U.S. WEIGHS ITS STAKE IN GERMAN SPY SCANDAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230049-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: September 9, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230049-5
ARTICLE APPEAREA
PAGE
U.S. Weighs Its
Stake in German
Spy Scandal
How to limit the flow of
secrets to Bonn without
alienating a key ally-it's a
tough test for Washington.
West Germany's widening spy scan-
dal confronts the U.S. once again with
the dilemma of how much to cooperate
with America's most vulnerable yet
most important ally.
With the magnitude of the latest es-
pionage case escalating almost daily,
wariness about how far to go in sharing
intelligence with Bonn is deepening in
Washington and other allied capitals.
In the words of a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization diplomat: "This
affair will shatter confidence in West
German security for some time to
come and mean most partners will re-
gard Bonn as being as leaky as a sieve."
The scandal, triggered by the defec-
tion to East Germany of Bonn's coun-
terespionage chief, Hans Joachim
Tiedge, involved at least five West Ger-
mans by the end of August, including a
secretary in the office of the President.
It also led to the ouster of the boss of the
country's foreign-intelligence services,
Heribert Hellenbroich.
Widespread fallout. Repercussions
from the scandal were felt outside Ger-
many, with the arrest in Britain and
Switzerland of two East German cou-
ples who had been under surveillance
as spies. They were apprehended when
Bonn informed authorities that Tiedge
might notify East Germany that its
agents were being followed.
The affair took an ironic turn with the
defection in Argentina of a senior East
German diplomat, Martin Winkler,
who requested asylum in the United
States. One report, denied by Bonn offi-
cials, claimed that he was a double
agent who worked for West German
intelligence and feared that he would
be exposed by Tiedge. Another report,
published in the mass-circulation West
German newspaper Bild, described
Winkler as an East German spymaster
with responsibility for most East Ger-
man agents in Latin America.
The bizarre affair dramatized anew
West Germany's vulnerability as a tar-
get of Soviet-bloc espionage stemming
from two factors.
One is that even after 40 years the
U.S.NEWS $ WORLD REPORT
9 September 1985
Counterspy boss Tiedge-s defector,
common language, culture and history.
Furthermore, with thousands of East
Germans crossing the intra-German
border on business and family visits,
and 40,000 having been allowed to im-
migrate to West Germany over the
past two years, Communist intelli-
gence agencies have found it relatively
easy to plant spies.
A second factor that makes West Ger-
many a soft target for East German
espionage is Bonn's policy of maintain-
ing a fragmented intelligence system to
insure against the emergence of a new
Gestapo. There are nearly a score of
separate agencies, each independent
and jealous of its turf.
For example, Tiedge's outfit-the
Office for the Protection of the Consti-
two Germanys still have strong ties of a Bonn's spy chief Hellenbr ch.
tution-operates from headquarters in
Cologne and is responsible for investi-
gating threats to national security such
as espionage and terrorism. But it has
no authority to make arrests. A related
agency, the federal police, which
makes arrests, is based in Wiesbaden.
Hundreds of miles from these two
offices is t o headquarters o t e or-
eign to igence Agency t e counter.
A tc
enc w wor s c ose y wit te
U.. in gat enn -n e i ence m ovie
bloc countries. Each o est erma-
n 's 1 states as we as t e city of
Berlin o crates its own secur~t o ces.
4 The effect 0 f is o icy o is rsing
intelli ence and counterinte i ence
operations widel is summ u b
Geor a Carver a ormer , A o cial
w o serv e in Bonn: " ~e Germans
have a aniz inte ' ence service
that is not very efficient But i it were
merged, that would make us extremely
nervous. Germany is a soft target ."
Just how sot West Germany is as an
espionage target is underscored by the
Tiedge case. The counterintelligence
chief was kept in his post despite wide-
ly reported drinking problems and
debts of some $55,000--classic tip-offs
of a security risk.
D6j6 vu. Further underscoring West
Germany's vulnerability to penetration
by East German spies is the fact that
Bonn has been rocked periodically by
espionage sensations. The most spec-
tacular led to the resignation of former
Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1974 after
it was disclosed that a confidential aide
was an East German agent.
Aware of the risks, allies have long
taken special precautions in exchanging
secrets with Bonn. Like others, U.S. in-
telligence agencies provide their West
German counterparts with sensitive in-
formation only on a need-to-know basis.
U.S. intelligence officials now are at-
tempting to assess the potential dam-
age caused by the latest spy case. They
fear that Tiedge may have tipped off
the East Germans to those among their
estimated 3,000 agents who have been
detected by West German authorities.
They are concerned, too, that the
counterespionage chief may have com-
promised West Germans recruited by
the U.S. for intelligence operations as
well as those working for Bonn intelli-
gence services.
As the shock waves from Bonn's lat-
est spy scandal spread, the challenge
for Washington is how to control the
flow of vital secrets to West Germany
without endangering cooperation with
a key ally. ^
from Bonn and LondoI
A
Approved For Release 2011/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100230049-5