SUPER-SECRET WORK REVEALED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100120034-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: May 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100120034-1 / STAT
VIV! F AFTM `
28 May 1986
SaperSecret Work Revealed
Prosecutor Discloses U.S. Agency's Capability
To Intercept, Decode Soviet Communications
By Patrick E. Tyler
and Bob Woodward
WasMMt0 Pat Staff Writers
The U.S. government yesterday
took the extraordinary step of dis-
cussing in a public courtroom its
capability to intercept and decode
some Soviet communications-a
subject that historically has been
considered one of the nation's most
sensitive national security secrets.
The disclosure at the opening day
of the espionage trial of Ronald W.
Pelton surprised intel-
ligence specialists,
who noted that U.S.
NEWS
ANALYSIS
intelligence agencies traditionally
have declined to prosecute espio-
nfte cases where they feared such
intelligence detail would emerge in
public.
Federal prosecutor John Doug-
lass in his opening statement talked
about the U.S. National Security
Agency's ability to "exploit" and
"process" and "analyze" coded So-
viet communications that travel by
radio, microwave and cable be-
tween "terminal points," such as
Soviet military or civilian centers.
Pelton's onetime NSA superior,
Donald R. Bacon, talked about the
special "compartment" at NSA
where Soviet specialists work on
the intercepted communications of
the "highest level" authorities in the
Soviet Union. His testimony's de-
tail, coupled with the general de-
scription of NSA's capabilities to
"exploit" coded Soviet communica-
tions, made it clear that the
$35,000 the Soviets allegedly paid
Pelton for information may have
been one of the best espionage buys
of the century.
The Reagan administration's de-
cision to allow such disclosures
about codebreaking capabilities was
surprising in the wake of concerted
efforts by CIA Director William J.
,Casey, President Reagan and other
senior officials to stop The Wash-
ington Post and other news organ-
izations from publishing a descrip-
tion of the principal communica-
tions intercept system Pelton is al-
leged. to have sold to the Soviets.
The testimony also raised ques-
tions about how Pelton-a brilliant
analyst in NSA but a "wheeler deal-
er" in private fife with a troubled
financial history-was allowed in-
creasingly greater levels of access
to virtually all intercept programs
aimed at the Soviet Union even as
his personal life was self-
destructing.
One administration official said
yesterday that the detailed disclo-
sures about U.S. intelligence sys-
tems allegedly sold to the Soviets
by Pelton reflects the Reagan ad-
ministration's determination to get
a conviction in the case, which is
one of the worst intelligence losses
suffered by the United States in
recent history.
James Bamford, author of an au-
thoritative book on the NSA, "The
Puzzle Palace," said the courtroom
disclosures by government officials
were unprecedented. "It's the first
time we have acknowledged we can
break Soviet codes," said Bamford,
adding, "It's always been implied
.. (and) it's not going to come as a
shock to the Soviet Union, but oth-
et countries with high-technology
cryptographic devices may have
second thoughts" about the security
of their communications.
In recent interviews, a number of
U.S. intelligence sources have ques-
tioned the way that the government
handles some of its most vital top-
secret information. In order to re-.
strict access, "compartments" are
set up around sensitive technolo-
gies or operations and a person
such as Pelton must be granted ac-
cess individually to each one. The
criteria for admission to what is
called "sensitive compartmented
information" is that the person must
need information on it to perform
his or her job.
Last November, during Pelton's
bail hearing, a defense attorney dis-
closed in open court a codeword,
"Ivy Bells," for one of the opera-
tions Pelton allegedly compromised.
Sources said Ivy Bells was a subma-
rine intelligence collection opera-
tion in the Sea of Okhotsk between
the Kamchatka Peninsula and the
eastern Soviet coastline. Pelton al-
legedly disclosed the location of the
operation when he first met with
Soviet officials in January 1980 and
pointed it out on a map.
Under the classification system
that controls access to programs
such as Ivy Bello, NSA employes
who are "cleared" into the "com-
partment" often gained more infor-
mation than they needed to know
for the performance of their tasks.
"You would certainly be surprised
and you would probably be disap-
pointed" to find out the broad range
of access relatively low-level NSA
employes get to some of the most
sensitive intelligence operations
targeted at the Soviet Union, a sen-
ior intelligence official said.
Ideally, U.S. intelligence employ-
es who work on sensitive national
security operations work in tightly
controlled "compartments" so if one
person betrays or sells what he or
she knows, the entire operation or
capability is not compromised. At
NSA, many technicians and trans-
lators do not know how the infor-
mation or foreign communications
intercepts are obtained, the sources
slid.
But Pelton, according to yester-
day's court testimony, apparently
was considered an oracle on Soviet
communications and had the broad-
est range of knowledge about what
was intercepted, where it came
from, how it was encoded by the
Soviets and how NSA had success-
fully "attacked" some of those codes
in the past.
One source has said that Pelton
probably did not need all this detail,
but a senior intelligence official de-
fended the system of access that
Pelton allegedly betrayed. The
source cited the need for NSA an-
alysts to know everything they can
about the origin of their information
as a means of improving the anal-
ysis.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100120034-1
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100120034-1
In addition, those "compart-
ments" that are erected to protect
sensitive information frequently
break down, sources said. An em-
ploye in NSA picks up details about
other operations or capabilities
over the course of years of service,
especially in Pelton's case, where
officials described him as a "trou-
bleshooter" and font of knowledge
about Soviet communications.
A related problem, according to
some officials, is that sensitive in-
formation gets passed up to high
levels without regard to protecting
sources and methods.
"I didn't know why I had to be
told what the [sensitive collection
system] looked like, where it came
from, how it was developed, where
it was placed, [and] how the infor-
mation was collected," said an of-
ficial who has served in a senior na-
tional security post. "It was often to
help keep the program funded, to
say to us, 'Hey, look at this neat
gimmick.' "
Pelton resigned from his NSA job
in July 1979 after declaring bank-
rupty. He allegedly first contacted
the Soviet embassy in Washington
six months later. One senior source
said that he was not able to explain
why NSA did not step in when a
person with such sensitive informa.
tion was in financial trouble.
"An alarm bell should have gone
off," this source said, "but it didn't
... and once someone retires his
clearances are revoked, and with-
out a 'probable cause' to believe he
is spying, no action or surveillance
can be undertaken."
a
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100120034-1