LETTER TO THE HONORABLE FRANK CARLUCCI FROM GEN. LAWRENCE C. WILLIAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100180002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 15, 1980
• Content Type: LETTER

STANDING
COMMITTEE ON
LAW AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
CHAIRMAN
Morris I. Leibman
Suite 3200
One First National Plaza
Chicago, IL 60603
Robert H. Bork
New Haven, CT
Gordon F. Engeler, Jr.
Mountain Home, AR
Rita E. Hauser
New York, NY
Max M. Kampelman
Washington, DC
John 0. Marsh, Jr.
Washington, DC
John Norton Moore
Charlottesville, VA
Walter E. Ricks, 111
Raleigh, NC
J. W. Riehrn
Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Hobart Taylor, Jr.
Washington, DC
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN
George D. Haimbaugh, Jr.
Univ. of South Carolina
School of Law
Columbia, SC 29208
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
LIAISON
Ernest H. Fremont, Jr.
13th Fir.
Commerce Bank Bldg.
922 Walnut
Kansas City, MO 64106
COUNSELLORS TO
THE COMMITTEE
Anne L. Armstrong
Kingsville, TX
George W. Ball
New York, NY
Hardy C. Dillard
Charlottesville, VA
Henry A Kissinger
Washington, DC
Edward H. Levi
Chicago, IL
E. V. Rostow
New Haven, CT
Dean Rusk
Athens, GA
LAW STUDENT
REPRESENTATIVE
Alan Finkel
Los Angeles, CA
EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANT
Frank R. Barnett
New York, NY
INTELLIGENCE
CONSULTANTS
Antonin Scalia
Chicago, IL
Raymond J. Waldmann
Washington, DC
CONSULTANTS TO
THE COMMITTEE
Bernard A. Ramundo
7908 Rocton Avenue
Chevy Chase, MD 20015
William C. Mott
Suite 601
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
STAFF DIRECTOR
Norman E. Nelson
American Bar Association
1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
A
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D~\ AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
1155 EAST 60TH ST., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637 TELEPHONE [phone]
October 15, 1980
The Honorable Frank Carlucci
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
/Ix
There is enclosed your presentation to the
Conference on Intelligence Legislation held at the
University of Chicago Law School, June 26-28, 1980.
As we will shortly go to publication, will you
please look it over and notify me within two weeks
if there are needed changes. Please return the
enclosure.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
I/ 7
l,~ ,..,~ `yt,~rsc/
Gen. ,awrence C. Williams
2455 N. Woodrow Street
Arlington, Virginia 22207
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 the d` 'errisvee f~St t nlpfi can?ff ?.2 eg a 1% -909
?r4P%9 8A?a a9man with
such broad, deep, and relevant experience was selected as the Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, to which post 'Ps was appointed by the President
on February 18, 1978. We are delighted to have h~cau with us, and I give you
Director Carlucci.
Honorable Frank Carlucci'
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Thank you, Morry, for those very kind words. I am delighted to be with you
tonight, and I congratulate you, Marry, and Dean Casper for, organizing this
conference. I think this kind of conference can do a great deal to illuminate the
very difficult issues that our country faces in the intelligence area. And as you
begin your deliberations let me start off with a reminder. You will be studying in
depth the role of the Congress, the role of the Executive, and the role of the
Judiciary in structuring the legal framework for our intelligence agencies. frrr
1j doing this you will necessarily bring to bear traditions of the American legal
profession and the American governmental system. But as you do this, I think it
is important that you bear in mind that those of us in the intelligence agencies,
that GS-12 or 13 up there in some other country trying to recruit an agent,
operate under circumstances where our rules are not necessarily applicable.
Our cultures are very different.
. I'm reminded of the time when I was a young Foreign Service officer back in
1960, and I'd been assigned to the Congo, El Zaire, then Leoppoldvillei a`r~cft was
shortly after indepepdence and the Congo was in ch(3os.i3r3ge had a visit from
three American senators--Senator Gore, who is presently on our Intelligence
Oversight Board; Senator Hart; and Senator Neuberger. )( I was named as
escort officer and I had arranged for them to have lunch at the home of the
President of the Congolese Senate, a man named Victor Cumarico. khdl those
days you very seldom saw the wives of the Congoles Out as we came in the
door a woman come up who I introduced as his wife. We were sitting around
having drinks before lunch (I was interpreting), and another woman come in and
shook hands all around, went over and sat down next to the first woman. Senator
Gore turned to me and said, "Who is she?" And I said, well, I don't know, maybe
she's his wife. He said, "I thought you said that first woman was his wife." I
said, "Let me ask him." I asked him and he said, "Oh yes, both of them are my
wives." Well with that the interest of the American senators picked up
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 conAo4wo .v4d sc1R~l~ t .QA fAd;as71 ~ri~bQ~F 1t-4@~A~A~4~i~90fl a~ over here
our customs are very different from yours. From where I come from in the
Leopold district of the Congo, I'm a big tribal chief and as a tribal chief I'd
normally be entitled to five or six wives. But since I'm a CothoIi ,1 have'. only
two."
So if we think about it, the strangeness of the intelligence business operating
in other cultures becomes apparent. We, in organizations like the CIA, must go
forward with-our task, often in disregard of fgreign law. And there's a paradox
here, because in this country w are soLti es mesmerized by our legalisms
when we structure our environments in which; our intelligence agencies must live.
But in so doing we must be careful not to block but the realities of our operating
environment. The decision makers in our country need a great deal of
information. This information is not easy to come by, by definition. We in the
intelligence business go after the most difficult and by definition}other countries
want to conceal it from us.. Our job is to get it. We do so in many cases by
establishing a contractual relationship, something very familiar to you lawyers.
The agent provides a service, information, and we frequently but not always
provide some compensation, salary. There are two significant differences from
the usual contract. One is that in many instances that contract may break the
low of the agent's host country. And the second is that that contract by nature
must be secret. Now, I don't think any of us should make any apologies for this
procedure. When it comes down to the hard facts our country has no alternative.
The problem that we all face, and you as lawyers in particular face, is how we
sanction this kind of activity within a carefully drawn legal framework.
The 1947 National Security Act simply said do what's necessary. It dodged
the issue. Or perhaps it is possible, I personally think it is, to be more specific-
but in being more specific5we must always bear inmind that we are legalizing an
activity that is inherently antagonistic to the interests of other countries in
which that activity is going to be conducted.
There's another upside down element to the intelligence business. In our
society openness is a virtue. The government can't be closed. We have Sunshine
Laws, open advisory committee meetings; we're perhaps unique in the world in
this aspect. But in the intelligence business we must by nature circumscribe our
openness. Secrecy is absolutely imperative. Wel f, you say that's a truism. Of
course, we all know that. But I can tell you quite frankly in the two and a half
years that I've been in the CIAAgetting this simple concept across has been our
I/
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single most dry cu F
problem. Our problem throughout the world is that nobody
believes we can keep a secret. And it's not just a simple problem of leaks. -Bt4,,
~uite frankly it's the entire atmosphere in which we operate. As you're all
aware, we're living in the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam syndrome where the
emphasis has been placed on the investigative reporter, the inspector, the
oversight mechanism, the leaker who almost inevitably takes on a moral mantle
and says he's a whistle blower. And all of. these people and functions have a very
legitimate role. No question about it. I don't mean to gainsay it; So does the
doer have a legitimate role and we have to strike a balance, and I oull suggest
.to you the balance has been tilted a bit away in government from the li~nan who
must accomplish the mission. We need to give him some incentives, too. We
need to give him some tools. And in the intelligence business the princip+il tool--
I'm almost tempted to say the only tool--is secrecy, because nobody is going to
impart information to an intelligence representative if he thinks he's going to see
it in the open and if this information is going to be traced to him. And this
inability to protect confidentiality of the information given to us has hurt us.
Now, our critics say demonstrate this. Well, you as lawyers know how
difficult it is to prove a negative. Nobody is going to come up to you and say,
"Well I didn't give you this information for this reason." We've had some cases of
people who have said, "I can't trust you; therefore, I'm signing off." But in the
vast majority of cases people just discontinue contact or don't establish contact
in the first place, and you never know how much information you didn't receive.
But time and time again we are asked, "Well, is this information going to go to
the Congress? Can you protect me? What about the Freedom of Information
Act?" When you're involved in high stakes, nobody wants to play with a partner
who can't control his own hand.
Before we frame new laws in any business, including the intelligence
business, I think we need to be clear on the existing laws. Some moments ago I
suggested that because of the world in which we operate some of our usual norms
do not apply. I would suggest also that our standards have not remained constant
but have changed over time. We have had a propensity to indulge in retroactive
morality and to give it a legal base. We have perceived in the seventies what
seemed to have been a good idea for low in the fifties and sixties. We have seen
numerous accusations that intelligence agencies have acted illegally when, in
fact, the law has only been interpreted as such in recent times. An example is
the retention by CIA of counterintelligence information on U.S. persons.
Everybody readily concludes that that's illegal, although the CIA has long had
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 coup -gft$fRR e?h%~n 2ig?Ri9gkOgfldct 6RcR o71tRe90ameOk,nOd 1 f?n? ormation is
held by other agencies without any problem. Sorting out this particular issue has
been complicated. It has now been determined that CIA can act in this area only
in cooperation with the FBI. That is a recent development, not as much of the
press would have you believe the low as it existed in the sixties. Of course we
recognize that times have changed, and we in the intelligence business don't want
to turn the clock back. To the contrary, we think our mission is to look ahead
into the 1980s and to put all the polemic behind us. And in so doing we welcome
guidelines and safeguards through statutor~ au~Ihority and through the surrogate
process. These are helpful, providing of course that they don't impede our ability
to do our job.
As we've gone through successive iterations of intelligence legislation there
are some concepts that have arisen that I personally consider a bit curious or
difficult. One is that we can reduce every detail of the intelligence business to
statute. The original intelligence charter, S. 2525, 273 pages, had an array of
prohibitions, restrictions, and reporting requirements. There was even one that
said CIA should be prohibited from covertly taking action Iikely to lead to flood,
pestilence, plague, or mass destruction of property. And in CIA there was a
tongue-in-cheek comment that we ought to oppose this just to keep our options
open. But the sting was there. I think all of us, including the vast majority of
people on the Hill, now realize that we can't legislate the intelligence business in
that kind of detail.
There is another interesting concept, legislation which is perhaps not unique
to the intelligence business but which runs somewhat along the following lines,
and that is that if you don't like the policy--kill the instrument. This has
happened with covert action. Our ability to try and influence events in other
countries clandestinely. There were people who objected to how this instrument
was used-Chile, Angola, perhaps elsewhere. Fair enough, but saying that you
can't have this, capability. )Efecause we object to that policy it's like saying we
can't have an aid program around the world, because we object to the way aid
was handled in Brazil in 1966. It's even gone one step further, in my judgment.
We created an optical illusion, because we said our country will have a corporate
action capability. All that has to happen before you start one of these operations
is for the President to make a finding and you brief eight committees of
Congress. That's two hundred members of Congress, perhaps fifty staff. Now,
fair enough, we haven't always had to brief that many members. But as long as
the requirement exists it is a significant deterrent to a flexible instrument that
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purportedly has been given to the President.
Despite the problems that I've mentioned, it seems to me that we have
reached agreement in the body politic on some of the very large issues that have
faced our country in the intelligence area. First of all, we have agreed that we
need an effective intelligence organization; we need an effective CIA. Some of
you may have seen the ABC program the other night on intelligence 'the
commentator was Britt Hume. He interviewed me for some forty minutes--none
of the interview was used on the program--but the theme he was following in the
interview was how in the world have you guys pulled the wool over the eyes of
the, Congress and the American people, because four or five years ago we were
ready to tear you apart and now we find this outpouring of sympathy for CIA. I
allowed as how I didn't exactly see an outpouring of sympathy but I detected a lot
of support and I presumed that some of the arguments we were making carried a
certain amount of weight. But the fact is that the American people, perhaps as
never before, realize how important intelligence is to their well-being and we
can no longer continue to pull it out by the roots just to see how it's growing.
We have decided that the U.S. government will have covert action capability
and that it will be housed in the CIA. And I think there is a widespread consensus
on the Hill that we do need to cut down the reporting requirements from eight
committees to two. And if there's any bill that will pass this yeas.I think it is a
bill that cuts down on the Hughes Ryan reporting requirement. There is a
consensus that CIA needs to protect the information it receives. The only issue
is how to do this. There is a consensus that U.S. citizens must receive a full
measure of protection of their constitutional rights vis-a-vis intelligence
organizations. And there is a consensus that there will be effective oversight of
our intelligence organizations. AWI'm pleased to report to you that, in my
judgment at least that oversight is working well. We don't always agree with our
friends on the committees and vice versa. We get criticism, we get support, and
we' have a heated dialogue. The important thing is that it's there and it's working
arid it's working well in my judgment.
a par These new aspects of agreement are now very much o of intelligence
community life. There are still some issues that remain to be resolved. One of
these is the whole question of statutory access to CIA intelligence information.
Is it necessary for the oversight process? There are those who argue that it is.
'' 'ssay ,i L've had a relationship for the past two years which we both say is
satisfactory. Let's continue that relationship where we are furnishing the
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 inforrW&%vd o %6Ne&A 2(t0 ro` ~~ I~-12 ~-t OF ~ 16 must be
some exceptions, otherwise you raise questions around the world. I myself have
been told by people who were giving us very important information, "We will give
you this information providing you promise us that you will not give it to the
communists." I was able to make that commitment because if I passed that kind
of a commitment onto the Congress today they respect it. With a statutory right
of access there is no way that I could make that kind of commitment.
There remains to be worked out the question of detpils the collection of
intelligence on U
persons. Now there's been'
S
a lot of deb to on the tensions
.
'
.
between civil liberties and intelligence. As a !practical ma ter, looking at its
pragmatic aspects, I think this debate has been overdone. We don't need a lot of
intelligence on Americans. The problem is that when we do need it
-.,it's liable to
be critical. We can all think of cases where intelligence collection on an
American citizen might be important:,A?dual national who is in a high position in /v/'r
a particularly critical country )ti he American scientist who might be engaged in
the building of a bomb for a potential nuclear proliferator.
The question, in my judgment, is not whether or what kinds of thresholds
should be built. And we agree that there ought to be substantial thresholds. So
we see it not as an either/or question but as essentially a design question. There
is the issue of how much exemption there should be from freedom of information
concepts. And here there's been a good deal of misunderstanding. The press
would have you believe that we have sought a blanket exemption from the
Freedom of Information Act. We have not. We have sought the authority to
exempt our most sensitive sources and methods from release and from judicial
review. This position has been supported by the Justice Department but we will
continue to respond to first-person requests and to requests for our finished
product.
Also unresolved is the form identities legislation should take. Everybody
agrees that the practice of deliberately exposing CIA personnel and CIA agents
overseas with the avowed purpose of destroying our intelligence organizations is
abominable. The question is how to deal with this practice without infringing on
First Amendment rights. We believe this can be done and we hope that it will be
done this year.
These are all issues that you will be debating and we will read the results of
your deliberations with great interest. But let me give youufor just a minute
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 befor6vf00T> Odj- s, in my
judgmert, will be a very difficult period. We are finding that our nation's
interests are increasingly intertwined with developments in all parts of the
world. We learned in Afghanistan that it's not sufficient to know Soviet
capabilities, we have to know their intent. We learned in Iran that we need to
have intelligence on political/social developments. We learned in Central
America the importance of intelligence in subversive activities. And we learned
in the oil crisis the importance of intelligence collection and analysis in the!
resource areas. The U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are now more in balance
than ' ever before. My judgement is Soviet leaders see themselves free to
undertake additional Afghanistans and Ethiopias as long as they don't challenge
vital U.S. interests. Under the protection' g their strategic powe5 they can wield
their very substantial conventional power and their very substantial capability
for political action.
There are two uncertainties in Soviet society. They have their problems
Xising consumer expectations; labor shortages; declining growth rate, unrest in
Eastern Europe; topping out in oil production is perhaps the most important
.transition, and I frankly doubt that we should take any satisfaction in the
problems of the Soviet Union. We know very little about the leadership that is
likely to come in after the transition phase--post-Stalin leadership. We have a
conservative leadership in the Soviet Union right now. Nobody knows\Zga new
leadership under the pressure of the topping out of oil production, consumer
expectations, and the other problems I mentioned, will react.
The 1980s clearly will be a difficult period in our relations with the Soviet Union.
Similarly, there will be no let up, in my judgment, in the problems of the Third
World. In addition to the aspirations of the Third World) we have a growing
division between the upper and lower tier of Third World countries. And then in
Europe we see an emerging economic power that could lead to stronger political
positions.on the part of our allies.
The ramifications of all of this for intelligence are profound. There is less
and less margin for error. We must succeed in getting good intelligence with
regard to both intentions and capabilities. During the period to come,
intelligence could make that crucial margin of difference. There are those who
think that the paramount threat in this country comeswithin, from the excesses
of our own institutions. As one who has lived in a number of countries where
democratic institutions have been destroyed, I share that concern. But I've also
seen Soviet expansionism at work, and that danger is no less real. And wha~&+e're
talking about is not a tradeoff. It seems to me we can certainly accommodate
./'
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concerns on both sides of the intelligence issue if we can just control our
emotions in channeling our intellects. You as lawyers are the dispassionate
element in American society. We need your help. The tools of the profession
here assembled are those of law. And thanks to the legal system, the richness of
the legal system, there are a variety of measures that can be seized upon to work
our will. And thanks to the constitutional framework of that system qK8 the V
levers and gears of ourself-governance are never very for away.
While the tools are there in profusion, it must take the wisdom of the low to
ensure that the measures apply to stimulate good help without permitting
abnormal growths or flooding the system with toxic medicines. Lawyers know
only too well cry1there ought to be a law takes us only to the starting point
of inquiry. Thank you.
Morris Leibman
Mr. Carlucci is willing to take a few extra moments for some questions.
You can field them yourself if you'd like.
0. I've been almost 40 years in this profession and most of it was spent in
the Agency. I have rarely heard an exposition of the problems and of the needs
of this country such as you have presented. I think it was an absolutely fantastic
performance, and I wonder if you would just ~t~eitthese people en-e-mint
what it has cost us and perhaps other agencies of the government +n-corm ctivtti
Freedom of Information Act& 'ri' a4
A. Well, thank y?u, Walter, for your kind words. The Freedom of
Information Act around the world has come to be regarded as a symbol. It's a
symbol of all the problems that I was discussing** the earlier part of my
remarks: /he basic inability of our government to keep a secret. Now, as a /
lawyer you can argue that you have exemptions under the Freedom of
Information Act. But try and argue that in an alley somewhere in Eastern Europe
or perhaps even in Afghanistan when the individual with whom you're dealing sees
daily in the press articles coming out attributed to the Freedom of Information
Act. He's taking a big gamble. Or try and argue with a sophisticated
intelligence service, many of whom have sent representatives overt Just discuss
FOIA with us, and assure them that you have exemptions. They say, "Yes, we
can trust you but what about those 400 Federal judges. Can you give us a
guarantee that one of them won't reverse you?" And, indeed, in two cases we
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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
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Signature
Coordination
Justify
Attached are two copies of Mr. Carlucci's speech
to the American Bar Association in June. One copy is
for our file and the second copy is for review by
for
I hope to send a corrected copy to the staff
of the American Bar Association in Arlington by the
end of this week in order that they may publish the
speech. If sees any flaws or feels there
are differing statements in the speech, please ask
him to get in touch with me before Friday.
ID G_ 1 Thanks,
CLrW
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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) Room No.-Bldg.
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