NEW FRIEND VS. OLD ALLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100050079-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: February 8, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100050079-0
11-
AR=IC-r.. THE WASHINGTON POST
o Pn~-~~--~- 8 February 1981
kw . Frieln
Alexander Haig, a smooth operator.
with a martial air who nevertheless has,
the brains and guile to be a superb secre-.
tary of state, will get an early test of his
diplomatic skills -,when he- tries to set
U.S. policy in North Africa- . 8 :
He must figure.out how-to cultivate a:
new friend, Algeria, without alienating
an old one, Morocco.-The two neighbors
---conservative,--, monarchical Morocco
l
and left-leaning, socialist Algeria-have
long been at odds politically.. -
Their! hostility also involves a vast:
'stretch--:of,-. valuable: desert called the:
Western Sahara. Morocco's claim to this
tract has been contested for five years by-
the.Polisario nationaLliberation move-
ment. These leftist `guerrillas get their _'.
strongest outside-support from Algeria.
Before the Iranian hostage crisis, the.
U.S. choice was simple enough. Morocco's:
King Hassan. was a staunch American
ally who risked the enmity-of other Arab
leaders to s upport ' the Camp David ac-
cords. Algeria,. on the other hand, chan-
neled arms and- aid from -the Soviet
Union to the Polisario guerrilla.~._This_
provoked :Hassan .to'- divert American
military-aid into the Western'Sahara, de-
spite legal strictures-that required Mo-.
rooco to use the arms for defense only.
But things have changed. The United
States is suddenly in the middle. The Al-
gerisas, who - volunteered then diplo-
matic services, in theL- negotiations -that
led to-the _American: hostages' release;
became heroes :overnight.. That puts
Haig in a bit of-a bind. Morocco is
.clamoring-for -more _U:S- weapons=an-
action that would obviously offend Alge-.
ria. As- one expert put:it to my associate
Dale Van Attar "Should we embrace the..
prodigal son more than the son who has
been good to us for years?"
The appearance of ingratitude toward
our new. friend must be weighed against
the danger to our old ally. The desert
war, has sapped--Morocco's resources,
caused internal . discord and seriously
weakened Hassan's once-stable regime.
Algeria's. responsibility. for the Western:
Sahara independence movement' has
helped bring Hassan to this sorry state.
"Algeria has provided Polisario guerril-
las with arms, training, some military ad
visers and a few regular army units, as well
as a logistics base and sanctuary," a top-
secret CIA document reports. The support
is doubly valuable, the report notes, be-
cause "the Algerians are experts at desert
guerrilla warfare, drawing on their years of
experience against the French."
The points are reiterated in another
CIA analysis, which says: "The [Polisar-
io] Front depends mainly-on'Algeria for
arms, training, supplies and financial
support; some Algerian military person-_
nel. are accompanying the guerrillas in:
combat. operations. A substantial in-I
crease in guerrilla operations could only,
occur as part of an Algerian move."
As powerful and popular as they are,
the guerrillas' ability to wage a war of
attrition against Morocco would evapo-
rate "without direct Algerian support,"
the CIA experts conclude.
Hassan must find a way to end the in-
creasingly unpopular war. And for him,
the only acceptable way is to beat the
guerrillas in the field, giving himself the
upper hand in any peace negotiations. __
Faced with the predicament of an old
and valued ally, the State Department
has come down on the side of Hassan-
however much it offends the Algerians--
and has indicated its intention to sell
Hassan more than 100'tanks. To lessen
the bad public-relations effect, State has
sought to, portray the-Algerians' help. 1
with the hostages as the repayment of an
old debt, rather than the incurrence of a
new one. Reminders were floated around-
that in the 1960s John F. Kennedy, both
as a senator and as president, spoke out.
on behalf of the Algerians in their strug...
gle for independence from France.
Interestingly enough, the Algerians
.themselves publicly recalled the Kennedy
connection, commenting graciously .that
."good begets good." The remark suggests
that the Algerians consider their debt 'of
honor repaid. And as pragmatic politi-
cians, they are probably under no illusions
that sentiment or gratitude will outweigh
the United. States' longtime commitment
to King Hassan certainly not with Haig
running things. < - . - ? _i
:.; oteat,vmtear+e.tar.srnaiest.,rac.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100050079-0