DEPARTURE OF A GOOD SOLDIER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060046-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: May 12, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Si_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/24: CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060046-5
Aepit.:,hEll
t-JG PAGE az_
TIME
12 May 1980
Departure of a Good Soldier
The chilling of Soviet-US. relations blighted Vance's dreams
In his handwritten letter I
of resignation to President
Carter, Cyrus Vance de-
clared: look with pride
and satisfaction at the many
actions and new directions :
which have marked our for-
eign policy under your lead-
ership." Then he listed the accomplish- '"??
ments for which he wants to be
remembered. Yet even that recitation
?by which Vance meant to console both
Carter and himself?has a melancholy
ring. It is a list of what may well turn out
to be pyrrhic victories, noble failures and
unfinished business:
The Panama Canal treaties. The
Administration's knock-down, drag-out,
barely successful battle for Senate ratifi-
cation left political scars that have still
not healed.
The Camp David accord and the Egyp-
tian-Israeli peace treaty. That process, in
which Vance played a key role, shows
signs of slowing to a halt and perhaps col-
lapsing altogether.
Normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China. National Se- i
curity Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski han-
dled the announcement in a way that
worsened Soviet-American relations and
humiliated Vance by making him look as
though he had been cut out of the play.
The strengthening of our military forc-
es and our alliances. The Administration's
military buildup has threatened a new
arms race with the U.S.S.R. without as-
suaging congressional hawks, and NATO
is racked by new strains, including dis-
agreements over whether to modernize
U.S. missiles in Europe.
The negotiation of the SALT II agree-
ment. This masterpiece of modern diplo-
macy is as much Vance's handiwork as
anyone's, but it may never become law.
The new thrust and direction given to
our relations with the nations of the Third
World. The U.S. seems baffled and threat-
ened by upheaval in the Third World as I
never before.
Vance leaves behind considerable ad-
miration at the State Department, but it
is tinged with disappointment. On the one
hand, the foreign service officers are
grateful to him for devoting many hours
to testifying on Capitol Hill on behalf of
reforms that would improve salaries and
benefits, streamline an archaic and oc-
cluded promotion system, and raise the
quality and morale of ambassadors. Un-
like Kissinger, Vance showed great re-
spect for the professionalism of career dip-
lomats and increased their role in day-
to-day policymaking.
But the participatory system he in-
troduced did not entirely mesh with his
own rather remote personality. He was
awkward in large meetings, uncomfort-
able about knocking heads, and he pre-
ferred to delegate unpleasant jobs. Even
some of Vance's staunchest admirers at
Foggy Bottom fault him for not going to
the mat more often to protect the depart-
ment against empire building by other
agencies.
The far more important battle that
Vance 'could never bring himself to wage
with a vengeance was with the National
Security Council and Zbig Brzezinski. In
a number of conversations during the
postelection transition in 1976, the two
men agreed that one of their biggest prob-
lems would be to keep their staffs from
each other's throats. They turned out to
be right. Immediately after his Inaugu-
ration, Carter promulgated presidential
Decisions 1 and 2, a plan for restructur-
ing and strengthening the National Se-
curity Council. A group of Vance's aides
bearded their boss in his office and alert-
ed him to what they saw as Brzezinski's
opening move in a power play against the
State Department.
Vance told them: "I'm not going to
make an issue over it. The best way to
keep it from becoming a problem is not
to get all excited about it." One of his
aides persisted. Vance frowned and his
eyes narrowed. "I don't want to hear any
more of this," he said sternly. "We're not
going to have that kind of squabbling."
Yet the squabbling continued for the'
next three years. both behind closed doors
and, increasingly, in public. When a sen-
sitive piece of information about Soviet-
American relations leaked to the press,
a number of top NSC officials immediately
?and falsely?accused Vance's Soviet1
affairs adviser, Marshall Shulman, of be-
ing the source. When an article appeared 11
revealing a U.S7espionage operation, a
middle-level State Department?affc-ir
spread the rumor?fa?that Triz-ezin-
ski's deputyDavid Aaron, -Fa planted
the story.
EX CEi-TTED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/24: CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060046-5