U.S.-BACKED REBELS CAN'T DEFEAT NICARAGUAN REGIME, CIA FINDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100030013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 25, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Si Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100030013-4
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE - I
WASHINGTON POST
25 November 1983
U.S.-Baeked Rebels Can. D efeat
Ni
By Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writer
The CIA has concluded that there are no
circumstances under which a force of U.S.-
backed rebels can achieve a military or polit-
ical-victory over the leftist Sandinista govern-
ment of Nicaragua, according to congressional
sources.
In addition, there are indications that the
administration, despite its tough public pos-
ture, is beginning to give some thought to how_
the war could be wound down and how an am-
nesty for the American-supported forces could
be arranged.
In a National Intelligence Estimate provided
to the congressional oversight committees this
fall coinciding with crucial votes to continue
funding to the rebel forces, the CIA said the
U.S.-backed "contra" forces made up of 10,000
to 1,000 guerrillas lack the military capability,
financing, training and political support to
overthrow the powerful and well-entrenched
Sandinista government with its relatively large
and 'well-equipped standing army of 25,000
soldiers and even larger militia forces.
The CIA analysis, according to these
sources, c:oncludes that. the Sandinista leader-
ship is controlled by hard-line Marxists who
will not give up in any kind of military con=
froritation with the contras. In addition, the
CIA has concluded that the U.S.-backed
counterrevolutionary forces have not been
able to win enough support in the
Nicaraguan population to overthrow the
Sandinistas, who seized power four years ago
after ousting Gen. Anastasio Somoza.
Administration officials said on previous
occasions that they did not think the U.S.-
backed force was strong enough to overthrow
the Nicaraguan government, but the rapid
growth of the rebel army from its original
500-man level authorized by Congress and
the loosely defined administration goals left
many members of Congress uncertain as to
President Reagan's true intentions in Nic-
aragua.
has sure on the Sandinistas until they stop sup-'
With the new IA analysis, Reagan
also stated for the first time that he wants a porting leftist guerrillas fighting the govern-
general amnesty for U.S.-backed rebels who ment of neighboring El Salvador.
have been fighting the Sandinista govern- The CIA has concluded that Paramilitary' meat as part of the CIA-directed force. Rea- -harassment from the U.S.-backed contras,
gan included the amnesty provision in a se- who have been operating from bases in Hon-
cret document justifying the covert action to duras since early 1982, has caused the San-
dinista government to reconsider its support
Congress. The amnesty provision would -be a for the Salvadoran guerrillas and may even-
precondition to a cessation of hostilities, ply persuade the Sandinistas to abandon
sources said. the Salvadoran leftists altogether. Accordin
The document, a presidential "finding" to one congressional source, who s k g
under the National Security Act, was po a on
the condition he not be identified, there is 'a
presented to the congressional committees in bipartisan consensus, especially -
September by Secretary of State George P. ate, that the coveoIic of the Re ag Sad-
Shultz and CIA Director William J. Casey. Pan
The amnesty provision is not spelled out ministration for the first t -time is consistent
nt
in any detail in the finding, and a number of with publicly stated policy goals of the U.S.
questions have been raised in the congres- Central government gover and the governments of the
sional committees as to how it would be ap- a American region.
plied and enforced. It is not clear whether Under this view, many members of the
exiles who are fighting the Sandinistas would congressional oversight committees report
be allowed to return to their homes in Nic- edly have become convinced that the admin-
aragua or win back property seized by the istration is willing to end' its secret war
against Nicaragua as soon as the Sandinistas
government
But the most recent discussions between give concrete and verifiable assurances that
will no longer give aid, command and
the administration and Congress have cre- they
ated the impression that the administration control and logistical support to the Salva-
is giving careful thought to how to end the dora'I a guerrilla movement.
Doubt remains, however, among m
2-year-old secret war against Nicaragua. The who were surprised by an administration
amnesty provision addresses an issue that effort during the summer to redraft a
has been unresolved in two years of private . pres-
consultations between the administration idential justification for the covert operation
in terms that some members believed would
and congressmen fearful that Reagan and
the CIA were slowly committing the United
States.-to thousands of Nicaraguan exiles
whose fate would be uncertain if a negoti-
ated settlement of regional tensions were
reached in Central America. .
Last spring, Casey warned in private of a
potential "bloodbath" if Congress withdrew
have committed the U.&-backed forces to an
all-out victory over the Sandinista govern-
ment if it, was not willing to make substan-
tial political and diplomatic concessions.
In this draft presidential "finding," the
administration said the secret war was nec-
essary to stop the spread of revolution from
sunoort from the U.S.-backed rebel forces. Nicaragua to other countries. It. also stated a
The House cut off funding for the cove necessity to keep up covert paramilitary op-
operation twice this year, but in a compro- erations until Nicaragua returned to a dem-
mise with the Senate, legislators ended the . ocratic form of government, reduced its level
session by approving $24 million to fund the of armament and guaranteed press and re-
covert paramilitary operations at least until ligious freedoms. Many members considered
June under a mandate to keep military pres- the latter demands as diplomatic goals, not
suitable for inclusion in the secret justifica.
tion as preconditions to cease hostilities. 1
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MA7XVVED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100030013-4