SHAH OF IRAN CULPRIT IN HIGH OIL PRICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100070048-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: June 5, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100070048-2
THE WASHINGTON POST
Article appeared 5 June 1979
on page B-15
3i? : _l Anderson
Shah
r
g
i?e real cuipr!t nemne the great on
r:p-o f is identified in secret intelli. the shah. Yamani alleged that nissln- "Reports from several reliable
nce reports as the shah of Iran. The ger "is speaking about lower oil prices ces and recent intercepted messages
documents reveal that he clamored for but in secret doing everything possible
;' 'tf;
higher oil profits to finance his dreams to jack them up." the CIA 's stressed, "statements." add credibilit,~
of glory In a secret "memorandum for the .--?-,
The shah's agitation and the Nixon file," the ambassador revealed: "The By this time, the shah had already
Saudis had urged us on numerous oc- succeeded in quadrupling oil prices.
administration's acquiescence, accord- casions to put pressure on the shah to but he still wasn't satisfied. His sales
ing to the documents, led to the devas- cooperate with Saudi Arabia and had declined in 1975? and his revenue
tating oil price increases of October reduce the oil prices. Yet we had re- wasn't keeping upwithhisspendiny"'`
1973 and January 1974. The western fused to do this." - Reported the CIA on Sept. 28, $75.
world still hasn't recovered from the Kissinger explained to us that he "Iran is a .. leading proponent of an economic impact. was aware of the Saudis' offer but OPEC. price rise and is generally.
Saudi Arabia, whose rulers feared a doubted their sincerity. "My belief thought to favor a jump of 15 to 20perr..
backlash against the Organization of was," he said, "that the Saudis did not cent. Saudi Oil `Minister Yamani repur-
Petroleum Exporting Countries want to get prices down but wanted to- tedly has counseled King Khalid_~hb ,
.OPEC) oil cartel, tried to stop the price place the onus for the price rise upon Prince Fahd against an increase at this
rise. The Saudis appealed to the Nixon the shah." time.
.
administration to help persuade the Yet intelligence documents, includ- However, the CIA cautioned: "T bp . .
shah to listen to reason. ing intercepted messages, strongly in- Saudis could prevent an OPEC price
As late as July 1974, after the extor- dicated that the Saudis meant. what increase, but they are unlikely to_'I :: '
they were saying. These secret reports cept the political costs of such a
tionary increases had already been im-
posed on the world, the Saudis offered should have been available to Kissin- move." _1 -.
to sell their oil at public auction to _ger.The shah lobbied with other oiUgtc'-
force prices back down. Yet unac- - On the eve of the 1975 oil min sters' ernments, meanwhile;. to drive up,,,
countably, President Nixon and his meeting, for example, the CIA repor- prices. Reported the CIA two ? t .
foreign policy whiz, Henry A. Kissin-? ted: "Saudi Arabia and Iran apparently later: "The shah's adviser, Amouze~ar,:
ger, never used their tremendous in- remain seriously divided on the issue met with Venezuelan *President Perez-
fluence with the shah to stop the ruin- of an OPEC oil price rise in the fourth in Caracas earlier this week to lint l
pus oil gouge. quarter. support for a price rise. ' - "..... -
The result was reported on Aug. 30, "The Saudis may attempt to thwart "Perez suggested that Amouiegar..
1974, by the Central Intelligence an increase at the OPEC conference on along with the petroleum ministers.
Agency: "Riyadh called off an oil auc- Sept. 13, although we believe,otber and Venezuela and Algeria, try to'con.
tion that would have lowered the price members will try to work out a com- vince the Saudis to change their-;lost--:
oil." The Saudis were unwilling to promise. tion on the price issue-..: ? ?
:' `.`,i:-
stand alone against the other oil-sell- "Ambassador Akins was informed In the end, a compromise
ing nations. As the CIA explained in a by Saudi oil minister Yamani on reached, and the oil cartel adopted' a.
top-secret dispatch: "The Saudis are Wednesday that Riyadh had decided it 10 percent increase. But it was th?
unlikely to risk political isolation and a must hold the line against any price in- shah, once again, who led the agit,1110 ;;
breakup of OPEC." ' crease. Yamani said he told the shah's for higher oil prices. -
F`r'om Riyadh, U.S. Ambassador adviser, Amouzegar, that if Iran insists- - This raises the mystifying queiti4,n:_
James Akins reported that Saudi oil on a large price increase, the Saudis- Why didn't Nixon and Kisstng
minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani had would sell at current- prices and strain the shah, since they had the po-,;
complained to him about ,Kissinger's sharply increase production, even at litical muscle to do it?' .. ,'`, ; ""'
STAT
st
an
e reluctance to intervene with itt n,, ( PEC
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100070048-2