SECRECY AND THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100080005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 17, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100080005-8
Notes from the Director No. 34
Secrecy and the Press
On 16 October, I addressed the National Press Club here in Washington. In my
remarks, I discussed the similarity between the problem which the media professions
face today in protecting their sources of information and our problem of protecting
our sources of intelligence. Recently, New York Times reporter Myron Farber
refused to disclose his sources for a series of newspaper articles when they were
demanded as vital to the defense in a murder trial. As a consequence, Mr. Farber
went to jail for 40 days and the New York Times was fined. Clearly, it was not an
easy decision by either Mr. Farber or the New York Times to withhold information
that a defendant felt might prove his innocence. Yet they did so on the larger
principle of their interpretation of the rights of the press under the Constitution.
In my talk I pointed out that while our problems of protecting sources are
analogous, the CIA's obligation is rather more clear cut. I am required by specific
provision of law (the National Security Act of 1947) to protect our sources and
methods of collecting intelligence from unauthorized disclosure, whereas the right of
the press to do so depends on an interpretation of a constitutional amendment which
has been questioned of late by the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it is always a
difficult decision for either of us to determine what disclosures would truly jeopardize
our sources. In our case, we do not determine whether such jeopardy would outweigh
the benefits to our country of prosecuting an offender in the courts. We simply make
known what we expect the damage of revealing classified information would be.
In sum, both we and the press are regularly confronted with the need to balance
the long-term impact of disclosing sensitive information on our ability to continue our
respective contributions to society versus the benefit to society of prosecuting alleged
offenses against the law.
Secrecy and Academia
There has been considerable discussion of the guidelines Harvard University
issued some time ago addressing the relationship between the Intelligence Com-
munity and Harvard University. We worked closely with Harvard when these
guidelines were being drawn up and agree with and endorse most of the provisions.
However, we have taken exception to those provisions which unfairly single out the
Intelligence Community for unique treatment or which prejudice the rights of
individual Harvard faculty members to associate with us or anyone else of their
choice. I have pointed out in public remarks and in replies to letters and editorials
that any set of university guidelines or regulations ultimately apply only to that
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university and are not laws which apply to any other organization. Even if it were
feasible for us or other government agencies to attempt to comply with the individual
regulations of each university in the country, which it is not, it is unreasonable to
expect such compliance.
At the same time, I stress that we do, in fact, sincerely try to comply with
university regulations insofar as we possibly can. Whenever we work with an
academic who prefers to contravene his university's regulations, such a decision is
carefully thought through, and conforms to our own internal regulations which
require that decision to be approved at a high level. Further, we will not undertake
activities with respect to the US academic community which we believe would be
inimical to the best interests of that community. Our relations with the American
academic community are very important to us and in most respects, today, they are
warm and constructive.
Secrecy and the Courts
To bring you up-to-date on the prosecution of individuals who violated their
Secrecy Agreement or released secrets without proper authorization, the present
status is:
-Former employee Frank Snepp has been convicted by the District Court of
Alexandria of violating the contract of his Secrecy Agreement. His appeal of this
finding is being heard by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia
and began on Wednesday, 15 November 1978.
-Former employee William Kampiles was accused of committing espionage by
delivering a classified document to agents of the Soviet Union. He is presently on trial
in Hammond, Indiana.
Secrecy and Basic Policy
I would like to reemphasize that we are pursuing simultaneously two courses
toward improved security. One is to be more open with the product of intelligence-
the estimates, analyses and studies-when they can be properly declassified. The
other course is to tighten dissemination control of information which cannot or should
not be declassified. The declassification policy helps us to reduce the total number of
classified documents in an orderly and authorized way, leaving us with fewer
genuinely sensitive documents to protect. It ensures that we are not attempting to
protect unclassified materials when we do not need to. The policy of enhanced
emphasis on security regulations and procedures is very important at this time.
I am grateful for the indications which I see around Headquarters of your
improved awareness of the importance of following sound security procedures. In
particular, I appreciate your cooperation in the inspections of briefcases and packages
being taken out of our buildings. This program is going well and making an important
contribution to our total security.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
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