SECURITY CLEARANCE DELAYS COST DEFENSE DEPT. $1 BILLION A YEAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020046-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: May 13, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020046-1
13 May, 1985
Secur' Clearance Delays cost
fty
Defense Dept $1 Billion a Year
By James K. Gordon
Washington-Delay in security clearance
processing costs the Defense Dept. almost
S1 billion a year because of lost productiv-
ity of defense and contractor employees
waiting for clearance, according to testi-
mony at a recent Senate subcommittee
hearing.
The numbers of requests and processing
delays are increasing in 1985 despite cost
and problems in granting clearance, Bill
W. Thurman, deputy director of General
Accounting Office's national security and
international affairs division, told the Sen-
ate Governmental Affairs Committee per-
manent subcommittee on investigations.
Access Not Required
sented a detailed case study of the security has onl,? been partially successful. The es-
clearance of former General Dynamics ex- tablishment and expansion of other De-
ecutive P. Takis Veliotis. who held Greek, tense Dept. industrial security programs
Canadian and U. S. citizenship. Investiga- has eroded the consistency and coher-
tor Frederick J. Asselin said foreign na- ence," Lawrence J. Howe said. Howe is
tions' opposition and lack of accurate or vice president-corporate security o accessible records may make it impossible ence A ications nternationa orp. an
to verify information provided by a candi- a ormer A security o cer.
date for a security clearance. Veliotis was Defense Dept. procurement offices in
given Defense and Energy Dept. clear-
ances despite discrepancies in file informa-
tion available to security officials.
Sen. Albert Gore. Jr. (D.-Tenn.), com-
plained that the Reagan Administration
was guilty of footdragging and bureaucrat-
ic wrangling. Gore and Nunn questioned
Donald J. Devine, then director-designate
of the Office of Personnel Management,
about federal agency complaints of OPM
delay -in conducting security investigations
and recent employee suitability evaluation
procedures. Nunn queried OPM issuance
of the new procedural guidelines affecting
federal employees while the White House
was still considering-an interagency work-
ing group study on security clearances. "1t
looks like we've got a first-class mess on
our hands," Nunn told Devine. .
The White House has not yet made any
decision on four policy issues raised in the
May 1, 1984, interagency working group
paper:
^ Standardization of investigative pro-
cedures and requirements for the numer-
security rograms.
t
i
The -. ,mi ron I., en . eet with security clearances accounted for 1
4 /c of all sucn eoeral emniovees, and ~I
t -fit 5 million cleared defense contractors
amount to 87Cic of contract emniovees
wltn federal security clearance. according
to GAO statistics. These figures exciuoe
employeesof the Central intellt ence
Agency, National Security Agency and
Hite House offices.
The U. S. government's personnel secu-
rity system is overburdened and inconsis-
tent, according to Nunn, while the foreign
intelligence threat is extensive and sophis-
ticated. "Over 4 million Americans hold
government security clearances, including
53% of federa: employees. More than 1.5
million industry personnel are cleared,"
Nunn said.
" 'I
' D r__ D t emnlov-
Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), ranking sub-
committee Democrat, said 35.000-40,000
defense contractor employees cleared for
top secret have never needed to have ac-
cess to top secret materials, out of almost
115.000 persons cleared for top secret.
11.000 government employees or contrac- establishment of the present a to achieve
tors born in the Soviet Union or other trial security program hoped
Communist bloc nations wriere U. S. au-
thorities are-unable to investigate their
backgrounds and determine their suitabil-
itv and trustworthiness. Nunn said. .
Subcommittee investigative staff pre-
individuate notdtng ig go e
ntv clearances had sold some of this coun- and the defense industrial security pro- maintaining a security clearance, Howe
11
recommended. Loss of clearance based on
try's most guarded high-technology gram. Director Thomas J. O'Brien tests-
secrets to hostiie intelligence services." fled that DIS's case load will reach a history of disregard for security proce-
Defense Dept. has authorized or is per- 219.000 in Fiscal 1985. dures or other serious misconduct should
forming security clearances to allow ac- ,The objective of consolidation and be basis for prompt, justifiable termination
ap of em to ment.
cess to classified information by almost consistency of plication which the 1965
A tense indus- p y
ou
tee nearings. Nunn sat , we
hd
; h v rnment sects- the volume of its personnel investigations tional on the individual's obtaining and
Evaluate Performance
The hearing was held to evaluate execu-
tive branch agencies' personnel security
clearance programs. In earlier subcommit-
nd that
f
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
- p
ous governmen
^ Standardization of the evaluation and human reliability factors, he believes. This
decision process of clearing individuals for should include early signs of stress and
access, with regard for due process. change which can reduce the predictive
^ Amendment or replacement of Exer value of an individual's past behavior.
utive Order 10450, the basic authority for "The profile of a traitor may not be
the federal civilian personnel security pro- significantly different from that of many
sociopaths and felons," Howe said. "Loy-
15a1 am. alty to country has become so abstract
Reconciliation of government em- that an act of treason is not necessarily
ty clearance suitability evaluation and secure- different from any other serious crime.
agreed that differentiates a traitor from a com-
Witnesses agreed that the Defense In- more thief may be little more than oppor-
ing Seotice, charged with conduct- tunit "
ing all personnel security investigations Legal basis should be established to
d b
d
ene
for the Defense Dept, is overbur
y make.employment of an individual condi-
charge of particularly sensitive classified
programs for which special access restric-
tions are imposed may emphasize produc-
tion requirements without proper
consideration of industrial security impli-
cations, Howe said. He recommended the
DIS be given review and inspection over-
sight authority over Defense Dept. procur-
ing offices.
The unsupervised and inadequately reg-
ulated proliferation of special access pro-
grams has resulted in many instances of
misapplied security measures, Howe said.
The defense industrial security program
should be broadened to include special
access programs and establish uniform se-
curity requirements for them.
Howe believes that an inordinate
amount of resources is being expended on
physical security measures, to the detri-
ment of personnel security. "A far greater
amount of sensitive information makes its
unauthorized departure from cleared facil-
ities by walking out the door than has
ever been stolen by force," Howe said.
More attention needs to be directed to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020046-1