PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060040-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: June 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

__ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/24 :CIA-RDP91-005618000100060040-1
UP7ITED ST_ATIS iI.-1VAL Tt'JSTI^lU1P i''r.r`C~'~' ~DI:'~1G
Jung 1950
~-
hen President Jimmy Cazter quietly, but of-
ficially, opened the closet door on one of the nation's
most coveted intelligence collection .systems- in a
Cape Canaveral speech on 1 October 1978, lie pub-
licly marked the beginning of the end of an era. His
announcement was part of the preparation for the ex-
petted battle with the Senate over approval of the
S:1LT Il agreement. It was anticipated- that the battle
rriighe eventually include the release of photographic
satellite reconnaissance materials to establish both
the verifiability of the provisions of the SALT II treaty
and the reasonableness of some of the treaty's provi-
sions. If this had occurred, the president may have
had in mind a restricted use of these materials by the
U. S. Senate. However, the House of Representatives
probably. would have insisted upon equal treatment,
and once the process was started, the president may
have been forced to go (or would have seen consider-
able advantage in going) to the general public with
his supportive evidence:
The Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan froze the SALT approval process in the
United States. The currently negotiated SALT II
.treaty is. now more than likely a dead document.
.t~hatever the timetable and in whatever manifesta-
tion arms control negotiations might resume,. any
administration of the future should anticipate a most
diffcult problem in gaining congressional approval
of a SALT-type" treaty. The- pendulum swing away
from accommodation ~ toward confrontation strongly
suggests that this will be thecase. Another possibil-
ity is that any SALT approach is dead for many years
to come, so that no administration will find it pru-
dent to pursue this path. Instead, increasing tension
and serious preparations for the use of force may
cause the cumnt or next administration to present,
to the American public and the world, hard intelli-
gence evidence that justifies the action being taken.
Whatever the basis, attempted accommodation or
anticipated confrontation, if it happens; the taxpayer
will have the opportunity to see examples of what has
been one of the most valuable sources ~,of strategic,
scientific, and technical intelligence for 19 years:
U. S_ `satellite intelligence collection systems. The
degree- of success in controlling specific knowledge
about these systems has been high. The conviction. of
a former CIA employee, t~/illiam P. Kampiles, of es-
pionage in November 1978, when the court found
him guilty of selling a top secret manual of one of
the country's operational photo satellite systems,. rep-
resents an important exception to this success. .Ac-
cording to news accounts which cited unnamed
"U. S. officials," .the Soviets first learned that the
KH-11 spy satellite was photographing their territory
-when they purchased a stolen copy of the satellite's
manual. On 23 November 1978, 7'he lY/athington Fort
reported, "The I:H t 1 'was misclassified' by t:he
Soviets as a nonphorographic satellite, .. so they
did not bother to try to hide sensitive weapons or
operations from it when is passed overhead:" I~Tews
reports about the spy trial and the KH-i i revealed
that KH was an abbreviation of the CIA code name.. If
correct, the selection of "Keyhole" to name a system
that secretly and silently peeked down from spacers
apt. The code word was probably too suggestive to
be openly used, so it was abbreviatcd_ There is no
way for anyone outside of the U_ S. and Soviet intel-
ligence communities .to judge the claim that the
Soviets did not recognize the KH-11 for what is actu-
ally was. The Soviets, however, wish their large
land-based optical and electronic systems, will prob-
ably be able to determine whether the manual they
purchased for $3,000 inauthentic or a U. S. plant: in
an attempt at misinformation.
A more important point is that the court e8ec-
tively ruled to keep the American public from know-
ing what the Soviets know. Reporters covering the
trial petitioned U. S. District Court Judge Phil M.
McNagny to release all evidence submitted to the
jury. A copy of the manual with .terrain parts cen-
sored was admitted into evidence, but Judge vie-
' Nagny refused to release it to the media. Apparently
the United States may have decided that it is un-
avoidable or even worthwhile for the Soviets to know
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/24 :CIA-RDP91-005618000100060040-1