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February 28, 1982
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-2) Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00040 WEST PALM BEACH POST (FL) 28 February 1982 k, STAT D120002-2 ? ? ? -.1t all started innocently enough with a form- i letter invitation to William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, asking him to meet with The Post's editorial board during his brief , visit to Palm Beach County. 1 hardly expected a reply, much less an accep-1 tance. Figures of Casey's stature usually fly in, t deliver their speeches at The Breakers or Society' of Four Arts, then fly right back to Washington. And given the nature of the CIA, it didn't seem likely that the nation's chief spy would want to spend an hour answering questions from newspa- .permen. .So I wasn't surprised when I received a phone call from a CIA public relations man thanking me for the invitation but giving the chief's regrets. What did surprise me was when the same P.R. man called back last weekend to inform me that ? Casey's plans had changed and he would, indeed, be able to meet with The Post. "Great," I said, "when will he be here?" "I can't tell you that," he said. "We'll be in touch." That was three days before Casey's Four Arts speech last Tuesday. Late Monday afternoon, I was summoned to the telephone. "Hold for William Casey," said a voice. The next voice I heard was Casey's unmistakable New York City brogue in- forming me that he would arrive at 4:30 p.m. Tuesday for a 30-minute conference that would be strictly off the record. ? We chatted about the beautiful Florida weath- er and the fact that Casey had just finished a round ; ,of golf at Boca Rio.. He allowed as how he had 'played poorly. - ? ? A CIA security man arrived during the lunch hour Tuesday to examine the conference morn where our meeting was to beheld. Then at precise-1 ._ ly 4:10 p.m., two limousines pulled into the parking lot and Casey appeared, flanked by several trim and well-groomed bodyguards. ' 1 , I opened the session by asking Casey about recent reports that the CIA was training Central' .American dissidents in Florida And other states. ; ? "You don't really expect me, to answer that, do' you?" was the reply. I tried again with a query about possible changes in the CIA's methods after the agency's failure to warn us of the Iranian revolution. Casey responded that the CIA now monitored social, , religious and economic developments in more than ,20 countries rather than concentrating solely on military intelligence. - . . ? Most of the questions, however, got the stan- dard "no comment" or "you'll have to wait and ; hear what the president has to say" response. Casey spoke in a barely audible voice, giving the :impression that he might be trying to confound any !FecorAlopftviltd3FdrcReteatter28051111/2..: CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 -;? About 15k minutes into the sessiOn, ane of ;Casey's security men came into the,reom. bran.; dishing a Post press card. He secretively flashed it to me and asked, "Does this man work for You and do you want him in the room?" ? ? ' - The card bore the photograph of reporter Edgar. Sanchez, who had covered Casey's speech and was late getting back to the office:Sanchez is a native of El Salvador and the CIA obviously was taking no chances, particularly with a dark Latin male who claimed to be a reporter. ? ? After I assured the man that Sanchez -was authentic, Edgar was ushered into the room.Casey wouldn't answer his questions, either. ? ? At exactly 5 p.m., Casey rose and said, "I told- you I'd give you half an hour and it's been 45 minutes. I've got to go." We thanked him and shook hands all around. ' The limousines pulled out of the parking lot, turned left on Dixie Highway and stopped in front of the seedy but much-loved El Cid Bar directly across Dixie from The Post. Two security men jumped out and entered the tavern. , In a few minutes they emerged and huddled with Casey. Then the CIA director, with two body- ? guards in front and two behind, entered the Cid. It would be somehow reassuring for, me to report that the crusty superspy, in his three-piece suit, then bellied up to the bar and hoisted. a cold one among the T-shirted and blue-jeaneel .E1 Cid clientele. But Casey didn't have liquid refreshment on his mind. ? ? - ."; ? Instead, while his security men stood guard, Casey plunked a quarter into the Cid's telephone and placed a call to parts unknown. Then-he was ' off to the airport for his flight back to Washington. ; It's not yet known whether themanagement of the El Cid will place a brass plate on its phone to commemorate the day when America's No. I spy came in from the cold. , ? ? ?? Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00040 1,7 '1 I 0:::E 2-1?PrARED ON THE WASHINGTON POST 28 February 1982 STAT r.r1T6 Jolly Jim Watt -S mfr. .s. onCapitol rp 0 ENVIRONMENTALISTS, of course, it's a lit- tle like nailing Al Capone on income tax evasion. But when it comes to bridling Interior Secretary James Watt, they will take it any way it comes. Watt is being stalked by three congressional com- mittees, not for his crimes against the land ? the leveling of mountains, the destruction of forests but, when you come right down to it, for being ob- noxious. To be more spe- cific, for guarding his files better than the country's wildlife and for being as obtuse about a national shrine as he is about the wilderness. Thursday, the House Energy and Commerce Com- mittee voted to cite him for contempt of Congress for refusing to hand over certain documents relating to the public's business. Friday, he refused to appear before another sub- committee which wanted to examine his federally funded social life. Watt, on two occasions in Decem- ber, appropriated for his OBNO MOUS own use the hallowed ? mansion that was the home of Gen. -Robert E. Lee. Mrs. Watt had 18 sister cabinet wives for breakfast on Dec. 14. The bill came to $1,148.10. Among the items was $48 for a sign that ad- vised the peasants who had come to pay homage to the Confederate saint that they must wait outside for two hours, while Mrs. Watt presided over scrambled eggs and quiche and conversation with guests whose name cards cost $5 'apiece. Two days later, the Watts. gave a sumptu- ous bash at Arlington House, as Lee's home is, officially' designated by the National Park - Service. This time the bill was $6,921, and no wonder a _ 'green and white striped tent, shrimp and crabmeat casserole for 177 peo- ple, not to , mention wine, champagne and. hard liquor.-: ? , ?; ? - , Six volunteers in period costumes- served drinks and -L..- -here comes a lovely touch ? held the guests' glasses for them when they went upstairs, where drinking is forbidden. -? A piano player played on a piano tuned especially for the-event. It is nice to think that the burdened dignitaries ? they in- -ciuded CFA Director ?Vatarn J. Casey and. Taasury .Secret -ponalct, Regan -- gath- ' ered around for little caroling. ' r.XCERPTED Approved For Release 2005/11128 : CIA-RD091-00901R000400120002-2 ApprqhfO1kt:161-ReLERN palfgei4/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00 Washington, D. C.20505 26 February 1982 Dear David, I've tried to clean this up a little. I don't think I changed any meaning significantly. Sorry it has taken so long to get it back to you. If I can do anything else to help, please let me know. Mr. David Kahn NEWSDAY Long Island, New York 11747 Enclosure Yours, William J. Casey x)t-epi C-(L. -ue-ag ta-44,L-a q-je iteg /97 2t-yta.) V4X, Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP499 400120002-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Next 16 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400 THE WEST PALM BEACH POST ( FL) 24 February 1982 By Edgar Sanchez Post' Staff Writer ? International terrorism represent a greater threat to the United Statep than all the nuclear missiles in the. Soviet Union, CIA Director William .1. Casey said yesterday in Palm Beach. In a speech before the Society of the Four Arts, Casey said the Soviet is using sophisticated terrorism to d stabilize governments friendly to the.: U.S. . . . The subversive acts are being cot- red out by the KGB, the Soviet's se- cret police agency, and communists around the world, he said. The goal is ? to eventually topple democratic gov- ermrients and create a Soviet-dorni- nated world, he said. 1 "In the aftermath of Vietnam', the Soviet Union began to test whether the U.S. would resist its advances," Casey said from a prepared text.. - Avoiding a direct confrontation, the Soviets instead unleashed "a witch's brew of terrorism" in developing na- tions such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala,. Iran and Lebanon. where numerous social problems ek- ist. " - !.. "The United States has. had diffici ty in countering this terrorism. is much easier to support an insurge* ase erroin r than resist it," Casey said. This international campaign is be- ing financed in part by Libyan dictator Col. Muammar Qaddafi, he said. "In Libya, terrorist training is the second largest industry next to oil," he - said. a . . "Sophisticated terrorism is a big business. It requires safe houses, safe training areas, multiple travel docu- ments, transportation and weapons, and all that is very expensive. Qaddafi has decided to pick up the tab," he said. Casey, who has a home in Palm Beach, requested that no cameras or tape recorders be allowed at his pre- sentation. He also would not hold a press conference. At the end of the speech, however, Casey did answer questions from the audience. "How do you account for the fact that two of our foremost newspapers ... have been so hospitable towards the Soviet Union?" one man asked, apparently referring to the New York Times and the Washington Post. ' "I'm much too discreet to answer that one," Casey said. . Casey was asked about the offer of Mexican President Jose Lopez- Portillo to become a mediator be- STAT 20002-2 tween the factions in war-tom IC Sal- vador. "How do you exph, in his motives?' one man asked. not sure I ought to accept the challenge of explaining all these ques- tions," Casey said. "The only e.,.plaria- ' tion I can give is that he (Portilio) is a politician. He's going out of off!cesoon? and he wants attention. He's ta.xious to play his role on the world st- ae (one last time)." In response to another quer:.. Casey said the Soviet Union is undergoing serious economic problems. "Li recent years, their (agricultural) haraest has gotten lower and lower," he ;aid. Casey was head of clandestine ac- tions for the World Wai- II ( ifice of Strategic Services, the foren.nner of the CIA. He later served as &airman of the Securities and Exchan,.;e Com- mission and established a reAttation as a corporation tax lawyer. He was appointed CIA clirxtor in January 1981. 'Sophisticated t .rrorism is a big business it requires safe houses, safe training , areas, multiple ,travetsiocu- rnents,. transportation ,and weapons, and ali that is very - s ex ? - ? 4 uammar)'- 13. Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-009014 I P Y ed to pick ? ? 'up the tab _f, ' -ifljdffl Casey STAT Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0004 THE BALTIMORE EVENING SUN 19 February 1982 Gas pipeIine would swell Russ power over West By Cord Meyer WASHINGTON HE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION is united in general disapproval of Western European plans to lend the Soviets $15 billion en favorable terms to build the Si- berian pipeline, which when completed in 1934 will carry Russian natural gas to European factories and homes. But the administration is bitterly di- vided on just how much American pres- sure can safely be brought to bear, with- out wrecking the alliance, to force a can- cellation of 'what CIA Director William Casey calls "the biggest foreign aid proj- ect in the history of the world." Although very critical of European ea- gerness to push ahead with the pipeline, Secretary of State Haig and his senior policy team are resigned to accepting the deal as a fait accompli. They point out that $10 billion has already been commit- ted and that too many contracts have been signed to expect the Europeans to back out at this stage. . In trying now to unscramble the ome- let, the U.S., State officials argue,- would not only fail but would in the process so alienate the European allies as to endan- ger the survival of the alliance. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Cosenittee, Sen. Charles Percy (R-FII.), joins State in warning that hours of con- versation with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and other European leaders have convinced him that at this late date an attempt to block the pipeline would he totally counterproductive. Against this solid phalanx of opinion in State that the pipeline is unfortunate but unavoidable stands the leadership of the Pentagon and the CIA. These officials are convinced that this deal is SO critical to the threatening buildup of Soviet military power that every lever must be pulled to stop or at least delay it. Dare disturbing than the blackmail ! potential of a Russian hand on Europe's ! energy faucet is the fact that the Soviets will be able to earn annually $3 billion of hard currency from the sale of their gas to the West over a period of 25 years. At a time when their oil exports are dwin- -dling? this windfall profit reaped in West- ern Europe would provide just that mar- gin of hard currency needed to expand the purchase from the West of military- rein ted high technology. Instead of being forced to divert re- sources to the civilian sector, the Soviet military budget would be bloated by the folly of the Europeans, who in their scramble for jobs and profits from the pipeline contracts would be endangering nut only themselves but the Americans as well. In fact, Pentagon officials make a very strong argument that the real fall guy in the pipeline deal will eventually be the American taxpayer. The West Euro- peans gain jobs from the recovery Of their steel industry in building the pipe. The Soviets obtain enough hard currency to keep their military machine growing with the most advanced Western tech- nology, and the Americans will have to pay ever higher taxes in order to try to maintain an increasingly expensive bal- ance of power. . Rather than rescuing the Soviet mili- tary buildup with these windfall profits, far better, it is argued, for the U.S. and Western Europe to pool their resources to help each other attain energy self-suffi- ciency. The Norwegians have 'recently discovered a huge new gas field but the capital to develop it will riot be available if it is drained off in loans to Russia. American opponents of the pipeline admit they should have started two years ago in developing specific alternative solutions with the Europeans. But with an oil glut and reduced demand for gas, they believe there is still time to appeal to the common sense of the Europeans, espe- cially in light Of the Polish events. If rational argument does not per- suade the Europeans, the hard-line oppce nents of the pipeline deal are prepared to use tougher tactics. Under the terms of Reagan's Polish sanctions, General Elec- tric has been prohibited from selling to Russia through. European firms the tur- bine rotors they need to build the giant compressors that pump the oil. 61/Al 00120002-2 The French I.rm, Alsthom Atiantique, is the only E!irepeall company that makes these roi ors but it has a specifiet contract with Ganeral Electric that pro- vides it will ab iae by U.S. export adminis- ? tration rules. I y forbidding export of these rotors to Faissia, the U.S. could suc- ceed in adelayin the completion of the ' pipeline by at lest two years. _ By this enfersed delay, Pentagon offi- cials claim the ILS. could keep billions in hard currency out of Soviet hands and win time for wiser heads in Europe to see the folly of the deal. But State officials warn that this costly delay caused by the U.S. would old; temporarily postpone completion of the project, would infuriate the Europeans end drive them towards neutralism. With his principal advisers thus divid- ed, President Rtyagan will have to do his homework on this one. He alone can de- I cide it. Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0 NEW YORK POST 16 February 1982 STAT By NIL.r..S LATH FM WASHINGTON ? Ad- ministration, C011greS:., sional and diplornatio sources . said. last night' that over the past year.: CIA Director William liCasey has ordered a: 'steady buildup of covert : activities in Honduras, Eli Salvador and Nicaragua. ' The operation is said to: have twewbjectives: - 0 Develop a major in- telligence .network to in- form the _White House: and the Pentagon of mili- tary activities and politi. cal trends. , ? 0 Disrupt the growing. Influence of Cuba and Nicaragua and-their arms pipeline. _ The revelations came in the wake of reports that the White House was de- bating whether to give $19 Million to the CIA for the operatioir,--;;=' ?. The CIA operation is one phase of. sweeping military, economic and political plans to pro- tect ? America's "back door." Sources told The Post -that- for the- past six months the .groundworkk fOr the CIA operation hasr kre,ady been laid, and! that spending is probably', running to much greater; levels than $19 million. 11 . Although many details, remain top secret, sources said: ? I 0 CIA stations in major:, cities in the region have been beefed up to full ca- Parit..Y. 0 A wide range of intel-: ligence contacts have been developed. . 9 Aerial -surveillance and other activities under ? the Defense In:elligence; Agency and the National! Security Agency have. been- dramatically in- creased_ ? 0 Several in. _,.;es forli training and infiltration operations have been es- tablished along the bor- ders of El S-alvarior, Gua- temala, Nieragua? and _Honduras. - 0 Training Cf para- miltary. "action teams" has been in prc gross forj .well over three months. Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 NEW YORK POST 15 February 1982 STAT ,Rnpcsan x.war is also rdid'kr5 El Snlyath5 By NILES LATH EM N.Y. Post Correspondent WASHLNGTON -The ''?; CIA is planning. to dis- patch hit- teams 'and to - launch a- massive carnea, paign of anti-Commu- nist propaganda . on Cuban and Nicaraguan agents infiltrating El - Salvador, sources report here. = : . The CIA is prepared , to use U.S.-trained pararni- t441' --- Mary teams of _ "non- ;.;?;;Liigr,,.4gwoid.`"' . ?,..r--- - . ,--.. = .._ , Associated Press Photo - r _ A.mericans" to go h'eact.'-; -- to head - ' with . Cuban .:. Demonstrators march through a snowstorm in Boston protesting continued U.S. ' -4-. ? ..._. . agents in El Salvador;_ a assistance to the government of El SolVador. Ahot,if 3600 people took-part. - ' Honduras and ." Guate-- .--.' " , ? _ .,.., .. ?7 ; .?. - - _ _ - - - .-- .- ----,...". , ,:;.,,, -, _ .- ,-...;. ? ._ ,.?s7. ' _,_, " . mala.'s!e"" ' - ' - ? ,..-; Haig told-reporters yes- sources said likely ac- jenti-Sandinisfa exiles. - poll: ical and military' Itigh ranking Admin: ' .terday, ''There's a host ' tivities would include: istration officials said of things to do," adding, 0 Declaring a major contingency plans likely last night that a Plan? "There is an increased 0 '.Craining, a series of propoganda war on to la- taken by the Rea- devised early last year. problem on the .`door- highly specialized para.- Cuba and. Nicaragua. gait Administration, by CIA Director William military hit teams for ;This would probably be whith is determined to Case and his de put step' of America." "' --? military, political and in-done-through a series of curl. Communist influ-, y y, Disclosure of the CIA Adm_ Bobby Inman, -o ame telligence purposes___ .' " I "disinformation." tactics ence in the region... - being actively reviewed: is peration c as Ftea-, ? n re pared to give a Like the aborted Bay-, . as-well as by using U i .S.- Re, - gan = spent the ga p by the White House aP ? major policy speech on of pigs operatioa in the - -sphorisored raddio " and wee end in Camp David part of its efforts to eon-. ,Central America which 1060s, the teams would . ot er 'propogan_ a .wea - revitwing the plans and trol a growing Comeau- .' -Will all on the American be comprised of clarales- ?- pons, sourc-e. s said. ..._ , , prep /ring his speech on- nist threat to El Salva- people to disregard corn tine solidiers and- di- --- Also _major U S.. slip- e- p- . Central America ' L a- - - dor and the Caribbean pari On to _ war era and stand an the -.Vietnam_ , %dint s from the - region - , port would probably be spee-h which will proba basin e 0... and possiblpArgentina. ? -given in Nicaragua-to a bly ke delivered within_ ,; .:-- Disclosure of -the, CIA . , tally' behind him in his., -. Sources reported thai""-' political movement' op. the r ext 10 days. operation- - first ? _ca-in, -efforts to protect the, a secret US. base has al,_ posed to the .Sandinista So far direct ITS: Mill; from the WaShingtori?N -"ba,ck yard," of the U.S. '. ready: been ? established regime. _ -- - - .- ..-__?tary action in the region Post and was later inde- _ ',Although details of the ' in Honduras, where sup- The -05.-Pey plan-is one is not one of the options), pendently confirmed- by ?'',, 9.1-14.21.o.a.rerriain secret.. ? -port is being given to in a series of economic under consider tion ? -? l . The New-York Post.--?fee-.1.. President Reagan, re- turning ,from ".Camp David, refused to com rnent 4..'either. way" ? on the report. ','......- 'All I can think-abou is .. . . this Caribbean program in which Can adaa_Mexico, Venemel and -the United _ Stat are going to help the with their economy." Secretary ;of Stat ?a-- . . ? --- - pproved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ? h Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ARTInE APPEARED NEWSWEEK ON PAO?. R 15 February 1982 Is There a CIA Link With Kaddafi? It is a government scandal that will not die, a sinister suspicion that the CIA can- not--or will not?police "rogue" agents - and ex-agents who sell CIA skills and con- nections to foreign governments. It has al- ready spawned grand jury hearings and in- vestigations by at least five government bodies, and the House Select Committee on Intelligence spent most of last week behind closed doors attempting to detail the activi- ties of two prime rogues, Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil, former CIA operatives who in 1976 contracted with Libya's Muammar Kaddafi to provide intelligence and weap- onry and to train Kaddafi's terror teams. Although ostensibly gone from the CIA, Wilson had numerous connections with the agency during that period. He offered S1 million to three CIA agents to assassinate a Libyan dissident, secured explosive devices from one active CIA officer and directed another's recruitment of Green Berets for duty in Libya. Indeed, Wilson appeared to be so close to senior CIA personnel in the "dirty tricks" Operations Directorate that many participants in his dubious intrigues are convinced?or claim to be?that they were involved in an official CIA operation to penetrate Kaddafi's entourage. CIA director William Casey and his deputy, Bobby Inman, iinsisted last week that neither Wilson nor Terpil had formal links to the agency during their Libyan operations. It was, they said, simply Wil- son.'s aptitude for name-dropping that cre- ated the impression of official sanction. But NEWSWEEK has talked to one House committee witness whose story suggests , that more than name-dropping was ; Bucks': Luke Thompson, 47, was a Green Beret master sergeant in 1977 when he was recruited to work in Liby;a under; Wilson. Now retired from the armed forces and training as a nurse in Hawaii, Thompson remains convinced that he was participating in a CIA operation. Like; many Green Beret's, Thompson was a vet- eran of secret CIA operations, and he was initially suspicious of a telephone offer of "big bucks" to go abroad. Consequently Thompson reported the contact to military ; intelligence at Fort Bragg, where he was ; counseled to pursue it. An intelligence offi- cer at the post twice instructed him to i "proceed until we tell you to stop." Says Thompson: "To me this was a CIA opera- ; tion from that point fdtward." . .. Thompson was hardly surprised when Wilson's recruiter, Patry Loomis, turned ; up in person and introduced himself as "currently employed by the CIA." In fact, Loomrs's agency contract had only days to run, but the impression of official business was enhanced by the ease with which ; Thompson subsequently obtained leave from his Army duties. Thompson and three men he had recruited then flew to Zurich where they were met by Wilson himself. Wilson made no references to the CIA. "I want you to go to Libya and make yourself indispensable to those bastards,' Thomp- son recalls Wilson saying. Thompson asked Wilson who they were working for. "You're working for me," he replied. Libyan offi- cials seemed to take the official connections of such foreign specialists for granted. "I know that one or all of you are KGB or CIA," Libya's deputy chief of intelligence told the group. "I don't care who you are. All I want is your professional services." 'Stinks': Back at Fort Bragg, Thompson says, his contact in intelligence informed him that he had learned the Libyan operation was not legal and "stinks to high heaven." Yet he also told Thompson to maintain contact with Wilson's team in Libya, and Thompson continued to recruit and obtain materials and supplies for them. Called before a Federal grand jury looking into gun-running charges against Wilson and Terpil, Thompson went first to CIA headquarters for guid- ance. A CIA counsel told him to say anything he wanted, abouts now .ire unclear. There ' have been ssisly rumors that ! Terpil's apy .saranee in several television t ocumentaries an- . gered some terrorists who kid- napped him. cut out his tongue and killed hi rn. U.S. authorities say only ths t Terpil has pulled disappearin; acts before?and. the mystery surrounding both men seems 5 areto continue. MARK 7, FARE with MCI! ARD SANDZA i Witikiki and DAVID C AARTIN in Washingtcn Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 LOS ANGELES HERALD-EXAMINER 12 February 1982 cAu troub rooks to us as if the CIA_ might be gearing up for dirty tricks. First,. President Reagan signed an ;executive ?Order in December that expanded- the agency's power to maintain surveillance over American citizens-iin this country and to infil- trate domestic organizations.. . Anknow, CIA.. Director. William :. Casey .is. asking .the Justice Depart- ment.Ifo ask Congress :to. shield the* agency: from criminal prosecution fort illegitimate acts so long as agents are on 'legitimate" missions. Yes, the old- fashioned end-justifies-the-means theory, and Casey wants .the exemp- tion written into the criminal code Perhaps it's really not so surpris- ing, he's pressing for intelligence behavior that the CIA's 1947 charter forbids and former. President Carter sought to curb definitively. After all, there are strange allegations about domestic infiltration by Libyan hit- men out to get our, president and about Sovietimmiabrants intent On disrupting the 1984 Olympics.. But the fact that it's not surprising does not make it any less disturbing. A blanket exemption from criminal prosecution is not only unnecessar for conducting intelligence activities it is undesirable. We've expressed concern before that our intelligence community's ability to perform effec- tively has been unduly curbed in recent years. But it was unduly 'curbed in response to excesses by the intelligence community,. and we're afraid this latest move by Casey might be asking for unnecessary trouble again. . ? , Avoiding not just impropriety, but the appearance of impropriety, is an awful lot trickier for the CIA than it could ever have been for Caesar's wife. And avoiding not only the abuse of power but the appearance of abuse of power is at least as important. Casey's proposed revision of the criminal code would permit an oppor-- tunity for abuse that, even if never exercised, would only reinforce the suspicion that some Americans, let) alone the rest of the world, hold for our intelligence operations. CIA agents should be free to' perform, their? duties effectively, of, course, but those duties must bet' carefully determined and their per- formance: as free from taint as\ reasonably possible. That means per- forming,their function within the'i limitations now prescribed by law. Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00040 APlO 1V REPORTS, INC. STAT 0120002-2 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 FOR PROGRAM DATE SUBJECT IMINIMMICALSOMINIPPMISMansa*.aaNdias?rmak PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PBS Late Night STATION WETA TV 'BS Network February II, 1982 12:30 AM Washington, DC CITY Interview with Frank Snepp DENNIS WHOLEY: Frank Snepp is our guest right new. Frank is a former CIA agent. He was awarded the Medal of Nerit for his work in Vietnam. His book "Decent Interval" calls the evacuation of Saigon a fiasco, and he criticizes the CIA fcr stupidity and mismanagement. The Justice Department sued, claim- ing that Snepp's book broke his secrecy agreement and causcd harm to the national security. The Supreme Court upheld that rtling. Kind of a broad question, putting it out on the lible right now: Should former agents of the CIA be allowed to criti- cize the agency, or, in some cases, use their knowledge, their experience or their expertise in civilian life? Good to have you here. FRANK SNEPP: Thank you. WHOLEY: The last four or five years, how has this book changed your life? SNEPP: Well, it's changed my life in many ways. One thing, it has turned my name into an italicized synonym for gov- ernment censorship. The Supreme Court ruling in my case, in fact, gives legitimacy, for the first time, to an American officill secrets act. In your introduction you left out one important fAct about my situation, and that is, I was never accused of publish- ing any secrets in that book. WHOLEY: True? Approved For Retease-2GO5t1l 28 .-el-A-RDP9'FO090-1-RG- 00400420002-2 OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES S CHICAGO 0 DETROIT 0 AND 011-ER PRINCIPAL CITIES STAT Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0004C NEW YORK TIMES APPEARED 7 1.-713',',U..-RY 1q82 011 1:+im Spotlight Cn Libyan Afl How do you prevent former Central Intelligence Agency employees from peddling their expertise to foreign governments? With difficulty, if at all, it appeared from testimony last week, before the House Select Com- mittee on Intelligence. The closed hearings capped a four- month committee staff inquiry into tile activities of two former C.I.A. agents, Edwin P. Wilson and Frank E. Terpil, and the C.I.A.'s investiga- tion of their dealings with the Libyan government. But the question of C.I.A. involvement and the nature of , the agency's relationship with its for- mer employees remained as murky as ever. Mr. WilApn was accused of recruit- ing Amene...n soldiers to train Libyan terroristsand he and Mr. Terpil, now fugitives, were indicted in 1980 for ,illegally shipping explosives to Libya. t .Mr. Wilson is known to have had the help of C.I.A. employees in his re- cruitment project, but two internal in- quiries, one of which was ordered last year by agency director William J. Casey, have concluded that the aid was not official. ' Two middle-level employees were dismissed in 1977 for their part in the affair. Two senior officials who were suspected of involvement were exon- I crated, and Mr. Wilson subsequently ' set one of them up in a business that , later hired the other one. In his testi- mony at the hearings, Mr. Casey ap- parently was unable to shed new light on this relationship. He did reveal, though, that the C.I.A. had recently adopted a new code of conduct extending agency regulations to former employees for the first time. The rales were said to prohibit the use of inside information . for private gain, but a spokesman conceded they were "not a legal, - binding agreement" and that the agency was powerless to make for- mer employees obey them. Mr. Casey was said to be willing to work with Congress on legislation that had more teeth. - - Michael Writ and Caroline Rand Herron 0120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 ART I CLIC EPPEAR-ED C2C !VIEINBERGER SEES TO DECLARE POLES IN A DEN DEFAULT ADMINISTRATION IS DIVIDED ; Aides Says Secretary Believes a Hard Line on Loans Can ? Block Soviet Pipeline By HEDRICX SMTTH ? Sirxial oTtrNewYoTln,r5 . WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 ?Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger report- edly intends to keep pressing to have Po. land declared in default of its debts to the West and to have Western European nations halt their natural gas pipeline deal with MOSCOW. ? On the recommendation of the State, Treasury and Agriculture Departments, President Reagan recently agreed to have the Administration pay American banks the Z71 million owed them by Po- land to forestall a declaration of default and the ensuing disruption of East-West economic relations. But, in the continuing debate on the question within the Administration, high Pentagon officials oppoise this 'ac? tion. They insist that the issue of Polish default has not been finally settled. Mr. Weinberger is known to favor the tee:eller stance of ancrwing default and the disruption-of Western credit rela- tions with the East to impose an eco- nomic penalty on Moscow and Warsaw for the repression in Poland... - Salvadoran Intervention Opposed e On the issue of El Salvador, however, . Mr. Weinberger opposes American: combat involvement and and is under, stood to be wary of military operations in the Caribbean, such as a blockade of Cuba or Nicaragua; that wcttld require Congressional approval. Tuesday, in Congressional testimony, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. seemed to reopen the threat. of American intervention in Centred Amer- ica by asserting that the United States would do "whatever is. necessary"? to prevent the overthrow the-!3.1)ese. ;Government 111,-,W YORK TIMES 14 FEBRUARY 1982 STAT Larry Speakes, a White House spokes- have that a Polish default would not only ? man; left Mr. Haig,'s comments stand- impose further economic burdens on the ing but emphasized-that there-were no Soviet Union but would delay the pipe- plans "at the moment" _for American line. The Administration concedes, how-- i-utars to go into combat in Salvador ever, that West European banks and t or elsewhere. governments are shying ,iway from this - ? ' approach. Mr. speakes.said the Secretary "was Mr. Wei nberaar's arguments with the discussing contingencies," and added, "The President has said he has no plans Western Europeans is that the Wests'nouldnot help tfie Soviet Union develo to send troops:anywhere and he has no its oil and natural gas r.,sources (not- plans. . cially. when Westerrr in:ell ig,enc&.> esti- A high Pentagon Official, acknowledg- mates project Soviet shorten in the :Jag domestiCr poliical opposition to I American military involvement, added . I that "one ot the lessons of Vietnam is ; that we can't engage in a war that is not supported by/American public opinion?! taken the most pessimistic. view of ln coments on another, more distant developments. Recently, for example Mr."?Weinberger commented that he felt- "the Polish Government is runby a R !sian general in a Polish uniform." " Although he is known to favor most policies that would make it harder for the Soviet Union to obtain new arms and ;support the military regime in Poland, Mr. Weinberger has not pushed for coy- ert operations in ? of Polish. resistance to martial law. ' years ahead, In the Reagan Adrainstraon's-inter- nal' debates over Poland Mr.,Weinber- gerand some of his P-entaaou aides have- trouble spot, a senior Administration of-. , tidal 'revealed rising concern over re- ports that the Soviet Union was provid- ing aid to the Communist Tudeh Party in Iran and was "very likely" sending_ arms and military supplies across the Soviet-Iranian- border to other groups :lighting the regime- of Ayatollah Hho- - :e e ? On the issue of possible Polish default, The Administration's announcement Mr. Weinberger was reported to have Monday that the Gcrverrin,.ent would pay been taken by surprise by the Adhurli%e American banks rather than allow Pe- traticn's decisicn to pay off the Amen- land to go into formal default has come an banks, primarily because ' he had . under fire from conservaeve groups,. been preoccupied vrith preparation of ,:, "Default would require the Soviet the new Pentagon budget. But since the Union, -rather than the American tax-- Defense Secretary did not get a chance., payer, to bail out the bankrupt Polish to press his own views on the issue with i Government," Howard Phillips, leader 1 not regard the matter as settled. - . Mr. P - ? ...hillips said at a ne wsconference President Reagan, the Pentagon does. of the Conservative Caucus, said today. -Mr. Weinberger is said to feel that the t?tha_t his organization had launched a recent decision to bail out the banks was- eleu,C4X) letter-writing carnixii7i to urge i an "interim" action.. He is said. to be- banks to force Poland into default by lieve that the question is still- "a live seeking immediate repayment of cut- issue" among, Administration policy, t standing Polish loans. . ',. .. , .;.., t makers and certain to be reconsidered as future installments of Polish debts carn e due. e ' "This is a continuing debate," a high Pentagon official said. "The default I issue is wit-h us continuously. There are quarterly payments due so it will come up again. It"s a live isaue."- ,,_ : -.- -. ? --, , - : , The default question is linked in Mr. Weiinberger's "opinion . to the pipeline deal, which has for months been a major target of Pentagon officials and Ameri- can diplomats. The rNaleap Piaaarapen Intelliaence pi1tri not only m ,erri_Eurapt.sitner4ent_tal Moscow vital ener ?lies but would also earn the Soviet Union about year in hard currency.. spent on Western technologa_vdthanili,_ tarv annlica tines. Mr. Weinberger is,undeptood to tx,?, _ is that e est- 10 billion a ase 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ART ICL 0.1:1 FAG:3 The CIA. 4,1L13a,D NEW YORK TIMES 4 FEBRUARY 1982 porkin Enjoying Move To Casey and Compan i3y JEFF GER'rH S"ialtoTbeNr?YorkTicmes, WASIIINGTON:eFeb. 3 A top offi- cial of the Central Intelligence Agency spent a week in California last month attending a securities-conference. But the session had nothing to with na- tional security.. est-ot-- .rhe conferencee7participants Justice. Department proposing; that cies. To many 'outside observers, Mr. Sporkin, in , that case, walked a fine line between-conservatives who-think the agency should be unleashed and civil rights advocates who oppose its intrusion into domes tic affairs. ? - Late last year, Mr. Sporkin helped ? draft a letter that Mr. Casey sent to the allow CIA. agents to en--. ' eluded officials_ of' the Sectuities and ,Congress Exchange Commission, members of gage in, otherwise illegal activities while on legitimate missions. The the securities bar, and alumni, such as E: pro- Stanley sporran, general counsel to the , posal,. labeled "technical" by Mr. Central Intelligence Agency. Sporkin, . evoked a strong negative - _ reaction from the Justice Depart- In May, in one of Washington's most ment's off ice of intelligence policy. unusual career shifts, Mr. Sporkin lett Mr. Sporkin is near completion of a a successful and visible tenure as en - study into the involvement of the for- forcement chief at the securities cam- mer agents Edwin P. Wilson and mission for the post at the intelligence agency. The man who made a career Frank E. Terpil in training Libyan ter-. out prosecuLg ? had rorists and- the adequacy of the agen- c.y's previous investigation into the at- ascome the-lawyer for "the Company," . the agency is referred to in intelli- gence circles. ' ? Mr. Sporkin, to heir him tell it, has ? "The True test of -any decision is whether you have would have done it again," he said.."I would have done it again, and more so." et e ? o. o ? Did lt for Long-Time Friend- For the most part, however, he switched jobs out of a sense of loyalty and respect for his long-time friend' William J. Casey, the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, who offered him the ' post. - The two met when Mr. Casey was . chairman- of the S.E.C. in the early 1970's. In 19;72; Mr. Casey avoided a potentially emba.rassing situation by following Mr- Sporkin's advice to re- buff White House attempts to interfere and delay an investigation of the finan- ? cier Robert. Vesco. Those attempts t ? led to the indictment of some Nixon -t. Administration officials;' Mr. Casey agency wall be- -- and Mr. Sporkin were witnesses for the prosecution. at , a -? ? -- great asset, to U.S Mr. Sporkin's closeness to the Direc- -- ? tor has given him tremendous latitude and power but has also evoked some ? private criticism:: ? -tee, ? ? ea - ,eatease, ete t ? ? Though lacking experience in intern- fair. Mr.. Sporkin declined to say what gence matters, Mr. Srxnldn has played changes, - if any, would be a key role in sensitive issues: the rules mended in the agency's employment under which the agency operates, its contract or personnel prO:Fedures. .ability to police itself and the extent to - -"You've -got to do whatever you can which agents are subject to criminal Luta prevent it from happening again," ,prosecution in. the rmance; ,of their duties. perfo ee. ? ti--.1---a.;;:??a-teet Mr.. Sporkin Said. . . , . Last Year hliaY skiiktkkeiti order loosening to some extent restric- great asset to this country" after being tions on_ the nation's intelligence agen?.? ?'drained down" in the last 10 years, an allusion to disclosures in the 1970's STAT a tl S. t2 Mr. Sporkin appeared oa many re- porters to function at tirr es last year as a Spokesman and privai a lawyer for Mr. Hugel, who resigned in the wake of disclosures about his hu-aness prac- tices, and for Mr. Casey, who, after a long investigation by the senate Intel- ligence Committee, was found "not unfit" to hold his post_ . ? Mr. Sporkin thinks the criticism is unfair and says he has a good relation- ship with C.I.A. employee, although he expects to be with ag..,T,cy only as long as Mr. Casey. ?- tt, The day-to-day feel of Mr. Sporkin's new job is different in m eny respects from that of his days with the securi- ties commission. Frequ .,nt contacts with the press have endeo. His staff is only a couple dozen lawyers, against the 200 he supervised at the S.E.C. And while he was at the center of the se- cu.rities commission's activities, Mr. Sporkin is far removec from, and- sometimes even unaware of, the Corn- pony's operations in the il tad. ? .e? ? Government officials and private- lawyers who have dealt vern Mr. Spor- kin-since he joined the C. 'LA. say they have found him to be ag,gnessive, fair, honest and occasionally single-mind- ed. His friends say Mr. pork in, who turns 50 next Sunday, ha; no ambiva- lence about his future; he longs for The'"Y`"'"Tilpmfr"'"zalit'la a Federal judgeship. S tanley Sporkhrt drafting the asen 1R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ART I CL APP.-6.61ED ON PAG ELL LOS ANGELES T DES 3 February 1982 ? ' , - ? - , 1 y1(013ERTL. JACKSON, Timis Staff Writer:7.4:?--- WASHLIGTON-i-Williiii::f-Caseetar of the.- Central: In Eelligence.. told a Housecoiniaittee-- Tuesdaylt.hat the CIA did 12otaprove Libyan, terrorist t rainin" activities. by; former:;- agents .Eid:,P;Wilsonf and FranCi:51.E..Terpil,-,:s'5,;-:, :132xyWilson and Texpil.:,Whes are under federal ment, in?ly have receivedhelp.from individual CIA:. - Pae t.wp:We'reytorls'ang. for the-radical-te,gittie; Libyan leader Moarcinar Kada5., according:to -Reri-: Edward - ( chairman; clf,the Hous - Intel 'hgenp.e - Casey-dertial of arty official CIA inrFement m the -Wilsoni-Temil !case ? came,: as. Abe HoUse ,conunittee; -opened.ciosed-illoortearingxintcrinternationalbUsiriess'l deals--byrformere ? Boland told" t'eficirters' after -The hearirig- th,aCCasey rlia-Crord?e:e:il a wi?git5fof the CIA's tiit - son and Terpil.,;whowere charged irtAPrit 1980Vvithil:. rlegalty eaporting*irarisirequipthent ?^ - -0- - ? tlie :Justice DeptirtrrientIs -investigating other-deals by the tivarnen;hialuding their:alleged secret attempt-sr.; ;to export high-technbIngj deViceilo the Soviet YJnipk. an d=tion.s in the lEddle =." "^ J Tiro Dirflik,Sea'r,.i ? ? ? drrt Stimifield "Itrner:l CaseP4Fedecessor ;as ?7.A- 'chief,.h ad received in _earlier 'internal, report,that?led- hirr to'ctsmiss twontiddle-level agency emplo:yeee who ?suspect ed _of having ties to 1,Vilson and Terciii2.ButIi the report- exoner1ter7--,-several senior officials who Were: stisp?ected othaving suck ties;Taccordink foriner._CIA_.z _ ty==. Boland sai&Casey's t the second investigation CIA..".involvement in LI there ivaiOicibfficial OZ Ter,pil after their indittip Bola'nd said his commit four-month inquiry and ' conduct at this May Rave Been Conies -Asked Whether thetIi 'before their indictment;i kno.._;of .a_r131.?.PPrPiarti Terptt but there may hav werebn.boari dicaftiiSe to th?p?fth Casey declined to meet. x.r.inn LeI3 d1 Lr uns.teitimony. hot pr.bvidedBoland tyPednotes. - t!Last month. Douglas M:?Schlachter; a:form ra- Close- a..):ociate of Wilson's told federal investigators tha't-he.:- h4d briefed two-high-ranidng CIA officialsTsabc Son'ai-activi ties atineetingx.ia. the Washington area: izisandlow. r - d.;;ThOmat-:- -;"O Both. b e-ietrediiidthave deni?kn?wixg al /01 lhari=teirorist training:: ShackleY?:-Was chief deputy'tCV thCL ector of clandestine services; : aZ-f CiLiec-o was (L'..ect. or bf_tre,a.indimtliat cn STAT Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 7 ARTICLE APPEAREapproved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 ON PAGE I. 3 kee.bruary 1982 400120002-2 STAT What's News? . ? * * * CIA Director William Cagey told a House panel, that the spy agency tentatively has concluded "there was no CIA involvement in Libyan terrorist training:: the committee's! chairman-,said. Rep., Edward Boland !ID? Mass.) spoke atter a closed meeting on pos- sible CIA links to two former agents : cused of setting up a terrorist training- ect in: -* - The White House dropped a controversial plan to plug news leaks by requiring offi- cials to get approval for interviews that Might bring up classified matters-...A spokes- man said new rules supersede a Jan. 12 presidential order that threatened use of "all legal means" against leaks.. The latest proposals limit the number of officials with access to sensitive data. * * Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ARTICLE SLY.F.Eil ON PAGE . roved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-R0P91-00901R0004001 002-2 Fe bruar7 i 982 Casey reportedly says CIA didn't train Libya terrorists Associated Press WASHINGTON -- CIA Director William J. Casey told the House In- telligence Committee yesterday that the spy agency has tentatively concluded "there- was no official CIA involvement in Libyan terror- ist training," the committee chair- man said, Rep. Edward P. Boland (D- Mass.) spoke with reporters after Casey and other CIA officials testi- fied before_ the House panel behind closed doors for three hours. The hearing focused on ques- tions over the adequacy of an inter- nal CIA investigation into possible links between the agency and two former agents. Edwin P. Wilson and Frank E. Terpil, accused of set- ting up a terrorist training project in Libya. Bola.nd said his committee has "a very deep concern because of .the impact that these allegations have upon the agency. Of course, the CIA agrees with this, too." The chairman said he was pleased by the CIA's cooperation with a committee inquiry into WO- son-Terpil situation. He added, "I'm satisfied with the agency's conduct at this point." However, Boland indicated that the committee believes there are- Still discrepancies that need to be :resolved between the CIA's official 'version and information from oth- e'v Sources about the Libyan-related dctivitim Boland summarized main points which he said were con- tained in Casey's testimony, call- ing them the "tentative conclu- sions" of the CIA's internal investi- gation. These were, according to Boland: ? "There- there was no official CIA involvement in Libyan terror- ist training." - ? "There was no official CIA contact with Wilson or Terpil after their indictment." ? "There was no official CIA in- volvement in the recruitment of Green Berets" for projects in Libya. Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ON Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0004001200 EARED THE WASHINGTON POST 3 February 1982 Of Conitit:.:1 ti.h Atdincr..Qaddcaft ?? , United Press International ? ' .The chairman of the-House Intel- ligence. Committee: said Yesterday that. investigation e iiiirtirrned.up no evidence of official ..contaCt. betWeen . the CIArandl-wp- former agents .w.1-.0 , went to work for-Libya's ;Col.,M?anie -? mar Qaddati- Howtever,r'cominitfee-'iltb:airinan Edward.Bolanil (D-Masjsaid CIA employes ...who -.1aterr'yverired-. for-, .a firm one of the. gitive ex agents, Edwin .Wigon; like- "..1y- had centact.with both Wilsoa-and Frank Terpi1 while. si1L at the agen-,?'. .? ?-,r? ? ., . Boland ? referred to 'rhentlore Sliackle?y;,forrner deputy- director;of clandestine operations, and Thomas Clines, former director of training in - the clandestine services': ? Clinesafter ;leaving] the in ?.-1978, established a petroleum equip- ment biisiness, with help from Wil- son..- S hackley went e to work for Clines when he retired in 1979. Boland. spoke with reporters 'after a three-hour close&eornmittee-hear- ing-.ittended by CIA,Direct4er: Wil- lim J. Casey,. Depnky ?I)ireCtor ? Bobby R. Inman, CIA inepector gen- eral ellarle-,i Brigg's?-and CTA general . . During the hearing, the first in, a series .focusing. on the activities .01 Wilson and ellerpil,.the' CIA officials denied that the iigericY 'had sanc- tioned any cOntactis With ?the two or ..any involvement in the recruitment of former. U.S.. Army Special Forces troops to train terrorists in Libya. ? 'Boland said he told t6. CIA of- ficials the committee - has "a very deep ?concern" about possible ram- ifications of the; work- Wilson and Terpithave done for Qaddafi. , ??? Wilson, last reported living in Lib- ? ya, and Terpil, said to be in Leba- non, were indicted, in 1980 on. charges of illegally- shipping explo- sives:and arms to Libya after they. lett the:agenCy in,1976. 'r TWO lower-level employes were. fired. for . cooperating with them still.with the CIA.. Boland:_quOted Casey as saying in his opening statement that?the CIA's -ongoing:- investigation came to the . "tentative .conclusion" there was no official tigekY: involvement in any of ? the the..LilaY*, activities, no official/ ..reontactrittrytilson and Terpil after their inclict-merit and no involvement in the recruitment of Green Berets i to train terrorists for Qaddafi.. , STAT Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 3 February 1982 N o Case For Hiding iniQnnuti? The Senate Subcommittee on the .Constitution showed little sense of , responsibility when, despite .the failure of CIA Director William Casey to justify the eneeln.pproved bill that would exempt theeCIA) from the Freedom of Information - Act. While testifying before the subcommittee; Mr. -Casey was asked to set forth examples of how his agency had been harmed by the act. Despite repeated questions from panamembers, Mr. -Casey was Unable to say how many agents had been lost, as claimed, because of their alleged fear . of being exposed through the FOI Act. At one ? point he said, "I really can't tell you." At another, he made the extraordinary remark that his information came from "hearsay." Mr. Casey's vagueness did not result from any glare of publicity, since he was talking at a closed session, for which the testimony was only made public later after proper clearance. Based on the director's unconvincing performance, several senators, including Chairman Orrin Hatch, expressed their disappointment for the record. But the panel still approved changes in the FOI Act ' that the administration had asked for. This display of senatorial willingness to weaken the act was unwarranted, not only because of Mr. Casey's failure to answer questions persuasively but because the FOI law already exempts information being kepi secret in the interests of foreign policy anc national defense. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner has said that the agencl has .not lost a single case in the courts ir which it . claimed that something wa.,. classified and therefore could not be released. Given this record, the only apparent reasons for the administration'.; move to dilute the FOI Act is to save the Cie, the trouble of having to justify secrecy in some areas or to avoid embarrassment from some disclosures. Those are not sufficient reasons for exempting . an agency whose illegal acts have been exposed under FOI. Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 STAT Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 S...FFEARED NE,14 YORK TIMES ON PLG7.;_67?__A: 3 FEBRUARY 1932 ? .Denles Official Link en? C ? - ? ? BY IEFFGERTI-1 hue:, ? -eel seed e. ,Y9r?c Ti rnel ..SHINGTO N. Feb. 2? William J. Casey, the Director. of Central Intelli- gence, told the House Select Committee on Lenelligtoday that the C.I.A. had teniati%ly Concluded that the agency hach' -40 'official lavolvernent ' in the Libyan.activities of two fon:tier agents, EcihrerhrIa! Wilson and Frank E. Terpil, a ecoraing to Ceoressional sources. ? 24e, Casey also told the closed hear-.: inge4e sources said, that the agency sharae4 the committee's concerns about preveeeeingefuture misuse ofintelligente expeatieeandinferrnation as well as in.. suringihe adequacy-of internal agency- MET-WilSon' YeTefeifilfiviere lic dieted in 19so on charges of exporting explosives to Libya and, with other for- mer. intelligence and military person- nel, have been linked to the training of terrorists and the 4ansfer abroad of ad- vanced minter/ equipment and exper- tise. Both men arefugitives; Mr. Wilson lives in Libya and Mr. Terpil is believed to be somewhere in the Middle East. Much of trxiay's hearing focused on possible legislative and administrative remedies that, if enacted, could signifi- cantly curtail the export of intelligence expertise and tighten disclosure- and reeistration requirements for Ameri- cans working for foreign governments; according to thesesources. ? ?' - ' ? In his testimony before the commit.. tee, Mr. Casey said the agency, after a long internal investigation begun last July after press disclosures about the case, had reached these these tentative conclusions: r ? 41There was no official contact by the agency with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Terpil al te.r their, orial indictment ill nap , _ ? tiThe agency had no official involve- ment in Libyan terrorist training. ? OThere was no official agency in- volvement in the recraiting of members of the Army Special Forces to help train Libyans. While Mr. Casey's testimony isi some respects echoed earlier agency denials of official complicity, it also reflected a new willingness to address questions surrounding the agency's ability to po- lice its employees and their outside ac- ties... = . ,e, ? e While Mr. Casey told the committee that the agency was revising its internal code of conduct as a result of the Wilson- :Terpil affair, he seemed to favor legisla- tive remedies as a solution rather than, for example, changes in the C.I.A.'s em- ployment contract, sources say. . Queries enTles to Aides Committee members, most of whom attended the three-hour hearing, ad- dressed a wide range of questions to Mr. Casey covering mast aspects of the Wil- son-Terpil affair. Representative Ed- ward P. Boland, Democrat of Massa- chusetts, who is chairman of the com- mittee, said afterward that Mr. Casey. and the agency now seemed to have a good pip on the facts in the cite, al- though Mr. Wilson's activities were first brought to the agency's attention in 1976. '' -. -- ?...., ? ? ? -. e ... .. Some committee members were. in- terested in the relationship between Mr. Wilson and some senior agency employ- ees who maintained contact and had business relationships with Mr. Wilson in 1977 and 1973, but Mr. Casey was ap-. parently unable to shed any new light on this matter.. . . . . . . Most of the discussion, according to _Corieessional sources, focused on ways to r the Inc pie wri iSSL rea find soul Among the legislative so atone being discussed were these: - ? qAmending, the laws gas' 'ening Tf..'..4- tration of foreign agents to cover people working for foreign goverrireentis on in-- telligence matters; . gArnending export con rol laws to miniraize the export of int-...?11igence ex- grtequiring intelligence e7rnployees to register after leaving the United Stat; Government if they go tow Leis for a for- ? eigiceuntry.. elProhibiting certain kinds of private employment for Goverrareent intelli- gence agents;. especially wen retained by foreign governments_ 'hat support terrorism. - - ? .? . "Working with Mr. Casey on the ques-. don of possible legislative remedies 'will beStanleY Sporkin, the alermcy general counsel; who accompanied' Mr. Casey to ihehearing. ee?e, . hTwo members of the inte4Ii gen? cam- rnittee inteieeted in , lee;siative reme- dies, Representative -Albert Gar- Jr.;- Democrat of Tenn e:ssee-, ari eeent- alive Norman Mazzoli, Democrat of Kentucky, both said that any legislation Would have to be designed so as not to: impinge _on ??? yariotz c oaUtutional rights. Mr. Mazzoni said that v,?-o,,s disturbed about the rov-ri. -!.zions of the Libyan, activiti- of the two , former agents, his -questions to Mr. e Casey loolsed more to the future, for the ;-:agency to "give us their vf- sdom on how to eliminat, . or stop this ind of prac- tice ee... ? - -." ee-e" erne:h Mr.. Gore said he three-4-d that-:?the agency had been "blinded' iaits analy- sis of Iran under the depoeed Shah Mo- hammed Rim Pahlevi and Libya in part .1;ecause of close ties between former 'egency personnel and the two countriee'. The Tennessee Democrat said he in- tended to propose legislation requiring members of the intelligence oornmunity_ to agree not to work fora foreign gave emment alter their stint as intelligence Approved For Releas 01R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 TO: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL 1 DCI 2 MI 3 D/ICS 4 DD/NFA 5 DD/A 6 DD/0 7 DD/S&T 8 Chm/NIC 9 GC 10 IG 11 Compt 12 D/EEO 13 D/Pers 14 D/OPP 15 C/EAS/OPP 16 C/IAS/OPP 17 AO/DCI 18 4, ,..1 / - ? 20 21 22 0002-2 STAT rpational Twrjrnv :ficatioApproved For Liic "'Icy Sites of Arre,fica Wash fl.g ton, D. C. 20547 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: elease 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-0090 , February 2, 1982 Office of the Director 90?400pcOct?13:," The Honorable William J. Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency Gilbert A. Robinson Acting Director SUBJECT: "Let Poland Be Poland" The first reports of usage around the world for "Let Poland Be Poland" are most encouraging. More than 100 million viewers in 25 foreign countries saw the presentation in whole or in lengthy excerpts on Sunday night or Monday morning. About 72 million of those viewers were in Europe. In the United States, 16 of the top 25 major market affiliates of the Public Broadcasting System aired the entire program Sunday night or Monday. The radio adaptation broadcast by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe is estimated to have reached more than one hundred million listeners. Many countries will be broadcasting the program in upcoming days which means the total viewing audience will ultimately be much larger. Two comments say a lot. The German TV commentator said: "It was a picture of America's unbroken capability to be sympathetic to freedom." In France, the TV commentator there said: "It was a quality production, advance criticism was proven to be unjustified." Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 02317 5' STA I Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-009 cLACh .es Spy Operations After Iran Loss Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 ? United States intelligence-gathering activities are increasingly being conducted under the cover of private commercial organi- zations rather than 'diplomatic mis- sions, according' to:senior intelligence officials. e ? e The officials said...the change was made in an effort to. tighten security after the loss of :Sensitive documents when the American Embassy in Tehe- ran was seized 4'1,1979, ? ? ? Approaches- to Banl-Sadr Cited :7 The officials said thii new procedure,. initiated by William J, Casey, director of Central Intelligence, resulted from the intelligence corrununity's concern over the public disclosures of secret con- tacts with Iranian, afficials?and 6C-de- tailed American assessinents of the Ira-' nian situation. that followed the take- _ . . ? ,? ? over? . -. . - . ? The documents were obtained by Ira- nian militants when they seized the em- bassy on Nov. 4, 1979. They were subse- quently published in Iran in a 13-volume series of paperback books, copies of '.which have now reached newspapers in ,- ,the United StatesitA-L, Information-int-lie doc4n3erits" ranges from account2of :CentraleIntelligence Agency efforts to recruit AbolhaSsan -Bani-Sadr, then a close adviser to Aya- tollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to a 47-page C.I.A. study of Israelts.inteifigenceand security serviceseeeeee--eeenea' ? That study reveals that the Israelis placed listening_ devices in 'American diplomatic offices in Israel in the 1950's and 1960's and attempted to blackmail an American consularofficial in Jerusa- lem to obtain information.- NEW YORK TIMES 2 FEBRUARY 1982 "We used to keep en cyclopedic files in a lot of stations, including Iran,, ' one in- telligence official said. "That was a mistake. We're now trying to keep files Ito a minimum." In addition, the C.I.A. has asked the State Department to restrict the circula- ' tion of intelligence data in foreign i post, the officials said. Much of the material lost in Iran, they said, was found in files 'kept by embasay pernonnel, Bruce Laingen, the charge d'affaires. At the time of the takeover, an effort was Made to burn or shred sensitive in- formation, but the militants-were able torecover. considerable quantities of documents and were also able to recon- Struct shredded materials.- , , .--eme documents, which were published Iran and made available here, dis- closed, among other things, that in the : days before the seizure of the embassy, the Iranian Govemnient, then headed ? by a moderateePrime Minister Mehdi Barzagan, established contacts with American intelligence agents to seek formation on whether Iraq was foment- ing the insurrection of the Kurdish mi- - parity and whether Israel was also in 1 According to the documents, the C.I.A. made contact with Mr. Bani- Sadr, who was then a close adviser to . Ayatollah Khomeini and later was to be- ? come president of Iran, in an effort to recruit him.: But the mission, which in- volved the use of a secret agent using an 'alias, produced only mcdest informa- tion about the political situation in revo- lutionaryIran. The attempt to recruit Mr. Bani-Sadr as an agent failed. ? Deportation of Shah Urged. 01R000400120002-2 ? For example, there is considerable documentation to show that American intelligence agents had contacts with Abbas Amir Entezarn, who was Deputy Prime Minister and official spokesman for Mr. Bazargan, whose Government fell in the aftermath of the takeover of the American Embassy; -ndri Entezam was appointed ambas- , iador to Sweden just before the Bazar- gan Government fell on Nov. 6, 1979 and later was tried on charges that included collaboration with the C.I.A. Last June the official Iranian press agency said a revolutionary court had sentenced him to life imprisonment. Mr. Entezarn is not named in the documents, but in the context seems to fit the description of 'a -C.I.A. contact known in the cablegrams to Washington as "SDPLOD/ 1." . Mr. Entezam and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi both appeared to have been particularly ? 'concerned about Iraq's activities, given the traditional enmity between that nation and Iran. A document says that on Oct 18, 1979, "SDPLOD/1" met with an American known by the code name of "Adiesick" to tell him that Iran's needs "at the mo- ment were basically for tactical infon roation on Kurdish situation and politi- cal intelligence ? on e who - supporting Kurds and why." :.".;tAfter the 'deposed Shah Mohammed Pima Pahlevi was admitted to the United States for medical reasons in October 1979, the publications reveal, various Iranian. officials pleaded. with the United States Embassy to deport him for fear that his. presence in America would be used by radicals to destroy any chances of improved Iranain-Arnerican relations. Mr. Laingen himself had ? strongly: urged against admitting the Shah to the United States. - a t? :In 1977, the documents shows, the C.LA.: complained in a repoit that too ' much credence was given to imforma- - The intelligence officials said that Mr. non supplied by the Iranian intelligence Casey, who took-office at the start of the-. service, Savak. - Reagan Administration; had placed a if 1 The public release of the documents, high priority on establishing con:anal-, which include the minutes of embassy cial cover for agents and operations; ette meetings conducted by Ambassador ther by gaining. the coc of:' William H. Sullivan, the last envoy to ' 'aseration ws"_ _rateee Teheran. seemed designed to put American Ira- . corporations -. ape '''.5 man moderates and other opponents of , abroad or by creating Jictitious corn-1-the religious factions in the worst1 I . i nies for the purpose.: a...,:',.4'' .. a.; . ' ' '1?be iht., ,. .; m: :_.; : : ; ? : " : Mr. Casey was also reported to have---------------- ordered that the amount of intelligence data stored overseas bereduced.:- Tatteit.: , Approved For STAT &ease 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 11/ Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER 2 February 1982 unity for the CIA C AREBRAINED" is what one unnamed LFilJusticeDepartment official called CIA Director .William Casey's proposal for the granting of immunity from criminal prosecu- tion to CIA agents while they are on legitimate missions. An "overreaction," said another. ? That may be the least that can be said of the Casey proposal. It is a worrisome request, for in the conduct of a person's duties, not even the president is above the law. Casey posed the idea in a letter to Attorney General William French Smith, suggesting that. Congress be asked to approve such a shield. Neither Smith nor the Congress should advance any further the notion of carte blanche for the CIA. No agency or agent of government ever should be endowed with such extraordinary power in a democracy. The Justice Department's Office of Intelli- gence Policy Review, which recognizes the need for internal agency oversight, opposes Casey's recommendation on the ground if would permit CIA agents to "freely engage" in' otherwise illegal activities without authoriza- tion or approval from Justice. The CIA's general counsel, Stanley Sporkin,. says that the Casey proposal is a technical, legal. matter, not a policy change. That is debatable: . ? . . ? STAT But even if Sporkin were correct, it is on technical, legal matters that courts determine privilege in this country ? as well as the admissibility of evidence. And if there could be little or no criminal prosecution of individuals or organizations sufficiently threatening to our national security because of rights' violations, then ,intelligence agencies realistically would have to employ other means of dealing with those considered to be enemies of the state. Ironically, some CIA officials contend that the Casey proposal really wouldn't give the agency anything it doesn't already enjoy under . current law ? the concern merely being for the status quo protection under the upcoming. revised federal criminal code. But that expla- nation is somewhat feeble, particularly since this administration has made clear its intent to relax what it considers to be unreasonabl restrictions on U.S. intelligence agencies. While there is no denying the need fora flexible, opportunistic intelligence community to protect this nation's interests, to grant a standing shield .of legal _ immunity to agents would effectively remove them from. the - control of government's elected leaders, who themselves could become the target of misdi- rected agents or an agency whose integrity had been compromised: Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ?T? ASSOCIATED PRESS Approved For Releas% 2105Wila8)9a-RDP91-00912 STAT R BYLVIXEEV ,?. 1R000400120002-2 L.ONCLUDES OFFICIALLY .'liVOLVE3 IN ...- :_,. _ ____-.- ., ...... t.r: ViKti-h J.;il-LirIN Q. Uhz.EY iviLt .iNTELLIGENCE ?_. laiitt, ON ,u1 irlhi thz zFY hUmNi..=i-ih".*:. ic.N;h!ivmi..; 1..vNt-i-vi,tv intnm 1141-5..:. Nu Urtita.i. ....AH INvUL.'vmPitNi IN LIBYAN TERRORIST TRAINING" THE COITTEE 1::HAIR!-AN SAID. EDWARD 7,-.:4ASS. SPOKE WITH REPORTERS AFTER OTHEN !..11 OFFICIALS TESTIFIED BEFORE THE 'OUSE PANEL BEHIND CiOFFD DOORS FOR THREE HOURS. -HE HEARING FOCUSED ON ti.uEETIONS OVER ThE ROFijArY OF AN ITERAL INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE LINKS EET'wEEN THE AGENCY AND TO - - FORiYiER AGENTS cONIN NILSON AND '7RANN C. iERPIL! ACCUSED OF SETTii-41.1 UP A TERRORIST TRAINING PROJECT IN :IFYA. 7.OLAND SAID HIS COMNITTEE HAS R VERY DEEP CONCERN BECAUSE OF THE IfIPACT THAT THESE ALLEGATIONS HAVE UPON THE AGENCY. F rOURF.E THE AGREES " WITH THIS5 7HE Ct.iFii.4 SAID HE WAS PLEASED EY Int COOPERATION WIiH A COnMITTEE INCI.LiIRY INTO w,ILSON-ERPIL AFFRIR. ;;;E .ADDED ":7M F.ATISFIED wiTH THE AGENCVS CONDC7 THIS POINT." RT ?OwEVER5 DOLAND INDICATED THAT THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THERE ARF STILL DISCREFANCIES WHICH NEED TO EE RESOLVED BETWEEN THE OFFICIAL VERSION FiNF INF-mFTION FROM OTHER SC-..'SCES THE LIBYRN-RELRTED RCTIVITIES. "Y,ITH REFERENCE 70 WHO s.f.NEW AND WHEN5 THAT NuuLD HAVE 70 EP BA,..ANCEL N,ITH SOME OF THE INFORmATION WA. HAVE IN THF FIF AND TESTIfviONY NhICH HAS BEEN ADDUCED BY WITNPSSES NHERF IT DOESN1T , wITH THF AGF4CY1F INVPSTIGATION? CJOLAND SAID WITHOUT ELABORATING. 7.FRFARING wITH C.REEY AT THP HEARING WERE E:OFFY THF- NE, L AL-7 EF INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AG,:--NrY5 P' R N N t: Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 2 February 1982 STAT L Lt1UtX5 LAP prz;zrioTr.: HT9JT TE TRIOW IM TI 5 R5O R117INn IN P O O : ..77 ?: I :0,111,47 r4t: sst-i? ? 1,17777:t7 F,??.: : : ? ? : 7 .7 , ? Ezp L1tLtr L::..r DEPUTY DIRECTOR OP CLHOESTIME OPERRTIBS$ AND THOM CLINFS - DIRFC- 3. OFRfl_I NI (..iiNnPSTDIEfi T HR TNTHE H.. . ? . ? t 1./S743 I? "s1?3? / 1? 5r. *1 tF 1i?-;1%1?1Wr )^ . H ?. .z EOUIPPIENT riUSILNESS WITH THE REPORTED HELP OF 4I_SEN. SHAP.KiFY UFMT TO WORK FOR CLINES WHEN HE RE -IP .ED IN A379. PPc:PY STfiRiFil Fi SECOND INYESTIG8TI114 IMTO THE LRS - Tp!$ ccr prippr ? re riiirriiiiivi;r? : .! t:I 2Aporcood ne,FIEfieaft005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 AR T I C:r_irs A:PPEABED ON PAGE HOUSE IS STARIIN FEARINCS ON C, NEW YORK TIKES 1 FEBRUARY 1982 ? The two men, accordirig to the Justice ' Department, reached an agreement with Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, in 1976 to sell Libya their ex-per- ' tise in intelligence and military matters ' to help train terrorists. ? The C.I.A.'s internal Investigation is one of several facets of the Wilson-Ter- case that the House Permanent Se- lect Committee on Intelligence is ex- pected to explore in three hearings this week, committee staff members said. Other. facets include the recruitment of Army Special Forces veterans :to train terrorists in Libya and.Mr.WiI- son's association with a secret Navy. in- tell igence unit called Task Force 157: . The hearings will conclude a four- month committee staff investigation. into the activities of Mr. Wilson and Mr. iTerpd. The- committee, according to staff members; has reached no conclu- sions about the adequacy of the inspec- tor general's report, but enough ques- tions have been raised to warrant a re- 'view of the specific Wilson-Teroil in- quiry' as well as the general ability of the ?C.I.A. to investigate possible rniscon- duct by its officials. . - : Ofileials Defend Inspector General I Former ' officials of the agency, in- cluding Adm. Stansfield Turner, Direc- Agency Report of-Activity for, Libya Is Focus of fnquiry. .By PHILIP TAUBMAN ,.SpecialtolbeNewYoesTtrers _ 1? WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, ?-?? The House! 'Intelligence Committee- will; begin: closed hearings Tuesday on the Central! ;Intelligence Agency's, investigation or, its possible links to two former agents. who sold their services to Libyae ? - The C.I.A.'s internal investigation: may have failed to pursue several sig- nificant lines of inquiry and may not, have examined all possible sources of. information, sources familiar with the. I committee's work said. The inquiry was. I conducted in -1976 and 1977 by the agene I cy's inspector general to . determine_ whether any officials helped establish a. ; terrorist training project itiLibya... ? ' Report Exonerated Officials. The inspector general's report, which led to the dismissal of two middle-level agency employees, exonerated several senior intelligence agency officials who were suspected of having ties:to the for- mer agents, Edwin P. Wilson and Frank Terpil, according to former C.I.A. of- ficials. The report also served until recentl as the basis for agency statements tha the C.I.A. had thoroughly irivestig,at the Wilson-Ter-ail matter and had teem no official ties to the Libyan operati organized by the two ' A second internal. C.1-..A..k investiga- tion, .initiated last_year by. William Casey,: the Director of Central gence; is continuing, according to Rea- gan Admitiisti ation official.: To date,' it has found no evidence of official agency approval or .support for the operation, according to the It has; however,--; raised questions about the thoroughness of the first in- vestigation, according to those familiar with the committee's work. These sources deelined to provide details, but said that agency investigators might have prematurely cleared .senior offi cials. - ? ' ' Mr. Wilson and Mr.-Terpil were in- dicted in 1980 on charge eFatelpi shipping explosives to 1..ib"ri. They are currently living abroad as fugitiyes,.. tor of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, defended the work of the inspector general in the Wilson-Ter- pil case. "I turned him loose and I'm satisfied that he got me to the bottom of ,7 the case," Admiral Turner said in a re-. cent interview. '? Admiral Turner disinissed two mid- dle-level agency employees in 1977 after the inspector general found that they had helped Mr. Wilson establish the ter- rorist training operation in Libya. .? -? 2 ? At the time, the C.I.A.'s inspector gen- eral was John H. Waller, who worked in the agency's.! clandestine oPerationa division for many years before becom- ing inspector general in 1976, according to former intelligence officials. Mr. Waller retired from the C.I.A. several years ago. _ ..- 'Mr._ Waller's investigation of the Wil.' ,Son-Terpil case focused almost exclu-- sively on officials in clandestine opera- tions, including several with whom he - had worked closely before becoming in- spector general, according to former in- telligence officials. Mr. Waller last week declined to discuss his work at the Specific Theodore rector Thomas C the eland! maintain( left gover establish - Mr. Stu denied kri son's bust acknowlec him set up ness when Shackley ? when he i - both men. - ? - a The Hou said to be ( -conflict fa( asked to ii Mr. Wilsor Clines. Witnesses expected to testify et Ites- day's hearing, which will examine Mr. Wilson's links to the agency, will aclude Mr. Casey; Admiral Bobby R. ':arnan, the Deputy Director. of Central Intelli- gence; Charles A. Briggs, the current 1 Inspector general, and Stanley S-.-orkin,,4 the agency's general counsel. s?,Adrnirrel Inman is expected to return ?the next day to discuss- Mr.. work for Task Force 157, a secret Navy intelligence unit that the admiral dis- ' mantfed in the mid-1970's when le as Director of Naval Intelligence. - Defense Department officials ire ex- ? ected to appear Thursday to eiscuss ?-Mr. Wilson's recruitment of L? eke. F. Thompson, an officer on active duty in the Army Special Forces, to hela train terrorists in Libya. Mr.. Taompecei . asserted that his superiors in the Green Berets approved his mission to Li aya.... STAT r Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 ARTICLE Al-TEA:RED U.S ULZA WO4LD ...RE.EQET or pAGE_piL3roved For RelealsT3RRiairl !48 im-Kurui-00901R00 king 0 nruly on Russia, Taiwan, Cuba, Mideast?the President is altering course across the board as complex international problems close in. America's allies welcome the change a lot more than Reagan's "new right" backers. Up against the harsh realities of a troublesome world, Ronald Reagan is being driven to alter drastically many of the premises he carried to the White House a year ago. To the dismay of his staunchest conservative supporters, the President has modified what was widely seen as an essentially ideological approach to a host of critical foreign- policy issues involving Russia, China, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Central America and the Mideast The President continues to stand firm on the administra- tion's two basic objectives?rearming America and meeting more vigorously the challenge of Soviet expansionism. But at the start of his second year in the White House, he finds himself moving broadly in the direction that American U.S. Foreign-Policy Establishment TIMOTHY MURPHY-USNMYR 400120002-2 ST Presidents have pursued internationally. for . quarter of a century or more. Thus? ii Stiff anti-Soviet rhetoric that stirred widespread con- cern about a return to the cold war last year now is muted in favor of arms-control negotiations and suminitry with the Russians. is Preserving unity of the Atlantic Alliance is given priori- ty in the Polish crisis over demands for sanctions against Russia and the military regime in Warsaw that America's partners are reluctant to impose. m Washington's drive for a "strategic consensus" in the Mideast, once a top priority, is being suborc inated to the search for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. ii Threats of military action against Cuba to neutralize Fidel Castro's support for Marxist guerrillas in Central America are giving way to greater emphas s on political and economic measures to meet the danger. ii Closer strategic cooperation with China, iewed initial- ly with suspicion by many close to Reagan, is t_ etting prefer- ence over campaign promises to upgrade elations with Taiwan. Behind these wide-ranging shifts in adminstration for- eign policy is the discovery that global realities often do not correspond to the views voiced by Reagan in the 1980 campaign. Many of the Chief Executive's orig-.nal initiatives overseas boomeranged?alarming U.S. alli ?s, fueling a peace movement in Europe to the delight of :lussia, impos- ing severe strains on U.S. relations with China, alienating black Africa and much of the rest of the Third World and allowing the dangerous Palestinian problem t ) fester. Beyond that, what has been brought home to Reagan is that America's ability to influence intractable allies and adversaries is limited, whether in responding to the annex- ation of the Golan Heights by Israel's Menaciern Begin or the Army crackdown in Poland instigated by Russia's Leo- Md Brezhnev. Military power, the Presider t has discov- ered, is of limited utility?even against international pyg- TIMOTHY MURPHY-USNSWA Caspar Weinberger Pentagon chief cc ntributed to ap- pearance of disarray by squab- bring publicly with Haig. Hard-liner on many issues b not on block- ading Cuba_ William Casey CIA director served as Reagan campaign manager, survived in- quiry into financial affairs, seeks active role in shaping of foreign policy. 2 A President Reagan Delegates wide authority over for- eign policy. Decisions on Taiwan, Poland, disarmament negotiations, Alexander Haig Secretary of State emerging as "vicar" of foreign policy, criticized by conservatives for favoring "Kissinger disciples" at State. William Clark New NSC head is close Rea- gan friend, foreign-policy nov- ice. His assignment: End bick- other issues disappoint "new right" ering, coordinate overseas supporters. ApprovecktRocisRelease 2005/11/2 coiviiivuED mies such as Cuba's Libya's Muammar Qa The result has been an increasing tendency by Reagan, in dealing with tests overseas, to overrule hawkish elements in his administra- tion in favor of the more pragmatic line usually, but not always, es- poused by Alexander. Haig's State Department. A conspicuous exam- ple: The administration's measured response to martial law in Poland, which a right-wing leader?Rich- ard Viguerie?denounces as Rea- gan's being soft on the Soviets. It is not only the substance of foreign policy but also its manage- ment that Reagan is altering. He is embracing a plan that he originally spurned by recasting in January the role of the national-security adviser into one of the most powerful in the White House and naming to the job a close confidant, William Clark, to replace Richard Allen. Criticized as an ineffective admin- istrator with a strong ideological bias, Allen had so little status that he was required to report to the President through White House Counselor Edwin Meese III, who is without experience in international affairs. With the reorganization, the President is attempting to elimi- nate the high-level arguments and turf battles involving Haig and De- fense Secretary Caspar Weinber- ger, as well as Allen. The feuding, which Reagan promised would not be permitted in his administration, gave rise to confusion over who, if anyone, was in charge of foreign policy. In the new setup, Haig ap- pears to be emerging with greatly enhanced authority. Staunch conservatives deplore the changes. They see the elimination of Allen and the promotion of professional Foreign Service officers to top State Department posts as further evidence that diplomatic careerists are gaining control of international affairs in the Reagan administration. -- Whatever the misgivings of the President's right-wing supporters, a survey by the magazine's bureaus abroad indicates that the current direction of the administration's foreign policy is endorsed by U.S. allies. Reflecting a widely - shared view in Europe, the magazine's London bureau reports: "To the British, Reagan is moving from rhetoric and ideology in his first year to greater diplomacy and realism in his second." The administration's handling of four of the most critical international issues points up how far it has modified its original premises in an effort to find an effective strategy for dealing with a world crowded with intractable problems and defiant nations?allies no less than adversaries. FfiltHaV =MOM aCIALAUP91-00901R Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. Deputy Secretary A 40-year veteran of For- eign Service, manages State for Haig. Lawrence Eagleburger Under Secretary Kissinger protege, still unconfirmed, driving force behind policies. Jeans J. Kirkpatrick Ambassador to U.N. A Democrat, but ranked among hard-liners on Po- land, human rights. Robert D. Hormats 4ssistant Secretary Slated for top economic 'ob, criticized by conser- ratives as too liberal. movement in West :.rrt Europe and 0N4NitZ9V-243.own in Poland. In its initial approach to relations with Moscow, the administration stressed that arms-control negotia- tions would have to await a signifi- cant-U.S. military b?iildup and that a Reagan-Brezhnev summit would depend on evidence of Soviet good behavior internationally?in Af- ghanistan and Poland particularly. At the same time, key members of the Reagan foreign-policy team indulged in what some critics, espe- cially in Europe, branded as unnec- essarily strident, anti-Soviet rheto- ric?for example, the President's assertion that Sos let leaders "re- serve unto themselves the right to -commit any crime to lie, to cheat" to attain their goal of world domi- nation. Also, there was a good deal of talk by the Preiident, Haig and Weinberger about limited nuclear war in Europe?a sensitive subject that previous administrations had assiduously avoidel. A top administration official in- sists that all this was necessary to send a clear signal to Russia of a definite change in Washington. His words: "As we evolved an East- West strategy, we needed in the early stages to clarify our positions. It has always been the President's view that confusion is the greatest threat to world peace. We set out to strip away the ambiguities. We wanted to make sure that the Sovi- ets understood where we stand," What administration officials dis- covered was that 7hey were fright- ening America's allies more than the Russians and 'neling the Euro- pean peace movement that threat- ened to undermine NATO's nuclear - strategy. The change in the administration's posture toward Russia was signaled dramatically by Reagart's November 18 state- ment proposing a "zero option" agreement in negotiations to limit medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and also calling for other arms control talks with Russia. With that move, he seemed to seize the initiative from Moscow in a fateful struggle for Western European opinion that the U.S. had been losing by default. ? Subsequently, the President announced what was seen as a reversal of his policy on summitry. He ceelared his inter- est in a summit meeting with Soviet President Brezhnev without linking it to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, Poland or other international crisis spots as in the past. Washington's reaction to the imposition of martial law in Poland underscores how far the administration is playing down its original policy of "linkage" and emphasizing what could be called a "NATO first" approacn. Despite his in- dictment of Moscow for complicity in the Army crackdown . in Poland, Reagan is resisting pressure from some support- ers to break off arms talks with the Soviet;, drop any notion of a summit and embargo all trade with Russia. Haig did inform the Soviets that he was unpreparei to discuss a date Vernon Walters Ambassador-at-Large Former CIA deputy direc- tor, Haig's personal trou- bleshooter. A New Line Toward Russia . Reagan's hard-line strategy for handling Russia has been tempered by two events?the spectacular rise of the peace Richard R. Burt Coordinates policy on arms negotiations, other strategic issues. ?-? . Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 for beginning strategic arms talks at a late January meeting, in Geneva with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. This was seen as a reaction to sharp criticism by former Secre- tary of State Henry Kissinger and the new right, but not as a new decision to spurn arms negotiations. Adjusting Mideast Priorities I laig's latest Mideast trip?his second in two weeks,- points up the switch in administration priorities in that volatile region. Originally the emphasis was on building an anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" embracing moderate Arab states as well as Israel, with the search for an agreement on the Palestinian problem pushed to the back burner. The theory was that a greater sense of security in the area would make it easier for Israel and the Arabs to come to terms. Events have deflated that assumption. In the words of a former high-level State Department specialist: "Haig tried to convince the Arabs that the Soviets were the main problem, but it didn't work. The people in the Middle East made it clear they wouldn't buy it." Saudi Arabia, cast for a key role in Reagan's regional defense plan, still opposes an American military presence in the Persian Gulf area, while the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat has raised doubts about military cooperation with that country in the future. As for Israel, even though Washington signed a strategic-cooperation agreement with the Jerusa- lem government, Prime Minister Begin was not deterred from defying the U.S. by annexing the Golan Heights. The upshot was suspension of the accord, a bitter Begin attack on the Reagan admin- istration and a major crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Says Amos Jordan, vice chairman of Georgetown Univer- sity's Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington: "Both Haig and the President have viewed the Middle East in terms of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and not in terms of internal dynamics. Both are in the process of learning." As a result of the learning process, the administration has reversed its Middle East priorities. Haig, in his travels to the area, now is concentrating on an attempt to achieve a breakthrough in peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt, while soft-pedaling the question of an anti-Soviet defense arrangement. Downgrading Taiwan If there was one international issue on which candidate Ronald Reagan held passionate personal views dating back many years, it was on U.S. relations with Taiwan. When he moved to the White House, he assumed that he could upgrade American diplomatic and military ties with the Taipei government and at the same time reinforce strategic cooperation with China. But in its first major test, that policy proved unworkable. The issue: Taiwan's request for an advanced FX warplane to augment its force of F-5E planes. Chinese leaders served notice that such arms deliveries to an island that they claim as an integral part of their country would jeopardize their :relations With the U.S. After months of tough behind-the-scenes debate in the administration, the President in early January decided to reject Taiwan's re- quest for more-sophisticated aircraft but allow further deliv- ery of the F-5E's that are produced on the island. He acted on the unanimous advice of Haig, Weinberger and Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey that, contrary to the claims of Taiwan leaders, the island does not face a threat that requires more advanced aircraft. IAGGIE STI?BEH The decision reflected an administration judgment that, I for compelling strategic reasons, relations with China should take precedence over links with raipei. Upward of 50 Soviet divisions are being tied down n the Far East by the face-off with China. Furthermore, Peking diverts other Russian forces by supporting guerrillas in Afghanistan and contributes to stability in Southeast Asia by deterring Viet- nam from contemplating adventures t eyond Cambodia. Conservative Republicans reject this rationale, accusing the administration of kowtowing to Peking. Even so, Chinese leaders are not happy. The magazine's Peking bureau reperts: 'The current pattern of arms sales to Taiwan, with no increase in the sophistication of weapons supplied, prooably will avoid a downgrading of official U.S.-Chinese re:ations. But it will set back for an indefinite period the surprising cooperation between the two olc enemies that was expanding so rapichy last year. Rea- View From the Kremlin: A Tougher U.S. Stance MOSCOW To the Kremlin, implications of Ronald Reagan's hard-line foreign policy come across loud and clear The era of unchallenged Soviet ad- ventures abroad is over. Even as Moscow assails America's toughened stance, it is evident here that Soviet leaders are convinced Reagan is determined to resist ex- pansionism and that Russia must move with greater caution as a result. Concern about a confrontation with the U.S., for example, contributes to Moscow's relictance to send its military forces into Poland. Likewi:.e, Soviet uneas- iness is seen as being behind President Leonid Brezh- nev's desire for a summit meeting with Reagan and Russia's deep interest in the reopened U.S.-Soviet arms-control talks. Behind Moscow's eagerness to keep doing business with the United States are these three main factors: II The Kremlin is extremely concerned about the U.S:military buildup and wants to avert an arms race-. or With its economy in a perilous state, Russia knows it must import American grain and acquire Western technology to boost productivity. =? The Soviets are convinced they can only gain from a face-to-face encounter between Brezhnev and Reagan_ Not only would a summit enable Brezhnev to take the personal measure of his U.S. counterpart, but it would enhance what Nfoscow believes is Western Eurooe's perception of Brezhnev as a man of peace a.nd Reagan as a troublemaker. For all of Russia's need for accommodation, the Kremlin has not been cowed by Reagan. The Soviets continue to deploy SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe, to strengthen their bomber squadrons and to send economic and military aid to clients such as Libya, Syria and Cuba. Even so, with Reagan residing in the White House, the Soviet Union views new ventures abroad as full of dangerous risks. " , ? ??? By NICHOLAS DANILOFF Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 c EVIVUV-0 Approved Fgr Release 2005/11/28 :QA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 gan s willingness to continue setting t aipei any military aircraft makes the Chinese wonder whether he ever actual- ly abandoned his pro-Taiwan 'two China' view." Stopping Castro Without Gunboats More than anywhere else, in Central America the admin- istration is confronted with the limits on the utility of American military power. Haig and others, from the outset, have talked repeatedly of possible armed action to cut off the flow of weapons from Castro's Cuba to Marxist guerrillas attempting to seize pow- er in El Salvador and elsewhere in the region. The Secre- tary of State set the tone with an early threat that the U.S. would "go to the source" if external arms deliveries to the insurgents continued. High-ranking administration officials concede that they are engaged in a game of brinksmanship with Castro. As one put it: "It is true that we are dealing in calculated ambiguities with our threats to Castro, but since when do you tell your enemy what you will and will not do?" The fact is that Cuba has continued its assistance to Central American guerrillas and the administration has re- frained from responding with military action. Weinberger's Pentagon reportedly is taking a strong stand against the use of American armed forces to try to neutralize Castro on the grounds that it probably wouldn't work and it would be widely opposed in the U.S. Also, Haig has found only minimal support among Latin American countries for military intervention. In fact, Mexi- co, which Reagan views as an especially important ally, stresses its friendship with Castro and opposes an American naval blockade or any other form of armed action to neu- tralize Cuban support for Marxist guerrillas in Central America. The danger, warns one Latin American expert, is that Castro will call Washington's bluff. To quote Prof. Luis E. Aguilar of Georgetown University in Washington: "It's like a Western movie: You'd better be willing to draw your gun or they will make you eat it." Despite the threatening posture, the focus of administra- tion policy is shifting away from militaiy options to political and economic measures designed to reinforce Central American governments under attack by leftist rebels. Washington is counting heavily on elections to be held in El Salvador in March and a Caribbean Basin development plan to help turn the tide against the armed revolutionaries. But administration policymakers concede that they are working against heavy odds. Thus, Reagan could find himself in a no-win situation in Central Ameri- ca, inhibited from using the military power of the United States and un- able to devise an effective political ' antidote to the threat posed by Marx- ist revolutionaries. For the President, all of this under- scores a clear lesson: Any American administration, sooner or later, must recognize that in the complex real world there are few simple problems and no simple solutions. 0 By JOSEPH FROMM with DENNIS MULLIN, SU- SANNA McBEE and the magazine's foreign bureaus Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0 NOTRE DAME NEWS February 1982 STAT In the CIA, says Ralph you hczve b do is tell the Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after he was cut from the Green Bay Packers. He's not sure why the CIA approached him, but during his intelligence training he met so many other pro football dropouts that he suspects the agency considered the National Football League a prime recruiting ground. When the Korean War ended in 1953 McGehee joined the agency's clandestine operations section as a case officer. Over the next two decades he served in the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam. He did the routine work of an intelligence officer: recruiting agents, conducting investigations, and maintain- ing liaison with the local police and intelligence organizations. During that era the CIA's main struggle was against Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. That struggle was a losing one. 01 all the countries in the retion, today only Thailand remains allied to. the West.. McGehee thinks he knows why our side lost the rest. In 1965 McGehee directed an intelli- gence gathering effort in a province in northeast Thailand where a Communist insurgency was beginning. After a detailed, yearlong, study, McGehee re- ported that he had found a popular movement so broad, pervasive and deeply rooted that purely military measures were unlikely to defeat it. McGehee submitted his findings to the agency but, .after a brief period of praise for this work, he ran into an official wall in Washington. His findings, he explains, ran counter to the official Washington view that Communist insurgency was a form of ' clandestine invasion, and that the natives involved were unwilling partici- ? pants who were duped or forced into joining guerilla units who took their arms and orders from outside. McGehee maintains that intelligence information often is politicized_ In .. theory, the agenc- provides accurate and unbiased informanon to the President so ! he can make wist decisions regarding' national security. in practice, when a . President is firrn'e committed to a particular policy such as military victory in Vietnani), the agency shapes its information to conform to that policy Bad or even incvnvenient news is - unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in the history of int-Ili.gence, and it is the rock on which R tlph McGehee foundered. After he subm tied his dissenting report, McGehee', career took a nose? dive. He was shuttled from one low-leve - job to another. Jr was promised promotions but r ever received them_ He was frustraned as he watched his country wage tht wrong kind of war in i Southeast Asia, :me he knew was doomed to failur t. Ho did what he coal Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-p/STII\ App,roved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00040 PAGE_ THE WASHINGTONIAN February 1982 STAT BOBBY RAY INMAN Master Spy Who's Not Out in the Cold Tall, spare, with hooded eyes and a Bugs Bunny grin, he has access to more raw intelligence than anyone in Washington. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Bobby Ray Inman was born 50 years ago in Rhonesboro, Texas. "Anybody from that far back in the sticks can't be all bad," says Senator John Tower, and in- deed Inman is regarded as extraordinar- ily good by powerfut members of Con? gress. They prefer Inman to CIA Director William Casey, whose errors have drawn fire but who retains President Reagan's support, for the time being. Inman?smart, ambitious, articulate, quick?reads half the night, subsisting on four or five hours of sleep. Asked to where he says the Soviets outnumber us three-to-one. After service in Korea and Vietnam, Inman headed the National Security Agency for four years, then hoped to accept a lucrative outside offer. He had two sons to educate and a wife in grad- uate school, But Reagan talked Inman into the slot as Casey's deputy, boosting Inman to four-star admiral. He was one of the youngest men to attain that rank. Rumors that Inman, not Casey, runs the CIA appear unfounded. A former CIA intelligence official who knows Inman well says, "Casey briefs the President. Inman coordinates the work of other in- telligence agencies, a tedious job. The assiV6118feEicKfrIMPeillkailtib8541/28v941110RItiRt4t-80190/1011413400/1/200 nesss Thniai ays: "On current intel- the President and the President doesn't ligence we're very good. In assessing always make the decisions. Should Casey loco tuall " 1-ks. ffsr"...1 nub, 02-2 Approved For Release -20051/12111218E:SCIA-IRDP91-00901R0004001 February 1982 There is nothing the news media love more than a good scandal. When the personal business affairs of a highly placed Govern- ment official appear to create a conflict with public obligation, every last detail is likely to be reported and rehashed. In reeent weeks, even the melodrama of a Libyan as- sassination squad and the tragedy unfolding in Poland failed to eclipse three grubby tales?Richard Allen's, William Casey's, and Maurice Stans's. While we would be among the last to rise to the defense of any of these three, it does seem to us that much of the hullabaloo raised about their alleged transgressions is utterly beside the point. What reporters and editors consistently fail to ask is whether Government Policy would be dif- ferent to any significant extent if the finan- cial affairs of a President's close aides were clean as the proverbial hound's tooth. Allencaseystans, whose name has been sullied with charges of wastefraudancla- buse, was merely going about his usual busi- ness: the shaping of a foreign policy that best suits the needs of U.S. multinationals. Certainly it is no news that democracy is but a footnote on CIA and National Security Council balance sheets; from Guatemala to Iran to Chile, corporate profits have always come first. Just as at the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to which Stans has just been appointed, the stimulation and protection of U. S. interests abroad rule the day. Richard Allen's consulting firm, William Casey's portfolio--7-they make a good read. But they have little to do with the way American foieign and domestic policy is shaped. In our economic system, conditions that make General Motors, ITT, Exxon, and the rest happy are the foremost goal. , But the Allencaseystans stories do serve one important function. A good house- cleaning now and then convinces many that our highest leaders are serving the public good. And the emphasis on the superficial ' failings of the cleaned prevents the media from undertaking even a modest examina- tion of the systematic role of corporate ! power in political life. 20002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 STAT 2--- Approved For,Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0004001 .1.J1T THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY ON February 1982 Tilting at Windmills When the Washington Post bought the printing plant of the Washington Star, it had a legitimate reason: Post circulation had skyrocketed because of the Star's demise. But the purchase also effectively cut off the possibility of a new afternoon paper published by anyone other than the Post. There is simply not the existing press availability to print such a paper, and the capital investment to buy new presses, considering the generally ? dim prospects for afternoon - papers, is just too forbidding.... ? Remember how clever criminals -once wore gloves or carefully erased their fingerprints before leaving the scene of a crime? These precautions are no longer necessary. You can leave prints all over the place and still have two months to escape to Rio or some other haven and commit a few more burglaries before you leave. The reason is it's now taking the FBI that long to process requests for fingerprint checks.... The Reagan administration has extorted S10 000 from William -Colby by threatening him with prosecution because his French publisher had distributed copies_ of his book containing certain "sensitive passages" that were deleted at the CIA's request in the American edition. It was this magazine that first pointed out the differences ["Le Convert blown," by Joseph Nocera, November 1980] between the French and American editions. Our point was that the agency's cuts?the so-called sensitive passages--concerned insignificant matters and proved how idiotic the OM csjamlbja_yeaLrhe fine is a shameful reversion to STAT The Reagan administration is giving us another appointee in the great tradition of Allen, Raymond Donovan, and William J. ("not unfit") Casey. He is Maurice Stans, who has been nominated to be director of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Stans, you will recall, served as finance chairman of the Committee to Reelect the President and raised a record S62 million for the 1972 campaign. Unfortunately, the way he raised and disbursed the money led to his indictment by two grand juries. On March 12, 1975, he pleaded guilty to three counts of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act and two counts of accepting illegal campaign -contributions.... Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2 Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-0090 THE PROGRESSIVE February 1982 Beau Grosscup Last January, shortly after the Ninety- seventh Congress convened, a reso- lution was introduced in each house authorizing the President to pro- claim March 16 as "Freedom of Informa- tion Day." The Senate version (S.J. Res. 22) made it a point to stress that public ac- cess to information is indispensable to pub- lic decision-making in a democracy. Tt states: . Whereas a free press exists to serve the American people whose daily decisions rest on their having information; Whereas a fundamental principle of our Nation is that given information? the people can make the decisions that determine their present and theirfuture; . Whereas if these decisions are to he wise, they must be reached after weighing the facts , and considering the alternatives and conse- quences; Whereas the freedom we cherish in this land is rooted in information. . . .- Since assuming office, the Reagan Ad- ministration has often invoked the central assumption of S.J. 22 that public access to information is crucial to the democratic process. This, after all, is the basis of its claim that its program has been shaped by informed public sentiment. . Whether the conservative Reagan forces have accurately gauged public opinion is by no means clear. What is clear is that the Ad- miniStration and its supporters in Congress. have moved swiftly to choke off the flow of information by which public opinion is pre- sumably formed. Three separate but com- patible tactics are being used:. ? - First, the Administration has mounted a direct attack on the principle that the peo- ple have a `-right to know" in a number of respects. Proposed changes in the Freedom of Information Act seek to restrict access to Government documents, either by outright denial or by burdensome rules designed to discourage demands for information. One bill, S. 587, would amend the Freedom of Information Act to limit access to records of law enforcement agencies. Another, S. 586, would amend the Privacy Act of 1974 to al- low Government officials access to law en- forcement records while limiting such ac- cess for those who are the subjects of Government files. S. 391 would prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information identifying U.S. inte hwifsvwdritsorTFlzgi Nuclear Regulatory Agffcy-has proposed Roan Gmccrun tpachev nolitics at Ithaca STA I legislation that would reduce the public's right to gather information for use at nu- clear plant licensing hearings. Each of these measures has its specific rationalization, of course, but the general theme for all of them is that "excessive" public access to in- formation is an obstacle to efficient govern- ment. . Second, reduced public access to in for-. _mation is a consequence of the Administration's wholesale budget cuts in social services. Many of the agencies bear- ing the brunt of funding cuts are basic infor- mational sources for consumers, educators, and public interest groups.. In a speech be- fore the National Association of Govern- ment Communicators, Ralph Nader argued that the Office of Management and Budget is deliberately using budget reductions to hobble those Government agencies that monitor business practices and publish con- sumer information. The Administration has, in fact, put an end to the dissemination of consumer infor- mation by the Government Printing Office and imposed a spending moratorium on films, brochures, and audio-visual aids. The Federal Trade Commission's funding is be- ing squeezed, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission is either to be abolished or to have its budget reduced to a level of paralysis. Agencies which provide the public with information on. the rights of workers, mi- norities, and women are under attack. The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis- tration (OSHA) and affirmative-action pro- grams in the Labor Department have had their budgets cut and their very existence challenged by the Reagan Administration's anti-regulation crusade. Reduced spending by the Food and Drug Administration means less information for consumers. Pub- lic access to information on welfare rights, tenant-and-landlord rights, health-care rights, and services available to the elderly, Social Security recipients, women (rape crisis centers), the unemployed, and youth (student loans and the CETA program) are being severely restricted as a result of budget slashes. Third, the Administration is resorting to the politics of intimidation to discourage the kind of public questioning that results in informed challenges to official conduct. aVreestiRltgee MAaRDPRiNtt01904 domestic spying have already begun to cre- ate a climate of intimidation. CIA Director William I_ Casey has asked fnr lenislatinn power to conduct st.rprise searches of news- 1 paper and broadcast newsrooms. The legis- i lation preventing the unauthorized idea- ! tification of U.S. ;itelligence agents has been applied in broader terms than origi- nally conceived by Federal agents in their attempt to stifle investigations and reports - they consider dama,Oe to their agencies. ? , ? . . ? . .. . . ?,---" he contradiction between the - Right's cel.!bration of public opin- ion as the -mandate" for its pro- gram, on the one hand-, and the Reagan Administration's attempts to limit the public's access to information, 'oh the other, has great and ominous significance. The Right is attemating to institutionalize - its alleged mandate end make it permanent. Drawing on its conception of past Amen- - can greatness, it wants to give rriaXimurn ex- posure to its ideas ot family, religion, sexu- ality, authority, ecenornic -structuring, and , national security, ,.\ hile curbing public ac- cess to ideas and V a, lies that differ. A mea- . sure of the extent to which this effort has al- ? ready succeeded can be seen in the pro-business, anti- consumer, anti-labor, anti-environment, anti-feminist message emanating from many Federal agencies. The Right denies, of course, that it is try- ing to limit public access to. information.. Rather, it claims to ae encouraging the pri- vate sector to act as the basic gatherer and - disseminator of in fo7mation vital to the for- mation of public opinion. But the Right also Understands that access to the private-sector depends on one's ability to pay. In fact, the greater role the Federal Government has ? assumed in the past two decades as a gath- erer and disseminator of information can largely be attributed to the extent to which private channels ?vera closed to the public. . Now the Right threatens once again to disenfranchise millions of people because they lack the information they need and the resources to acquire it. Public opinion is to give way once again to elite opinion. Para- doxically, the concentration of control over - . .public and private mechanisms of cornmun, ' ication will make it increasingly difficult for people even to perceive that all this is hap- pening. . The ultimate danger posed by the public's diminished access to in forination is that in time it will become impossible to 01(104001291}012i-ai_ I to information still ex- ists. We may wind up celebrating "Freedom of Information Day' on March 16 and not -1? Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA-RDP91-00901R0004 THE PROGRESSIVE February 1982 Narrainfg, Names (ince open societies of the ,..)sort that can put up with Freedom of Information Acts and ACLUs are at a disadvan- tage when it comes to operat- ing an intelligence agency, Jeff Stein should name his under- cover CIA agent only when he can expose one KGB agent ("Naming Names," December issue). Of course, if he believes we shouldn't maintain any sort of intelligence service, then any- thing done to weaken the CIA would, in his eyes, be beneficial. But I would argue that such a position is unrealis- tic?first, because some sort of information-gathering system is essential, and second, be- cause there isn't any chance of accomplishing such an objec- tive. The goal, it seems to me, must be to defeat the dan- gerous people and encourage the moderates: to rid the agency of the likes of Casey, rid the nation of the Adminis- - t to the Editor tration that strives to lessen re- strictions on the CIA, and work for a world in which the need for spying is reduced as speedily as possible. The act Stein is tempted to take could be taken in almost no other country in the world, and would merely demon- , strate that he is willing to take unfair advantage of that fact. Robert H. Yoakum Lakeville, Connecticut DoesJeft Stein think the United States should in- dulge in espionage? If so, how does he think a regular, run- of-the-mill spy's duties should differ from the duties he pro- - jects for his "bright, attractive your'," woman"? The reasons se l out in his article surely explain why "the Government [must makerit il- legal to revea) this woman's name," along with the names of other dedicated, hard- - working Americans in the es- pionage service of their coun- try. Ben Owen ? Columbus, Mississippi Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400120002-2