SILENT SPREAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100380003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100380003-9
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SILENT SPREAD
by Lcorard S. Soector
Since no new country has declared itself to be
a nuclear power for more than 20 years and
since none is known to have detonated a first
nuclear test for over a decade, it is not
unreasonable to hope that the spread of nucle-
ar weapons can yet be curbed. Indeed, if a test
is taken as the standard, then proliferation has
actually been tapering off. The first decade of
the nuclear age, 1945-1955, saw three new
entrants to the club, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Great Britain; the second
saw two, France and the People's Republic of
China (PRC); and the third only one, India, in
1974. Since then, no additional countries are
known to have conducted nuclear tests.
This is cause for optimism, since a country
that demonstrates its nuclear capability by
testing intensifies the pressures on its neigh-
bors to follow suit and further legitimates the
pursuit of nuclear arms worldwide. Testing is
also an essential steppingstone to H-bomb and
missile-warhead development. Nonetheless,
testing is but one measure of proliferation.
Most specialists believe that reliable nuclear
weapons can be developed without testing;
indeed, the type of bomb dropped on Hiroshi-
ma had never been tested.
When measured in terms of countries that
have the capability to produce nuclear weap-
ons and that might be prepar?d to do so in a
major conflict or in response to other regional
pressures, the pace of proliferation has been
considerably quicker than suggested above,
and the trend less reassuring. Israel probably
achieved this status between 1968 and 1973;
India, in 197.7; South Africa, by 19771; Pakistan
is likely to join their ranks in the next year or
so; and Argentina and Brazil may gain similar
status by the early 1990s. Iraq was on this
ad. too. until Israel destroyed the Osiraq
reactor near Baghdad in 19F].
Seen in this light. proliferation has been
increasing at a steady rate and will continue to
do so through the end of the century. Still
more disturbing. the United States. its princi-
pal industrialized partners, and the Soviet
L nion have shown by their actions that they
will tolerate such veiled nuclearization. Pro-
vided the emerging nuclear powers keep their
nuclear capabilities ambiguous, the advanced
industrial countries have embraced a set of de
facto restraints on their responses to such
activities. In effect, rules of engagement have
emerged in the nonproliferation battle. Unless
these rules are substantially strengthened,
they will not stop the bomb from spreading.
Danger at Dimona
Israel, which is not known to have tested a
nuclear weapon and which has never acknowl-
edged possessing any, is the prototype of
ambiguous proliferation. Since 1962 Israel's
announced policy has been that it will not be
the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons into
the Middle East. Nonetheless, most observers
believe that Israel has possessed nuclear arms
since the late 1960s or early 1970s.
During the early 1960s the United States
aggressively intervened to prevent Israel from
developing such weapons, insisting that it
restrict the use of the Dimona research reac-
tor, which it had obtained secretly from
France under a 1957 agreement, and submit
the facility to annual U.S. inspection. By 1969,
however, Washington had become considera-
bly more tolerant.
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100380003-9