CIA: OPERATION CRIPPLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100090097-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: August 15, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST A T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100090097-6
'V I a;il9?dAL I EVtP,W
15 AUG 19/5
CI: Operation Cripple
One ';ymptom of the CIA predicament maybe seen in
the fact that former director Richard Helms, now am-
bassador tb Iran, could face perjury charges arising out
of his 1973 testimony concerning the role of the CIA in
Chip. Helms is a professional and a thorough establish-
mentarian. During the 1973 hearings he minimized the
CIA role in Chile, stating that no attempts had been
made to overthrow Allende, and that no-money had been
funneled to Allende's political enemies. It now appears
that these-points were substantially misleading, whether
or not such testimony actually constituted the crime of
perjury, and that the anti-Allende effort constituted high
White House policy, originating with President Nixon.
-It is evident that in the 1973 hearings Helms faced an
excruciating dilemma. The judgment had been made by
the President that it was in the U.S. interest to assist in
the removal of Allende, though in the event, to be sure,
that removal was brought about. by powerful indigenous
political forces. Should Helms; in 1973, testify truthfully
about U.S. policy and create a blizzard of headlines clam-
aging to the U.S. and to the CIA? Or should he -testify
blandly and evasively?. A sound case,- both. professional
and patriotic, can be made for the latter course. A sound
patriotic case can even be made for the proposition that
under certain- imaginable circumstances an individual is,
required to lie to a congressional: investigation.
As matters have turned out, the various investigations
of-the CIA combined with relentless press and media as-
saults have damaged-perhaps critically-the effective-
ness of the Agency.
On May 25, the New York Tines published the "revela
tion that U.S. submarines. with special electronic gear
had been monitoring Soviet missile operations for 15
years, and sometimes operated inside- Soviet territorial
waters-. Immediately following that leak, the Soviets
planted mines and installed jamming devices and in vari-
ous other ways crippled such intelligence-gathering opera-
tions.
Because of past and prospective-loaks and disclosures,!
foreign intelligence: agencies are now showing a marked
reluctance to cooperate with the CIA.
-- Before -it encountered the present--circumstance, - the
CIA had the- mission- of-influencing`eventsabroad with-
out publicly involving the United States: -As--present di-
rector William Colby put it recently; the CIA provided an
alternative "between diplomatic protest and sending in
the Marines." This. capacity has now been largely para-
..Iyzed. Before. the, deluge of publicity. and investigation
the CIA might have been expected to assist in preventing'
the satellization of Portugal."No CIA activity' is-discern-
The near paralysis of the CIA comes at a time when
the principal Communist thrust in the West is political,
and possesses a --large- conspiratorial element. No one
doubts that the KGB is highly active in Portugal. NATO
battalions can thus be outflanked politically,-as in Portu-
gal today, Italy and Spain tomorrow, and perhaps France
the day after tomorrow.
In Congress, the Michael Harringtons -and l'the Bella
Abzugs are outraged that the overthrow of Ailende-was
desired by the White House-nor is their outrage form-
alistic, a matter of "non-intervention." They presumably -
know that not to intervene is to intervene in another way.
Their outrage derives from positive approval of the Al-
lende regime. Thus the overthrow of Diem excites no,
such passions. -
At the present time, small but strategically potent ele-
ments both in the government and in the media are erno-.
tionally and ideologically favorable to the world revolu-
tion, to Mylarxism, that is, in its non-Soviet forms. That,!
indeed, is what the struggle over the CIA is all about.
A principal task of the Administration, therefore, must be
the reform of the Agency to guard against major abuses
while at the same time reviving its effectiveness as an in-
strurnent of U.S. policy, even whert such policy is dis-
.pleasing to ]Michael Harrington or to Seymour Hersh.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100090097-6