THE CONTRA FIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 6, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4
- `71
The Contra Fight
How CIA-Aided Raids
In N icaragua in '84 Led
Col- gress to End Funds
But Officials Help Insurgents
Raise Private Funds Here;
The Role of Rep. Boland
Scaring Exxon's Ships Away
By DAVID Rocs
And DAVID IGNATIUS
er.' Of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
.ern ed speedboats and a helicopter
'hunched from a Central Intelligence
Agency "mother ship" attacked Nicara-
gua's Pacific port, Puerto Sandino, on a
mo:rless New Year's night in 1984.
A weer. later the speedboats returned to
mine the oil terminal. Over the next three
months. they laid more than 30 mines in
Pue o Sandino and also in harbors at
Corinto and El Bluff. In air and sea raids
or. coastal positions. Americans flew-and
`red from-an armed helicopter that ac-
companied the U.S.-financed Latino force,
while a CIA plane provided sophisticated
reconnaissance guidance for the nighttime
attacks.
The operation, outlined in a classified
CIA document, marked the peak of U.S. in-
volvement in the four-year guerrilla war in
Nicaragua. More than any other single
event, it solidified congressional opposition
to the covert war, and in the year since
then. no new money has been approved be-
yond the last CIA checks drawn early last
summer.
Fund-Raising Help
U.S. officiais are quietly helping the i
sir-ens raise private funds to keep aliv
the Contra program the CIA began to fi-
nance in 1981. As he throws himself person-
a'.ly into the fight, President Reagan faces
broad public opposition to U.S. involve
ment in efforts to topple the Sandinista re-
gime. The level of private contribution so
far-between S5 million and $10 million-
can't match the support formerly provided
by the CIA And in Honduras, a guerrilla
base throughout the war, the Tegucigalpa
go,. e-nment nervously awaits a new con-
-ressional vote on funding this season.
The rise and fall of the CIA's Nicaragua
'pr ,Ject'' is a story of war abroad and
ry,-- ii,_! at home. In the absence of a clear
WALL STREET JOURNAL
6 March 1985
administration policy, congressional per- the people,' " a U.S. official says. And Mr.
sonalities came to play a decisive role, and Chamorro remembers Mr. Clarridge's
the fight took on an institutional signifi- mentioning that the Americans were will-
cance for Congress that made it the most ing to sink ships to stop the arms flow.
emotional debate on any foreign-policy is- As the CIA assumed greater control of
sue since Vietnam. { the war in 1983, the agency moved on two,
The mining operation in 1984 symbol- sometimes conflicting, tracks. It sought to
ized a larger military escalation that never build the insurgency into a stronger grass-
had firm political backing at home. It roots guerrilla movement. Yet, increas-
yielded a propaganda victory for Nicara- :ngly impatient with the pace of the Con-
gua, and in Congress it left a legacy of ;ras. it wanted to make auick, direct, at-
mistrust that haunts the CIA and covert tacks against Nicaragua with forces re-
operations today. The congressional over- cruited elsewhere in Latin America and
sight process was damaged by misleading trained and financed by the U.S.
testimony and news leaks, and the biparti- Contra leaders say the CIA training im-
sanship that had governed the two Intelli-
gence Committees since their founding fell
apart.
The administration decisions leading to
the mining of the oil terminal had their
roots in the spring and summer of 1983.
"Everybody saw that these guys the San-
dinistas] were in the process of consolidat-
ing the revolution," an administration offi-
cial says. "And we needed to stop it." Yet
a June assessment by the CIA and other
U.S. intelligence agencies was highly skep-
tical of the Contra insurgency, and in late
July the House voted for the first time to
cut off CIA funding for the program.
Slipped Cover
Against this background. Duane Cl -
dge, then head of the CIA' atin Ameri-
an division, met with Contra leaders in
Honduras in July. He traveled under the
code name of "Mr. Maroni," but his cover
slipped a bit when the CIA base com-
mander, a gruff, likeable military man,
addressed him by his nickname "Dewey."
Edgar Chamorro, a former Contra leader,
remembers being bemused at the logic of
proved their forces, but the insurgents re-
sented what they regarded as CIA interfer-
ence in their operations. At the same time.
CIA paramilitary officers were upset by
the ineffectiveness of the Contras. A bridge
at Corinto was repeatedly targeted, for ex-
ample, but missions failed. As the insur-
gency force grew-doubling to about 15,000
during 1983-the CIA began to use the
guerrilla army as a cover for its own small
"Latino" force. Guerrilla radio broadcasts
gave credit to the anti-Sandinista move-
ment, but the raids were carried out now
by non-Nicaraguans from such countries
as Bolivia and Ecuador.
Increasingly, economic targets were
picked by the Americans, and the most ce-
lebrated attack, by armed speedboats.
came Oct. 11. 1983, against oil facilities at
Corinto. Three days later, an underwater
pipeline at Puerto Sandino was sabotaged
by Latino frogmen. The message wasn't
lost on Exxon Corp.'s Esso unit, and the in-
ternational giant informed the Sandinista
government that it would no longer provide
tankers for transporting oil to Nicaragua.
The CIA's success in scaring off a ma-
jor shipper fit well in its mining strategy.
Mr. Clarridge, who studied at Columbia
University's Russian Institute, told a mem-
ber of the Joint Chiefs staff that the
scheme came to him from his knowledge
of mining tactics in the Russo-Japanese
War.
The weeks before the January 1984 min-
ing operation were among the darkest for
the administration in Central America.
The Salvadoran elections had been post-
poned from December to March, and even
as the mining began, the CIA was planning
covert financial and political support to
head off right-wing candidate Roberto
d'Aubuisson.
The mother ship used in the mining op-
eration is described by sources as a pri-
vate chartered vessel with a configuration
similar to an oil-field service and towing
ship with a long, flat stern section where
helicopters could land. To conceal the
ship's identity, the CIA is believed to have
changed the ship's name regularly; the
agency may also have repainted the ship
Continued -
Mr. Clarridge sought to boost spirits by
stressing President Reagan's personal in-
terest in the guerrillas' progress, but his
underlying message was a call for change.
"He told them, 'You have to be more like
guerrillas, you have to swim in the sea of
:J NICARAGUA
Corinth
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4
,4
during a February break in the operation.
The ship used in the mining was larger
than an earlier version that launched the
ctober attack on Corinto, and the CIA
wanted the larger size to accommodate a
second helicopter.
A CIA document recounting the opera-
tion lists two helicopters, both believed to
be Hughes 50Os: one was flown by CIA-
:p ervised Nicaraguans, the other by
.mericans. A Fairchild Merlin IV, a twin
vncine propeller plane equipped with for-
',r:rd looking infrared radar, flew offshore
,nternational airspace. Some of the
"eeducats, armed with mortars and ma-
chme guns, were converted from smug-
ciing boats confiscated by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration.
The second helicopter gave the CIA bet-
ter command and control over the opera-
tion but also heightened U.S. involvement.
At leas;. once before, an American helicop-
ter had entered Nicaraguan airspace to ex-
tract a Latino commando. but in the 1984
raids, the U.S. pilots directly fired on Nica-
raguan positions, according to the CIA doc-
ument. interviews with U.S. officials, and
Sandinista military records.
Ships Hit
Administration officials still express
surprise and some annoyance that insur-
ance firms like Lloyds didn't increase
rates high enough to stop shipping to Nica-
ratua. Late in March the speedboats fired
aroufld Corinto in a further effort to scare
off cargo vessels. "This was the largest
display of weapons fire ever to occur at
Corinto," the CIA reported later, adding
that the operation served to warn cargo
essel crews of hazards of being in Nicara-
guan ports.
Though the threat posed by the explo-
sives-some as large as 300 pounds-was
later played down, at least five interna-
tional ships hit mines, and the CIA re-
ported serious damage to a Dutch dredger
and Cuban freighter and the sinking of at
least four smaller Nicaraguan patrol
boats.
The mining ultimately hurt the adminis-
tration's own policy, and despite President
Reagan's authorization of the operation,
there is still debate among his advisers as
to how thoroughly the move was consid-
ered. Two administration sources say that
Secretary of State George Shultz was sur-
prised by news reports of the mining, prob-
ably because he missed a discussion of the
program by a top-level committee of the
National Security Council. Other State De-
partment officials remember the mining
only as one item on a list of covert opera-
tions.
"It was neither illegal nor immoral, but
it was incredibly destructive,'' contends a
U.S. official who supports the Contras. "It
was perfectly clear that it would involve
third parties whose ships would be hit. It
couldn't have been better designed to un- year later, and the situation became so
dermine our policy." poisoned that the CIA sometimes fed dif-
gress, yet from the outset, the administra-
tion had underestimated the depth and
character of the opposition it faced. Just as
Mr. Casey symbolized the CIA, Rep. Ed-
i ward Boland came to stand for his Intelli-
gence Committee and the House. A former
county registrar of deeds, the Massachu-
setts Democrat instinctively avoids con-
frontation. His 1982 legislation forbidding , may have been his own worst enemy.
i U.S. funding to overthrow the Sandinista For all sides, the public disclosure of
regime was intended as a warning to the ' the controversial psychological warfare
administration. In challenging Mr. Boland, manual last fall represented'
epresented a low point.
I the CIA provoked a man whose alliances Democrats seized on the issue in the last
and credibility in Congress made him weeks of the presidential campaign, and to
uniquely able to defeat the agency. cut its losses, the administration con-
Highly Placed Friend ducted a quick investigation. Relatively ju-
The personal background of Mr. Bo- nior officers in the CIA were disciplined
land's friend and former background
Washington room- for what was seen as a management disas-
mate, Speaker Thomas O'Neill, added to ter, and the agency's morale was badly
the emotion of the debate. Rep. O'Neill's hurt.
late aunt had been a Marvknoll nun, and The more lasting question that troubles
Maryknolls working in Nicaragua today both supporters and critics of the program
visit him in Washington. Among his boy- is what happens to the Contras now. Sup-
hood friends was a Marine who was porters don't want to abandon the Contras,
wounded while serving with the American dooming their movement to failure. But
force that occupied Managua a half cen- j many fear that they can't succeed without
tury ago. "I remember him talking about U.S. intervention. "You're either going to
the' poverty he saw," says Mr. O'Neill. be in a position of saying 'Bye. Bye Birdie'
"Everything we did was for the protection or 'Here Come the Marines' " says a Sen
of American industry down there." ate Democrat.
Congressional opposition was quietly en- For now the program is surviving on
couraged by senior career CIA officials private contributions raised with the help
who were unhappy with the program and of American officials. Adolfo Calero. a sil-
the risk of damage to the agency. Congres- ver-haired opposition leader and Notre
sional scrutiny focused on the size of the Dame graduate, travels seeking contribu-
insurgency and the U.S. command and tions from wealthy conservatives and oth-
control. In the Senate, a secret staff report ers. He is helped in small ways by the ad-
in early 1983 raised major questions about ministration. "Adolfo Calero has been in-
the direction of the program, and while re- troduced to people in various countries
porters were fascinated with the details of who are sympathetic to the cause of de-
operations, members tended to look more mocracy," says a U.S. official confirming
at management and total numbers. the U.S. fund-raising help. "These people
"The thing that impressed the commit- I have decided, after being introduced to
tee the most was the regular and constant him, to contribute. Mr. Calero then pro-
increase in the number of Contras being vides them with information."
supported," says a senior Democrat. "The Enrique Bermudez, the military com-
members didn't pay as much attention to mander of the U.S.-backed Fuerza Demo-
the activities as to the numbers." cratica Nicaraguense said at a press con-
Journalists' Role ference yesterday in Washington that the
This distinction reflects an ambivalence Contras would keep fighting even if Con-
in the congressional process. The commit-
tees wanted to be kept informed, but above
From Mr. Casey's standpoint, Congress
got cold feet. Legislators had initially ap-
proved the paramilitary program, the CIA
complained, and then abandoned it when it
became a political embarrassment. But
even some agency officials concede that
Mr. Casey, in his pique toward Congress,
gress doesn't renew funding, but he said
the group would "adapt to the situation"
all they hoped to avoid embarrassment. by decentralizing its forces and avoiding
They initially gave some license to the large operations. He also said the FDN
CIA, but this trust broke down as Mr. would seize territory inside Nicaragua and
Casey sought to limit information, presum- ! declare a shadow government if that would
ably as a way to limit opposition. convince Congress to loosen the purse
When reporters were first allowed to strings.
travel with the insurgents in early 1983, Mr. Calero estimates that more than $5
their stories brought the war home and million has been raised privately since CIA
embarrassed House supporters. They saw funding was cut off. He says a Washington
the CIA as further manipulating informa- law' firm is researching the possibility of
tion on a supposedly "secret" war. Much selling private bonds to finance the war,
the same reaction came in the Senate The private funding compares with the es-
when the mining operation was revealed a timated $1.2 million the CIA had been pro-
Continued
This impact was immediate in Con- ferent information to the two panels in an
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4
\i,.. ; rnor.th; Th
'er IPas don't have
c ~~;: SL'L i!ES Cr ,r anspor'"ytior. to :no,
that changes.
'' Ore eotn'e i:; be a I.orneem N1C3rzg'ua
uer- :a rnovemen?? s2vs a U.S. of
,icia .
1 here also is the cancer that Honduras
2n,- Cos:2 Ri
cam. u?errie.d that the U.S.
c ec: . .,, ~atnst attacks by the
+^ a 4n G rrl _ i ~ `
the co'-' -- as.
e ?r esker.; Reacar's appeal
e'?'rc `cnd.ng. there Js ?ncertatnt~
e Ccn:ras Er'Sek;es. '1 r
_ ealJZe
cem..c-acc)es or~rat_
- '': pec~;Jar
2) -. ?',:'. Caierc says. ., T here
s.is not a
\'oJCe.... R.k~~,e, from the
.~ ' . sta.-:. we
:here was the danger of a cutoff, 1
cor"r fee) betraV'ai as such.,,
I his home :n He.. Biscayne, Mr Cha-
`'orrc. the u
forme,- Contra official, says
cr'\ : ''\r e wer e ius: the fro, t. ? felt we
e r' a,^,1^t cteC, used as a `ig',irenead.
::'s like a book that
0"'\, ,-,e\ 'C reading but
know the last chapter.
At CL; headquarters in angJe\ . Air.
2-rid-?L ra-s beer, transferred to head tree
car'-,i.^.c e bump 11
sticker emolim,
the U.S. in 'as)on o` C-e'aca and on
clai ing. "\1Cara~ua ' e);: has a ac
y
from now, but a coaeague says agenc\
off::als zked him to bac : it in its parking ''
ace, o :he st)ckerS wo;ilan't be seen.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/24: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100250011-4