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December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 10, 2001
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June 25, 1976
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Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100, EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY GEORGE BUSH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT CLEVELAND CITY CLUB 25 JUNE 1976 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 EXCERPTS YOU , If'VE= ALL HEARD AND READ INNUMERABLE CHARGES AND ALLEGATIOI;: 'GAINST THE CIA A:JD THE INTELLIGENCE COE1i1Ur.IITY AS A "lNOLE, I HOPE THAT YOU DO NOT CONE TO BELIEVE UUJFOIiiJDID ALLEGATIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE APPEARED INN PRINT OR BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN REPEATED SO OFTEN, MANY OF THE ALLEGATIONS WERE UTTERLY BASELESS, MANY OTHERS WERL BLOWN OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO REALITY, MD IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE MISTAKES AND BAD JUDGMENTS HAD BEEN MADE, THE AGENCY ITSELF HAD MOVED TO CORRECT TIHEf1 LONG BEFORE THEY BECAME PUBLIC, ALL OF THIS PUBLICITY, THE INVESTIGATIONS, THE CHARGES HAVE HAD MANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES BUT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED ONE IfiPORTA'JI T NING, THEY HAVE MADE- THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE A PROPER SUBJECT FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION. THEY HAVE BADE IT CLEAR TO THOSE OF US I N I NTELLI GE'ICE THAT WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE Af11EERI CAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THE I NTELLI GEJCE PROFESSIO I AND ITS VITAL ROLE IN EJSURING OUR NATION' S SECURITY. 111E PEOPLE MUST KNOW THAT CIA IS DEDICATED TO LIVING WITIINd THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS OF THIS COUNTRY. PART OF ASSEJMING THIS RESPONSIBILITY IS ACCOMPLISHED BY FACE-TO-FACE TALKS, AS I All DOING HERE TODAY, ANOT1-IER PART IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ENSURING THAT THE PEOPLE`S ELECTED REPRESIE:f,TATIVES I-11 CONGRESS HAVE THE INFORMATION THEY NEED TO PERFORM THEIR ROLE OF OVERSEEING THE INTELLIGENCE COf IIU JITY, Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 2 THE CIA AND THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WELCOME STRONG AND EFFECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO GAIN FROM IT. WE GAIN THE ADVICE AND COUNSEL OF KNOWLEDGEABLE MEMBERS, WE GAIN THE ASSURANCE THAT YOU, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE CONFIDENT THAT YOUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS CLEARLY ACCOUNTABLE TO BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS. LET ME GIVE YOU AN IDEA OF THE EXTENT OF THIS ACCOUNTABIL- ITY BY CITING A COUPLE OF FIGURES. I PERSONALLY HAVE APPEARED 28 TIMES BEFORE VARIOUS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SINCE I BECAME DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON JANUARY 30, IN ADDITION TO MY APPEARANCES, DURING THAT SAME TIME OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE AGENCY HAVE BRIEFED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBERS SOME 65 TIMES. AND, 19 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE VISITED THE AGENCY ON SEVERAL OTHER OCCASIONS FOR BRIEFING SESSIONS, WE WANT TO COOPERATE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH THE CONGRESS, BUT CONGRESS MUST ALSO DEAL RESPONSIBLY WITH SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. CONGRESS MUST ENSURE THAT OVERSIGHT ENHANCES, RATHER THAN HINDERS, THE VITAL OPERATIONS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, ONE IMPORTANT WAY THE CONGRESS CAN DO THIS IS BY CENTRALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN POINTS OF PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 13, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS IT AGAIN. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 THE SENATE HAS NOW ESTABLISHED A PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. IT IS CHAIRED BY SENATOR INOUYE OF HAWAII; SENATOR BAKER OF TENNESSEE IS THE VICE- CHAIRMAN. THIS IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT IT IS NOT CONSOLIDATED OVERSIGHT. I NOW REPORT TO THREE OTHER SENATE COMMITTEES, ALTOGETHER THERE ARE SEVEN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVOLVED IN THE FORMAL OVERSIGHT PROCESS. IN ADDITION, SOME ELEVEN OTHER COMMITTEES OR SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE MADE OVERSIGHT CLAIMS AND BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO SENSITIVE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION$ THIS RAPIDLY BROADENED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE MATERIAL HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PAST YEAR'S UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF LEAKS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. SUCH LEAKS ARE DAMAGING AND CAN HURT AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES FAR INTO THE FUTURE. COMPLEX AND EXPENSIVE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEMS CAN BE COUNTERED, DEDICATED AND COURAGEOUS MEN AND WOMEN WHO RISK THEIR LIVES IN THE SERVICE OF THIS COUNTRY CAN BE EXPOSED AND DESTROYED. AND WE WILL NEVER KNOW HOW MANY POSSIBLE SOURCES OF VALUABLE INFORMATION DID NOT COME FORWARD BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT WE COULD NOT KEEP THEIR SECRETS. AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, I AM CHARGED BY FEDERAL STATUTE WITH PROTECTING BOTH THE SOURCES OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AND THE METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE, Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 I AM DEAD SET AGAINST OVERCLASSIFICATION, AND I AM TAKING STEPS TO SEE THAT ONLY TRUE INTELLIGENCE SECRETS ARE CLASSIFIED. I AM TOTALLY COMMITTED TO ENSURING THAT SECRET STAMPS ARE NEVER USED TO HIDE FAILURES OR ABUSES, BUT I AM EVERY BIT AS DETERMINED TO SEE THAT LEAKS, CARELESS TALK, OR A DESIRE FOR A SENSATIONAL HEADLINE DO NOT RESULT IN THE SENSELESS DISCLOSURE OF OUR REAL INTELLIGENCE SECRETS, I SEEK TO COOPERATE WITH THE CONGRESS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, I WANT CONGRESS TO BE A CONSUMER OF INTELLIGENCE -- SHARING IN THE FRUITS OF OUR EFFORTS IN ORDER TO BE BETTER ABLE TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, CONGRESS MUST ALSO HELP US TO KEEP OUR TRUE INTELLIGENCE SECRETS, NOW LET ME TURN TO ANOTHER MATTER OF VERY SERIOUS CONCERN TO ME. I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE OF ALLEGATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PRESS REGARDING THE AGENCY'S SUPPOSED "SUBVERSION" OF THE PRESS. BECAUSE A FREE PRESS IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS REPUBLIC, I PARTICULARLY WANT TO BE SURE THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES IS IN ACCORD WITH REALITY, NOT WITH SENSATIONAL HEADLINES. HISTORICALLY THE CIA HAS HAD RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN MANY WALKS OF AMERICAN LIFE. THESE RELATION- SHIPS, MANY OF A VOLUNTARY AND UNPAID NATURE, HAVE REFLECTED THE DESIRE OF AMERICANS TO HELP THEIR COUNTRY, SUCH Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 RELATIONSHIPS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH THE CLEAR INTENT OF FURTHERING THE AGENCY'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE MISSION, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN AIMED AT INFLUENCING OR IMPROPERLY ACTING ON ANY AMERICAN INSTITUTION, ON FEBRUARY 11 OF THIS YEAR, I ISSUED A POLICY STATEMENT THAT SAID, IN PART: "EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, CIA WILL NOT ENTER INTO ANY PAID OR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY FULL-TIME OR PART-TIME NEWS CORRESPONDENT ACCREDITED BY ANY U.S. NEWS SERVICE, NEWSPAPER, PERIODICAL, RADIO OR TELEVISION NETWORK OR STATION. AS SOON AS FEASIBLE, THE AGENCY WILL BRING EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN THESE GROUPS INTO CONFORMITY WITH THIS NEW POLICY," I HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS STATEMENT WOULD BE MORE THAN CLEAR, BUT THE MEDIA HAS CONTINUED TO WONDER WHETHER THERE WERE SOME LOOPHOLES LEFT. THE POLICY I SET OUT ON FEBRUARY 11 IN REALITY REPRESENTED A VOLUNTARY LIMITATION ON OUR PART OF PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, WE DID THIS BECAUSE WE ACCEPT THE GENUINE CONCERN OF THE MEDIA, AND BECAUSE WE, TOO, WISH TO AVOID EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF ANY IMPROPER USE BY THE AGENCY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR FREE PRESS, LET ME MAKE THESE ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS WHICH RESPOND TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT MY FEBRUARY 11 POLICY DIRECTIVE, WITH REGARD TO THE WORD "ACCREDITED," WE MEAN ANY FULL OR PART-TIME EMPLOYEES -- INCLUDING STRINGERS -- OF Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 AMERICAN OR FOREIGN NATIONALITY WHO ARE FORMALLY AUTHORIZED BY CONTRACT OR BY THE ISSUANCE OF PRESS CREDENTIALS TO REPRESENT THEMSELVES AS CORRESPONDENTS FOR AN AMERICAN NEWS-GATHERING ORGANIZATION OR WHO ARE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED (ACCREDITED) BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO REPRESENT AN AMERICAN NEWS-GATHERING ORGANIZATION, FURTHER: THE CIA WILL NOT USE FULL-TIME AMERICAN JOURNALISTS OR STRINGERS FOR ANY INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES. I MUST STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION I EMPHASIZED ON FEBRUARY 11 THAT CONTACT IS PERMITTED WITH JOURNALISTS'OR ANY OTHER AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO VOLUNTARILY SEEK CONTACT WITH THE AGENCY AT HOME OR ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRANSMITTING ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS INTELLIGENCE OR COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SECURITY INFORMATION WITHOUT FINANCIAL REMUNERATION OR OTHER FAVOR. MY INTENTION IN CONTINUING TO AUTHORIZE SUCH CONTACTS IS OBVIOUS: IT IS TO PERMIT INDIVIDUAL JOURNALISTS, OR MEMBERS OF ANY OTHER PROFESSION OR GROUP, TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT AS AMERICAN CITIZENS TO REPORT INFORMATION VOLUNTARILY AND WITTINGLY TO THEIR GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE AGENCY. I BELIEVE YOU WILL AGREE THAT NO ONE SHOULD UNEQUIVOCALLY DENY ANY AMERICAN CITIZEN, INCLUDING JOURNALISTS, THIS RIGHT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, NEITHER CAN WE BETRAY THE TRUST IMPOSED ON US BY SUCH INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM WE HAVE MADE COMMITMENTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY, IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA DP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 I SIMPLY CANNOT REVEAL THE IDENTITIES OF ANY SOURCES WHO HAVE WORKED WITH US, WHETHER THEY BE JOURNALISTS OR MEMBERS OF ANY OTHER GROUP, THOSE IN A PROFESSION WHOSE MEMBERS ARE WILLING TO GO TO JAIL RATHER THAN REVEAL A SOURCE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE CLEARLY DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE LAW TO PROTECT OUR SOURCES, THE PRESIDENT RESTATED AND REEMPHASIZED THAT RESPONSIBILITY IN HIS RECENT EXECUTIVE ORDER. THE AGENCY RECOGNIZES THE SPECIAL STATUS AFFORDED THE PRESS UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, AND WE WILL REMAIN COMPLETELY WITHIN THE GUIDELINES I HAVE SET FORTH. THE PRESS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BOTH SEEK KNOWLEDGE. CLEARLY, THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACTING ON THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE IS ACTING ON THE BASIS OF IGNORANCE, AN INFORMED CITIZENRY AND INFORMED NATIONAL LEADERS ARE ESSENTIAL. AND THAT IS WHY A FREE SOCIETY MUST HAVE A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, IT IS ALSO WHY A FREE SOCIETY MUST HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM SECOND TO NONE$ Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 GEORGE BUSH I Cleveland City Club Q&A L t June 25, 1976 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 MAN: We can all agree on intelligence gathering by the CIA, but there's been much criticism of the CIA by people in other countries that there's actual interference in their affairs [unintelligible]. GEORGE BUSH: I would simply say that the CIA mission of foreign intelligence has, as the Senate Committee report reveals [unintelligible] controversial situations. It will continue to be controversial situations. Out of the President's Executive Order, new procedures to govern and control covert actions have been implemented, faith- fully implemented. The 40 Committee, the former 40 Committee, now named the Operations Advisory Group, has been elevated to the level of [unintelligible]. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, NSC advisers, Director of Central Intelligence, the President him- self approves of any covert activity that's undertaken. Covert activity used to be a major percentage. I believe it was 50 to 60 percentage points of the total intelligence budget, and today it's two percent. My own view on covert activity is that this country should use it carefully, think out carefully the consequences, but that no President should be denied the capability of a covert -- denied a covert capability. Now, the Senate report exhaustively talked about Chile itself. There were clearly some things that in retrospect were wrong. But in terms of the present, which I try to focus on; in terms of the future, which I'm determined to help shape, I think this country should retain a strong covert capability, carefully used, fully reported to the United States Congress. May I add a disclaimer before the next question, so if I appear to be ducking a question, you'll know that that's exactly what I'm doing. [Laughter] There are many areas which normal questions, proper ques- tions would get into the area of sources and methods of intelligence, and some of those I simply must ask your indulgence in commenting on. And one of the tough things about my job is, unlike any other head, there are many more of these areas where you, you know, legi- timately should say, "No comment," because of the restraints placed on me by the law. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 So I hope, If I can't answer this next question respon- sively, or the next or the next, that you will have some under- standing. I'll.try to be very frank and simply tell you I can't. MAN: You said in your presentation that only true intel- ligence secrets are classified. If you take those words "true intelligence secrets" alone, any one of the three is subject to very broad interpretation. How do you -- how can you more closely define what is classified information? BUSH: Well, what I meant to say, if I didn't, was only those things should be classified, only those should be classified, 'cause I will agree with many that there is overclassification right now. The President saw this very clearly and promulgated In this Executive Order that the Director of Central Intelligence ought to do something about declassifying. What I think -- the only way I know to do It Is what we're undertaking now. We have underway two major declassification efforts, one of them headed by a very able and very -- a Ph.D., as a matter of fact, a very well educated man with a long history in the Intelligence side of the business; Ianother a community effort which would Include some input from all elements of the community, looking at the information and trying to establish if it is. Congress itself has some insight into this, through these two tremendous hearings, and we welcome suggestions from, as I've made clear, the committees of Congress, some suggestions from them as to what it should be. But your question's a tough one and a good one, because there is such activity involved. And what we must do is simply not overclassify. And we're -- I'm determined to take that part of my mandate just as seriously as I do the part that would protect secrets. But again, it's a tough one, because what one would think shouldn't be classified, because it's on sourcing, might be classi- fied, might lead to a source that would be cut off from other infor- mat1on. So, it's a highly complex issue. We are looking at It as objectively as we can. We are determined to do something about it. MAN: Mr. Bush, recently in The Washington Post, and on your relation -- CIA relationship with [unintelligible] -- you're reported as saying that you had, quote, talked privately with a number of members of the fourth estate, although not all of them were totally happy with the situation as It is, and I have met with considerable class understanding. One top figure in the national media told me privately that he thought that after issuance Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 of my statement that no more could probably be demanded of us. Well, who are the members of the fourth estate whove you've been quietly giving you your quiet, quote, understanding to [unintelligible]? And who is the top figure in the national media who says he is satisfied with the CIA position? BUSH: I'm not going to go into sources. I'll simply say this: that we had a meeting yesterday with people from the National News Council, came down, at the request of this inves- tigatory body. They will report to the National News Council. I hope that out of that comes the real understanding. But I am not going to cite individuals who people can then turn on and ask them why they are taking this view, contrary to the view of some of their colleagues. I've been asked to reveal the names of reporters who worked for agencies, you know, by the agencies themselves, 10 years ago or today. And we're not going to do that. We're not going to go Into naming sources, even of sources of this nature. Whether we have the credibility to have one believe that in a letter I wrote, which subsequently has been widely dissem- inated, or not, that's a problem we may have to face. But when it gets down to naming names and naming [unintelligible], I simply am going to stop short of that. MAN: In this age of tension, as a former Ambassador to the U.N., what reforms or [unintelligible] would you like to see? BUSH: Well, that is a problem I haven't addressed my- self -- I haven't had the time to even think about in the last six months nor address myself to in some time. My view about the United Nations -- and again, please permit the parameter that this is a personal view. The last thing we need is somebody to say, "The Central Intelligence Agency has a view on U.N. Charter reform." [Laughter] ...article appeared by a CIA analyst the other day, and It said, "This is a personal view of this individual." It said it twice in the front of the Foreign Policy magazine. And the next thing I knew, I was projected into a big debate with Henry Kiss- inger over whether we were trying to change policy from the Central Intelligence Agency. I'm determined to stay out of it. I'II take a chance on this one. But if it comes out that the CIA Director, not George Bush, ex-U.N. Ambassador, feels this way, I will -- there's nothing I can do about it, but I hope that the reporting will reflect these Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 continuous disclaimers. I'll make [unintelligible] answer the ques- tion, too. My view of charter reform for the United Nations is that It's Impossible at this time. And the reason it is Impossible is it cannot be accomplished without big-power unanimity. And the Soviet Union, for a long time, has opposed charter reform. And until that changes, you're not going to have any action. Just as in the political arena at the United Nations, until the big powers, the five veto-holding powers agree on some- thing, you don't get political action. So I would have to simply say I don't think, though charter reform is needed, and it would be needed, in my view, in the area where you have a more realistic voting pattern in the General Assembly; that's where it's needed. And my own recommendations would come that that's where it should be considered. I'm not naive enough to believe that's where it will be implemented, because it won't happen until you have major-power agreement, and there's a difference of opinion among the major powers on that one. But that's the place I'd go, so a country with a population of 850,000 people will not have exactly the same weight in the General Assembly as a country of 800 million people, in terms -- or responsibility for the economic end of It won't have the same power, you might say, in the General Assembly as the small ones. These are the personal views of George Bush, former Ambas- sador to the United Nations. MAN: [Unintelligible] Was there any arragements with the Mafia on [unintelligible]. Was there any arrangements with Lucky Luciano and the Mafia in the Invasion of Italy and Sicily? The second question is with regard to Cuba invading Angola. I understand 200 of these are being evacuated every week. This would take about two years. Are they merely replacements, or are they going tomorrow into someplace else? BUSH: On the first question, sir, the CIA wasn't in business at the time of the Burma Road, during World War II [unintelligible], nor the invasion of Sicily; and that I can say without fear of contradiction. [Laughter] ...very fascinating question about a fascinating part of our history. Whether there was some U.S. intelligence involved in any way at that point, sir, I just simply can't answer. But in terms of CIA, we came into the business after World War Ii. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 Now, the question of the Cubans in Angola. This Is one that's right on our plate, it is one where we are concerned. The Secretary of State, from a policy standpoint, has made very clear that we want to see the Cuban military forces out of Angola. There is some indication that some have been removed. There is some Indication that Cubans from Angola have gone into other countries in Africa. We think -- without sounding mysterious or hiding behind my previously announced policy of not being as forthcoming as I'd like, we think that we know -- have a good indication of where most of them are. And without specifying which countries, they are pre- sent in quite a few countries in Africa. MAN: Mr. Bush, I'm over here. I was interested in your remarks that several committees of Congress know the details of the CIA budget. Apparently that has not worked for control, because the Rockefeller Commission did find the interference with foreign governments and their leaders and domestic spying by the CIA on some 300,000 Americans, all of which would be illegal. What you say [unintelligible] as a minimum control that the overall budget, not detailed figures, but the overall budget of the CIA ought to be made public, and that this in fact could be done because, after all, most -- probably the biggest bulk of in- telligence work Is public or overt work, in any case. BUSH: First, I'm glad, sir, that you recognize that most of it is overt, analysis. There's not so much of it [unintelli- gible], the collection system and a lot of things like that. But as I indicated, covert is an infinitesimal, a very small percentage of the total budget. I -- you cited abuses by the CIA. I don't believe that the publication of a total budget figure would have any effect whatsoever on -- had that total budget figure been published in the past, would have had any effect whatsoever on the abuses of the past, the legitimate ones, nor -- you know, I've indicated many of the things that have been alleged simply didn't happen and the CIA didn't do, as the Senate Committee points out. My view on the publication of the budget figure is that it's wrong. I went to the Senate Committee and testified that even the publication of the total figure was wrong, not because that figure itself would be a tremendous revelation over what we were doing and how it worked, but that the subsequent comparisons would be. If a whole new method of collection of intelligence, upon which this country depends to know the capabilities of Soviet missiles, for example -- and that's the kind of serious business Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 we're involved in -- If a whole new collection system were put into effect in one year, and there was a hump in that total figure that would maybe have no more defintion than that, raise it from X billion to X+I, something of this nature, I believe that those significant programs that we have developed could have been at least hinted at through total figure changes. Now, if you say, "Can you testify under oath that the pub- lication of a total budget figure is going to be detrimental to the national security per se?" I couldn't do that. But it's the nose under tent, it's the -- it's my view that the budget numbers which are given, as I say, in infinite detail to several committees in the United States Congress -- and you're right. It hasn't always been this way. It is now, I can guaranty it -- that the total figure would be detrimental for that reason, and the people should look to their elected members of Congress to give infinitesimal scrutiny to our agency and to the intelligence community. That's the best protection for the people, given the constraints we feel in terms of -- given the constraints I feel, at least, supported, I might add, by the President and by most of the leadership. The Congress voted on this twice, the Senate 2-to-I, the House 2-to-I: "Don't make public any budget figures." And that's why they did it. And so that's our position, then, and I hope that that position doesn't get eroded away. MAN: Mr. Bush, my problem with the CIA has to do with activities which are illegal activities in foreign nations, which are illegal in this nation, are illegal in the nation in which they're conducted, which we would resent If they were done In this nation by a foreign nation, and the justification [unintelligible] doing it is unworthy [unintelligible]. BUSH: Well, sir, I think I expressed my comment when I expressed my belief that the United States must retain a covert action capability., I strongly support, as does everybody at the Central Intelligence Agency, the prohibition [unintelligible] on, say, assassinations. That's no question, no problem. The CIA didn't do what it was alleged to do. There was some planning at some levels [unintelligible]. It's written and rewritten, and there's been some facts and there's been a lot of fiction on it. I must confess to you that in taking this job and dis- cussing it with children and family and people with, I hope, a high sense of ethical and moral judgment, particularly the young people, I had to wrestle very hard with this. We're living In an unlovely world. Everybody doesn't play by the rules. I would accept that because someone else does it this way, that's not necessarily good enough for the United States. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 If you have any doubt that we're living in a rough world, I could refer you to several published books [unintelligible] things like this. Sometimes there are unlovely things in intelligence. But -- perhaps it's pure rationalization, but I thought it out in a family contact, [unintelligible] contact, contacts with police and [unin- telligible] openness in terms of the CIA, and recognized that in this one field of our endeavor, sometimes one condones something that in a pure utopian world one would condemn. And that's no -- that's no plea for inordinately silly or brutal operations abroad. Not at all. I simply say we must retain a covert capability, and some- times in the business of espionage, spying, and these kinds of things, one runs Into conflict with either one's personal values or one's values of his nation. And yet intelligence has been a [unintelligible], has been a fundamental part of our history. I was looking at some of the things in -- in 200 years ago, the use of intelligence by Washington and others, and it's there. And Kung Fu, the great Chinese philosopher, pointed out five or six hunred years before Christ, the way you win battles and win for your principles is not always through arms, not always through war, but sometimes through intelligence. So, I know it's not satisfactory, but, gosh, it's not an easy problem. And that's the way I, at least, have sorted it out personally. MAN: Mr. Bush, 22 years ago it was my pleasure to attend a seminar at St. Augustine's College at Canterbury, England. One of the speakers was an Anglican Bishop who had returned from India. He was strong in his denunciation of certain missionaries who were quietly asked to leave India -- I cannot say whether they were American missionaries or not -- but that they were acting as in- telligence agents for a foreign country. Do you feel that that hypocrisy should be [unintelligible] by any intelligence agency, of enlisting missionaries to do their work? BUSH: I had problems when I came to the CIA with relation- ships, perhaps the relationships with the press, as I've indicated, for constitutional reasons. I had similar problems with the use of missionaries, which has been scattered, but nevertheless [unintelli- gible]. And therefore I unilaterally changed the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency to say that we would not use church people in that kind of a basis, and that's the way the policy of the CIA head. And I don't mean to be sanctimonious about it or anything else. I just felt that journalism, freedom of the press, and church and state separation under the Constitution is correct. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R0001 00040013-1 Having said that, if a missionary is living in a troubled corner of the world and he comes and says, "I have some information that I want to give to you, sir, give it to you voluntarily, will- ingly," and he thinks he's helping his country, we're going to accept that information. MAN: Mr. Bush, you took over CIA in February, and you also mentioned in your speech that you have been testifying about 28 or [unintelligible] different times at different congressional committees, [unintelligible] committees, and so on. Now, my question is this: Can CIA do its job, or you, sir, and your agency, are you taking to try to find out what are the [unintelligible]? For four months being the head of CIA, being questioned and testifying one month of that time, it's a little bit over done. Are you tempted sometimes to find out the real reasons, what are the real reasons behind this overdoing and this type of a screening of your agency by our Congress? BUSH: I don't think there's anything other than meets the eye for their intent to grill the CIA. I have been up there 28 times, as I've indicated. It's too much. We need consolidated oversight. I want to report as fully as possible. I support the concept that many senators and the Senate leadership, for example, supports, that we need consolidated over- sight In the Senate, consolidated oversight in the House, If we're going to protect, and the Congress now wants to, legitimate national security information. It's too much. And I have many other respon- sibilities. But I don't impugn to them anything wrong in the terms of motive in getting me up there, and I will continue to cooperate to the fullest. I hope that Congress will come to grips, though, with the problem of consolidated oversight, and will not stand for this pro- liferation -- when I say oversight, it sounds like I'm worried about people knowing what we're doing. What I want to do is to find a way to communicate fully what we're doing and not endanger the security of this country by some one person going off and making -- and disclosing willfully, for perhaps for matters of great con- science, something that can [unintelligible]. And that's the way I feel about It. And I had some difference with Congress. And I have a mandate, under the law, to do this, and I'm going to keep It. And I'm simply not -- no matter what they do, until that law is changed, I'm going to protect the sources and methods of intelligence. And I ask the support, and I think I've got it, of the American people in this regard. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1 [Applause] MAN: Mr. Bush, several City Clubbers have asked me to ask you this question [unintelligible] should be asked at this time. There's been much publicity in the newspaper in the last few days about the CIA's Involvement In Cuba at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy to the effect that the assas- sination of President Kennedy was merely in retaliation for an attempted assassination of Fidel Castro by the CIA. Would you care to comment? BUSH: As I say, I'm glad you asked that question. I... [Laughter] I thought it might come up. [Laughter] Therefore I wanted to read a quotation from the committee report. It says it has not uncovered -- the committee report stressed that it, the committee, had not uncovered -- this is a quote -- it had not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. I believe that the CIA, going back from 1976, looking back for whatever lo those many years, has given full cooperation to not only this committee, but to other committees of the Congress on this question. I will continue to insist that our people give full cooperation. I have no judgment beyond -- that would counteract the committee's report that there has no -- It has not got evidence of any such to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. And having said that and having added to the Kennedy assassination the many other subjects we're asked to investigate, I think the thing I can do [unintelligible] Is to be responsive, through staff, to inquiries of this nature, to keep my sights set on the present, cooperating with the Congress at this point, being sure that we live within the constitutional constraints imposed on us by the Constitution and by the law; and then looking to the future to see that we have, in this troubled world, where we have some awful tough stuff happening, an intelligence capability that is second to none. I want to look ahead. Thank you very much. [Applause] Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100040013-1