DECADES OF SOVIET SPIES DEFY WEST GERMAN DAMAGE CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020042-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE Ap RED
ON PAGE
PAR T
LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 September 1985
Decades of Soviet Spies Defy
West German Damage Control
WAIRDIGTOR
T he recent discovery of Hans Joa-
chim Tiedge, Margarete Hoeke
and other Soviet satellite spies in
the West German government and the
recent discoveries of Soviet-American
spies John Walker in the U.S. Navy and
Richard Miller in the FBI are symptoms
of espionage cancer in both countries.
The cancer is caused by the Soviet Union
and fed by the stupidity and corruption of
the West German and U.S. political and
intellectual Establishments. If the malig-
nancy of the espionage cancer becomes
even more evident, the two Establish-
menu will not control it. The record of 40
years shows that they will make it worse.
In July, 1954, Otto John, the head of
the West German government's internal
security organization, disappeared from
West Berlin and reappeared, several
who served as editor of Die
ers ng, the U.S. military govern-
ment's newspaper for occupied Berlin,
1941-1949, was an official in the Central
Intelligence Agency.
weeks later, at a Soviet-controlled press
conference in East Berlin. John had been
appointed in 1950 by the West German
minister of the interior, with the approval
of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and of
the American, British and French high
commissioners for West Germany.
Whether John carelessly let himself be
drugged and kidnaped, as he later
claimed, or whether'he treacherously
defected, as his political enemies assert-
ed, his choice and retention as the J.
Edgar Hoover of West Germany was a
blunder on the part of the West German
and Allied political Establishments.
In October, 1969, Willy Brandt became
the West German chancellor. His sneaky
genius was Egon Bahr. Under Bahr's
influence, Brandt tried to appease the
Soviet Union. In 1970, Brandt signed
treaties of cooperation and nonaggres-
sion with the Soviet Union and Poland. In
1972, he signed a treaty with, and
thereby recognized, the Soviet satellite
government of East Germany. Brandt
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and
Time magazine named him "Man of the
Year."
The Soviet Union did not honor
Brandt. Instead, they recruited another
of his top aides, Guenter Guillaume, as a
spy. In late 1972, when evidence of
Guillaume's espionage was presented to
Brandt, he ordered it suppressed. In May,
1974, the evidence of Guillaume's espio-
nage and Brandt's cover-up became
undeniable Brandt was forced to resign.
Establishment commentators called his
action a noble gesture. The Soviets did
not deny that Guillaume was their man.
Nonetheless, the U.S. political Estab-
lishment followed Bahr and Brandt with
continuing attempts to pacify the Soviets.
Former Sen. John Sherman Cooper went
to East Berlin as the first American
ambassador. The East German govern -
ment was allowed to set up an embassy in
Washington.
Late last year, Helmut Kohl, the
current chancellor of West Germany,
sought to have Ecrich Honecker, the boss
of communist East Germany, visit him in
Bonn. More recently, Brandt, coming
back like Richard M. Nixon, planned to
visit East Germany with Franz Josef
Strauss, the Bavarian political leader.
These gestures were approved by gen-
teel Americans, but they did not curb the
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new Soviet-German espionage in the
office of the West German president and
other West German government agen-
cies.
These days, the intellectual Establish-
ment is explaining why the American
Walkers and the German Tiedges and
Hoekes spy for the Soviet Union and its
satellites: the idealistic urge to promote
peace, resentment, ego trips, thrill-seek-
ing, emotional imbalance, sex, liquor, real
need of money, greed. However, the
fundamental reason why Americans, Ger-
mans and others spy for the Soviet. Union
is the Soviet Union. Without the Soviet
Union and its satellites to lure them,
recruit them, train them, run them and
pay them, the Walkers, Tie, ges, Hoekes
and others would have no jobs as spies.
One way to counter Soviet espionage is
to cut to the barest minimum the size of
Soviet and Soviet satellite embassies,
consulates and other missions. For exam-
ple, the Soviet Union has been permitted
to build a huge new embassy complex in
Washington. The U.S. State Department
allows 320 Soviets to staff this embassy
and the consulate in San Francisco. Add
to this the staffs of the Soviet satellite
embassies, Soviet agents in other embas-
sies, the United Nations, other interna-
tional organizations and those without
diplomatic status and you potentially have
an army of Soviet agents and agent
handlers on U.S. soil. It stretches U.S.
counterintelligence resources pitifully
thin.
The offensive, rather than defensive,
way to counter Soviet espionage is to
recruit more and better people for U.S.,
German and other Western intelligence
and counterintelligence agencies. Such
recruitment will go much better if poten-
tial recruits received social approval and
intellectual encouragement for intelli-
gence careers. For 40 years, the United
States and other Establishments have
scorned intelligence professionals and
intelligence work. They will approve and
encourage intelligence when, as Nikita S.
Khrushchev liked to say, "shrimps learn
to whistle."
Controlling Soviet espionage in West
Germany is especially difficult. East Ger-
mans who come to the West readily
receive full citizenship and all civil rights,
on the grounds that all Germans are
members of one nation. The concepts of
civil rights, as a reaction to Nazism, are
extraordinarily liberal: Breathalyzer tests
are seldom administered to drunks let
alone security tests to suspects. Ideology
plays an intense role in people's lives-
they will spy out of misguided idealism
and not for money. Also Germans and
their Soviet handlers are very patient: A
German spy may lie doggo for many
years, slowly working his way up to a
position where he has access to secrets:
Under these circumstances, espionage
damage control in West Germany re-
quires a much larger counterintelligence
force than currently exists. Since the
Soviets put a priority on the penetration
of German intelligence agencies, it will
require even more personal guardians to
guard the guardians. Most of all, in an
ideologically charged climate, it will re-
quire a West German political and intel-
lectual Establishment that has not existed
since Adenauer retired as chancellor in
1963, a leadership that gives the best and
brightest Germans a true sense of demo-
cratic mission.
In the West, people in and close to the
intelligence agencies are scared. Given
the skill and diligence of Soviet espionage,
the known and unknown numbers of
Soviet agents and agent handlers around,
the raggedness of Western security mea-
sures, the active hostility of respectable
people to Western intelligence and count-
erintelligence and the stupidity of the
political and intellectual Establishment
about the Soviet Union, they sense that a
large-scale Soviet penetration of Western
capitals exists. They expect the cancer to
show up in other vital places, far more
malignantly than the West German and
the Walker symptoms. 0
Z
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