CONFUSING INTELLIGENCE GIVEN CARTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100070021-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 28, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100070021-1
THE WASI-n_GTON POST
0;,.,; P GE -l 28 August 1979
-Jack Anderson
1,01
confusl*111`11' In-le'll, -ence Giveh 'Carler
The fear that nags critics of SALT II is
that the.Urited States won't be able to
tell whether the Soviet Union is cheat-
ing on the strategic arms limitation
agreement
This is a legitimate concern. The
Soviets have a track record of "inter-
preting" treaty provisions in their favor.
But what is not generally known is
that the most serious problem of inter-
pretation may rest with our own intelli-
gence organizations. Although our abil-
ity to gather information about the Rus-
sians is excellent, there is serious disa-
greement in our intelligence commu-
nity over how the information should
be interpreted. -
The result is that two or more conclu-
sions-each based on a logically rea-
sonable interpretation of the same basic
facts-have been presented to the presi-
dent as guidance in setting national
policy. "I don't know how the president
can make his decisions from all the dif-
ferent conclusions we give him," one in-
telligence source told our associate Dale
Van Atta.
The simple, appalling truth is that,
though the Soviet government is in its
62nd year of existence, our intelligence
experts still can't agree on what kind of
beast the- Russian communist bear is.
They are like the legendary blind men
trying to describe the elephant from dif-
ferent vantage points, and it is left for-
the president to decide which descrip-
tion is most reliable.
The basic disagreement is over the-
Soviets' long-range strategic goals. Are
they, in the late Nikita Khrushchev's
phrase, out to "bury" us.and take over
the world? Are they defensive ? para-
noids, fearful of being overwhelmed by
U.S. military and industrial strength? Or
are they just practical politicians seek-
ing to exploit any temporary advantage
on the international scene in hopes of
achieving stability through equality
with the United States?
The diversity of opinion is spelled out
in a document, "Understanding Soviet
Strategic Policy," written by Central In-
telligence Agency analyst Fritz Ermath,
who is now with the National Security
Council. Although the paper was pre-
pared in December 1975, it is still
all
is regarded as valid today.: Footnote: For what cold comfort it of-
anobjectives is very elusive," Ermath kin leaders are as confused about the'
began. "Pertinent evidence is volumi- United States as we are about them- The)
nous; but it almost never speaks for it- I information they collect- from L-.S..
lf
se
. Interpretation of the evidence al-
ways involves our preconceptions about
the Soviet Union as a nation, interna-
tional politics, the meaning of military
power, and the condition of our own
country."
Ermath then spells out the "three dis-
tinguishable perspectives current in the
intelligence community" concerning
the Soviets:
? The first group contends that the
men in the Kremlin "seek clear superi-
ority over the U.S. with confidence and
determination and may see some seri-
? ous prospect of achieving it in the next
decade."
? The second group believes "that the-
newspapers, congressional hearings, pol-
iticians' statements, Pentagon announ-'
cements, their own covert activities-
probably gives them no better grasp of
U.S, strategic goals than the average;
:American newspaper reader has.
Soviets entertain no realistic hope of ac-
quiring clear strategic superiority over
the U.S. and even see the chance for ad-
vantage as dubious," according to Er-
math. "Their [the Russians'] main aim is
quite simply to prevent the great techni-
cal and industrial might of the U.S.
from placing them once again in an in-
ferior position. Their arms and arms
control policies are chosen to this end
? The third group sees the Soviets' oh-;
jective this way-"to choose policies
that best hedge against uncertainty;
they frame their policies to offer some
chance of attaining a decisive prepon-
derance over the U.S., a-greater chance
of something less dramatic but still ad-
vantageous and a virtual guarantee of
establishing and retaining at least over-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100070021-1