BROWN SEES PACT TO CURTAIL ARMS VERIFIABLE BY '80

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100070061-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: April 18, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R0001 00070061-7
ARTICLE APPEARED
NEW YORK TIMES
18 APRIL 1979
er, Defense Secretary Brown said that
:he recovery of ale full intelligence-gath-
ering capacity "will take until 1983 or
1984, depending on how much we are able
to accelerate programs already under
way." But he made a distinction between
regaining the full intelligence capability
and regaining enough to verify the arms
treaty.
"Regaining enough of it?to verify ad-
equately Soviet compliance with the
provisions of SALT II, I estimate,, will
take about a year, again depending on
how fast, we can carry out monitoring
programs under development," he said.
Mr. Brown suggested that the year-
long gap would not be decisive because
the principal problem would be to define
the characteristics of new or modified
Soviet missiles to insure that the Rus-
sians were not developing more than the
one. new land-based missile system ex-
pected to be allowed under the projected
treaty.
Sped;l toThet`ew York Times
WASHINGTON, April..17 - Defense
Secretary Harold Brown said today that
it would take the United States about a
year to regain the ability. "to verify ad-
equately" Soviet compliance with a new
strategic arms limitation treaty.
. American ability to monitor an accord
has been weakened because of the loss of
two listening posts in Iran. In the Admin-
istration's most detailed comment to date
on the verification question, Mr. Brown
contended that it would also take the Rus-
sians a "period of years" to complete
mightviolate the vact.b -
'
'
Year to Verify Adequately -_
.
.
? In effect, Mr. Brown said that while it
would take a year or so to regain the abil-
ity to verify adequately that the Soviet
His statement was issued as a result of
doubts raised by Senate critics who re-
ceived a briefing last week from Adm.
Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central
Intelligence. It was reported today that
Admiral Turner had said it would take
gathering facilities lost in Iran. -
for Jake Garn, Republican of Utah, said:
"There is nothing the United States can
, pensate for the loss of electronic listening
fiposts in Iran, making verification of a
new SALT treaty, an impossible task. For
the foreseeable future, there is no re-
Generally agreeing with Admiral Turn-
Each test program will require about
Thus, while existing systems or replace-
ments for the Iranian monitoring sites
might miss some test flights, the total as-
sessment of Soviet compliance would be
made from the whole test program, from
a variety of sources.
Earlier, a State Department spokes-
man, Thomas Reston, said that despite
Admiral Turner's statement, it would be
Secretary of State Cyt'us R. Vance re-
turns to Washington tomorrow after an
Easter holiday in Florida and is expected
to meet again soon with Ambassador,
Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union
to see whether the remaining handful of
issues could be concluded in the next
week or so. That could open the way to a
meeting between President Carter and
Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, in
Geneva by the end of next month.
Text of Brown's Statement
The Iranian monitoring sites sup.
plied us with various kinds of informa-
tion on Soviet strategic missile pro.
grams, much of it connected with fea-
tures that will be limited by the provi_.':
sions of a SALT II treaty. Regaining au
of this monitoring capability (with or
without a SALT II agreement), will
take until 1983 or 1984, depending on
how much we are able to accelerate -
programs already under way. Regain- ,
ing enough.of it to verify adequately
Soviet compliance with the provisions
of SALT II, I estimate, will take about a
year, again depending on how fast we I
can carry -out monitoring programs
under development. ~:-
:The principal information at issue is
the nature and characteristics of new
or modified Soviet ICBM's. Each such 91
Soviet program will require about 20
possible to have a verified accord. flight tests over a period of years. !
"Nothing Admiral Turner said contra- ' Though existing monitoring systems or
venes the basic judgment of this Adminis ,replacements - for the Iranian sites
-
tration that the terms of the treaty will be- could well miss some flights and might, I.
adequately verifiable," the spokesman miss some data from some flights that! .
said. "The President would not sign an they see, our assessment ofcompliancett
agreement unless he was firmly con- would be made from the information!
vinced that it is adequately verifiable." we would collect over the whole test!
program for each missile from a vari-,
ety of monitoring systems. We expect!
to conclude a treaty that resolves satisce
factorily the remaining provisions on:
verification and on new ICBM's. In that.
event, it is my judgment that our moni?+
toring will be such as to provide ade.;
quate verification as to Soviet compli.;
ance with the curbs on new or modified1
ICBM's. ~. .r. 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R0001 00070061-7