SOVIET OIL PRODUCTION DECLINE IS NIGHTMARE FOR GORBACHEV

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010090-3
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RIPPUB
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K
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1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 25, 2011
Sequence Number: 
90
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Publication Date: 
October 18, 1985
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OPEN SOURCE
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STAT 000, STAT AS Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010090-3 ONrPAir. ''II WHJniL~~iviv ltiliJ 18 October 1985 Soviet oil production decline is nightmare for Gorbachev By Ralph Z. Hallow THE YW.5H TON TIMES When President Reagan meets Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva on Nov 19-20, the Soviet leader may have more troubling him than U.S. space-defense research and restrictions on high-technology trade. What almost surely will darken Mr. Gorbachev's inner thoughts, according to a number of Western experts, is that the Soviet economy is being wracked by a self-inflicted setback in the one area in which it has global supremacy. Though the Soviet Union leads the world in energy resources and oil production, it is the only industri- alized nation that still has an energy crisis. Soviet oil production began to decline in late 1983, a bit later than Predicted a-1977 C n encx enc Stu . It was rested i uun w en acco to aaengyli economic re search director 3- ir s Dress-co erence ref- erence to the classified document or its re ease. The oil-production decline has accelerated, falling by 4 percent in the first eight months of this year, according to Marshall I. Goldman of Harvard University's Russian Research Center As a result, the Soviets have can- celed sales to Western Europe of an estimated I million barrels a day in oil, worth nearly $10 billion a year in hard-currency earnings to a Russian economy sorely Pressed for invest- ment capital. Mr Goldman notes that the large drop in oil exporpthas meant that for the first half aftlM year the Soviets ran a trade deQc1r with France, which used to complain bitterly of its trade deficit with the Soviet Union. Worse, from Mr. Gorbachev's viewpoint, is that at the same time Soviet oil exports are down, grain and especially corn imports from the United States are up. Overall, what was a Soviet trade surplus with Western Europe and Japan for the last three years has turned into a deficit "A trade swing of this magnitude undoubtedly hurts the Soviet Union," says ML Goldman. Oil is the critical factor because it is the Soviet Union's No.1 generator of foreign currency and pays for food and technology imports from the West. The impact on the Soviet economy has strategic implications for Pres- ident Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at their encounter next month, according to some US. offi- cials. Speaking on a not-for-attribution basis, these officials say a continu- ing hard-currency loss of the magni- tude the Soviets are now experiencing could spell trouble if Mr. Gorbachev, who needs oil-export earnings to help finance his top- priority plan for modernizing Soviet manufacturing, feels compelled at some point to risk an adventure in, say, the Mideast. One faction in the Reagan admin- istration, represented by Richard N. Perle, assistant secretary of defense, has been counseling the president to take advantage of the Soviets' economic problems, sources say, by hanging tough at Geneva on trade concessions and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Sources say the argument being made to the president for keeping up the pressure on Moscow is not based on the simplistic notion that the Soviet economy is on the verge of collapse. Selling the Soviets more technol- ogy, it is argued, would make it eas- ier for Moscow, in spite of its hard-currency crunch, to build bet- ter weapons sooner instead of divert- ing more investment into technology catch-up. Normally, the Soviet Union earns more than half its. hard currency from exporting about 1.7 million barrels of oil a day to noncommunist customers, mainly in Western Europe, and a similar amount to East European members of Comecon, the communist trading bloc, and to Cuba. But last month the Soviet Union had to tell its West European oil cus- tomers that it would cancel or delay shipments of up to 80 p percent of the crude oil and up to 70 percent of the gasoline, heating oil and diesel fuel contracted for delivery this month. "The surprise is that in allocating those export cuts, the Soviets have steered what oil they had to East Europe and cut way back on exports tote West;' says Thane Gustafson, director of Soviet studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. "But conventional wisdom in the West held that the Soviets cannot afford a sharp drop in the hard cur- rency they need for grain, machin- ery and technology imports from the West:' What this reveals about the politi- cal thinking of the Gorbachev lead- ership is that it puts the stability of the Soviets' client states in Eastern Europe at the "absolute top of the list of priorities," says Mr. Gustafson. Further confirmation of this Gor- bachev emphasis, he says, came ear- lier this week with the naming of Nikolia Talyzin to head Gosplan, the Soviet state planning organization. Mr. Thlyzin, 56, who was also made one of four first deputy prime min. isters, was the Soviet Union's chief permanent representative to Comecon. None of this means, however, that the Soviet Union will relax pressure on its East European clients to sub- stitute more Soviet natural gas for oil. But just as surely, the East Euro- peans, who depend on Russia for 90 percent of their oil needs, will con. vince the Soviet Union that any cutack would be disastrous, says Ed A. Hewett, a Soviet specialist at the Brookings Institution. "The East Europeans aren't bad at playing that game;" Mr. Hewett adds. What could drive Mr. Gorbachev to the brink is if world oil prices, now nearly $28 a barrel, slide to $24 a barrel or even to $20, as some oil analysts predict. This would further reduce earnings from what little oil the Soviets manage to export. Beyond allocating export cut- backs, the Soviet leadership has to turn around its domestic oil produc- tion, which for the first time since 1979 has fallen below 12 million bar- rels a day. "Mr. Gorbachev thinks he can get Soviet production back up above 12 million barrels a day. He's wrong;" says Mr. Hewett. "He could if he threw enough money at it, but he wants to direct investment in the technological ref- ormation of the Soviet economy, in renovating factories with a new gen- eration of machines that are computer-controlled," Mr. Hewett says. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100010090-3