21
78
Mali
Moussa Traore
1936
1968
16
48
Morocco
Hassan II
1929
1961
23
55
Nepal
Birendra Bir Bikram
1945
1972
12
39
Niger
Seyni Kountche
1931
-1974
10
53
Oman
Qaboos bin Said
1940
1970
14
44
Paraguay
Alfredo Stroessner
1912
1954
30
72
Philippines
Ferdinand E. Marcos
1917
1966
18
67
Qatar
Khalifs bin Hamad Al Thani
1932
1972
12
52
Rwanda
Juvenal Habyarimana
1937
1973
11
47
Sierra Leone
Siaka P. Stevens
1905
1968
16
79'
Singapore
Lee Kuan Yew
1923
1965
19
61
Somalia
Mohamed Siad Barre
1921
1969
15
63
Sudan
Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri
1930
1969
15
54
Syria
Hafiz al-Assad
1928
1970
14
56
Tanzania
Julius K. Nyerere
1922
1961
23
62
Togo
Gnassingbe Eyadema
1937
1967
17
47
Tunisia
Habib Bourguiba
1903
1956
28
81
Vietnam
Le Duan
1907
1969
15
77
Zaire
Mobutu Sese Seko
1930
1965
19
54
Zambia
Kenneth David Kaunda
1924
1964
20
60
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Table 3
Rankings of Countries With Current Long-Term Authoritarian Leaders e
Country
Piedeath
Instability
Duration in
Power
Social
Organization
Instability
Estimate
Level
Score
Years
Score
Level
Score
Albania
Limited
1
40
3
NEGL
0
4
Bahrain
Limited
1
23
2
Low
1
4
Benin
Limited
1
12
0
Low
1
2
Bhutan ~
Limited
1
12
0
Low
1
2
Burma
Extensive
3
22
2
Extensive
3
8
Chile
Extensive
3
11
0
Extensive
3
6
Cuba
Limited
1
25
3
NEGL
0
4
Gabon
Limited
1
17
1
Moderate
2
4
Gambia, The
Extensive
3
19
1
Moderate
2
6
Guyana
Moderate
2
18
1
Moderate
2
5
Haiti
Moderate
2
13
0
Low
1
3
Indonesia
Extensive
3
18
1
Moderate
2
6
Ivory Coast
Limited
1
24
2
Low
1
4
Jordan
None
0
31
3
Moderate
2
5
Korea, North
None
0
36
3
NEGL
0
3
Lesotho
Moderate
2
19
1
Low
1
4
Libya
Moderate
2
15
1
Low
1
4
Malawi
Limited
1
21
2
Low
1
4
Mali
Moderate
2
16
1
Moderate
2
5
Morocco
Extensive
3
23
2
Extensive
3
8
Nepal
Limited
1
12
0
Low
1
2
Niger
Moderate
2
10
0
Low
1
3
Oman
Limited
1
14
0
Low
1
2
Paraguay
Limited
1
30
3
Low
1
5
Philippines
Extensive
3
18
1
Extensive
3
7
Qatar
Limited
1
12
O
NEGL
0
1
Rwanda
Limited
1
11
0
Low
1
2
Sierra Leone
Moderate
2
16
1
Extensive
3
6
Singapore
Limited
1
19
1
Moderate
2
4
Somalia
Extensive
3
15
1
Extensive
3
7
Sudan
Extensive
3
15
1
Extensive
3
7
Syria
Extensive
3
14
0
Extensive
3
6
a Each of the 38 countries with current long-term authoritarian
leaders was ranked on each of the three key factors most closely
related to postdeath instability in the past. Numerical values were
assigned as follows: for the factors of previous instability and level
of social organization, three points were given for "extensive," two
for "moderate," one for "limited" or "low," and zero for "none" or
"negligible." For duration in power, three points were assigned for
25 or more years, two for 20 to 24, one for 15 to 19, and zero for 10
to 14. The points for each country were then added to provide the
estimated potential for postdeath instability.
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Tunisia
Habib Bourguiba, founder of the modern Tunisian
state, is the only leader the country has known since
independence. This compounds the effect of his long
tenure-almost three decades-on the prospects for
stability. Not only do few Tunisians have any memory
of another regime or ruler but there is no historical
record of legitimate transfer of power, apart from the
withdrawal of the French colonial government. In this
sense the Bourguiba government resembles revolu-
tionary regimes dominated by longstanding charis-
matic leaders, like Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, Mao
Zedong of China, or Tito of Yugoslavia. If the current
Tunisian Government rested on a highly developed
and disciplined party structure as did those regimes,
prospects for stable succession might be greater. But
the ruling party. has been decaying at the same time
that Bourguiba's personal charisma; legitimacy, and
political skill have been faltering.
Bourguiba's rule has been autocratic but compara-
tively benevolent, promoting a personality cult but co-
opting and reappointing opponents willing to accept
his authority. For example, several years ago he
pardoned Habib Achour, former Secretary General of
the labor federation (UGTT), who was then elected
chairman of the federation. The regime is based on
Bourguiba's Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), which
has an operating structure at lower levels. At the top,
however, the party is, according to Clement H.
Moore, "a patrimonial system." Conflict within the
elite has been controlled, but, when Bourguiba leaves
the scene, the PSD will not be equipped to mobilize
the public or channel mass action to support the
government. Party vitality has declined as social
mobilization and unrest have grown. Bourguiba's
duration in power bulks large in the question of what
instability may follow his death because the country
has undergone marked social and economic transfor-
mation during that time, and instability scarcely
known for most of the period has increased notably
since the late 1970s.
Over half of Tunisia's population now is urban, and
over 60 percent is literate. The latter figure contrasts
with 15 percent at independence and reflects Bourgui-
ba's extraordinary investment in education. Given
rapid population growth, the post-Bourguiba genera-
tion will be unusually large and educated. This is
significant in the context of recent economic straits-
20-percent unemployment, severe underemployment,
and constriction of opportunities for migration to
Western Europe that had earlier provided a major
economic safety valve. (Currently, only Libya imports
large numbers of Tunisian workers, who are then
exposed to anti-Bourguiba propaganda.) Many edu-
cated young Tunisians are now unemployed and lack
enthusiasm for the regime, and survey data indicate
that less educated youth are very politically alienated.
In recent years several opposition parties have been
legalized, but in the 1981 elections Bourguiba's Na-
tional Front took all 136 Assembly seats,
(Opposition parties collectively received only 5
percent of the vote.) The most significant semi-;
independent organization, the UGTT labor federa-
tion, is linked to the regime but has often been a
source of opposition. The ruling party and the UGTT
agreed to support a common list of candidates in the
1981 election, but government efforts to undermine
the UGTT could drive it into opposition again.
With Tunisia ethnically homogeneous, the main po-
tential bases of opposition appear to be class and
religion. After independence Bourguiba's moderniza-
tion program reduced clerical influence, but Islamic
fundamentalism has increased recently, especially
among the young and outside the capital. The govern-
ment has retreated from confrontation with such
religious resurgence. Actual or potential influence of
the fundamentalists within the military and among
students is especially significant. Of 30 members of
the small Islamic Liberation Party sentenced to prison
in 1984, 19 were soldiers.
Beginning in 1978, student and labor unrest grew..A
general strike and riots-crushed by security forces-
left up to 100 dead. Violent countrywide protests
against food price increases occurred in January 1984,
with 70 deaths and 800 arrests. The economic prob-
lems coincided with infighting and jockeying for
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position in the PSD.
armed forces, is that apro-American colonel might
try to seize power in order to preempt a move by the
radical Muslims.
riots forced Bourguiba to repeal the price increases
and offer up his Interior Minister as a scapegoat to
protect his chosen successor, Prime Minister Moham-
med Mzali. Without Bourguiba's status as "Father of
the Country," there is little reason to assume that
Mzali will in fact be able to take and consolidate
power, or that he would succeed in containing opposi-
tion should he come to office.
Apart from those emanating from Libya, external
influences are not likely to be a major determinant of
political events after Bourguiba. Libya, which borders
the country, almost certainly will- try to meddle.
Qadhafi has already sponsored an attack on the
Tunisian town of Gafsa in 1980 and has been charged
with training Tunisian dissidents and dispatching
assassins to kill Tunisian officials in 1976. Libyan-
trained Tunisian dissidents may have been involved in
a January 1984 explosion on the Algerian-Tunisian
pipeline near the Libyan border.
Tunisia does not necessarily have the greatest poten-
tial for serious instability; as our ranking of the 38
countries might suggest. The length of Bourguiba's
tenure accounts for Tunisia's position at the top of the
list. The length is indeed -important-it reflects the
absolute lack of experience in Tunisia with transfer of
authority and the reasons for doubt that any individ-
ual would have the prestige to manage, as Bourguiba
has, challenges to the regime. Yet there is a dominant
party, sclerotic though it has become, and the govern-
ment and important organizations such as the UGTT
labor federation have learned the art of compromise
in negotiations with each other. Social organization
and predeath~ instability have been extensive, but not
clearly more so than in several other countries on the
list, such as Chile, Morocco, Syria, or the Philippines.
Radical as demographic changes have been, they too
are matched in significance in some other countries.
Nevertheless; whether or not Tunisia is the most
unstable country on the list, it is virtually certain to
experience severe turmoil. Mass turbulence is likely to
occur before and after Bourguiba's death, but a
radical coup or armed civil strife-the forms of
instability more likely to lead to a change of regime or
foreign policy-are less probable. One possibility,
especially in the context of increased US aid to the
The Philippines
For 25 years after independence, virtually all, save
one, of the conditions favoring revolution and major
upheaval existed in the Philippines. There was rapid
modernization and urbanization, a highly literate and
educated population by Third World standards, ex-
treme inequalities in income and wealth, a major land
tenure problem (most notably in central Luzon), ex-
tensive corruption, the domination of politics by a
small group of families closely tied to sugar interests,
a tradition of rural insurrection, a pervasive culture of
violence, and, most important, a massive foreign
military and economic presence. Social and economic
conditions in the Philippines in the 1950s were more
favorable to outbreak of a major revolution than they
were at that time in Cuba. There was, however, one
significant political difference: the Philippines had a
wide-open democracy, which produced a steady flow
of political leaders (including the regular defeat of
presidents running for reelection), at least minimum
responsiveness of government to local needs, and the
widespread distribution of the spoils of corruption.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the democratic safety
valve eased the pressures that would have produced
far greater instability than actually occurred. After
martial law was instituted in 1972, the safety valve
was closed.
At present, Philippine politics is largely focused on
how and when Marcos will cease to be President and
what will be the consequences of his departure from
the scene. During the past year, major debates have
occurred over the Executive Committee that he creat-
ed to manage the succession and the desirability of re-
creating the office of vice. president to have a succes-
sor in place. There are three ways Marcos could leave
office:
? He could retire voluntarily. From time to time he
has suggested he might do this, most recently with .
reference to the 1987 presidential elections. On the
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basis of his performance to date, however, the
probability that he would actually retire seems
extremely low.
? He could' be forced out of office. To date, however,
Marcos has demonstrated great skill and flexibility
in outmaneuvering and co-opting his opponents.
During the six months after Aquino's murder, for
instance, he showed himself to be the master of the
neatly timed concession or compromise necessary to
divide and weaken the opposition. At present there
is no political figure with sufficient appeal and
resources to effectively challenge him. If he were
going to be forced out of office as a result of massive
popular disaffection, it would have happened in the
tumultuous months following Aquino's death. Con-
ceivably, he could be overthrown by a military coup,
but he has carefully ensured that the key command-
ers in the Army are loyal to him. The military "We
Belong" reform movement, however, represents a
potential coup threat if its demands are not met.
The one other circumstance in which he might be
forced out of; office is if he were incapacitated. In
that case, the military, perhaps in combination with
some civilian' politicians, could move in to take
control.
? He could die in office. This seems the most probable
way the Marcos regime will end. The turmoil and
instability that have existed in recent years plus the
high level of social organization in the Philippines (a
product of its previous democratic phase) virtually
ensure a fair amount of instability after Marcos's
death. The later that death occurs, the more sub-
stantial that instability is likely to be. If Marcos had
died in office two or three years ago, a transition
back to a democratic system would have been more
probable and' less traumatic than it would be now or
in the future., Ironically, Marcos's ill health is one of
the few factors favoring less instability in the Philip-
pines.
Marcos appears to occupy a position comparable to
that which Franco of Spain had in his last years or
that Assad of Syria has at the present time. All three
were or are the linchpins of their systems. In the two
current cases, a major succession struggle is almost
certain to occur involving personal associates, political
factions, military leaders, technocratic executives, and
opposition groups of varying stripes. In the Philippines
the principal actors are likely to be Imelda Marcos
and close associates of the Marcos family; senior
political figures and cabinet ministers, such as Juan
Ponce Enrile; the military chiefs, particularly Gener-
als Ver and Ramos; major leaders of business and
commerce; Jaime Cardinal Sin; and opposition politi-
cal leaders, such as Salvador Laurel, Jose Diokno, and
Agapito Aquino.
In its post-Marcos era the Philippines will face two
major political challenges: the restoration of a demo-
cratic system and the establishment of stability. The
two are closely linked, and it will be almost impossible
to achieve the second without achieving the first.
Democracy, however, could be restored at least tem-
porarily without achieving stability. The immediate
issue after Marcos. dies will be whether the principal
political actors can agree both on an immediate
successor and on a process for establishing a lasting
democratic regime. Factors favoring agreement in-
clude the awareness among elite groups of the need
for external help and the widely prevalent feeling that
a democratic system is the proper form of government
for the Philippines. Factors working against such an
outcome include the absence, since Aquino's death, of
a broadly acceptable opposition leader, the organiza-
tional disunity and conflicting goals of the opposition
groups, and the natural reluctance of Marcos's asso-
ciates to yield or to share power for fear of the
retribution they might suffer from his successors.
If Marcos's widow or his close associates attempt to
continue to monopolize power, the democratic opposi-
tion groups are likely to engage in massive demonstra-
tions, strikes, and riots to force them at least to share
power if not to relinquish it completely. In these
circumstances, the military leaders will be in a critical
position. If the Army remains neutral or actively or
passively supports the opposition, the Marcos loyalists
will be forced out. If the Army supports the successor
leaders, the situation,will polarize, with the democrat-
ic opposition increasingly resorting to violent methods
and the Marxist New People's Army rapidly gaining
adherents.. The road will then be open for prolonged
terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and eventual revolution.
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If, on the other hand, Marcos's associates and opposi-
tion leaders can agree on an interim leader and the
basic elements of a new democratic system, prospects
are brighter although the new authorities will still
face serious problems. Central among these, of course,
is the economy, with the huge external debt, a
declining GNP, unemployment variously estimated at
20 percent or more, and a 50-percent inflation rate.
The problems facing a leader in the post-Marcos
regime are comparable to but in many respects much
worse than those that Alfonsin has confronted in
Argentina. Thus, even if there is agreement on a
constitutional process, there is also great likelihood of
strikes; protests, and riots over economic issues. A
democratic successor regime's ability to deal with
these effectively would depend primarily on the skill
of its leader in obtaining political acquiescence from
his people and economic support from the IMF and
the United States. Shortly before his death, Benigno
Aquino remarked on the impossibility of a democratic
post-Marcos regime meeting the high expectations
that people would have for it. No successor to Marcos,
including himself, Aquino said, was likely to last in
power more than six months. If the successor regime
is unable to keep a lid on instability, the way could
again be open to, and indeed great demands could
exist for, intervention by the military.
Syria
Syria experienced chronic political instability in the
quarter century after independence-47 different
cabinets and 11 violent changes in leadership. Hafiz
al-Assad, who came to power in 1970, was the key to
breaking the pattern, and there are ample reasons
why. Syria's politics could revert to chronic instability
upon his death-which could be imminent because of
serious illness. Assad's government rests on a narrow
base in a country with marked social cleavages,
serious opposition and instability have occurred in
recent years, and violent.jockeying for succession is
already under way among the regime's elite.
Assad's tenure in office (14 years) is not the major
factor in potential instability, except insofar as he-
through his personal skill-has managed tenuously to
keep a lid on internal turmoil. The primary source of
instability is the interaction between the two other key
variables-social organization and a history of insta-
bility-aggravated by strife among the elite, which is
particularly intense in Syria. Syrian society is exten-
sively organized and divided along ethnic, religious,
and regional lines. The severity of elite conflict means
that not only autonomous organizations but govern-
mental ones as well (such as rival security units)
contribute to instability. Government repression has
suppressed social conflict in the near term, but in so
doing may have channeled organizational efforts in
directions that could be more dangerous for the longer
term. For example, after the brutal suppression of the
revolt at Hamah, public support for the subversive
Muslim Brotherhood declined. One of the two main
factions of the Brotherhood, however, reacted by
shifting strategy toward penetration of the armed
forces.
The Syrian military and government apparatuses are
dominated by individuals from rural areas-although
half of. Syria's population is urban, and the urban
population is growing at a rate 50 percent faster than
the rural. Moreover, the regime is overwhelmingly
dominated by members of Assad's Alawite sect,
which represents only about one-eighth of the popula-
tion and is outnumbered by Sunni Muslims six to one.
The tightening Alawite grip on Syrian politics ~'
prompted Sunni countermobilization, most notably by
the Muslim Brotherhood, which is centered in the
cities. Non-Alawites are represented in the regime,
but as isolated individuals, not power blocs. (Two key
figures, however, are Sunnis-Defense Minister Mus-
tafa Tlas and Chief of Staff Hikmat Shehabi.) Three-
quarters of Alawites live in just one region (Latakia).
To compound the problem, challenges to Assad have
come from within the Alawite community, which is
divided into different tribal associations and sects.
This has led Assad to put more reliance on family
members. Intra-Alawite cleavages were reflected in
battles that reportedly took place in Latakia in 1984.
Thus ethnic-religious, sectional, urban/rural, and in-
traelite cleavages combine to shrink the foundation of
the regime. "The problem became a vicious circle,"
Nikolaos Van Dam wrote in 1979, "...power was
essential~if.the necessary drastic social changes entail-
ing the suppression of sectarian, regional, and tribal
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loyalties, were to be effected; on the other hand,
maintenance of that power entailed dependence on
those same loyalties, thus hindering their
suppression."
Between 1976 and 1981, there were over 300 assassi-
nations of people linked to the regime-and an,at-
tempt on Assad, after which security forces reportedly
killed several hundred political prisoners-as well as
attacks on Bath Party installations. Alawite officer
candidates were massacred in Aleppo. In 1980 gener-
al strikes paralyzed northern Syria's cities, and in
1982 an uprising in Hamah led to a two-week battle,
destruction of parts of the city, and casualties that
may have numbered in the thousands. This led to
formation of the opposition National Alliance for the
Liberation of Syria (including elements of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Islamic Front, pro-Iraqi Ba`thists, and
others=of which the two religious groups are most
significant).
The Bath Party ostensibly is in a position to be a
prime mechanism for social mobilization and control
or co-optation of other organized social forces. Party
discipline improved under Assad but did so because of
the greater sectarian homogeneity, which in fact is the
more general underlying weakness of the regime. The
party also expanded into more of a mass organization,
but overall political mobilization of the population has
not been notably successful even though the political
consciousness of the population is generally quite
high. This suggests potential for mobilization of the
populace by antiregime forces in an uncertain period
after Assad's death.
The effective power of the regime resides in security
units, especially the Presidential Guard (dramatically
increased in size in 1984), the Defense Companies
(heavily Alawite in composition), and the Special
Forces under Ali Haidar. The latter two groups,
however, are bitter rivals within the elite. When the
President was believed to be dying in the spring of
1984, the two organizations deployed into contesting
positions in and around the capital, and the recovered
President's personal intervention was required to re-
store order.
Since these events the struggle within the elite has
continued. Publicly available sources provide only
ambiguous accounts of how it is evolving. Whatever
the actual situation is, the tense controversies over
succession suggest that different inferences might be
drawn about the effect of the third key variable in our
analysis-the leader's duration in power. The general
lesson drawn from past cases implies that the longer
Assad survives in power, the greater will be the
instability when he dies. The specific events in the
Syrian case, however, suggest that any chance of
muting instability now depends on Assad's keeping
the reins for some time-in order to resolve or modify
the conflict among would-be successors. (One of As-
sad's maneuvers, for example, was to appoint three
vice presidents in the wake of the struggles in the
capital.) In any event, the odds of a peaceful and
orderly transition upon Assad's death are low.
All the factors that point to instability are aggravated
by a number of other variables. High inflation, heavy
dependence on foreign aid, and the possibility of an
economic downturn can only work to promote political
instability. External factors are also less promising in
this regard. The 1976 Syrian intervention in Lebanon
was unpopular at home, and without Egyptian col-
laboration the option of another voluntary military
engagement with Israel (which might rally the popula-
tion) appears out of the question.
Syria has the hallmarks of major instability waiting to
explode. The length of Assad's tenure is the least of
the three major causes. He has managed the sources
of conflict within Syria but not overpowered them.
Several facts indicate that Assad's demise could
trigger the outbreak:
? His personal leadership, however tenuous, has kept
the marked political fissures in Syria from cracking
wide open.
? There is little evidence that other elements of the
narrow elite will honor his preference for succession
(which has not even been made explicit).
? The divided governing elite is socially unrepresenta-
tive of the population.
? Opposition forces have been mobilized, organized,
and embittered by violent repression.
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Judging by the various forms of predeath instability
and the lack of elite cohesion, postdeath instability
could easily occur under numerous circumstances.
One or more coup attempts are certainly likely, and if
the intraelite conflict is severe or inconclusive, broad-
er opposition groups could seize the opportunity to
foment civil strife on a large scale.
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Figure 5
Noninfluential Factors and Instability
First Year After Death
Age at Death
Extensive Spain Dominican Republic South Korea Extensive Dominican Republic
Portugal Guinea Portugal
Spain
Guinea
South Korea
Yugoslavia Egypt (Sadat) Egypt (Nasser) China Egypt (Nasser)
Moderate China . Moderate Yugoslavia Egypt (Sadat)
Kuwait Panama Haiti Nepal
Haiti Nepal Limited Kenya Panama
Kuwait
Taiwan Vietnam
Saudi Arabia I I Liberia
Guinea
Dominican Republic
Portugal
Spain
Extensive Portugal Dominican Republic
Spain Guinea
China Egypt (Nasser) Egypt (Sadat) China Egypt (Nasser)
Moderate Yugoslavia Moderate Yugoslavia Egypt (Sadat)
Haiti Kenya Haiti Kenya
Nepal Kuwait Limited Kuwait Nepal
Panama Panama
Vietnam Algeria Saudi Arabia Swaziland Taiwan Algeria Saudi Arabia
None Liberia None Vietnam Bhutan
Taiwan Liberia
Nicaragua I I Nicaragua
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Figure 4
Economic Development and Instability
First Year After Death
Calorie Consumption a Urban Population b
Postdeath instability South Korea Postdeath instability
Extensive Guinea Dominican Republic Portugal Extensive Guinea Dominican Republic South Korea Portugal
Spain Spain
Haiti
Limited Kenya
Nepal
Egypt (Nasser)
Egypt (Sadat)
Yugoslavia
Saudi Arabia Algeria Taiwan Nicaragua
Bhutan Liberia Vietnam
c.,.~.,a~..,t
Egypt (Nasser)
Egypt (Sadat)
Yugoslavia
Haiti Kuwait Panama
Limited Kenya
Nepal
Liberia Nicaragua Algeria
None Swaziland Saudi Arabia
Postdeath instability Postdeath instability
South Korea
Extensive Guinea Dominican Republic South Korea Extensive Guinea Dominican Republic Portugal
Portugal Spain Spain
Liberia Algeria
None Saudi Arabia Nicaragua
c.,.~~a~..,t
Literacy
e Data unavailable for Bhutan and Vietnam.
Haiti
Kenya
Kuwait
Nepal
Algeria
Liberia
Nicaragua
Swaziland
Less than 2.0% 2.0 - 4.0
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Figure 6
Potential for Significant Instability Following Death of National Leader
r?~ ~?
~:.~~
a~~~
South
Pacific
Ocean
CsNADA
Miller Cylindrical Projection
Scale 1:85,000,000
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'i
CUBA ~ ~ OMINICAN
1 N ITI ~~_ at LXR atORNER axn XEVa
BEEI2F lAN CA ? ~~AxnGUa RXO eaRBWX
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the United Sta~ea Government hae not recopnired
iha incorPaaiian al Estonia, lane, and tifhuanu
mto the Soviet Unim.Other boundary representation o e
n
Potential for Instability
Medium ~ High
Very high
b~
VANUATU;
North
Pacific
Ocean
NEW
WESTERN
? SAMOA?~~~
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