WHICH SECRETS SHOULD BE KEPT SECRET?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100080083-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: March 14, 1977
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100080083-2
'f'rank Church
WASHINGTON POST 14 March 1977
Secrets Sol e eD-t Secre
Which ~ -
STATecrets. Can anyone keep a secret? '
In the aftermath of The Washington Post's
disclosure that the CIA for 20 years had been
secretly paying King Hussein of Jordan sums
adding up to mullions of dollars, that 'vas the
question that Newsweek featured in its discus-
sion of the Hussein affair. President Carter's re-
action was, first, constructive-to stop the pay-
ments; second; defensive-to assert that there
was nothing improper or illegal about them;
and third-regressive, to reduce the number of
people in the executive branch with access to
information about covert operations and to
suggest that a joint congressional committee on
intelligence be formed to reduce access in Con-
gress to such information. Adm. Stansfield
Turner, the CLA director, volunteered that he
might support criminal penalties for unauthor-
ized disclosure and publication of national se-
crets, a position seemingly endorsed by several
members of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Finally, the Secretary of State sought t) detect
a distinction between our payments to Hussein
and the Korean CLA's alleged financing, of U.S.
political figures.
I suggest that the wrong question is being
asked and the wrong remedies are be izg pro-
posed. The right question is not whether any-
one can keep a secret but, rather, what are the
secrets that ought to be kept?
I suspect that if we examine this question we
.would find that, with very few exceptions, se-
crets that ought to be kept are being kept. For
example, with the single exception of the book
by Phillip Agee, a CIA defector who left the
United States, there has been little or no disclo-
sure of CLA sources or methods; or of the confi-
dentiality of sensitive, negotiations, such as pre-
ceded the partial test ban treaty, SALT I, and
the release of the Pueblo crew. The practices
that have been revealed are mainly those that
should never have been approved or under-
taken: the CIA's secret war in Laos, the subver-
sion of a freely elected government in Chile,
Sen. Church (D-Idaho) was chairman of,
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
United States to ensure. its sovereignty and, un-
til recently, its economic viability. If intelli-
gence collection was the objective, as claimed,
it was in the king's own interest to share intelli-
gence with the United States, and he should
not have had to be paid for it. If, on the other
hand, Hussein used the money for his personal
needs, then the purpose as well as the means .
chosen was clearly improper. Nevertheless, the
disclosure seems not to have harmed the king;
the facts of geography and geopolitics appear
to be working to fortify his position.
Why then the draconian response? Perhaps
it reflects only the inexperience of a new ad-
ministration abruptly confronted with the
basic contradiction of official secrecy in an
open society. If so, it is best that it happened
early, before knee-jerk reactions 1?ecome en-
-rusted habit. The dynamic of an open society,
.)y definition, works in favor of disclosure. A
determined free press probes relentlessly to
uncover dubious practices and, in the after
math of Watergate, the automatic invocation of
national security no longer suffices to hide
dirty linen.
This is also a society in which all kinds of spe-
cial interests-in and out of government-
compete for resources and influence. They will
"go public", with information whenever, it
the prolonged and illegal mail openings in the
United States, and the conspiracy to murder
foreign leaders, to name a few.
The Hussein case is a classic illustration of
the confusion that surrounds the issue. If slip-
ping money to King Hussein wasn't "illegal or
improper," as the President maintained after
stopping the payments, why were the pay-
ments stopped? Why, indeed, did we run the
risk of so embarrassing a revelation in the first
place? The United States has openly extended-;
economic assistance to Jordan for years. If we
had to purchase the king's cooperation to get
intelligence, why put him. on the payroll of the
CIA? Money is fungible: U.S. aid could readily
release Jordanian funds, which the king could;
then use to furnish us. intelligence. The explan-
ation just won'twash.
Indeed, the' whole operation won't wash.:
Throughout the many years of the Middle East;
c 'lsls, Jordan has basically relied upon th :
Declassified in Part ~Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100080083-2