DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, FRANK CARLUCCI QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100200001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1978
• Content Type: TRANS

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Frank Carlucci
Question & Answer Session
The Channel City Club
Santa Barbara, California
Friday, November 17, 1978
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MR. LANCASTER: ...Since we're in a theater, it's
very appropriate to have some attractive scenery for you to
look at during our proceeding. And we're very happy to have
the wife of our distinguished guest, Mr. Carlucci.
[Applause]
And the president of the Woman's Forum.
[Applause]
In all of our years and all of our speakers, we've
never had an official of the CIA. Since accurate intelligence
is always necessary, and in today's sophisticated weaponry it's
vital, we're delighted to have the Deputy Director of the CIA
here with us today. However, our guest has had such an impressive
career that we would have welcomed him without the CIA connection.
A graduate of Princeton, Harvard Graduate School of
Business, he joined the U. S. Foreign Service in 1956. He served
in South Africa, the Congo, Zanzibar, Brazil, and then returned to
Washington where he was the operations officer of the Office of
Economic Opportunity. He was then made Associate, and then Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. That was BBL,
Before Bert Lance.
[Laughter]
After that he became Undersecretary of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, and, in 1974, was appointed our
Ambassador to Portugal. Last February, he was appointed Deputy
Director of the CIA. There're only one or two men who I can
recall, like Elliott Richardson and James Schlesinger, who have
held more top positions in Washington. So he's going to talk to
us today on good intelligence, all of whose importance today is
vital.
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It's a real honor to present to you the Honorable Frank
C. Carlucci.
[Applause.]
[ADDRESS BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI]
LANCASTER: Thank you very much for a very interesting
and informative address. Mr. Carlucci has agreed to answer ques-
tions for a few minutes. I think you'll have to lay down a couple
of rules. There're a lot of people here, so please make your ques-
tions short. Since there're no microphones out there, you'll have
to speak up so we can hear them up here on the platform.
The meeting's now thrown open for questions.
Well, either one.
Q: I wonder who is responsible for the Freedom of
Information Act.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The question is, who was
responsible for the Freedom of Information Act? And it was
enacted -- passed by the Congress during the tenure of President
Ford. And he vetoed it, and his veto was overridden. I don't
think it would serve any particular purpose to enter the names
of the individual sponsors of the act. It was overwhelmingly
passed by the Congress.
The President -- part of the reason for the President's
veto, for President Ford's veto was that he felt the act was in-
applicable to the intelligence agencies. But this argument did
not prevail. We are making it again with the Congress. And I
think it's fair to say that at least in the discussions I've had,
I've found a fair amount of sympathy for our position.
Yes, go ahead. Yes, ma'am.
Q: On the subject of the Russian's gross national pro-
duct, I'd like to know how you determine that, and who is responsible
for that?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we in the CIA -- the
question is the Soviet Union's gross national product, who is
responsible for determining it, and how do you determine it?
We have an economic unit, quite a good one, in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. That unit, in conjunction with various
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other intelligence organizations, tries to put the information
together. The information can come from any number of sources:
open publications, although the Soviets don't publish very much,
of course; information from our embassies overseas; information
that we pick up from returning businessmen, people in the eco-
nomic sector who have some knowledge of developments in the
Soviet Union; consultation with the academic world. We have
certain technical ways, certain models that we can build for
crop forecasting, one important element. We gather informa-
tion on the various indices in the Soviet Union. Some of our
information is clandestine intelligence; some of it is gathered
by technical means. And it is our job in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to pull all that together and to try and make the
best estimates that we can.
I might say that it's a difficult task, and we make
extensive use of computer in doing this kind of thing, because
our information comes from such a wide variety of sources.
Yes, sir.
Q: You have characterized Soviet Russia as the ad-
versary. What about Red China?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, there're certainly....
MAN: Question, please.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The question, I'm sorry --
the question is, I have characterized the Soviet Union as the
adversary. What about Red China?
There's no question that they represent a potential
threat. But measured in quantitative terms, there really is
no comparison between the two. The military might of the Soviet
Union is far superior to that of Communist China. This doesn't
mean that we don't need to keep a watch on Communist China, or
indeed, with modern technology and nuclear weapons, we have to
keep our eye on a number of countries around the world, because
obviously one of our chief concerns is that a country with irre-
sponsible leadership would develop a nuclear weapon.
So that's one of the things that makes the intelligence
business a lot more complex today than it was a number of years
ago when we really only had to watch the Soviet Union. You're
quite correct. We do have to watch a number of other countries
as well.
Yes, sir, right here.
Q: Does the Freedom of Information Act apply to un-
published information as well as published?
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, yes, sir. That's the
-- what happens -- he asks, does the Freedom of Information Act
apply to unpublished as well as published information?
What happens is that if you want to write in and say
to the CIA, "Please give me all the information you have on
the Berlin Tunnel," and indeed one person did do this and wrote
a book out of the information that he got, or "Please give me
all the information that you have on me," we are required, under
that act, to search all our files and take the information, re-
view it, and then we are entitled to take out anything that is
national security information. If you then believe we've taken
out too much, you can go to court and sue us. And the judge
then makes the decision. If the decision goes against us, there
is a requirement that that particular government employee who
took out the information be disciplined.
So the fact is that when your request comes in, we
have to search as many as 23 different filing systems, because
one of the principles of an intelligence organization is what
we call compartmentation. We don't want to have all our infor-
mation together. We want to keep one part of our organization
from knowing what another part of the organization is doing, for
security reasons. We operate on the "need to know" principle.
So that means we, far more than any other government agency, have
to go through a number of different files.
And quite frankly, what you get out of it I think is
of very little value, unless you really do plan to write a book.
I was told of a case the other day where we've had one person
employed for four years answering freedom of information requests
on a man who's writing a book on a particular subject in Germany.
Yes, sir.
Q:
Is the CIA concerned with UFOs to any degree?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Is the CIA concerned about
UFOs in any degree? The answer to that is, no, that's really
the Air Force's responsibility. We haven't had any reports of
any lately.
I'll take a question way in the back there.
Q: Did the CIA ever authorize the assassination of
[Laughter]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Of course, then, I think
you all heard it. Did the CIA ever authorize the assassination
of Castro?
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The CIA, as an organization, does not have the power to
authorize doing any activity of that nature, other than Intelli-
gence collection. In virtually every case, as I indicated in
my earlier remarks, as verified by the Pike Committee and the
Church Committee, the activities CIA engaged in were as a result
of a political decision at a higher level. The fact is that,
according to the hearings -- and I wasn't involved in the CIA
at the t i me -?- there was a p Ian a I ong those I i nes. The assas-
sination attempts never took place. I personally think it's
reprehensible, but the planning took place.
But in any event, President Carter has issued an execu-
tive order making it very clear that the CIA will not engage in
assassinations pursuant to directions from anyone.
Yes, ma'am.
Q: What do you see as our [words inaudible] the ap-
parent inroads that the Soviet Union is making into Africa?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Your question is, what do
we need to do to include [sic] the apparent inroads that the
Soviet Union is making into Africa?
I myself spent a number of years in Africa, and I
wish I could answer that question easily. It really is a policy
quest ion which wou Id be better addressed to the Secretary of
State or the President. We as an intelligence organization are
only charged with the responsibility of following the developments
in Africa, analyzing them and reporting them to the President, the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, along with possibly sug-
gesting options. But we do not get in the policy-making process.
Having said that, Iet me just note once again that the
Soviet Union obviously thinks it is gaining some leverage by
its activities in Africa. Castro obviously thinks that he is
enhancing his image among the non-aligned. My own view is that
i t i s very important to stress that this, i n no sense of the
wordd -- by this, I mean the Soviet and Cuban activity -- can
be considered non-aligned. The Cuban activates in Africa are
very clearly aligned with a big power, and it's important that
the non-aligned countries, the truly non-aligned countries of
the world understand that. And it seems to me important that
the countries of Africa understand that if these activities con-
tinue, their hard won independence could be in some danger.
Q: I wonder who is the lesser person who can give you
an order on what to do?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, the Director of Central
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Intelligence -- "Who is the lesser person who can give us an order
what to do?"
You have to make a distinction here between intelligence
collection and what are called special activities, non- intelligence
collection. In terms of intelligence collection, the priorities
are set through the National Security Council mechanism. The
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Adviser for National
Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence meet, decide
what are the critical items of information that they need to
make a decision. And that's reported to the President, and he
then establishes the priorities.
In terms of special activity, that is other than
collection activities which have been authorized by executive
order and are authorized under the 1947 statute, there is a
process that has been set up which requires a meeting of the
National Security Council, a presidential determination, and a
briefing of those seven committees of Congress that I described.
I n terms of line of command, the Director of Central
Intelligence reports to the President through the National Secur-
ity Council.
Yes, sir.
Q: How does your agency feel about President Carter's
willingness to release the satellite photos?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The question is, how does
our agency feel about President Carter's willingness to release
satellite photos? Correction. The President made a statement
in which he acknowledged the fact of overhead photographic sys-
tems. He did not indicate that he was going to release the
information gained through those systems. He did indicate that
those systems would be important in verification of the SALT
treaties. And we certainly agree with that, and we support his
decision to make known the fact that we do have these satellites.
Yes, sir.
Q: I understand that the Civil Defense is planning to
evacuate cities in the event of nuclear attack. Do you think it's
possible to get a warning early enough to do this?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: It is possible, yes. And
indeed that -- the question is, is it possible to get a warning
early enough to evacuate our cities in the event of a nuclear
attack?
Yes, it is possible. That's one of our missions.
Warning, though, can be as much as a year's leadtime if you
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start to analyze some of the troop deployments, some of the in-
dustrial production, or it could be -- if you miss something, it
could be as short as a couple of hours. And that is precisely
why it's important that we continue to have an effective intel-
ligence organization.
By and large, I think we have the capacity to give
our country sufficient warning. But given the nature of modern
technology, I can't give you a categoric assurance that you would
have four or five days' warning to evacuate cities. Certainly
we would have enough warning to be able to retaliate. And our
current doctrine is based on strategic retaliation. That is,
and this is not a very pleasant subject, after they hit us, we
still have enough left over to do very severe damage to them.
And that is the ultimate deterrent. And certainly our warning
is sufficient to give us that.
[Applause; end of Q&A]
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