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December 14, 2016
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August 6, 2001
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November 16, 1978
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Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Deputy Director Frank Carlucci World Affairs Council Q&A Session Thursday, November 16, 1978 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 [Q&A session] Q: You emphasized the need for the human element.... DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: I don't know what the exact ratios are. But it is clear that the intelligence business is becoming more technically oriented. And indeed, we are looking for technical people. For instance, we could hardly exist today without computers. Data processing, information storage and re- trieval is very important to any intelligence organization. It enables us to take that one report from somewhere in Latin America and link it to something else we receive from Eastern Europe, and put together an item that might deal with Soviet weaponry somewhere e I S E: . In addition, as I mentioned, we're dealing with a host of different issues than in the past. Nuclear proliferation: technical people. Resource issues. So we do have to put an emphasis on some technical capability there. I would say, by and large, our recruitment effort is much, much broader across the hoard, particularly on the analyti- cal side -- cartographers, all kinds of people that one would not normally associate with the intelligence business. I don't think we have any anthropologists yet. [Laughter.] Q: You mentioned SALT in your presentation. How con- fident are you of verification....? DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, the question and answer is a bit premature, because until we've seen the agree- ment we can't elaborate on the verification possibilities. And I am sure that this will be an issue that will be subjected to great scrutiny in the Senate when it comes before the Senate. Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 My best judgment -- and I confess to you that I really haven't put in sufficient amount of time in the SALT area to really make an informed judgment. But those who have think that we have a sufficient capability to monitor the kind of SALT agreement that is presently under negotiation. But I am sure there's going to be a lot of dialogue on this subject. And I would hesitate to stand before you and be quoted categorically as saying, yes, sir, we could monitor whatever agreement is go- ing to come out. It's going to be a tough -- it's going to be a tough question. Q: [Inaudible] DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I really don't know. But if anybody bumps up against an umbrella, why, take a second look. These are being investigated by the respective countries concerned, the British and the French. And I don't know that we've seen any definitive reports yet. One can hypothesize. But if your question is, do certain countries of the world engage in assassin- ation, the answer is, yes, they do. But I'd just as soon in a public forum not name those countries. Q: What's the CIA.... DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No, not us. We have an executive order that explicitly prohibits it. Sorry. Q: What is the CIA position as far as China and its impact on Asia, or China versus Russia....? DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we don't really have a position. We try to analyze developments. And there's no ques- tion but that is one of the more significant developments of our era. Up in San Francisco I was asked if that could be some sort of a charade to dupe us. I think the answer clearly is no. There is very genuine and historic hostilities between those two coun- tries. We are seeing manifestations of that right now in the Vietnam-Cambodia dispute, which is getting very serious. It's really a bid for who will be the dominant power in East Asia. It's more than just a border skirmish. The Chinese have made -- they've launched, in fact, something very unusual for them. They've launched a world offensive with trips to Europe. They're great supporters of mail these days. All kinds of interesting things -- sending ten thousand students abroad. And right now they have people visiting Egypt. They're very concerned about the Soviet Union. And the Soviets are almost paranoid about the Chinese. Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 -3- Suffice it to say from an intelligence viewpoint that this is one of the things that we watch and watch very closely. Well, if you're asking "Do we try to play one off against another?," that's a question you'll have to put to Cy Vance, or Henry Kissinger, or Brzezinski. But the answer in very case that they have given me is no, that's not the name of the game. Q: The attack upon the reporter's right to protect his sources usually arises in a criminal context in the case of a man on trial for a very serious crime. And what is at stake is the r i g h t to have a f u l l and open defense. The attack upon the CIA's right to protect its sources: I'm not clear in what context that a r i s e s . I s that the general publ ic's right to know; in general, a person has that type of freedom? And in what way would you limit it? What type of a law would you like to see that actually would restrain this type of attack on the right of an organization to protect its information? DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, it's more than a right to protect CIA sources; it is a responsibility charged to the Director of Central Intelligence under the 1947 National Security Act to protect intelligence sources and methods. And so it's grounded on somewhat of a different concept. But I would say to you that a man who is willing to risk his life by helping us penetrate a terrorist group is entitled to a certain amount of protection. Someone who is penetrating a drug smuggling group is entitled to protection. Or, agents in denied areas are entitled to a certain amount of protection. The point I was trying to make, if you can't give them that protection, you're not going to get information and you can't have an intelligence organization, which is why the Act was passed. Q: You're not saying -- for instance, there was a mas- sive intelligence failure in 1973 in the Middle East. You're not saying, for instance, that if the CIA had information that the Soviets were pulling their ambassadors and their diplomatic personnel out of Damascus, without revealing how they got that information, that that type of information should be, say, pro- hibited from being printed in the press, and the other people would pick up on it. DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I'm glad you raise that issue, because that's one of the most difficult issues we face -- is how you can use intelligence information, because intelligence informa- tion is only valuable if it can help the policy-makers. We don't gather it for the sake of gathering it. And if you know, for ex- ample, that a certain country intends to produce a nuclear bomb, Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 and yet if you go and make a demarche to that country, it's not not too hard for them to figure out how we got that information, and somebody's life is in jeopardy. And how do you go about dealing with that kind of situation? That's the constant dialogue we have, with the State Department, for instance, quite frequently. How do we use the information without compromising somebody that gave us the in- formation, both because of our obligation to him, but because of the fact that if people are compromised, we're not going to get other sources of information. We have made the choice the other way in some instances. Terrorism is a case in point, where we have revealed terrorist operations, knowing that our agents would be compromised, because we knew that if we didn't, certain people would be killed. It's just a tough issue that you have to make on a case-by-case basis. Yes, ma'am. Q: [Question is largely inaudible, but deals with former CIA drug experiments and follow-up efforts by the CIA to contact the persons involved, or their families.] DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Yes. And I might say I think that was one of the more disgraceful episodes. And the Attorney General has ruled we have an obligation, affirmatively, to try and find the families of those people and assist them and provide them compensations appropriately. I might say that this kind of thing, as reprehensible as it was, is not unique to the CIA. June, correct me if I'm wrong. Wasn't there an HEW syphillis experiment back in the 1930s when a number of blacks were injected to track their syphillis? Virtually the same kind of thing. And we and HEW have an affirmative obligation there to search out the people. Q: Who made the decision? DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know who made the decision back in the 1930s. In the case of the drug experi- mentation with the CIA, it was made by a division, which, in my judgment, exceeded its authority. It had too much authority unto itself. And when I talked to you earlier about the checks and balances, it was that kind of thing that I was directing myself at. I don't think that that kind of thing -- in fact, I'm sure that that kind of thing could not happen under the kind of checks and balances and escape valves that we have today. Q: I'd like to know how our government views events Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 -5- in Iran. And are we doing anything in Iran to help the Shah or the military....? DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That's really a policy question, not an intelligence question, and it offers me an opportunity to unburden myself with a little lecture. We try very hard to keep out of the policy business. From time to time, we find that the press accuses us of tailoring our estimates to said policies. If an intelligence organization starts to do that, it's dead. And at National Security Council meetings, when the time comes to vote on a policy issue, we don't vote. We try to present the information and try to be as objective as we can. And I might say with this particular President, it's now hard to go in with bad information. He really is a man who takes a deep interest in intelligence and wants to know the full range of facts. Obviously, the situation in Iran has very serious strategic implications for us. The President has expressed the hope that the Shah can find a way to stabilize the situa- tion. The last couple of days seem to show that events are a little more tranquil than before. It's an enormously complicated situation. We're following it as closely as we can. But I'm afraid I can't -- I wouldn't know, indeed, if we had any mili- tary contingency plans because that's really not our bag of tricks. Q: ... I heard Helms state, in the case of Ellsberg, about the assassination of Allende in Chile. It seems to me, as I recollect, that he admitted that was a CIA order. I'm not sure of the details. Perhaps you could fill me in on this. How do these things happen? And how can they be prevented in the future? DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't think I can fill you in, because, as I recall, I was in Portugal at the time. And some of the communist press in Portugal accused me -- they accused me of having been in Chile. I've never been anywhere near Chile. I'm not -- my recollection, and the Church Commit- tee went into this in some details, is not quite the same as yours. I think it was clear that the CIA was supporting some anti-Allende groups. And there was some kind of directive after Allende was elected to try and prevent him from getting into of- fice. There was some contact between the CIA and certain groups. The CIA was not involved in the assassination of Allende. But in any event, there is, as I mentioned, a very clear executive order, which says that the CIA should not engage in those kinds of things. And there are very specific procedures set up. Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6 You may recall that I said if we engage in anything other than in- telligence collection -- and surely this was something other than intelligence collection -- we have to have a meeting of the NSC, a presidential finding, and we have to brief seven committees of Congress. Now, my position is that we ought to be going through presidential findings and NSC meetings, and we ought to be briefing the Congress on these kinds of activities; not seven committees. I think we ought to be briefing two committees, our oversight committees. I think with those kinds of checks and balances and with the Intelligence Oversight Board, where anyone who is engaged in that kind of operation can go to the board, anonymously if they wish, and say "Hey, something funny is going on here; you better look into it." And they have full authority to look into it. I think with those kinds of checks that are established today, that kind of situation could never develop again. And I'm thankful, personally, that it never could. [Applause; end of Q&A.] Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200002-6