U.S. ONCE FELT IT HAD A TROPHY IN K.G.B. MAN
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ON PAGE -Afl 6 November 1985
U.S. Once Felt It Had a Tr phy in.K.G.B. Man
By JOEL BRINKLEY 'ures about the Walker family spy The Americans drew conclusions
ring, the latest and largest in a series of from Mr. Yurchenko's statements.
Special to The New York Times damaging Nov. 5 - To Amer- turned to s murp rise and satisfaction over Two weeks ago, William E. Colby,
who was Director of of Central Intelli-
ican intelligence officials, Vitaly Yur- the Soviet defections, gence during the middle 1970's, said:
chenko's defection had seemed an ex- Not only were Mr. Yurchenko and "If we had had defections of three
traordinary coup, a signal that the tide Mr. Gordiyevsky senior intelligence senior C.I.A. officers to the Soviet
in the ideological war turning in favor officers, but information from their de- Union, this country would be in an up-
of the United States. briefings indicated- they were unlike roar. What this seems to signal is a
Just last week, officials were calling Previous defectors. change in appeal, from the the 50's and
Mr. becau a new breed g These guys are 'the new Soviet 60's, when Westerners found appeal in
who left eft because he was dsf defector man, ? an official said last week. their society, to a time when they are
who disillusioned "They are able, capable, privileged finding appeal in ours." Comm
sm, w
in or ith
troub a unin debt.t because he was men who were doing very well in the Colby Sees a Change of Heart
Soviet system. Both were colonels up Today Mr. Colby said he was not sure
Before his redefection, a White for promotion to flag rank." the redefection changed that conclu-
House official, speaking of Mr. YurV Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, the; sion. He said it was possible that Mr.
chenko and other recent defectors, `New York Democrat who was vice i Yurchenko had been planted to confuse
said: "It certainly has caught the at- chairman of the Senate Select Intelli- American intelligence.
tention of senior people in Government, gence Committee until early this year, Mr. Colby said he believed Mr. yur-
the difference between these cases and said before Mr. Yurchenko redefected: chenko "was probably legitimate" and
the ones of the past." "These are the ones who are given the "went through the psychological i
nice homes, the fake Persian rugs, free trauma" that many defectors undergo,
But today, officials at the Central In- vodka and their own Volga." "
telligence Agency said they were separating themselves from their
Y Disillusionment a Factor family and their country,"
stunned and perplexed. If Mr. Yurchenko was lying officials found that strik- ying all along,
"We just don't know what hap- ing, they said. But even more impor- a White House official said, '-he was
pened," an official said. tant, they said, the two men, partite- very clever."
The prevailing views med to be larly Mr. Yurchenko, were telling in. His responses were very sophisti-
terrogators that they had left the Soviet sate and reasonable," the official
that Mr. Yurchenko was a genuine de- Union largely for ideological reasons, said, referring to the debriefings.
fector who had changed hi mind. But "It is disillusionment," Senator Another intelligence source, repre-
some members of Congres , briefed on? Dave Durenberger, chairman of the seating an opposing view, said he be-
the situation, said they believed Mr. Senate Select Committee, said recent- lieved Mr. Yurchenko had been lying
Yurchenko had been send ere by the ly. "They have come to the conclusion from the start.
K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency. that their system just does not work. "The ideological business is non-
As Government officials try to an- This is specific information from the sense," he said. "He came here be-
debriefings." cause he had a girlfriend."
swer the unanswered questions, they About the same time, a White House After defecting, officials said, Mr.
say the incident has added another re- official said of the defectors: Yurchenko visited a woman in Canada
versal to what has been a turbulent "They have n(,t come out speaking of with whom he had been involved while
year in the intelligence business. the broad struggles of men and charac- stationed at the Soviet Embassy here
It is difficult to know which side is ter, of communism versus democracy. from 1975 to 1980. But she sent him
They are saying their system is away, the Americans said.
winning the espionage war. An intelli- screwed up, corrupted. They are cyni. Mr. Yurchenko and Mr. Gordiyevsky
gence official said the redefection "is a cal.,, were only the best known of several re-
scoop" for the Russians. Mr. Gordlyevsky defected to Britain cent defectors. Sergei Bokhan, deputy
"It is sensational," he added. "But in l in August, and said disillusionment director of Soviet military intelligence
the long run, it probably won't be that was part of the motiviation, Senator in Athens, defected in May. Senator
important." Durenberger said. Mr. Gordiyevsky's Durenberger said there-had been other
The original defection of Mr. Yur- views apparently have not changed. defections that had not been disclosed.
chenko and of other Soviet intelligence With Mr. Yurchenko, "disillusion-
officers, including Oleg Gordiyevsky, ment was clearly the dominant fac-
who was the K.G.B. station chief in tor," according to interrogators, Sena-
London, had led to a striking change a in tor Durenberger said.
g g Officials said previous defectors had
attitude among American officials. not mentioned disillusionment.
Through the summer, the prevailing "I have never seen a political defec-
mood had been gloom after the disclo- I tor in 30 years," Harry Rositzke, a for-
mer C.I.A. officer, said today.
Richard M. Helms, who served in the I
C.I.A. from 1947 to 1973, when he re-
signed as director of Central Intelli-
gence, said: "During my time in the
agency, I don't recall a single defector
who came here for ideological reasons.
It was always girlfriends or money
problems, or they got in trouble for one
reason or another."
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22 December 198 H S
Scientist, ex-CIA chief urge U.S.
I;L
to consider Soviet test-ban
offer
By Joseph Bauman
Deseret News environmental specialist
The Soviet Union's offer of an agree-
ment ending nuclear-weapons tests poses
a unique opportunity, say a former direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the widely acclaimed "father of radiation
health physics."
This might be a chance to end the nu-
clear arms race, according to William F.
Colby, who directed the CIA from 1973
through 1975, and Dr. CarfMorgan, for
50 years a physics pioneer.
Colby and Morgan visited the Deseret
News Saturday afternoon 'to make the
case for acceptance of the latest Soviet
offers of a comprehensive test ban. They
were accompanied by members of the
anti-nuclear-testing group, Downwinders,
which arranged their visit to the state.
In 1943, Morgan's research helped
launch American nuclear health physics,
a science he led for its first decades. He
was the Health Physics Society's first
president, editing the group's journal for a
quarter of a century. He has written at
least 350 scientific articles.
Today, he is a member of Physicians
for Social Responsibility - a group whose
founders recently won the Nobel Peace
Prize for their efforts on behalf a world-
wide nuclear freeze. In 1962, the United
States and Soviet Union agreed to a ban
on atmospheric testing, but underground
tests continue.
American underground tests at the Ne-
vada Test Site have been known to vent,
allowing huge amounts of radiation to es-
-cape into the atmosphere.
In August, the Soviet Union launched a
temporary halt in its subsurface nuclear
blasts and said it could be extended be-
yond Jan. 1, 1986 if the United States
would do the same, The offer was seen as
a possible step toward a treaty banning
such tests.
However, U.S. nuclear tests continue.
Recently, the Soviets offered to accept
teams of visiting observers to verify that
tests were not taking place, if a treaty
could be achieved. The Reagan Adminis-
tration rejected the offer on Thursday.
Morgan cited two main reasons that an
end to underground testing is desirable:
the dangers of both venting and of nuclear
war.
"First of all, I believe that the people in
Utah and some of the neighboring
states can see the inordinate, unneces-
sary.exposure over the years from
ionizing radiation - fallout." He re-
called the now-familiar story of how
the glovernment made soothing state-
ments during the period of above-
ground testing, saying there was noth-
ing to be concerned about.
In the meantime, "we found out the
risks from exposure to radiation, in
terms of carcinogenesis (causing can-
cer) are 10 to some 15 times what we
thought 15 years ago."
"I think ... all of us are far more
concerned, though, about the escala-
tion in the direction of a nuclear war,
and the consequences."
He said he believes a ban on all nu-
clear tests might be impossible to
achieve in his lifetime, but the Soviets
offers should be taken seriously.
"It's very frustrating now that our
own government is apparently not
willing to consider in earnest moving
in that direction."
He said it is important to "release
the pressure we have, moving toward
a nuclear war." He called the situa-
tion today appalling.
Colby said the Soviets offers are se-
rious. "They start from the fact that
they've got new management. He (the
ne*Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorba-
choy) has come in with a mandate to
getIRRussia moving again."
mandate is similar to the one
dent Kennedy had when he was
eleBed in 1960, Colby said. To do this,
Gorbachev is trying to improve the
Soviets' bogged-down economy, and
that takes money. , `^ ~4
Gorbachev thinks he ca oney
to stimulate the economy, instead of
pouring it expensive weapons sys-
tems, according to Colby.
The Soviets have an interest in stop-
ping the Star Wars development be-
cause to keep up would take a giant
chunk from their economy, he said.
What about the argument that if the
arms race harms the Soviet economy,
that's good for the United States?
That theory is not true, Colby said.
He quoted a Soviet official as saying if
necessary, his country would eat pota-
toes in order to keep up militarily.
They are determined not to be in a
subordinate position. Trying to make
their economy collapse won't work.
In the offers. "there's a lot of small
print that's loaded in his favor, which
is what you'd expect when you make a
contract with a used-car dealer,"
Colby said. But if the offer were taken
seriously, negotiations could start
aimed at picking the undesirable
small points out of the deal.
"If you also want to achieve an
agreement, then you can get together
and work the small print out."
If our sophisticated detection sys-
tems spot some unusual developments
in the Soviet Union today - such as
the possible deployment of new weap-
ons systems - and U.S. officials asked
for an explanation, the Soviets would
say it's none of our business.
But under a treaty, this country
could "demand satisfaction." The So-.
viets would have to convince America
there was no violation of the treaty.
Verification teams could assist in
the overall intelligence-gathering ef-
fort, checking all sources of informa-
tion to see if the Soviets are testing
STAT
"You want that redundancy ... If
you can get more of these measure-
ments, it's fine, get more," Colby said.
In order for the nuclear arms race
to end, Morgan said, "I think we have
to have a rising up of public opinion,
as we did with atmospheric testing."
"We have this unique opportunity
now, where the Soviets have imposed
a moratorium," Colby said.
"We have been invited to join it. We
could stop the development of nuclear
weapons . ,f
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COLBY
SALT LAKE CITY UT
The country's former CIA boss and a physicist who helped pioneer radiation
health studies joined local. anti-nuclear advocates in Salt Lake City to drum Lip
public support for a nuclear test ban treaty.
. William Colby, CIA director under Presidents Nixon and Ford, said during a
Salt Lake City visit Saturday the Reagan administration should stop waffling on
justifications for continued testing of nuclear weapons.
''At first we say 'no' to a test ban because we claim we don't have a way to
verify it, which isn't so with our high technology,'' Colby said. ''Then we say
'no' to the latest (Soviet test ban) offer on the grounds we need an opportunity
to test reliability.''
Colby's comments referred to the recent Soviet offer to allow observers
inside the country to verify a proposed comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
Nothing about the continued testing of nuclear weapons makes sense in a world
poised on the brink of annihilation, Colby said.
''Nuclear weapons are unusable, a nuclear war is unwinnable, unilateral
restraint is unworkable, and life in this world would be unliveable once the
trigger is pulled,'' he said.
The former intelligence chief said the main block to grasping hold of the
opportunity presented in recent Soviet concessions to on-site verification is
the Reagan administration's love affair with ''Star Wars,'' officially named the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
The Star Wars blueprint calls for developing a defensive nuclear umbrella
over the United States that would detonate incoming missiles far out in space.
''Some say Star Wars could be 99 percent effective,'' Colby said. "Well,
with roughly 8,000 strategic missiles at the ready, that still would leave room
for 80 to get through, and possibly room for Salt Lake City to be targeted.''
Dr. Karl Morgan, the Atlanta scientist who helped pioneer nuclear health
physics, said even underground testing poses serious dangers of radiation
exposure and increased risk of nuclear war.
While the U.S. government was assuring residents of southern Utah and
neighboring states that above-ground testing during the 1950s was safe,
scientists were discovering that the cancer risks from radiation exposure was 10
15 times greater than previously thought, Morgan said.
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11 December 1985
CIA Inspires Confidence
Of Former Director
"moles" in the
s
By The Tribune-Review
William Colby, director of the
CIA under President Richard Ni-
mm, believes the quality of Amer-
ican intelligence is so good as to
"almost eliminate" the need for
verification of Russian missile
capabilities.
On top of this, he believes
President Reagan should have
responded more positively to So=
viet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's
offers concerning verification and
other arms control matters.
"Those' offers reflected a major
change in Soviet attitude," Colby
said, "We shouldn't have turned
them all down."
Speaking at a World Affairs
Council "Noon Briefing" in Pitts-
burgh, Colby said a nuclear arms
race is unwinnable, unilateral
restraint is unworkable, and a
world under the nuclear gun is
"unlivable."
At an earlier press conference
he said the arms race can and must
be stopped through negotiations.
We are diverting too many res-
following a potential nuclear war.
Today the CIA "is the best
intelligence unit in the world,"
Colby said. He admitted that
following the Vietnam War and the
Watergate episode, the CIA declin-
ed. But he claimed the agency has
made a comeback - but it needs
more manpower abroad.
"People do not realize the CIA
goes far beyond spying. The agents
gather intelligence (not all of a
military nature) which is analyzed
in a central location so that we can
better understand the world," he
said.
The agency has changed greatly,
he reported, moving toward heavy
use of technology - computers,
listening devices, seismic equip-
ment, etc. "We haven't had a
strategic weapons surprise since
Sputnik," he reported.
Colby is concerned about the
recent leaks and surge in spy cases.
Some of them could have a signifi-
cant impact on security if the
Russians "determine our sources."
he said.
No longer are we in an age of the
spy motivated by ideology, Colby
said. Most of today's spies are
"little people selling out for a few
bucks," he added. Most people are
no longer inspired by the "Soviet
ources to the race, resources that
could be used to reduce the deficit
and solve more pre s sing
problems," he said.
`There's a growing sense of
unreality concerning nuclear mis-
siles, while the threat grows
stronger as the time between
launch and impact grows shorter,"
he added. "The experts on this
(nuclear war) seem to be out of
control."
Colby also said he opposed the
Strategic Defense Initiative (Star
Wars) because it was the "... wrong
strategy, too expensive with ambi-
guous results." He said that no
defense program could keep out all
attacking missiles and that the
small percentage that got through
would still cause great damage.
Colby was joined later by
Thomas Powers, a contributing
editor of Atlantic magazine, also
an SDI opponent. Both men spoke
as members of the Committee for
National Security at Carnegie-
Mellon University. Powers outlin-
ed the ."nuclear winter" effect
model."
The increase in spy, leak cases
happens, Colby explained.
"because we are doing a better job
of detection." there are too many
Soviet agents in the country. we
offer an open society, and
"because the mood of the country"
has shifted toward anti-
communism.
Colby claimed Yuri Andropov
had vastly improved the KGB. He
said, "We must pull up our socks on
this leak business," via successful
prosecution. He believes the numb-
er of Soviet "diplomats" and
"visitors" should be reduced and
that we "deal with the Soviets
strictly on a reciprocal basis."
The definition of "secret"
(classified materials) should be set
by each administration, Colby
suggested, because the variables
threatening national security
change.
py
Are there
CIA? "We must assume there are
moles and implement a vigorous
security system, distributing infor-
mation on a need-to-know basis
only," he responded.
Do we spy on our friends? Colby
was non-committal, except to say
two questions were asked before
such decisions were made - would
the information gathered be valu-
able, and what are the risks
involved? He said spying on Ca-
nada, for example, would not be
worth the potential for bad reac-
tion if the activities were discover-
ed.
Colby, now a practicing attor-
ney, said he believes in covert
activities in foreign nations
even to the paramilitary level.
"We (CIA) ran a full-scale war in
Northern Laos for quite some
time," he said. But these activities,
according to Colby, must fall under
the rules of war, which reject
torture and assassination.
Do ideological or political trends
dictate CIA activities? "National
interests determine covert wars,"
he said. Of course, those interests
may be set by "political
preferences."
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BALTIMORE SUN
E ` ~_? __ 8 December 1985
/j
By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite
SPYMG
AMONG
FRIENDS
"Most of the world's 400 or more intelligence and security services are targeted
to one degree or another on U.S. military, diplomatic and intelligence personnel,
facilities, and technology.... One should remember, as some intelligence practi-
tioners put it, there may be friendly countries, but there are only other inteW-
gence services."
- Intelligence and Policy, by Roy Godson, 1985.
"We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."
- Lord Palmerston. 1848.
4
ik
srael, in recent days, has given fresh focus to what an American intelli-
gence expert wrote just this year and a British statesman declared last
century.
Israel today, much to its own embarrassment and confusion, stands
accused of pursuing its own interests by paying an American spy to divulge
the secrets of its staunchest supporter and richest patron.
If two such closely bound and beholden friends cannot trust each other, who
can?
It is not the first time an ally has been caught spying on the United States, or
that the United States has been accused of spying on an ally.
In 1954, the Dutch Embassy in Washington admitted receiving secrets from
Joseph Sydney Petersen Jr., a research analyst at the top-secret National Securi-
ty Agency. The Dutch said they thought the information transfer was authorized.
Petersen pleaded guilty to unlawfully taking secret information and was sen-
tenced to seven years.
In 1956, the United States reportedly monitored British code messages to keep
abreast of developments during the United Kingdom's Suez Canal Invasion.
Communication interception, even among allies, has become almost routine.
In recent years. U.S. diplomats have been expelled from South Africa (1979)
and Spain (this year) for allegedly spying.
The current Israeli case is particularly disturbing because of the closeness of
the relationship. The question it provokes Is: How common is the practice of ally
spying on ally?
intelligence experts agree that it certainly goes on when circumstances con-
vince a government that the information It needs, albeit from an ally, can be
acquired only by espionage. But they doubt that allies, particularly those formally
aligned, as In NATO, routinely finance spying operations against each other.
"As the length of alliance and strength of alliance varies, you have greater and
greater probability of having human agents [spies] being run against countries,"
says Jeffrey T. Richelson, an American University expert on intelligence who
suggests, by way of illustration, that the United States would be less likely to spy
on the British than to spy on the traditionally more independent French.
But he adds: "Even with the strongest and closest of allies you always have a
certain amount of intelligence going on."
The Soviet Union, for example, is widely held to regard even Its closest Warsaw
Pact allies as intelligence targets. The United States, however, has generally
preferred a system of close intelligence liaison, although this has been frequently
compromised by leaks and security breakdowns in allied security services, nota-
bly the British.
Does the United States spy on Its allies these days?
Richard Helms, a former CIA director, says: "In the world of espionage, usually
allies don't spy on each other. On the other hand, there may come an occasion
when something is going on in an allied country that It is in the national interest
to find out about.
"And maybe the only way to find out would be doing a little bit of spying. But it
would be done on a case-by-case basis."
William Colby, another former CIA director, says: "You can't answer that
question. It's too hard to answer. Who are your allies? You have to look at the
particular situation.
"You would be out of your mind if you spied on Canada. If you want to find
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something out about Canada, go up and ask
them. Other countries are more secretive
a Mr. Colby and other intelligence experts
say the basic equation behind any decision
to indulge in espionage against an ally is
likely to be: is the information to be obtained
worth the potential of the acute embarass-
ment of discovery?
"Obviously, each nation is going to have
to make its own decision about its own secu-
rity. But when you do a secret operation in
another country, you obviously have to
weigh the value of the Information you hope
to get against the risk of being caught." says
Mr. Colby.
"That means in many countries the im-
pact would be so serious you wouldn't do it.
But you also have a problem here of control
of the intelligence services."
When the French secret service decided
to sink the Greenpeace yacht in New Zea-
land earlier this year to scuttle a planned
anti-nuclear protest at France's nuclear test
ground in the Pacific, the blame was eventu-
ally laid on the defense minister and the
chief of intelligence. Both lost their jobs in
the diplomatic furor that engulfed the scan-
dal.
It was not exactly spying, but it was a
hostile intelligence action taken on friendly
territory, and It shows the lengths to which
intelligence services are prepared to go in
pursuit of their own perceived interests.
Other documented examples of hostile in-
telligence activities among allies would be
the South Korean and Filipino governments'
activities against dissident groups residing
in the United States - undertaken with
official blessing of the foreign governments
but despite U.S. protest.
In the Israeli case, the intelligence outfit
allegedly responsible for retaining the U.S.
spy was apparently operating without the
knowledge of Prime Minister Shimon Peres
and other Cabinet members. The potential
of political embarassment appears, there-
fore, to have been left out of the scales when
the espionage decision was made.
According to one NATO ambassador
based in Washington, intelligence services
frequently operate in such an autonomous
fashion that political leaders are not always
privy to their activities.
In the United States, however, such
loose-cannon activity is less likely. The intel-
ligence services here are required by law to
inform the congressional intelligence over-
sight committees of any particularly signifi-
cant actions or developments. This puts
clear political restraints - frequently re-
sented - on them.
There is. of course, a fundamental differ-
ence between Intelligence-gathering and
spying. Every embassy. of an ally or an ad-
versary. is In the business of snooping. of
finding out as much as it legally can of what
is happening in Its host country. That is why
embassies have political, economic and mili-
tary experts to glean whatever informatioa
is available, to analyze trends. to dissect and
predict policies, to study personalities, to
read every available tea leaf.
"What would our (intelligence] station
chief do In Britain?" asks Richard H. Shultz,
who teaches an Intelligence course at Tufts
University's Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy. "Obviously he is going to be collect-
ing a lot of open-source information. He Is
going to be working with his British counter-
parts against adversaries. Would he be re-
cruiting British officials (to spy]? The answer
is: I really doubt it."
Mr. Shultz says. "Generally. what your
Intelligence (operator( will do is attempt to
identify people who can provide information
that is helpful in terms of the external dy-
namics of a system. Do they really recruit
them and pay them off in the ways the Israe-
lis (allegedly) did? I don't think so. Generally.
it's a little different. It's what is called In the
trade 'having a close contact.' You don't
have this guy in tow. You are not paying
him. It's pretty deep in the background."
This is all diplomatically de rigueur. It
stops short of illegal espionage.
But when you find, finance and control
an agent who is channeling secret docu-
ments to you, you are spying.
That is what the Justice Department al-
leges Israeli Intelligence officials did in the
case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, a Navy count-
er-terrorism expert.
The Information Mr. Pollard allegedly
sold to the Israelis - largely details of Arab
military strengths, as perceived by the Unit-
ed States - has prompted some American
Jews to suggest that it was the sort of intelli-
gence the United States should have been
willing to share with Israel anyway.
The problem here is that, in peacetime,
the United States maintains close military
contacts with some Arab nations, notably
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Indeed, so
close is the current U.S. relationship with
Egypt that three U.S. officers attached to the
U.S. Embassy in Cairo accompanied the
Egyptian commandos on their mission to
Malta to try to rescue the passengers in the
hijacked EgyptAir plane last month.
That sort of cooperation would be impos-
sible if Egypt thought the United States was
routinely passing along military information
to the Israelis. Here U.S. national interests
clearly take precedence over Israeli intelli-
gence requirements - at least in peacetime.
The Israeli government has instigated its
own inquiry into the Pollard affair, and it
has promised to forward the results to the
Reagan administration, and to return any
documents illegally obtained. Despite its
original "dismay" over the espionage case,
the Reagan administration is still ready to
take Israel at its word as a close and trusted
ally.
Roy Godson, a Georgetown University ex-
pert. says, "The point is that in the history of
international relations, allies have spied on
each other. It would be remarkable if that
didn't exist to some extent In the closing
years of the 20th century."
W. Lewthwatte is a reporter In The Sun's Washington bureau.
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Israel's apology
Israel's statement after two Americans were charged with spying for Israel, issued Sunday by Prime Minister Shimon Peres:
The Government of Israel is determined to spare no effort in investigating this case thoroughly and
completely and in uncovering all the facts to the last detail no matter where the trail may lead. The full
inquiry is still incomplete and therefore the Government of Israel is not yet in possession of all the facts;
but the inquiry is progressing vigorously.
The Government of Israel assures the Government of the United States that in the wake of the inqui-
ry, if the allegations are confirmed, those responsible will be brought to account, the unit involved in this
activity will be completely and permanently dismantled, and necessary organizational steps will be tak-
en to ensure that such activities are, not repeated.
Our relations with the United States are based on solid foundations of deep friendship, close affinity
and mutual trust. Spying on the United States stands in total contradiction to our policy. Such activity to
the extent that it did take place was wrong and the Government of Israel apologizes. For the time being,
we have nothing further to say on this.
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F"1'F APPEARED
ON PAaE__dQjl__
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~ MARY M. L ~
Fear of Seeming Wimpy
The people promoting an encore in
Angola ought to get hold of In
Search 'of Enemies," the inside
account of the ori ginal fiasco by Jain A
Itief of the
WASHINGTON POST
28 November 1985
their lives thinking up ways to foil Fidel
Castro. And Pepper responded with an
alacrity that suggests that avidity to
retain office is a quality that does not
diminish with the passing years.
Cosponsor Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.)
denies any political motivation, He
supports."freedom fighters"
everywhere, he insists. Still, Angola
offers him a wonderful chance to make.
up with the far-right of his party, which
was twtraged by his support of the
South African sanctions. Coneervativ-
cannot handle the idea that a Marxist:'
government exists. a world away.
The rabids went into orbit when
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
recently advocated holding off on aid
until the United States could wear its
mediator's hat a little longer. A State
Department official met this week with
a representative of the Angolan
government to give him a last chance to
settle with UNITA.
Rep Matthew F. McHugh (D-N.Y.)
rounded up 100 signatures on a letter
to the president in which he said that
either overt or covert aid "would
damage our relations with governments
throughout Africa."
The result in Congress is much in
,need fear they would enrich
a,a The CIA was so exercised over
Stc well telling the whole appalling
story of,the Angolan operation that it
took him to.court-and won. His
royalties go to the government, and his
money may even now be being used to'
fund the kind of madness he so
ine=rably recounts.
But if those who want to do it all over
again can't be persuaded to read his
book, maybe they would study one
paragraph. Stockwell is describing the
impact of a Washington Post story in
1975, which revealed the presence of
South African troops fighting with Jonas
Savimbi, the head of UNITA, the
guerrilla group that would benefit by an
Angola replay.
"The propaganda and political war
was lost in that stroke. There was
nothing the Lusaka station [CIA
headquarters in Zambia where the war
was runt could invent that would be as
damaging to the other side as our
alliance with the hated South Africans doubt. A Democrat, the late senator
was to our cause." Frank Church, exposed the abuses of
But we are poised to renew that
alliance with the South Africans in.
Angola. The president artlessly.
revealed that he favors covert
operations. Two congressmen, one an
85-year-old Democrat, the other an
undeclared Republican presidential
candidate, want overt aid and have
boldly proposed a bill funding UNITA to
the tune of $27 million.
Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), the
guardian of senior citizens, is frank, at
least, about why he is sponsoring the
return to folly. He never heard of
Angola, he told a House committee,
until his Cuban-American constituents
called it to his attention. The presence
of some 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola
is an affront to the folks who spend
the CIA, which were, incidentally, being
aired on Capitol Hill while the agency
was pressing ahead with its Angolan A
intervention and William E. , then
the agency's director, was ymg it.
But today's Democrats have been
thoroughly indoctrinated in the horrors
of seeming wimpy on national security.
"Everyone is shopping around for
freedom fighters to support," says Kirk
O'Donnell, counsel to House Speaket
Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.).
McHugh hopes that some who voted
to repeal the Clark Amendment, which
forbade aid to covert operations or
training for any Angolan movement
without authorization by Congress, will
draw the line on money that will
prolong Angola's civil war. The head of
Committee on Intelligence, PAD. Lee H.
Ci..n,,I nn (M(ntl. one who yes to
r - o grounds the president
should not be specifically hampered in
any area of the world--is saying no on
aid.
Everyone knows that in Angola the
Nicaraguan formula will be used. That
is, we give enough help to keep the war
going but not enough to win it.
How House members from farm
states are going to explain why they
gave $27 million to help somebody in
the African bush when their own
farmers are being foreclosed is not
something they are thinking about.
But the chances that we will do it
again-squander millions of dollars,
hear hundreds of lies and ruin countless
lives-are 50-50. Too many
officeholders these days, when faced
with a problem,; begin by asking
themselves, "What would Rambo do?"
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1Z Novemoer 1yO5
7:r)0 P.M.
NBC - TV
Arms Control Verification
BROKAW: On Special Segment
tonight, Verification: The
countdown to Geneva. wt's a
key word in every arms control
negotiation. In plain
language, it means knowing
whether the other side cheats.
NBC News Pentagon correspon-
dent Fred Francis reports that
with Secret, high-technology
spying, we know almost every-
thing that the Soviet Union
djoes.
FRED FRANCIS: The SR-71,
the Blackbird, the fastest,
highest-flying airplane in the
world, with a set of cameras
that can record photographic,
infrared, and radar images.
And here, hidden in the
Northern Virginia woods 15
miles south of the White House,
a secret satellite ground
station that receives a
continuous stream of photo-
r~ra~;:r; Irr;a space.
And in Groton, Connef,t. icut,
Sturgeon Class submarines
prepare for classified missions
near Soviet naval bases. There
.they will take periscope
photographs and record the
sounds of Soviet subs.
And in the Great Smoky
Mountains of North Car;)lina,
another secret. base that, among
other things, monitors Soviet
naval communications down to
the walkie-talkie level.
.Together, at ten billion
dollars a year, it's a dizzying
array of airplanes, submarines,
satellites and radar, all
making sure the Soviets keep
their treaty co.mmitments.
Mostly, though, we rely on
photographs. Twenty-two times
a day a Keyhole 11 phot o-
reconnaissance satellite scans
the Soviet Union. In a few
hours its pictures c.3n be
flashed onto a screen at the
Pentagon or put on the P resi-
dent's desk. They are
computer-generated pictures of
remarkable clarity, de:.ailed
enough to examine a tank, as in
this simulation.
JOHN PIKE: You'd be able to
spot something about the size
of a grapefruit or a softball
from an altitude of perhaps 80
or 100 miles.
FRANCIS: Only a handful of
these satellite photos have
ever been made public. This
one of a Soviet aircraft
carrier was taken from a slantt
angle 504 miles to the south of
the shipyard.
WILLIAM COLBY: We don't
trust them any more than you'd
trust a secondhand car dealer.
You watch it like a hawk. You
do your own inspections. You
check it over very carefully.
FRANCIS: Carefully means
using more than photographs.
When photo satellites detect
Soviet launch preparation, that
word is relayed to the National
Security Agency o,, t. side
W05hingt.oil . 11 aIcrt~s lis -
tening posts around the world.
Above the Soviet Union,
satellites aim their sen~iat9.
In Turkey, the Air Force
eavesdrops on the countdown.
And around the Pacific,
electronic equipment on remote
islands, aboard converted 707s,
and on a tracking ship await
the splashdown, all recording
electronic information.
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11 November 1985
FBI reviews story
about KGB murder
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The FBI is reviewing information
supplied by Soviet KGB official
Vitaly Yurchenko that Soviet agents
abducted and murdered Nicholas
Shadrin, a Soviet defector who
turned double agent for the FBI and
CIA and then disappeared, his wife,
Blanka Shadrin, said in a recent in-
terview.
But Mrs. Shadrin said she spoke
to FBI officials last week and was
told the FBI still believes Mr. Shad-
rin died in the hands of the KGB,
despite Mr. Yurchenko's Nov. 2
redefection to the Soviet Union.
According to a secret State De-
partment cable sent to the American
Embassy in Moscow, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for European Affairs
for U.S. naval intelligence and was
involved in a CIA attempt to help a
Soviet KGB operative purportedly
cooperating with U.S. authorities to
move up in the ranks of the KGB
hierarchy. In 1967, Mr. Shadrin, at
the direction of the FBI and CIA,
allowed the KGB operative, code-
named "Igor," who was then in the
United States, to recruit him into the
KGB as a "double agent." Intelli-
gence experts now believe Igor was
only pretending to work for the
United States in order to capture Mr.
Shadrin.
Mrs. Shadrin said her husband
had been under a Soviet death sen-
tence since his defection.
"They took terrible advantage of
my husband," Mrs. Shadrin said. "Tb
let him go to Vienna without any pro-
tection is a criminal act."
R. Mark Palmer lodged an official As part of the plan to establish his
protest Oct. 28 with the Soviet Em- credibility, FBI and CIA officials al-
bassy's deputy chief of mission, lowed Mr. Shadrin, a naturalized
Oleg Sokolov, on the KGB's murder American citizen, to go to Vienna to
of Mr. Shadrin in 1975. meet KGB officials in 1972 and 1975.
A copy of the cable was obtained He never returned from the 1975
by The Washington Times. meeting.
Mr. Shadrin was a former Soviet Former CIA Director William
destroyer captain who defected to Colby said recently in a television
the United States in 1959. He worked ~` interview that the CIA was to blame
for Mr. Shadrin's abduction because
it did not provide adequate surveil-
lance to protect him in Vienna.
"The U.S. government has reli-
ably learned that Nicholas George
Shadrin ... was abducted by repre-
sentatives of the Soviet intelligence
service (the KGB) on or about Dec.
28, 1975," the cable stated. "During
the abduction of Shadrin, a chemical
substance was forcefully adminis-
tered to him, rendering him uncon-
scious"
Intelligence sources have said the
source for details about Mr. Shad-
rin's death was Mr. Yurchenko, al-
though at a news conference at the
Soviet Embassy here on Nov 4, Mr.
Yurchenko denied having ever heard
of him.
The cable said that Mr. Shadrin
was driven by the KGB toward the
Hungarian border "but died before
reaching the border, apparently as a
direct result of the chemical sub-
stance forcefully applied to render
him unconscious."
The State Department told Mr.
Sokolov the abduction and murder
were "reprehensible" and said there
is no excuse for a government com-
mitting such acts.
"This case is particularly disturb-
ing since the United States repeat-
edly asked for information in this
case and was assured by high-level
representatives of the Soviet Union
that they had no information on Mr.
Shadrin," the cable stated. The case
was discussed between President
Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Leo-
nid Brezhnev in 1976.
Robert Kupperman, a friend of
Mr. Shadrin, said that, despite Mr.
Yurchenko's return to the Soviet
Union, he still believes Mr. Yurchen-
ko's account of the fate of Mr. Shad-
rin.
Mr. Kupperman, a senior associ-
ate at Georgetown University's
Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, said Mr. Shadrin
clearly was a double agent. "The
question is whether he was a triple
agent" working for the Soviets all
along, he said.
Some intelligence experts believe
Mr. Shadrin is alive in the Soviet
Union. However, Soviet press
accounts have blamed the CIA for
murdering him, a charge not likely
to have been made if he were alive,
experts say.
STAT
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World War II Spies Plan
By IRVIN MOLOTSKY
Spada] to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 10 After 40
years, some of America's grand old
spies are preparing to come in from
the cold. They want to tell their story
before it is too late.
The people involved were part of
the Office of Strategic Services, the
nation's first organized nonmilitary
espionage and sabotage agency,
which came into being in World War
II and was a forerunner to today's
Central Intelligence Agency.
In particular, these former undere-
cover comrades want to shine up the
somewhat disputed image of their
leader of those days. Gen. William J.
Donovan, and they want to rebut
some recent assertations that the test
spies in the war were British, li-t
American. To that end, some of them
are to meet here in the next two
weeks to plan for a symposium in the
spring at which they will attempt to
spread on the record the accomplish-
ments of the O.S.S. and the contribu.
tions of Wild Bill Donovan, who died
in 1959. If things go well, they then
hope to compile a written record of
the O.S.S.
"We feel Donovan has been ma-
ligned a little," said a former O.S.S.
official and former Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, Ray Cline.
"There has been an emphasis on his
being a cowboy, while others of us
think he was more a scholar, a tem-
peramental, romantic type figure,
but with a shrewd understanding of
Washington politics."
Another old intelligence hand, Max
Corvo, publisher of a weekly newspa-
per in Midddletown, Conn., says for-
mer O.S.S. operatives particularly
want to rebut an assertion by Bradley
F. Smith in his book "The Shadow
Warriors" that the O.S.S. accom-
plished little and that the really suc-
cessful spies were the British agents..
Age Is the Enemy Now
Mr. Corvo says it is especially im-
portant that the surviving O.S.S. vet-
erans now get a chance to tell their
on O.S.S.
story because age is doing what
enemy agents did not to the 25,000
.people who served in the agency be-
fore it was abolished shortly after the
war. "Most of our people are in their
70's," he said. "During the last five
years, I have been to several meet-
ings and you can see that time has
taken its toll."
The O.S.S. was started after Pearl
Harbor when President Roosevelt
asked General Donovan, a hero in
World War I, to set up an agency
separate from the military's intelli-
gence services. Participants in the
symposium will be asked to bring
with them evidence of all that hap-
pened thereafter, for lots of things are
missing from the files although the
secrecy protections were taken off
2,000 cubic feet of archives last sum-
mer.
Notes Will Be Sought
"It is my contention that a lot of
members took some documents with
them, probably as mementoes," Mr.
Corvo said. "We are going to call on
them to make any notes they made
available."
The people scheduled to meet here
for the planning session include Mr.
Corvo; William J. Casey, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, as well as
two former C.I.A. directors, William
Colby and Richard Helms; Mr. Cline,
now a professor at Georgetown Uni-
versity, and Michael Burke, who once
ran the New York Yankees, the New
York Knicks and the New York Rang-
ers.
Mr. Casey said: "The O.S.S. activi-
ties against Germany and Japan
were really the genesis of today's
American intelligence service, and it
is an important and interesting story.
It would be a worthwhile thing to put
it together from the historical point of
view."
Mr. Helms, now a consultant, said
of the O.S.S. history project: "The
goal is a more balanced description.
It is a very ambitious, project, and
whether it is going to fly is something
else. Look at the calendar and you'll
see that most people who served in
the O.S.S. are no longer children."
He Learned Linotype Italian
Mr. Corvo, at 65 years old, is one of
the younger veterans. He got involved
as a spy in Italy, he said, because he
had learned idiomatic Italian as a
youth by setting type at his father's
newspaper, then 11 Bollettino, which
has since been converted into The
Bulletin, a weekly paper published in
Italian and English.
Mr. Cline said: "At 67, they con-
sider me one of the younger guys. The
feeling of the old O.S.S. crowd is that
we are going to die off soon. If some-
one doesn't capture Bill Donovan and
those times, it's going to be lost. It be-
hooves us to get our act together."
When they get together, will they
remember each others' agent num-
bers, as in 007 for James Bond? Mr.
Donovan was 109 and Allen Dulles,
later to head the C.I.A., 110.
STAT
STAT
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YYttDC7h 1NUivIN I 1P1LD
8 November 1985
Ex-officials' foreign advocacy hit
By Myron Struck
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Two House Democrats charged
yesterday that numerous former
government officials from the Rea-
gan, Carter and previous adminis-
trations are making a mockery of
U.S. trade policy by having surren-
dered their public positions for the
lucrative role of foreign lobbyist.
Reps. Howard Wolpe of Michigan
and Marcy Kaptur of Ohio claimed
that the insider's knowledge of
American interests these individu-
als gained while on the public pay-
roll is being siphoned to sometimes
hostile trading partners.
"The typical foreign agent of the
1980s is a representative of foreign
commercial interests at a time when
the United States is experiencing a
$150 billion trade deficit with the
world," said Miss Kaptur. "Current
federal laws are insufficient in reg-
ulating [these] activities." The two
House members asked the General
Accounting Office to review current
practices, and introduced a bill ti-
tled the Foreign Agents Compulsory
Ethics in Trade Act (FACE IT), which
would prohibit high-level officials
from working for a foreign interest
for 10 years after leaving federal
service.
A list compiled by congressional
aides shows 17 former key overn-
ment o ficials are on the foreign
a ents re tster at the Department of
Justice, including two former CIA
d, rectors - William Co-15-v.-who, ac-
cording tote list, now represents
Ja an, Brazil Thailand and Sin s-
pore, an tc ar [elms, who now
re resents Iran.
Mr. Colby and Mr. Helms could
not be reached for comment, but
most of those on the list who were
contacted said the legislation was
unnecessary.
"People around this town behave
with discretion when they consider
using something learned within the
United States government to [help] a
subsequent private-sector client;'
said William D. Rogers, a former un-
dersecretary of state for economic
affairs.
Mr. Rogers, who now represents
the government of Brazil's finance
ministry on the restructuring of that
country's foreign debt, said a "fur-
ther tightening of the law would
make it much more difficult to at-
tract people into public service."
Theist includes former National
Security Adviser Richard Allen,
now representing Japan; former De-
fense Secretary Clark Clifford,
Mexico; former U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Robert Strauss, Japan and
China; Paul Warnke, former director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, Mexico and Aus-
tralia.
STAT
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/I/
If ^T',11 F- .
7 November 1985
Yurchenko's re-defection
raises interesting theories
By Fred Kaplan
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - The case of Vital
Y
-
y
ur
chenko, the Soviet defector who reversed him-
self and returned to the Soviet Union yester-
day, raises several questions.
How did Yurchenko, the 5th highest-rank-
ing official in the KGB and thus a valuable in-
telligence asset, elude his CIA escorts? Why did
he re-defect to the Soviet Union'? Was his ini-
tial defection to the West genuine, or was it the
first step of an elaborate deception by the
KGB? And if the latter, what might have moti-
vated such an operation?
Yurchenko defected to the US embassy in
Rome last July. In September, he reportedly re-
vealed details about Soviet spying to the CIA.
On Monday, Yurchenko surprised the US intel-
ligence community by appearing at the Soviet
embassy here and claiming that he had not
defected voluntarily, that the CIA had kid-
napped. drugged and tortured him.
The State Department has called Yurchen-
ko's story "completely false."
How Yurchenko escaped his CIA supervi-
sors is not yet clear. Monday, Yurchenko said
he had been kept in total isolation and had
broke away during a "a momentary lapse" in
security.
On the other hand, intelligen officials
have said Yurchenko was dining wit his CIA
escort at a restaurant in Washington'q George-
town section Saturday night, got up said he
would return shortly, and disappeared.
Conversation reported IF
[ABC News yesterday reported that Yur-
chenko asked his dining companion: "What
would you do if I walked out? Would you shoot
me?"
["No, of course not," the CIA escort report-
edly said. "We don't treat defectors that way."
[Yurchenko departed, reportedly saying, "If
I'm not back in 15 minutes, don't blame your-
.-If ?
Legislators have criticized the CIA for keep-
ing loose reins on such a heavyweight find.
However, his easy escape is neither implausi-
ble nor Inconsistent with agency practices.
Several Soviet defectors have been allowed out
of isolation a short time after their case offi-
cers deemed them genuine and reliable.
Says former CIA director William Colby,
"You really have to begin treating the guy like
a normal person. You can't keep him in pris-
on. There are very clear rules on this."
In fact, the rules resulted from the case of
Yuri Nosenko, another senior KGB official who
defected to the West in 1962. Because some of
Nosenko's Information conflicted with that of
a previous KGB defector, and because the pre-
vious defector was much favored by senior CIA
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a BOSTON GLOBE
counterintelligence officers, Nosenko was kept
in isolation for 31/2 years and repeatedly ques-
tioned by interrogators who suspected he had
been sent by Moscow to purvey disinforma-
tion. Even under this pressure, Nosenko never
changed his story, and was finally released.
In the mid-1970s, the case was reviewed,
interrogation procedures were changed, and
several counterintelligence officers were fired.
Why Yurchenko ultimately decided to re-
turn is another mystery, -Says Colby. "There
have been lots of defectors who have chosen to
go home. There's nothing new about that."
Even so, very rarely has someone as highly
ranked as Yurchenko made the turnaround.
One possible theory
A leading theory, provided by CIA officials,
is that Yurchenko had a girlfriend in Canada.
the wife of a Soviet diplomat, who he thought
would' also defect to be with him. When she
refused, he despaired, began to moss his fam-
ily, and tried to undo what was looking more
and more like a big mistake.
Another possibility concerns Yurchenko's
16-year-old son, still In the Soviet Union. If
Yurchenko was in fact allowed to move about
a bit, It is not unlikely that Soviet officials "got
to him," says one US intelligence official.
"They could have said, 'If you stay in the US,
your son has no career, no job, no future. If
you come back and go around telling everyone
that your experience ii, the West was horrible,
we'll give your son a nice job, we'll give you an
income, maybe a dacha somewhere.'"
Once such hypotheses as these are consid-
ered, the possibilities for intrigue become end-
less. Could Moscow have planned the whole
enterprise? Could Yurchenko have been told to
pretend to defect, give the West some impor-
tant - but not vital - material, and then re-
defect, denouncing the CIA and proclaiming he
was treated inhumanly?
Some, including President Reagan, suspect
this might have happened. Colby, among oth-
ers, doubts it, saying, "I don't think they'd use
a senior officer for something like this."
If the Yurchenko affair was a ploy, the in-
tent would have been twofold, said one former
Intelligence officer: "It would make the next
guy who was planning to defect think twice
before going. And it would make the United
States less willing to believe his credentials if
he did defect."
Interestingly, he said, even If the Yur-
chenko case was not a Soviet setup, the effect
may be exactly the same.
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ARTICLE API'EAKtlJ
_._.
ON PAGE I - 6 November 1985 FILE urii
Yurchenko Case
Leaping CIA
With Black Eye
By DOYLE McMANUS,
Times Staff Waiter M1
WASHINGTON -Whether Vi-
taly Yurchenko was a brilliant
Soviet agent or merely a confused
and homesick man, the KGB offi-
cer's sudden decision to return to
Moscow has given the CIA an
aching black eye, Reagan Adminis-
tration officials and members of
Congress said Tuesday.
Senior administration officials
insisted that Yurchenko could not
have learned much about U.S.
intelligence operations during his
three months of interrogation.
"He gave us stuff; we didn't give
him anything," Secretary of De-
fense Caspar W. Weinberger said.
"There wasn't the slightest damage
to us."
But former CIA officials and
members of the Senate Intelligence
Committee said the KGB man un-
doubtedly learned some U.S. se-
crets 'that will be valuable to
Moscow, although the degree of
damage has not yet been fully
assessed.
Warning for Others
Perhaps more important, one
former U.S. spy said, the KGB will
use the strange saga of Vitaly
Yurchenko to warn other potential
defectors that "anyone who even
thinks of putting his life on the line
depending on the professionalism
of U.S. intelligence organizations
had better forget it."
While U.S. officials dismissed as
absurd Yurchenko's charge that
the CIA kidnapped, drugged and
tortured him, the incident never-
theless complicates President Rea-
gan's effort to raise human rights
issues at his summit meeting with
Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev
in less than two weeks.
"The damage which may have
been intended, if there was any, is
in giving them a kind of talking
point to try to embarrass the
United States in a particularly
important time," Weinberger con-
ceded.
And the CIA's apparent bungling
of the case exposed some of the
agency's most secret operations
and methods-and its managers'
competence-to unwelcome public
scrutiny.
"You're assured that the CIA
knows what they're doing," said
Se}t. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice
chairman of the Intelligence Com-
mittee. "That's an assumption
thft's now being questioned.
"Other than walking away with
ouk credibility and our national
hdd}}''~tor, I don't see him walking
aWay with a great deal," he said
wjyly.
Leahy and Sen. Dave Durenber-
ger (R-Minn.), the panel's chair-
m4nn, said they plan a full investi-
ga.ion of the CIA's handling of
Y4rchenko and will summon intel-
li nce director William J. Casey
fot questioning.
According to U.S. officials, Yur-
chenko, the KGB officer in charge
of: Soviet espionage operations in
North America, defected last July
by walking into the U.S. Embassy
in, Rome. They said Yurchenko
voluntarily submitted to extensive
CIA debriefings and provided valu-
able information about Soviet spy-
ing:
'But on Monday, Yurchenko sur-
faced inside the Soviet Embassy in
Washington and told reporters that
he had been kidnaped on the
streets of Rome and held captive by
the CIA until he managed to escape
Saturday night.
Most intelligence experts said an
a1a)arent defector like Yurchenko
should not have learned much
aljput CIA operations in Moscow -
aPleast, not if his American inter-
rcj'gators were careful. But he
would clearly have learned a great
dial about the CIA's methods in
htdling defectors, information
that could be useful to the KGB in
e4her planting false defectors or
recapturing real ones.
"'In talking to him, we would be
careful in protecting the identities
of our people (in the Soviet Un-
ion)," former CIA chief William E.
CDlby said. "We wouldn't be talk-
irrl~ about our operations-we
Y "d ask him about theirs....
We would be very cautious about
sat we would tell him or let him
know, particularly in three
months."
:Former Deputy Director George
Carver was less sanguine.
-"It's aggravating. It shouldn't
hive happened," he said. "It is
going to provide the KGB with a lot
oC details about agency practices
aftd locations of safehouses and
other information you would-just as
soon the KGB didn't have.
"More damaging is the KGB's
message to their own people that
anybody who is thinking about
leaving Mother Russia had better
forget it, because our arm is very
long and we will get you back,"
Carver said. "Also, anyone who
even thinks of putting his life on
the line depending on the profes-
sionalism of U.S. intelligence or-
ganizations had better forget it-
the U.S. talks a better intelligence
game than it plays. That image is a
lot easier to get than it is to get rid
of."
Much of the debate over the
amount of damage Yurchenko did
turns on the unresolved question
whether he was a genuine defector
who had a change of heart, or a
deliberate KGB "plant" who buffa-
loed the CIA's counterintelligence
branch for three months.
The experts remained divided on
that issue. On the Senate commit-
tee, Republican Durenberger said
he agrees with the CIA's conten-
tion that the Russian was "a very
troubled man"; Democrat Leahy
said he had "a nagging and persis-
tent feeling" that Yurchenko was a
phony.
Either way, however, Congress
planned to call Casey and his aides
for questioning-a process that will
inevitably expose the agency to
closer public scrutiny of its opera-
tions and management than the
CIA chief likes. The case has
already subjected the intelligence
agency to more public criticism of
its competence in basic spycraft
than any operation since congres-
sional investigations of the mid-
1970s revealed bungled assassina-
tion plots and other scandals.
"If it turns out that he was a
double agent, then, of course, there
was a great problem and a grave
mistake," Leahy said. "If he was a
real defector, the question is why
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was he out having dinner just a
short distance from Mount Alto
(the Soviet Embassy compound),
and he just walked off."
"They ought never to have let it
-be known that they had him and
they should not have let things
dribble out into the press about
what he was telling them," said
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-
N.Y.), a former member of the
Intelligence Committee. "That's
the kind of self-promotion. that an
intelligence agency very wisely
avoids."
"It was as unprofessional as you
can get," charged a former top CIA
official who refuses to allow him-
self ever to be quoted by name.
"It's a basic problem of manage-
ment over there."
Durenberger and Carver warned
that some of the criticism may be
undeserved.
"You've got to keep in mind that
something like one out of every
two defectors goes home," the
Senate chairman said.
"The sun will still rise in the east
and set in the west," said Carver.
"There is going to be some obvious
embarrassment in the CIA, and
some people will raise some ques-
tions about the professional compe-
tence of their colleagues-perhaps
unfairly."
Yurchenko's turnabout failed to
cause any clear damage in one area:
the preparations for the Reagan-
Gorbachev summit in Geneva later
this month. Secretary of State
George P. Shultz discussed the
affair briefly with Gorbachev dur-
ing their meeting in Moscow on
Tuesday, but aides indicated it did
not disrupt the discussions.
One U.S. intelligence official said
Yurchenko appeared to st':er away
from accusing Reagan of wrongdo-
ing in his dramatic news confer-
ence Monday-"so it's not embar-
rassment they're trying to
accomplish."
In any case, the White House
official said, "We,, won't be pro-
voked into anytching that could
cause problems leading up to the
summit, whether or not that's what
the Soviets want to do."
"We are proceeding with our
preparations for the meeting,"
State Department spokesman
Charles Redman said. "We already
have stated our desire that Presi-
dent Reagan's meeting with (Com-
munist Party) General Secretary
Gorbachev should set an agenda for
more productive U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions in the coming years.... We
do not believe that the Yurchenko
case should affect these plans."
Times staff writers Mourn Dolan
and James Gerstenzang contribut-
ed to this report.
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ARTICLE APPEARED 6 November 1985
ON PAGE !f
Experts dispute meaning
of KGB officer's return
By Ernest B. Furgurson
and Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Bureau of The Sun
WASHINGTON - The spectacu-
lar redefection of Soviet spy Vitaly
Yurchenko upset official Washing-
ton yesterday, with one expert say-
ing the turnabout "leaves a lot of
people with a lot of egg on their faces
to the intelligence community."
"This could take a long time to
repair," said a former senior official
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
But other intelligence profession-
als minimized Mr. Yurchenko's sur-
prise decision, maintaining that in-
formation disclosed in his three
months under questioning made the
whole exchange a net plus for the
United States.
At the Capitol, key Democrats
said the incident had shaken legisla-
tors' confidence In the CIA and its
director. William J. Casey. Mr. Casey
had personally vouched that Mr.
Yurchenko was a bona fide defector,
according to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy,
D-Vt., vice chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Leahy said the reversal might
have damaged U.S. intelligence
operations. "The concern is very real
that the man is a double agent, was
a double agent and always was," he
said.
But a White House official re-
sponded by saying, "There's no feel-
ing that someone screwed up."
Two former CIA directors and
some other specialists largely dis-
counted suggestions that Mr. Yur-
chenko might have been a "plant,"
assigned by Moscow to embarrass
the U.S. side by faking a defection
and then pretending to change his
mind.
They also doubted that the star-
tling switch in the Yurchenko case
had any relation to the forthcoming
summit meeting between President
Reagan and the Soviet leader. Mik-
hail S. Gorbachev.
Richard Helms, CIA chief from
1965 to 1973, said it was "unlikely"
that the KGB would have sent a
high-ranking officer like Mr. Yur,
chenko to dupe its American com-
petitors. "if you did that, you
wouldn't send along somebody who
knows all your best secrets," he saidt
William E. Colby, who ran the
agency from 1973 to 1976. agreed.
Both men also said such a change of
heart was not an uncommon event
in intelligence work.
"This sort of thing happens every
now and then," Mr. Colby said. "Pea
pie defect and then decide to go back
because they can't stand the psy-
chological strain of separation from
their old life.
"Mr. Casey should get praise rath-
er than criticism for the net results
of the Yurchenko venture."
Mr. Colby noted that the KGB had
lost three senior officers by defection
in recent months. If that happened
to the CIA "we'd be in an uproar," he
added. "Instead, we've lost some
tawdry little spies being paid a few
thousand dollars. It's not the same
thing at all."
Harry Rositzke, who spent 20
years as a CIA specialist in Soviet
operations and counterintelligence,
said. "There's no reason whatsoever
to think Yurchenko was a plant. If
you plant somebody, you do it for a
purpose. You don't send somebody
with a lot of classified information in
his head."
George Carver, former deputy di-
rector of the agency, acknowledged
that the episode was obviously an
intelligence embarrassment and "it's
obviously awkward." He was the
man who said it left intelligence offi-
cials with "egg on their faces."
On balance. however, the KGB's
recent troubles outweigh those of the
CIA, he suggested. Mr. Yurchenko's
assertions that he was kidnapped
and drugged were "scripted by the
Soviets." he said. "It's not that we are
incapable of evil and people don't do
stupid things, but nobody would do
anything that stupid in this day of
oversight committees and the press."
But there was more suspicion in
Congress, where Mr. Leahy said,
"There are an awful lot of angry sen-
ators in both parties on this matter.
I'm one of them."
He said many of his colleagues
had had strong doubts about the am-
thenticity of the Yurchenko defeS-
tion, and had been assured by W.
Allen E. Goodman, a former CIA
st now at Georgetown Univer-
anal
y
sity, also said he thought Mr. Yur-
chenko had been "lying from the be-
ginning, probably a plant to
embarrass the U.S. at a summit
where human rights will be dis-
cussed."
Rather than seeing Mr. Yurchen-
ko's switch as a CIA failure, he said
the agency might have suspected he
was a plant and intentionally gave
him the opportunity to run back to
Soviet custody.
Representative Bob Livingston.
R-La., a member of the House Intelli-
gence Committee, said the defection
was "a legitimate deal gone sour. But
we got a lot more than we gave." he
said. "We might have been lax, but
we weren't wrong."
Assessing damage to the CIA. Mr.
Carver said that any Soviet agent
considering defection now probably
would have doubts about coming to
the American side. "The KGB has
shown its arm is very long and that
the United States - well, don't be-
lieve their promises of supporting
you.... This could take a long time
to repair."
Some observers believed Mr. Yur-
chenko might have decided to go
back home after reading in the U.S.
press about disclosures he reported-
ly made to the CIA. One was about
Edward Howard. a CIA officer who
may have tipped off the KGB about a
Russian working for the CIA in Mos-
cow and who then fled the United
States before he could be arrested.
"Too much talk is deleterious;
former CIA Director Helms said.
There also was speculation that
Mr. Yurchenko's original defection
might not have been ideological. but
personal.
According to reports. Mr. Yuri
chenko, when stationed here earlier.'
had an affair with the wife of a col-
league now posted in Canada. After,
defecting, he allegedly spoke with,
her. When she refused to resume tht
affair, he decided to redefect.
Asked about this version, a Whig
House official said. "We have reasOli
to believe there is something to it."
Correspondent Nancy J. Schwer
zler of The Sun's Washington Bu-
reau contributed to this article.
Casey. "You assume the CIA knows
what they're doing," the senator
said. "That's an assumption thai,ts
now being questioned."
R
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STAT
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ARTICLE Al
WASHINGTON POST
3 November 1985
ow p4GE
For the Record
From a speech at Ball State University
by John Brademas, president of New
York University and former U.S. sena-
tor, on Oct. 24:
Terrorism in the Middle East, conflict
in Central America, the threat of civil
war in the Philippines, tensions in Cy-
prus and in the Eastern Mediterranean
--are all developments that reach far
across international borders. In the
present day, how well are we preparing
Americans to understand other nations,
other cultures, other peoples? In my
view, we are not doing very well....
The National Council on Forei Lan-
guage and International to es found a
serious lack in this country o experts on
the c tures, economies and foreign
ctes o to sub-Sahara Africa, the
e East, the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe.... [Former CIA directorsl
William Colby and tansfield Turner
blamed our lack of expert knowledge
about Vietnam and ran for serious in-
te gence s o comets in those coun-
tries.... I the National Endowment for
Mies has cited a sharp decline
since 1966 in college entrance and
graduation requirements in foreign lan-
guages....
Whatever the reasons for the trou-
bled state of international studies in this
country, it seemed clear at one time
that we were as a nation willing to take
steps to overcome our ignorance. The
Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957
shocked us into a reevaluation of the
quality of American education. Our re-
sponse was the National Defense
Education Act, an effort . . . to retain
our international leadership in science
and technology. Through Title VI of
NDEA, we sought to strengthen our
capabilities in foreign languages and
area studies. I regret to say, however,
that we have consistently failed to pro-
vide adequate funds for these programs.
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KEENE SENTINEL(NH)
30 October 1985
Vol by; ex-la1A chi, sees social, economic, nro h l Pms ahead
B
TANI HURLE
y
Y sentu.l s, f Wrls, 1
The most important interna.
tional problems the world will
face in the years ahead are social
and economic rather than mili-
tary, predicts William E. Colby,
the former head of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
Speaking at the Greater Keene
Chamber of Commerce annual
dinner at Keene State College
Tuesday night, Colby reviewed
the history of spying, beginning
with spies Moses sent into Ca-
naan, and then enumerated cur-
rent world "hot spots."
Colby began his intelligence ca-
reer during World War II, par-
achuting behind enemy lines to
the French and Norwegian resis-
tance forces. He was chief of the
Far East Division of the CIA and
In 1968 was named ambassador to
South Vietnam.
lie was director of the agency
I roan 1973 to 1976.
Today, Colby told the Chamber
audience, regional, problems and
subversion surface, Out economic
uncertainties underlie them all.
And now, the emphasis of this
center of intelligence is analyti-
cal. "There are more doctors and
masters on the payroll than on a
university campus," he said.
"They're the center of our intelli-
gence system."
Gone, for the most part, are the
days of "cloak and dagger" spy-
ing, Colby said. Describing him-
self as a real., spy, Colby said
ptany of the atKiience might be
disapp9inted, `"I've[ got. gray hair
and glasses. I'm wearing a suit. I
might be another mel~iber of the
Chamber of Commerce.
We began to develop a differ-
eut kind of intelligence after
['earl Harbor," Colby said. After
flue bombing occurred, officials in
Washington discovered there Was,
information "lying all over the
place" to indicate what the Japa-
nese had in mind.
And that was the problem: in-
forlnation was diffused and the
agencies didn't communicate
what they knew. That became the
function of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Santlnel photo by RICHARD PRATT
William E. Colby, former head of CIA
At ter the war, it was difficult to
find out what was going on in
many areas of the world, so the
agency's role shifted. "We turned
to America's genius in science
and technology. The result was
an aircraft that flew higher and
further than any -before ... and
brought home pictures," he said,
including photos of nuclear mis-
siles being installed in Cuba, The
agency didn't rely on photo-
araul,s alone, but corroborated
the information with data pro-
vided by a Russian spy.
The cumulative package gave
President John F. Kennedy am-
munition for a confrontation with
Soviet Officials. "Khrushchev
blinked - and they did remove
the nuclear missiles," Colby said.
As the technology of spying
changed, the governuuent's atti-
tude toward its role changed as
well. Gone were the days when
government would deny know-
lege of spying activities.
Although Colby said a Congres-
sional examination of CIA activ,,
ity in 1974-1975 was "grossly
exaggerated," it did show a de-
termination to run the agency
within the constitution. The agen-
cy worked out a system of con-
trol. There is, however, a
.'nntinual delicate balance of re-
leasing information without jeop-
ardizing the source.
The president needs infurma-
tion gathered by the CIA to act,
he said. "But the president can't
operate without the Congress.
Congress can't operate without
their constituency. So the people
need to know, too," he said. "But
they don't and can't know the
sources." And that sometimes
creates tension.
Shifting from a review of the
past to a prediction of the future,
Colby said current talks with the
Soviets about arms control could
produce major moves.
While scientists might say pro-
duction of the strategic defense
initiative system, or Star Wars,
isn't plausible in the near future,
American ingenuity in the past
has pushed technology beyond ex-
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petted llrtifts= he said.
So, concern1about American de-
fense capability is likely to get
the Soviets to offer some conces-
sions in weapons reduction. In
turn, President Reagan will prob-
ably be able to offer some conces-
sions on Star Wars.
Leaders on both sides at the Ge-
neva talks scheduled later this
year will be pressed for action,
Colby said. Although those talks
may not produce solutions, "I
think you will be looking toward
another summit in a year," Colby
cause the governnent has the
means to control violence.
"The main action (for change)
will take place in stockholders'
meetings and boardrooms," he
said. "It's not going to ch.-nge in
South Africa."
^ in Central and South Ameri-
ca, the balance of power is,;hang-
ing, Colby said. But in Nicaragua,
he doesn't expect the contra
forces to overthrow the Sandanis-
ta government. The United
.States' relationship with that
Colby also made his forecasts. ume.
for other world hot spots:
^ The stuggle in South Africa
will continue as both sides in the
racial confrontation hold to their
positions. The tension will in-
crease, but the situation won't get
out of control, Colby said, he-
In areas of concern, it is the
role of the United States intelli-
gence network to gather informa-
tion, Colby said. "The purpose is
to enable us to understand other
countries and problems to solve
them."
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, LU October I9?3b
ON PAGE
The Morison Trial Provokes a Constitutional Argument
When Secrets Are Passed to the Press
K-
Mr. Trott said the A.C.L.U.
was "attributing to us motives
that are simply nonexistent."
The Justice Department did
not seek out this case as part of
some agenda or program, he
said. But he added: "It is our
sincere hope that this reminds
people that classified informa.
tion cannot be leaked."
The only previous espionage
prosecution involving a'disclo-
sure to the press was that of
Daniel Ellsberg. and Anthony
Russo, in the case involving the
Pentagon Papers. Charges
against those men were dis-
missed on the grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct.
The trial of Mr. Morison re-
volved largely around three
photographs, produced by a
KH-11 reconnaissarnns satel-
lite, showing a Soviet vessel
under construction at a Black
Sea shipyard. The photographs
are of striking clarity although
a senior Central Intelligence
Agency official testified that
one of them had been taken
from a distance of 500 miles.
The technology demao-
strated by those photographs
was at the heart of the Govern.
meat's case against Mr. Mori-
son. Witnesses for the prosecu-
tion testified that the pictures
could have provided the Soviet
Union with valuable insights
into the KH-11 program. The
A Troubling Case?
Morton H. Halperin, director of the Washing-
ton area office of the A.C.L.U., said he was sur-
prised at the lack of outrage at Mr. Morison's
plight. Attorneys for Mr. Monson said the verdict
would be appealed, and Mr. Halperin said his
group would "try to got people to understand
what is at stake here."
Floyd Abrams, a New York attorney who spe-
cializes in constitutional issues. contended that
the A.C.L.U. was not emsggeratlog the import of
the case. "By its expansive definition of what
constitutes espionage." be said,"the Morison
case is troubling and indeed dangerous, not only
for those who occasionally provide information in
an unauthorized way. but also to the press and
the public." ~
But William L. Colby. a former Director of
Central In lllgeoos, aif rat a different perspec.
five. The Morison case may make the job of the
moire difficuft by stemming the release of
classNed Infsormation, he sak1l, brat "we've got to
~
do something topill up our socks here and put a
little discipline back in the Government."
Mr. Mariann, the grandsm of Samuel Eliot
Monaco, the naval historian, is to be sentenced
Nov. 25. He faces a maximum penalty of 10 years
in prison and $10,000 in fines for each of the four
counts of which he was convicted.
WASHINGTON - In his quiet gray suit, with
his professorial air and patrician background,
Samuel Loring Morison seemed an unlikely de-
fendant in an espionage trial as
he sat in Federal district court
in Baltimore over the last two
weeks.
This was no classic spy sce-
nario, with a surreptitious
passing of defense information
to foreign agents. Mr. Morison,
a former naval intelligence
analyst, was being tried on es-
pionage and theft charges for
giving classified photographs
to a British defense magazine.
And when he was convicted'
Thursday, some legal experts
said the law had taken a dan-
gerous turn.
Most vocal was the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union,
which assisted Mr. Morison in
his defense and long portrayed
his prosecution as a perilous
assault on the First Amend-
ment. The threat of such prose-
cutions, the union argued, will
give the Government new
power over what information
can be published, and the de.
bate on national security issues
will be chilled. Among journal-
ists, there was talk that the Ad-
ministration would use the es-
pionage statutes to plug leaks.
Benno Schmidt Jr., dean of
Columbia Law School, sounded
a similar concern. "If the (kw-
ernment's legal position in this
case is accepted," be said, "we
have an official secrets act in
the United States under which
any Government employee re-
vealing defense-related infor-
mation to the press could be se-
verely punished.
defense emphasized that KH-11 photographs had
been released twice before, and that the Soviet
Union already had a copy of a technical manual
for the satellite system, sold to it in 1978 by a for-
mer C.I.A. employee.
While Mr. Morison did not take the stand, his
persona, as defined by prosecution and defense,
dominated the trial. From the prosecution came
the image of a man dissatisfied with his job at the
National Intelligence Support Center in Suitland,
Md., eager to join the staff of Jane's Defence
Weekly, and thus willing to give them informa-
tion to strengthen his candidacy.
The defense portrayed Mr. Morison as a pa-
triotic man who gave Jane's the photographs not
for any personal gain, but rather to inform the
public about the extent of the Soviet military
buildup. In giving information to the press, be
had engaged in a routine governmental practice,
the defense attorneys argued.
"Such a construction of the espionage statutes
is ftmdamentally at odds with 50 years of consis-
tent legislative history."
The Justice Department dismissed such con-
cerns as unfounded. "For the life of me, it's very
mysterious to see all the arm-waving going on,"
said Stephen S. Trott, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of
the department's Criminal
Division.
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