NSC SHOULD REMAIN THE PRESIDENT'S ARM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000200790001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/06/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000200790001-5
aj. WALL STREET JOURNAL
ARTICLE APPEARED 2 December 1986
ON PAU~...ia._.__
RLE ONLY
NSC Should Remain the President's Arm
The controversy about the Iranian arms
sales and the diversion of some of the pro-
ceeds to the Nicaraguan contras has
placed a spotlight on the president's Na-
tional Security Council. Several in Con-
gress have suggested there should be new
laws to regulate the NSC staff's activities
and perhaps make the job of director con-
firmable by Congress. But an understand-
ing of what the proper relationship be-
tween the president and the NSC should be
makes clear that this straitjacket ap-
proach would be a mistake.
Congress established the NSC in 1947
because it concluded that foreign policy
was no longer just the sum of diplomacy
and international economic relations. The
U.S. also had to help rebuild democracy.
encourage economic revival and help
friendly countries defend themselves from
a new form of indirect warfare-Soviet-
supported subversive aggression.
The National Security Council exists to
help the president by assuring him of the
simultaneous, candid advice of its mem-
bers: the vice president, the secretaries
oL,state, a ense and treasury, the attorney
general, the director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Constitution pro-
vides that the president is the chief execu-
tive in both domestic and foreign policy.
That means the president listens to the
viewpoints of his cabinet but that he makes
the final decision.
What does this imply about the intrinsic
responsibilities of the NSC director and his
staff'
First, NSC employees must assure that
the president makes all the key decisions
in foreign policy and that the president
knows the views of all key foreign-policy
advisers. This means that neither the State
Department nor any other group can uni-
laterally undertake a new policy initiative
without a decision by the president. Every
bureauracy, to some degree, has its own
agenda, so the NSC helps assure the Amer-
ican people that the person they elect will
in fact actually govern rather than merely
preside in foreign policy.
Second, the NSC staff must monitor im-
plementation of presidential decisions. Un-
less there is some regular and predictable
way for the president to follow up on deci-
sions, many will be forgotten or carried
out with too little vigor. Every president
has learned that there can be a large gap
between his decisions and real action.
Third, the NSC staff should inform the
president of major foreign-policy opportu-
nities or threats that may not have been
noticed by the various foreign-policy agen-
cies. Here the staff functions as the eyes
and ears of the president to listen to con-
cerns and suggestions from Congress, civic
leaders, experts and scholars that may not
get attention from the implementing bu-
reaucracies, such as the State Department.
When the NSC director judges that new ac-
tions might be needed, he should request
the foreign-policy agencies to provide their
analysis and recommendations to the pres-
ident at a future NSC meeting. In 1983, the
Strategic Defense Initiative came about
from this type of process.
Fourth. the NSC staff must help the
president coordinate the political, eco-
nomic and security aspects of foreign pol-
icy. This is done in many ways: by brief-
ing the president on all these aspects in
written background and decision memo-
randa: in preparing the president for
meetings with foreign leaders: in working
closely with the press spokesman and the
presidential speech writers to assure that
all White House statements on foreign pol-
icy are consistent with presidential deci-
sions: and, when requested, providing
briefings to members of Congress, the me-
dia and civic and foreign leaders.
What do these tasks imply about con-
gressional oversight of the NSC? Clearly,
since the NSC staff is working directly for
the president, its advice to him should be
treated with the same degree of confidenti-
ality as that of other elements of the White
House staff. Congress can and does exer-
cise oversight in foreign policy through its
power to confirm members of the cabinet,
its control of funds and its other powers.
All contemporary presidents have used
their constitutional authority in foreign pol-
icy to designate particular individuals or
organizations to carry out missions
deemed highly sensitive-the diplomatic
aspect of the Iran action is not a departure
from these precedents (e.g., Gen. George
Marshall's missions for President Truman
in pre-communist China, and Henry Kis-
singer's diplomacy with the Vietnamese,
Soviets and Chinese). But, with only rare
exceptions, the NSC staff should not have
any responsibility to implement policy.
The NSC staff must include ana-
tion of foreign-policy experts and experi-
enced individuals from all three career
services: foreign service, military, and in-
telligence organizations. Last April, Rep.
Dan Burton IR., Ind.) and 30 other con-
gressmen wrote Vice Adm. John Poin-
dexter, then director of the NSC, of their
concern that all the senior NSC staff mem-
bers handling specific geographic regions
were career government employees-
mostly from the State Department. The
letter said: "We believe it essential that a
President of either party have at the senior
levels of the NSC staff competent foreigr
policy experts who share the President's
political values and are independent of ca-
reer bureaucracies.''
The case for NSC staff 'leadership
mainly resting with foreign-policy experts
brought in by each president is that three
of the four NSC staff responsibilities will
inevitably involve some degree of friction
with the foreign-policy bureaucracies.
While the individuals from those career bu-
reaucracies work hard and do their best to
be independent of the organizations to
which they will return in a short time, it is
simply not realistic to expect the same de-
gree of fresh vision or concern for the
president's authority from most career
employees-who, by law, must be apoliti-
cal. Mr. Poindexter's reply to the letter il-
lustrated this by saying that State, CIA
and milita employees on the . s a
have "full freedom of expression -oten
exercised tote degree of putting t eir ca-
reers at risk."
It is generally agreed that presidential
control of the military requires that civil-
ians and not military officers make up the
senior staff aiding the Secretary of De-
fense. This implies no questioning of the
loyalty or skills of military personnel-it is
simply a matter of common sense. Like-
wise, it is reasonable to expect that genu-
ine presidential control of foreign policy
requires independent civilians in the senior
positions at the NSC staff.
When the American people elect a pres-
ident they expect that man or woman will
be in charge of toreign policy, and can be
held accountable for his or her perform-
ance. No other department or cabinet offi-
cer can substitute for the role of the NSC
staff, not even the Secretarv of State. The
State Department is one of several organi-
zations implementing foreign policy and
frequently has strong disagreements with
other institutions. For example, it often
clashes with the Defense Department on
strategic arms control issues and with the
Treasury and Commerce Departments on
international economic issues.
Therefore, every president needs to
have an NSC staff that includes competent
foreign-policy experts who share his politi-
cal values and who will insure that he is in
charge of foreign policy.
Mr. Menges sewed as special assistant
to the president for national-security a."-
fairs from 198J to June 1986.
Approved For Release 2010/06/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000200790001-5